# Another Lifeboat launching accident?



## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

http://www.bristolwired.co.uk/news.php/128851-Man-dies-in-Royal-Portbury-Dock-fall


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## John Campbell (Aug 30, 2005)

Nick Balls said:


> http://www.bristolwired.co.uk/news.php/128851-Man-dies-in-Royal-Portbury-Dock-fall


Thanks for that news Nick.
It seems that doing any maintainence on lifeboats these days is extremely dangerous - we have had two this year already . How many more before the MCA and IMO take action?
JC


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## Satanic Mechanic (Feb 23, 2009)

Any bets the words 'on load release mechanism not reset' will come into play somewhere along the line (Sad)

How many people actually have to die bofore they ban these damn things


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

John, I think you will find more than 2 this year! 

Nick


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## Scurdie (Aug 6, 2009)

MAIB investigations list states "While alongside in Royal Portbury docks, Bristol, a UK registered car-carrier was hoisting a rescue boat which fell unexpectedly resulting in the death of one crewman and three others being hospitalised."


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

How many of us have experienced a near miss with these darn things? 
What really gets me is that if you go back a few years the equipment was simpler better and more reliable! The last few years have seen ever more complex arrangements all of which have a higher and higher maintenance schedule over the very same period we have seen 1) A decline in the numbers on board, 2) A reduction in the basic skills of some crews and 3) A move away from designs that are needed to ones that are 'perceived" by people who have not a clue! Will they ever sort this out? I doubt it!


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## Andrew Craig-Bennett (Mar 13, 2007)

I agree entirely. We have now got to a point where these contraptions are so dangerous that crews are no longer required to lower them for drills (!) and frankly everyone I know is scared of them.

Often, so scared of them that they don't want to undertake maintenance and their mental, as opposed to written down in a manual, abandon ship plans revolve entirely around the rafts. 

The chances of the IMO admitting that it has been deeply, deeply wrong are zero under its present deeply unimpressive and arrogant head, so we will continue to see men killed by bureaucracy.


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

Exactly! From the perspective of Officers and crew it is a nightmare! At the end of the day the Rescue Boat is there to help/save them! Its simply madness! In the old days we had very large heavy open boats that were a hang up from the last war! Then along came the likes of the RIB based craft which had tremendous capability as a rescue boat. I recall training with these in the 1980's under extreme conditions using simple 'Welin' type single arm davits. When the on load/off load hooks came along the practical solution for the people concerned was to put these in the nearest deep locker and order up a simple Gunnebo hook ! Light weight , reliable, and dependable. Next came the insistence that we all stick strictly to the original hooks. The next generation of ships all had the most fancy heave compensated arrangements with falls of a complex form and lowering lines to lift brakes, etc etc etc...........+ of course differing types of clever hook.
The last few years of my career were then spent introducing people to such arrangements and the very first question was 'Do you understand what type of hook this is and how it works?' Next was ' Now demonstrate it! Chances were that the initial understanding was 50-50 at best! And no wonder! It always took first a very good read of a manual followed by the essential hands on 'mucking about' with all the gizmo's to even start to become properly competent! No wonder as ACB says that these days people are so scared of this stuff that they simply avoid it! I have never seen one of these type of complex arrangements that I would describe as 'suitable' for the proper launch or recovery of a boat at sea. I also recall being asked by an engineering super to launch a boat in a small 2 Mt swell and when I refused point blank he thought I was incompetent! I informed him that the davit arrangement was unfit for purpose to which his reply came back ' Well its all fully certificated' The boat stayed where it was.


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## Duncan112 (Dec 28, 2006)

Andrew Craig-Bennett said:


> The chances of the IMO admitting that it has been deeply, deeply wrong are zero under its present deeply unimpressive and arrogant head, so we will continue to see men killed by bureaucracy.


I was hopeful that Mr Mitropoulos would have been a reasonable man to be in charge, having been to sea, unlike the last in***bent, who didn't do a great deal for the mariner either. 

Seems my belief that anyone having a senior position in the IMO should have held a senior position at sea was fallacious.

Ah well, he's up for re-election at the end of the year.. what odds on him being replaced or doing an O'Neill and hanging on to the bitter end?


