# El Faro



## alan dd (May 16, 2010)

The NTSB have just published the report on the El Faro sinking, all the do***ents are here:

http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/do***ent.cfm?docID=447547&docketID=58116&mkey=92109

This link is for the VDR transcript which is pretty emotional reading towards the end, but all the other do***ents can be accessed from the drop down section.


----------



## Wallace Slough (Mar 21, 2009)

I agree that the end of the VDR transcript is very emotional. I can't imagine what must have been going on in that wheelhouse as the ship went down.


----------



## makko (Jul 20, 2006)

I pondered long and hard about reading this. In this current climate of "heroes" and other such hyperbole bandied around without any thought of the meaning of the word, I think that what stands out is the professionalism and stoicism of the officers in the execution of their duties in the face of the inevitable. RIP all - "For those in peril on the sea........."
Rgds.
Dave


----------



## Samsette (Sep 3, 2005)

makko said:


> I pondered long and hard about reading this. In this current climate of "heroes" and other such hyperbole bandied around without any thought of the meaning of the word, I think that what stands out is the professionalism and stoicism of the officers in the execution of their duties in the face of the inevitable. RIP all - "For those in peril on the sea........."
> Rgds.
> Dave


Right on.

http://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world...moments/ar-AAlz7h9?li=AAacUQk&ocid=spartandhp


----------



## jmcg (Apr 20, 2008)

Tragic indeed. RIP to all who perished. A brutal reminder of the M.V. Derbyshire tragedy and the perils of the sea.

J


----------



## kewl dude (Jun 1, 2008)

I have read the entire 510 pages of the transcript. At the beginning on Wednesday September 30, 2015 @ 0530 Hurricane Joaquin was discussed by the Master and Chief Mate. As was the schedule, throughout this transcript there is a lot of attention paid to keeping the schedule. 

That and El Faro apparently was going to be transferred to the Tote Alaskan trade? The deck officers were requisitioning new Pacific Ocean charts from the Panama Canal to Alaska. Whether these were paper charts, electronic charts, or both; is not clear. 

Based solely upon the transcript it appears the chief mate worked the 4-8 watch, the second mate the 12-4 watch and the third mate 8-12. All officers were male except the female second mate. Again based only upon the transcript there appears to have been a chief engineer with four assistants, 1 A/E, 2 A/E and two 3 A/E.

It appears that the Master communicated with Tote personnel ashore only from his quarters/office? It was not stated except the Master on the bridge referred to going below to contact someone ashore.

Greg Hayden


----------



## FuzzyGolfito (Oct 3, 2015)

*El Faro, just popped in to post this....*

http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/do***ent.cfm?docID=447547&docketID=58116&mkey=92109

Yesterday the DOT released the report on the El Faro. If you click on the link above it should take you to it provided I haven't ****ed up. Sad, voices from the grave.


----------



## litz (Aug 20, 2012)

In the factual report, there are a few pictures of the VDR as mounted on the ship, then as found on the ocean floor.

If anyone doubts the ferocity of the storm, it stripped the paint right off the unit. It was recovered as basically bare metal.


----------



## FuzzyGolfito (Oct 3, 2015)

*Folks I wanted to add this...*

First, both of us are retired Chief Engineers and both of us are familiar with these vessels....but from years ago....

Given the incredible danger of the situation there is surprisingly little communication between the Captn. and the engine room. 

Before I read this transcript I had already arrived at the conclusion that the Captain was solely responsible because he foolishly sailed his vessel into deadly conditions. Now I am certain of it, the man was either an arrogant ass or did not understand the history of those waters nor the force of an Atlantic Hurricane. The day before you hear the 3rd. Mate who plotted the collusion course they were on with that of the hurricane. He says it brings us on the south side but within 30 miles of the eye and expresses real concern and questions the Captain's wisdom, at least to the AB on the wheel and I believe the 2nd Mate. At that point a sensible Captain would have turned around and hauled ass off shore, put some distance between himself and the storm and get out in deep water where there was room to maneuver. Truth of the matter was he sealed their fate right then and there, he was intent on plowing through the center of the damn thing.