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## RayJordandpo (Feb 23, 2006)

In my opinion there should be a complete rethink of the present day ships lifeboats, back to the drawing board if need be. Off load release, on load release whatever. If crews are frightened of the mechanism then something is fundamentally wrong. Off load release mechanisms can in certain cir***stances be released whilst the boat is in mid air with weight on it. When you get lifeboat manuals stating "fatality may result if correct launching procedures are not carried out" then of course crews are going to wary, me included. I've sailed with many experienced, intelligent seamen of all nationalities who now fear boat drills and boat launching for maintenance purposes and sometimes with good reasons. You can carry out all the crew training you like, if people do not have the confidence in the eqipment something needs to be changed. I really do believe that we should either go all free-fall or a complete overhaul of the present day twin fall systems are required and sooner rather than later


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

Again Ray this is spot on. A good example to try is at your next davit launched life raft drill ask for a DETAILED explanation from those assembled about the EXACT function and operation of a standard Shatt Harding type of release hook.
These are in my opinion a pretty good bit of kit but its amazing just how many people fail to properly understand there full operation. They 'Think' they know but because of the huge variations in these type of hooks and the way they work it is probably that only50% of any crew have a proper and detailed knowledge of their particular equipment. It is also noticeable that during the last few MCA inspections involving a boat launch, that I was involved in,it was very noticeable that the inspectors themselves are not that well informed and are also extremely nervous about seeing the boat launched!


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## JoK (Nov 12, 2006)

I sent a enclosed Schatt-Harding ashore for painting, about 6 years ago. While it was in the shop the tech was to check out the entire boat.
I got a call from him, saying that I had to go look at something. When I got there the boat was blocked and partially painted.
He climbed up the ladder and with a little wrench, flicked the hook open. The outer vinyl\plastic (whatever coating) on the steel cable to the hydrostatic release was broken allowing the hook to be opened.
When he arrived the painters had the boat suspended from the hooks painting under it.
We had lowered the boat from the ship, picked it up onto the dock, onto the truck and took it off at the shop. The boat could have fallen at anytime.
We have a steady bunch of competent /mates in my org. They have been around a long time. It always struck me how flimsy the arrangement was to fail like that and if we missed it, how many boats are on ships ready to drop off the hook.
Very scary....when I went to sea, I always refused to go in the boat, if I could avoid it. I never really felt comfortable with it, I guess it was the hind brain talking.


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

Well this is it Jok! I always went in the boat and towards the end of my career the first thing to do on a new job was always examine in detail all the equipment, then read all the manuals on the equipment , then 'play' with all the equipment......... Do all that and I have still had occasions of the 'near miss' variety ..faulty hooks..faulty fall wires..........faulty brakes.........and faulty davits. 
I would also agree that some equipment even when new and fully stamped with approval is these days simply not up to the job. (Made down to a price and that price has been the lives of a number of people)


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## JoK (Nov 12, 2006)

About a month later, he called me again for another lifeboat issue and a hook on another boat. On the lifeboat, someone had done repairs to the hydrostatic release. In that case it was done correctly but there is always the possibility...On the FRC davit, the hook was installed backwards . 
Like I have said, we have very steadily employed officers, I can't even imagine ships where people come and go. To fall 30 m because of a piece of kit that is suppose to save your life, is just wrong.
Our DPA was telling me of an arrangement instead of a hook, it is a ball on the cable. It fits up into a slotted cup, as the slack goes on the line the ball drops and is pushed out of the cup. Sounds reasonable to me. Apparently Maersk uses this arrangement.


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## GeeM (Mar 2, 2009)

At the next IMO Marine Safety Committee meeting a new specification for on load release hooks will be offered for adoption by the Members which will eliminate the uncertainty regarding the present designs. The new design Is termed "Over Centre" meaning the suspension point of the hook Is In a direct line with the attachment to the boat as opposed to most of the current designs In which the hooks are off centre and will open If the latch is not properly set or If the latch is damaged or excessively worn . 

This means that In use there will be no possibility of the hooks tripping open under load due to Incorrect operation of the release controls. The higher the load on the hook, the more secure It will be. The method of releasing the hook will Involve two deliberate actions Including release of a latch and multiple strokes on a hydraulic pump to force the hook open. The requirements will be retroactive so all boats regardless of age will have to be assessed and refitted as found neccesary. Being a Class Surveyor I feel that these hooks cant come Into service quick enough as I always have qualms about asking for boats to be exercised with the older type of hooks. If anybody is curious there is plenty of Info on the web on these hooks, just search on over centre release hooks.


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## JoK (Nov 12, 2006)

thanks for that info, I will be looking into that


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## Satanic Mechanic (Feb 23, 2009)

JoK said:


> thanks for that info, I will be looking into that


do you know Mad Rock Marine from St Johns, NL - they make an extremely good quality product and retrofit them as well - worth a decko(Thumb)

As for IMO - the glacial like machinations of which are legendary. I am not sure about a full retrofit program a lot of countries will object - maybe a from new build rule with a few products outlawed completely.


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

Why do we need on load/off load hooks on open FRC's ? You just need a hook ! The complicated modern devices came about and are needed for enclosed lifeboats and the likes of self releasing liferafts (which is fine) .......never used to have them on working sea boats. On an FRC you simply need a hook preferably without a weight....... Ever tried to reconnect these things in a 3 Mt swell ! Impossible, best to take a good stout woven strop and forget the hook if you want your boat back .


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## Mechanic-H (Apr 21, 2009)

I saw the simultaneous dropping of two lifeboats due to the release mechanism being used as a "coat hook" for the bowsing intake tackle. Still have the photos.


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## John Campbell (Aug 30, 2005)

Here we go again - Fairplay reports:=
CMA CGM Christophe Colomb Two killed in lifeboat drop 
TWO OFFICERS have been killed and another seafarer injured after a lifeboat fell into the water during a safety drill being conducted on CMA CGM Christophe Colomb, Fairplay was told today.

CMA CGM said it appeared that part of the davit’s hoisting mechanism had given way while the boat was being lifted back aboard during the exercise at the Chinese port of Yantian on 15 April.

The vessel’s master and first officer dived into the water in an attempt to aid the three men, but the two French officers died in the fall, the company confirmed.

CMA CGM told Fairplay that the davit and lifeboat had been inspected in September, and a similar test exercise was carried out using the boat in January. It added that both pieces of equipment were equipped with a fall prevention device, in line with the recommendations of the IMO.

In a statement, the group said it is “working with the French flag authorities, the manufacturers and safety experts in order to ascertain exactly what occurred and to do everything possible to ensure that these tragic events are not repeated”.

The company indicated to Fairplay that CMA CGM Christophe Colomb had been authorised to leave the port after having taken on board two craft to replace the lifeboat involved in the accident. 

CMA CGM The French Line


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## Mike S (Dec 27, 2005)

Ok so my knowledge of this subject ceases way back in the dark ages long before free fall lifeboats. They seem to be a very effective way of getting clear of a vessel in distress. No comment on the drills using them as I have no knowledge.
However...........
Back in the dark ages when ships were ships and men were men I joined an ancient vessel called Durham in Liverpool as a first voyage apprentice. One of the first memories I have is the arrival of the Viking Marine Rescue Boat to be stowed in the fwd port side davits after its maintenance. It was the first of these little craft ever built.
As a very green little boy I watched in awe as the senior apprentices all of 19 and 20 years old cranked out the quadrant davits and lowered the falls to pick up the boat complete with 9 ft long nylon strops on the hooks.
Up she came to the embarkation deck where they then bowsed her in and changed over to the blocks to haul her to the davit. She was then wound in on the quadrant davits and secured firmly into the chocks and lashed down.
I saw this boat launched and recovered many many times both under way and in port to be used as a liberty boat. 
Lower to the prom deck and bowse in.
Transfer from blocks to nylon strops.
Lower to water with the bow and stern hands leaning back on the strops to keep weight on them.
"Release aft"
"Release fwd"
Swing away from ship if underway and pull painter toggle.
Reverse when coming alongside.
System designed by seamen for use by seamen.
These boats were fitted to many P&O passenger ships and all the Rangi boats and I NEVER heard of one malfunction.
Seems to me the we need to revert to this system on sea boats pronto and get rid of all this complicated _"overcentre on load off load hydraulic release pin pulling designed by numerous committees and passed by IMO junk"_
KISS peebles............KISS
*Keep It Simple Sailors*


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## Robert Hilton (Feb 13, 2011)

Thanks, Mike S. I thought I was the only one left. 

I was once aboard a 70ft Clyde RNLI lifeboat and felt envious of them for having a simple purchase with synthetic rope fall to handle their small inflatable instead of a wire fall on a hand winch designed to seize up at the first whiff of salt water.