The Captain seems to have no concept of what he is purposely sailing into. His plan is push ahead and pass just south of the eye where he seems to think he'll find suitable conditions. What a horses ass did he actually think he was going to find the wind and waves moderating on the south side of the eye wall, he says or infers that many times when anyone with a brain would know that dangerous conditions were going to prevail for hundreds of miles in all directions. Just prior to loosing the Main Engine they are right in the eye wall of the storm on the south side precisely where the Captain planned to be( the wind has shifter to the starboard side ) the problem with that is you now have monster seas coming out of the north-east by east except now they are pushing up against sustained hundred+ knot winds which would very probably makes them all the more steep. 

For the life of me I cannot remember whether that ship had two or one settler I believe it only had one which was midships forward of the boilers so I doubt they lost suction because of a 15 degree list. If they lost suction it was more likely do to all the sludge that had ac***ulated in the tank breaking loose and clogging the filters caused by hours of violent pitching and rolling. 

They seem to have lost main lube oil suction and I suspect that would be for the same reason as a 15 degree list is not great enough to cause it, unless of course they left port with a main sump dangerous low in the first place. That may be the case since the ship was going to be sent to the scrap yards after that last voyage or soon after. The company is a junk ship operator and I doubt they would spend the money to top off the sump. The lube oil settler/storage tank is one deck up at the operation level port side aft. If it were loaded with oil you would think they could have opened the drop valve and flooded the sump if necessary, to get some suction. More probably the lube oil was a slurry of suspended sludge and plugging up the main lube oil filters, ( I have seen that happen on those vessels where we had to change the lube oil filter at least once a watch for a whole day).

That other thing that pissed me off is the Captain doesn't ring the general alarm until eleven minutes before the capsize, he rings abandon ship a minute or two later. He was aware of the incredibly dangerous conditions with the plant down for almost a full hour before he makes any effort to prepare the men to abandon ship, consequently they run out of time to save themselves. That arrogant ass killed himself and his whole crew. 
________________________________________
From: "Glenn Klima" <[email protected]
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 5:11:46 PM
Subject: RE: FYI

The last bit is interesting to me…..however the daily BS on the bridge was what are we gonna do if they lay us up…and we ain’t got charts, *****in about inventory, usual crap….I never did see anything about why they lost power…..I am certain that the list may have been a fuel problem, but I never hear about transferring fuel to prevent the loss of suction from boiler fuel pumps….I can believe that the list caused the high/low water trips caused a problem…..and from the conversations that I read, I doubt that anyone aboard had the steamboat savvy that I was used to sailing with….cheap company, you get what you pay for…..I note that the 1st told the mate to secure the hospital and slop chest…..from the bit that I can understand/infer, 
The black gang had their **** together, and the mates were more or less lost in daily BS……what a shame…..


----------



## kewl dude (Jun 1, 2008)

To be fair I believe the Master was under commercial pressure. We have no idea what the Master and Tote shore staff talked about. Yet the Master remarked more than once about getting 'direction' from ashore. The El Faro had subscriptions from three weather routing services, which stated that Joaquin eye wall wind speeds were 85 - 120 knots, while the US Hurricane Center in Miami was saying 40 knots.

I had wondered if the El Faro realized that Joaquin had turned around, but that fact is in the transcript, that they did know that. Had Joaquin not turned around most likely El Faro would have been fine? The deck officers wanted to go through the Old Bahama Channel, but the Master stated that would lengthen the voyage by 160 miles. I do not recall the exact language, but when I read it I was under the impression that the Office and Master had a 'gentleman's agreement' to not use that route. Whether the El Faro would be protected in the Old Bahama Channel is something deck officers will have to let us know.

Regarding loss of suction, I am under the impression that it was lube oil in the main engine sump, when the vessel had a list in excess of 15 degrees. I cannot speak for today, but I pulled out my copy of USCG Marine Engineering Regulations circa June 1, 1973; where I found that said ME and generator sumps were required to keep suction at up to a maximum of 15 degrees list. I had thought it was greater than that.

I do not recall reading anything in the transcript about the El Faro being scrapped. Yet there were many references to her being transferred to Alaska. Throughout the transcript, especially after a severe roll, folks talked about it being a forecast of seas to come on the Alaska routes. 