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## Nick Balls (Apr 5, 2008)

Using modern FRC's in the North sea we on more than one occasion ended up using a decent (spare) nylon stop to pick up the boat, rather than attempt to engage the 'proper' lifting hook. Some modern hooks that are attached to a fixed lifting frame (rather than the simpler 4 point lifting strops) are only designed for getting the boat away with no thought to recovery in a swell. In the 80's when a lot of this fancy stuff arrived on the scene we took off the whole ball and hook assemblies and replaced the lot with a simple gunnebo hook, This used to work a treat for small working boats , but of course we ended up being told that we had to replace the 'proper' gear......much of which to this day is simply not up to the job. I always told people in training that any lifeboat is expendable and that once a real emergency job had been done that in many cases it would be much better to use the pilot ladder to recover the boats crew and than simply either abandon or try and tow the boat (not likly to be successful) Watching the standby boats crews recovering a boat in 5 and 6 Mt seas is quite something , but for other trades where the boat is rarely if ever used in anger it is vital that better equipment and indeed better training is provided. One last point of interest, I have a book at home with an early design for the RIB..... from the 1970's These type of craft revolutionised the capability of small boats at sea....and yet in all the intervening time we have seen the exact opposite when it comes to boat launching equipment ........ Thats crazy!


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## spongebob (Dec 11, 2007)

On the subject of life boat launching in port during a routine boat drill and again in a real at sea emergency I take the liberty of re posting the following story from 2006

Quote

After the war the “Peat” Ferries were purchased from Australian owners by the Devonport Steam Ferry Co in the late 1940’s for use on the increasingly busy Mechanics Bay to Devonport service and renamed “Ewen W Alison” and “Alex Alison” after the two brothers who founded the original Devonport Ferry Company in 1881. 
The two “Peats” crossed the Tasman from their Australian Base in convoy under their own power after having temporary weather shields built over the open bow and stern sections.( I can recall their arrival in Auckland but time denies me of the memory of their exact departure port)
At 385 tons gross, 138 feet long x 36 feet beam x 10.5 feet draught they were somewhat bigger than the old wooden vessels they were replacing and quite capable of making the journey especially in one another’s company and with the good back-up then provided by the myriad of other ships on the Tasman and Pacific Island runs. .

A journey in later years from Auckland to Hobart under their own power was not considered a sound plan as it was a longer passage into more southern waters and without the comforting proximity of the many ships on the North Tasman runs. Other factors were the Ferry’s ages, by then thirty years old, the lack of proper crew accommodation and, as I would suspect, the Devonport Ferry Co’s overall maintenance standards may have been reduced to meet the survey requirements for Harbour only duties bearing in mind their pending redundancy and thus would have been unable to obtain an off shore survey certificate.
.

It was early 1960 that the Union Steamship Co’s vessel MV “Kaitoa” was engaged to tow the first Ferry, the “Alex Alison,”’ to Hobart.

The “Kaitoa” built in 1956 and of 2584 gross tons was a happy ship with a companionable crew. Captain James Kirk, known in the Company as “Gentleman Jim,” was the Skipper, a Senior Master and experienced ship handler (he was before the time of the Star Ship Enterprise’s Captain of the same name so he was not trading on the spaceman’s glory), The Chief Officer was ‘Cactus’ Cox (the reason for this nick name is forgotten) and the Engineering members were Chief Engineer Jim Cowie, a Scot, Second Engineer Peter Kiddell, a SN member, myself as Third Engineer and John Bruce (Jock) the Fourth, also a Scot.
Prior to departure from Auckland on 19th April 1960 it was intended that the “Kaitoa’s Engineers were to board the Ferry to check on the layout below decks, emergency bilge pump facilities etc in case of any difficulties during the voyage but time and tide were against us as we maneuvered into the Rangitoto Channel to take on the tow and these precautions were not allowed to happen.
The towing bridle was formed by placing heavy steel chains around the port and starboard mooring bollards fixed to the after deck then led through the stern fairleads to form a ‘Y’ shaped yoke to which to shackle the steel hawser towing line. The chains were tightly wrapped around the bollards and fastened in place using taper pinned shackles.