Greg Hayden


----------



## Wallace Slough (Mar 21, 2009)

I too would fault the Captain for failing to alter course so as to not be so near the storm when the opportunity was available earlier. Sailing into a hurricane with a lee shore to starboard and no sea room to maneuver leaves no room for error. A deviation of 160 miles is minimal when compared to the loss of the ship and the safety of her crew and cargo. The Captain is ultimately in command of his ship and gets paid to make the tough decisions, with or without the advice of the office. When the findings of the NTSB are published, I would expect them to find the Captain at fault, especially after being advised by his subordinates to alter course.

At the same time, there is more to this story that needs to be discovered. Why did the hatch fail and cause the flooding which sank the ship? Had it been properly secured prior to sailing. Why was the crew unaware of the ongoing flooding? Was the cargo properly lashed and secured? What caused the ship to lose the plant? Was the age of the ship a factor in her loss? Why were the weather reports on the position of the storm so dated? Some of these questions will be answered, but many answers went to the bottom with the ship. The findings of the NTSB report will likely lead to changes in the regulations that will affect all seamen.


----------



## Jon Vincent (Dec 31, 2006)

Another very tragic and avoidable accident that cost a lot of people their lives. We all know that this was a perfect storm of cir***stances. A Captain that makes poor decisions, a ship that is past its useful life by modern container ship standards and disreputable owner that most probably pressurizes a master into making the wrong choices and maintained his ship on shoe string. These condition exist in more companies than we are prepared to admit too and everything coasts along swimmingly until the aforementioned three meet a bad hurricane or some other obstacle, then disaster. The wrong decision was made before the vessel even sailed and it sealed everyone's fate. When I did my master ticket and after with BP it was always stressed over and over again the master's first duty was to his crew and their safety.


----------



## kewl dude (Jun 1, 2008)

re: with BP it was always stressed over and over again the master's first duty was to his crew and their safety.

Then you were lucky. Such companies exist - used to exist anyway. Yet not all companies were the same. Both aboard ships and ashore I was required to break laws. Laws of multiple countries and international laws. Nothing adverse ever happened but the companies were happy that they avoided large expenses. Was I not prepared to do the bidding of the people who paid my salary; I would be told to 'pack you're bags - your relief will be at the next port". 

Has no one else noticed in the transcript, that an El Faro sister ship passed through the eye of Joaquin? Said ship was 31 miles east of El Faro and recorded gusts of 115 MPH when they went through the eye walls. Said ship communicated with El Faro via VHF when they met.

When this happened there was a film clip shown on US TV. It showed the Master of El Faro on Jacksonville Florida TV, after a nasty weather event, stating "Hurricanes Are Us". El Faro and sister ships ran back and forth on a schedule from Jacksonville Florida to San Juan Puerto Rico. "Hurricanes Are Us".

Greg Hayden


----------



## kewl dude (Jun 1, 2008)

re: Why was the crew unaware of the ongoing flooding?

Read the transcript: they thought the list was caused by the high winds pressing against her container stack sail area.

Greg Hayden


----------



## Wallace Slough (Mar 21, 2009)

A fifteen degree list from the winds isn't viable, and the relief Chief Engineer stated as such. If there was any doubt as to the cause of the list, the crew should have been investigating to confirm there was no flooding and the transcript doesn't refer to that until quite late in the event.


----------



## Bill.B (Oct 19, 2013)

I am sure I read somewhere that this class of vessel had very small ballast tanks.


----------



## D1566 (Sep 7, 2009)

http://gcaptain.com/el-faro-open-le...ed&utm_campaign=Feed:+Gcaptain+(gCaptain.com)


----------



## 5036 (Jan 23, 2006)

The report is published and seems a fair and accurate assessment. 

The executive summary is here:

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Do***ents/2017-DCA16MM001-BMG-Abstract.pdf

One word sums it all up and that is "complacency." Complacency creeps in when we get too comfortable, when our jobs become routine or mundane and it is a significant factor in a range of failings from profits to safety. It is why we need to regularly shake up teams and prevent the dangers creeping in from boardroom to broom cupboard to captains to deckhands. It should never be seen as a cost because it saves money. And lives.


----------