A Harbour tug maneuvered the Ferry into position, the tow line was attached and we were away.
The journey was to take us up around North Cape then down into the Southern Tasman Sea , a passage of about 1800 nautical miles which would normally take about 7 days at our normal service speed of 10 to 11 knots but this time was revised to approximately 12 to 15 days allowing for the reduced towing speed . By nightfall the tow had settled down to follow us obediently at about four to five knots, gently yawing side to side and looking as though she was under her own power. The next morning saw us off the Northland coast in fine flat weather and the towing speed was increased very slightly and all was well. We were already recalculating our ETA Hobart and looking forward to arriving at a Port seldom visited by Union Co ships and a place where most of us had not been before.

We rounded North Cape with the ferry skimming sweetly astern, the tow line of calculated length and weight was correctly sagging below the water and showing no symptoms of excess power transfer so again our twin six cylinder ‘British Polar’ diesel engines were notched up just a few more revolutions per minute with no adverse effect on the tow. A few uneventful days passed with the Ferry following like a very obedient puppy dog on a leash and we were slightly ahead of schedule but one afternoon the weather freshened from a westerly direction creating slight seas on to our starboard bow but the ferry seemed to be taking it in her stride and the pace continued.
I came off the 12 to 4 afternoon watch in the engine room and wandered aft to take my usual look at the towing scene and there I found the Captain and the Chief engineer discussing the ferry’s stance on the water and it was becoming obvious that the vessel was slightly bow down. The towing speed was reduced to see if that corrected its trim but as nightfall neared with freshening winds and wave motion it became obvious that the Alex Allison was taking on water either through a sprung plate or rivets, a hole in the hull, a leak via the forward propeller shaft gland or a damaged hull fitting. We could only guess as to the exact cause as we had not been able to inspect the ferry prior to sailing.
As darkness fell the bow had lowered to the extent that water was almost lapping the vehicle deck so we virtually hove to, just providing enough way on the ship to maintain some tension on the steel tow line to avoid it gathering under our stern and fouling our propeller.
The senior officers, the Captain, Chief engineer and the First mate had a conference and as there was some doubt that the ferry would still be afloat in the morning it was decided to plan a boarding party to check on the damage and to endeavor to start the auxiliary diesel fire and bilge pump that was reportedly on board and all ready to go.
The starboard life boat was prepared for launching, the usual bulky Board of Trade design unsinkable craft that was propelled by sweep oars that were intended mainly for rowing the craft clear of a sinking ship and not for any long journey. The Ferry rescue crew was to be the First Officer, the Boatswain, about four Able seamen plus the Chief and Fourth Engineers, the latter two being the intended boarding party.

Weather conditions had continued to worsen with a rising swell and as it would have been impossible to row the life boat to the ferry it was decided to use a long rope line, one end attached to the life boat’s bow and the other looped around the drum of the ship’s aft deck mooring winch. This would allow a controlled drift down to along side the stricken vessel for boarding and allow the life boat and crew to be retrieved when the mission was over.
This was 46 years ago and although our ship was only 4 years old and up to date in the safety equipment standards of the time, we did not have a motorized lifeboat or a RIB “Rubber Ducky” with a 50 HP outboard, nothing like that, just wooden oars in the starboard boat and “Carling” gear in the port unit. This latter propulsion was a series of rocker arms connected by cranks to a central propeller shaft that enabled the crew to sit on the thwarts and pump the arms back and forth to produce a rotary motion to propel the craft through the water. A means of propulsion that had mixed reviews, to say the least.

Communication was also a problem, no Ship’s Radar, no Satellite phones, or portable RT sets, no GPS or life boat locator beacons in those days, only a ship/ship/shore short range radio, a short wave radio and a Morse code transmitter for long range contact with the outside world plus, of course, a Radio Operator who could send and receive Morse code at a speed approaching a normal conversation. We did however have a spare, portable, battery operated ‘Aldis’ signaling lamp. This was a powerful light with a six inch diameter signaling lens switched on and off by a trigger to allow the sending of optical Morse code signals day or night. This was issued to the life boat crew and a simple signaling code was agreed upon like one flash “haul in”, two flashes “Stop” and three flashes “pay out”. 
The life boat was duly lowered with Jim and Jock on board complete with a bag of assorted tools and a couple of fresh batteried torches and ready for any thing. Peter Kiddell and I were to keep a doubled up watch in the engine room in case of a need to carry out any maneuvers with the twin screws but we quickly set up a roster to allow one man to briefly nip up top every now and then to watch the proceedings mainly because of our increasing concern about the wisdom of the exercise given the weather conditions.

I was topside when the life boat reached the side of the Ferry and although the two vessels could barely be seen through the gloom it was obvious that the swell was going to make a boarding leap a dangerous one. The ship continued to pay out the line slowly to allow the life boat crew to fully inspect the ferry hull full length and to size up a boarding plan but as they reached the stern section they began to drift under the towering overhang of the raised stern and fearing being swept under the counter they flashed the “Aldis” lamp three times, the pay out signal, to get them clear. Unfortunately it so happened that a wave or swell crest at the wrong moment obscured two of the three flashes and the ship’s crew responded to a one flash signal, ‘Haul in’.
Next minute the life boat crew found themselves being hauled right under the heaving stern counter of the Ferry and one AB instinctively raise his oar up to fend off the descending menace. The oar, compressed between the ferry hull and the floor of the boat, bent like a banana then snapped like a carrot. The other crew ducked down below the gunwales fearing that the Ferry was going to squash them while ‘Cactus’ Cox cried “cut the rope” which the Boatswain did in a flash with his sharp sheath knife and they quickly drifted free and away from immediate danger.
On board ship we were unaware of this action and the first indication was when we saw the Aldis lamp flickering away well astern of the ferry position and a laboured Morse code signal that read “SOS we had to cut the rope” or words to that effect.

I can imagine to this day the thoughts that must have been going through Captain Kirk’s mind, what started as a routine mission to pump out the Ferry was turning into a serious predicament. Here we had eight men adrift in a lifeboat in the lonely South Tasman waters, in fresh weather that made rowing the craft almost impossible, no visibility apart from the ship and Ferry navigation lights and the occasional flicker from the Aldis lamp to allow the ship’s lookouts to maintain a spot location. Plus- a waterlogged tow that could well decide to founder without too much notice.
What took place next was a prime example of excellent ship handling as the Master steamed the ship in a very wide circle at slow speed and ever mindful of the “sea anchor” of about 400 tons roped to our stern until he was able to bring the ‘Kaitoa’ just to windward of the lifeboat to shelter it and limit its drift as the ship slowly bore down on them. All this had taken a couple of hours and had it taken any longer we may of lost contact with the lifeboat until day break as by this time the Aldis lamp battery was down to providing only a pale yellow flicker
. A worst case scenario that crossed most minds was that if we lost sight of the lifeboat in the dark due to the signal lamp failure and were unable to pick up the crew the problems compounded to include a shortage of hands to deal with any immediate crisis with the tow. There was also the possibility that the lack of Radar may prevent the ship finding the boat in the morning as it was scudding to leeward at a faster rate than the ship and unless they remained within ‘flare range’ the prevailing weather and big swell would of made a visual search very difficult.
The life boat crew were in a sound seaworthy vessel equipped with emergency and survival provisions so were relatively safe in the short term, not that I would of changed places for quids, and the end result had this worst course of events occurred would probably have involved calling out the RAAF to carry out a sea search to pin point the boat and lead us to them.

Although the life boat was now alongside the drama was not yet over as we had to retrieve the craft, easy enough in Harbour where we had done it many times during boat drill but not a normal or easy task in a swell and choppy seas. Perhaps 90% of life boats seriously launched at sea never return to the ship as in most cases they are used to “abandon” it.
With the lifeboat along side and surging up and down relative to the ship’s slower motion the first attempt to attach the “falls” failed.(the falls are the ropes and hooks hanging down from the ship’s life boat davits) The bow hook was attached successfully but the stern fastening missed due to the crazy motion of the life boat with the result being that as the next trough passed under the boat the stern slumped with it but the attached bow did not causing the lifeboat to hang off the forward davit at an angle of about thirty degrees pitching the crew toward the stern and immersing the aft section under water for a moment until it bobbed up again. At this point Jock Bruce was just regaining his feet and saw the aft fall swinging wildly toward his head and his instinctive ‘hands up’ action to prevent his block being knocked off enabled him to grasp the hook and safely secure the boat ready for hoisting out of the water.
That drama thankfully over, the boat crew was taken to the Captain’s cabin for a medicinal whisky followed by snatches of sleep until the dawn allowed another revue of the situation.

It is of interest to record that a 1994 survey into lifeboat safety by an International Marine Forum revealed that life boats were launched for the following reasons; 
Boat Drill (82%), Maintenance & Survey (16%), and Emergencies (2%) and that 48% of accidents happened during lifting recovery so the ship and lifeboat crews did very well that night given the cir***stances.


Morning brought a slight improvement in the weather but the tow was obviously sinking as the bow portion of the vehicle deck was under water and the stern high in the air. The Chief Engineer had previously raised concerns with the First Officer and the Boatswain about the method used to pin the shackles securing the heavy towing chains around the bollards without a means of quick release. If the ferry foundered while still attached there could be disastrous consequences due to the weight hanging off our stern with its capability of fouling our propeller, affecting the ship’s stability and even ripping the bollards off the deck plates when loaded beyond their intended duty. We had no such aids as gas cutting gear or powerful angle grinders in those times and the deck crew, finally appreciating the Chief’s concerns in the cold hard light of the morning, set about unpinning the shackles which took quite some time and when completed, about 10 am, the Captain gave the order to release the tow.

Only about fifteen minutes after the bridle chains rattled overboard to a watery grave the Ferry decided to follow. She slowly decreased her angle of repose until vertical, floated around for a few minutes with 50% of the hull pointed skywards then plunged out of sight before popping up again buoyed by the air trapped in the stern. Then something gave way and she disappeared for good with a hiss and a roar of escaping air from a ruptured hull.

I guess every man had his own thoughts about the drama but I am sure that we were all pleased to see the back of it as we set sail at our best speed for Hobart.
We were head lines in the local paper, the “Hobart Mercury,” and after docking we soon had a reporter on board. He was a New Zealander and it so happened that when we left Auckland I was the only crew member to have a full roll of black and white film in my 35 mm camera and was able to record the first few days of the tow, the initial bow down pose and progressive shots of the Ferry from daylight thro to the final plunge. The reporter offered to take the film back to their photo lab for immediate processing and after assuring the Captain that they would not publish any shots without his approval we soon had a pictorial record. Three photos were selected as news worthy and they duly appeared in the next edition together with an account of the drama. I turned out to be the winner as the reporter syndicated the photos to the Melbourne Age, The Sydney Times, The New Zealand Herald and The Auckland Star. They all eventually sent me their cheques and I scooped about 26 pounds in total which more than covered the cost of the then expensive Zeiss Contina camera that I had bought duty free for 15 pounds some two years earlier
After a day or two in Hobart while a preliminary enquiry was carried out the Mercury reporter treated several of us to various tour rides in his car around the area then we were off to Melbourne to pick up a cargo of oranges before heading home to Auckland.



A sea going adventure

Bob Jenkins 10/4/06


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## JoK (Nov 12, 2006)

The problem is Mike S, today's minimum manning standards has made it impossible to launch boats in that fashion. It is almost like today's seaman are throw-aways.


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## Mike S (Dec 27, 2005)

Well JoK I know things have gone well past being crazy however it seems to me that if the manning scale does not allow suffucient crew to carry out the required duties on board then either the numbers are increased or the duties are curtailed.
I fear the worst.
My reason for the account was to point out that good old fashioned seamanship will beat the ideas of academics and committees every time.
The more I hear of modern seagoing the more I realise that common sense and good seamanship seem to have vanished into the gloom. I hope very sincerely that I am wrong..............


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## Scurdie (Aug 6, 2009)

*Electrical fault!*

Very interesting discussions above regarding hooks, falls etc., but apparently a simple failed switch initiated this particular catastrophe. Now, did anyone tell the designers that electrics and salt water do not mix ?

"MAIB Safety Bulletin 2/2011 Issued 12 May 2011

A second Safety Bulletin is issued following the death of a seafarer in Royal Portbury Docks, Bristol when a rescue boat fell almost 29m when its fall wire parted. The Bulletin highlights a Product Awareness Notice issued by Umoe Schat-Harding Equipment A.S. regarding the testing and periodic replacement of an inductive proximity switch that did not operate." - www.maib.gov.uk


Scurdie said:


> MAIB investigations list states "While alongside in Royal Portbury docks, Bristol, a UK registered car-carrier was hoisting a rescue boat which fell unexpectedly resulting in the death of one crewman and three others being hospitalised."


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