# Derbyshire



## John Rogers

Watch a a TV show today about the sinking and the finding the wreck of the Derbyshire,great to watch,the program is on the History Channel. Anyone remember the loss of the ship.?
John.


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## 2548hopw

I remember it well. I was a cadet at the time on a ship nearby. My fiance at the time thought it was our ship had gone down when she heard the news. I was on watch when we found out and our Somali lookout had swapped ships with a friend so he wasn't on the Derbyshire. He was naturally devastated and relieved at the same time. Very very sad. Was it eventually put down to a construction fault.. Steve


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## John Rogers

Thats what they said,due to water entering the holds through the open 12 inch vents,every time a wave came over the bow most of it went down the vent. They did change the design feature due to that problem.
John


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## 2548hopw

Was she called the "........... Bridge" before and had already suffered a crack between hull and accomodation block. The way I remember it she suddenly broke her back. Help me with the name. Memory isnt what it used to be. Cheers Steve.


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## rushie

I think she was the Westminster Bridge...may be wrong, but a friend of mine served on her under that name.

Rushie


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## John Cassels

Did an inspection once on one of the 6 sister ships. There was indeed
a discontinuation in way of fore and aft girders , cofferdam between
pumproom and ER.

JC


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## Les Gibson

She was 'Liverpool Bridge' before renaming 'Derbyshire'


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## Paul Liu

Steve,

The disaster of Derbyshire was also partly blamed on rogue waves, since you were nearby, do you remember the wave conditions at the time?

Paul


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## LEEJ

The latest version of the loss was down to a defective design of the focsle hatch.Apparently it was customary to secure the hatch with extra lashings as it was known to spring open in any weather. Unfortunately the lost crew were not aware of this defect and this started a chain reaction of events once water started entering the focsle.The discontinuation of the longitudinals was considered not a cause of the loss I believe. I think all the sister ships cracked here and one was lost through it.


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## Pat McCardle

Sir Alexander Glen was one of this design & I remember a friend telling me that everytime they were in port welders were on board working around the hatch comings. Welders were even flown out of Cape Town as some of the cracks were appearing after being in foul weather.


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## John Rogers

Where were the ships built Pat?
John


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## Pat McCardle

Swan Hunter's, Haverton Hill yard, near Sealsands


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## 2548hopw

Paul The weather was pretty bad but I was on a SD14 and she coped well with the conditions.....Steve


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## Fairfield

More in the Bulkers Forum.


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## Frank P

Didn't one of the Derbyshires sister ships (Hongkong Bridge?) break up in bad weather somewere near the Irish coast.

Frank


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## Gulpers

Frank,

Almost correct. 
The ore/bulk/oil motor vessel Kowloon Bridge, was built in 1973 as a sister ship to the ill-fated Derbyshire which disappeared off the coast of Japan in September, 1980. Kowloon Bridge also became a total loss in November 1986 when she was wrecked off Baltimore on the southern coast of Ireland.


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## Gulpers

*Derbyshire, Tyne Bridge, Kowloon Bridge*

".......... Then on 18th November 1986 the Kowloon Bridge, one of the Derbyshire's sister ships, developed severe deck cracking at Frame 65 whilst crossing the North Atlantic in severe weather. In view of the connection with the Derbyshire the Department of Transport's inspectors boarded the Kowloon Bridge on 20th November in Bantry Bay, Eire where she lay at anchor.
But on 22nd November she broke away from her anchor and, to be safer, put to sea again. She then lost her rudder and on 24th November went aground on Stag Rock off the south coast of Ireland. On 25th November, after grounding, she broke her back; the break occurred near Frame 65. It was learnt that cracks in the Frame 65 area of the Kowloon Bridge had been repaired in April 1982 and that massive girders had been welded over the deck there to prevent further cracking. ........."

Extracted from http://www.nautical-heritage.org.uk/derbyshire.html which gives some background to the Derbyshire, Tyne Bridge and Kowloon Bridge incidents.


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## Frank P

Thanks for the addition information Ray, I remembered that the ship that went aground in Southern Ireland had a name that had something to do with Hong Kong. I can remember seeing the newsreels about the incedent. My brother was sailing on the "Kowloon Bay" around that time. 

cheers Frank


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## Gulpers

A pleasure Frank - hope it was useful. (Thumb)


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## Guest

I was on the Furness Bridge at the time, one of six ships built by Swan Hunter(Haverton Hill) From what I remember the longitudal beams were incomplete. Our main deck cracked for'd of the accom. block. We had a team of Japanese welders on board at sea for weeks. We had to set tables up in the alleyways to feed everyone. Chief Engs. dreaded serving on her, things kept dropping off the engines.
Regards
Leo(Wave)


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## ddraigmor

She cracked at Frame 65 - which was the point all her sister's did, so far as I recall.

I wrote an article and some letters to 'The Seaman' (the NUS Newspaper) at the time and also got involved with captain DC Ramwell, who was a tireless campaigner for the truth behind her loss.

Anyone know where dave ramwell is nowadays? I heard her moved to mid Wales........


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## john g

I always felt the gut feeling over the tragedy was probably closer to the truth than the official written word but there is no evidence to support "gut feelings", having sailed in bad weather in the south China sea I still cringe at the thought of this tragedy.


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## quietman

I sailed on the Tyne Bridge before the Derbyshire disaster happened,even then the class of ship had various problems.On the tyne bridge you couldnt even stand on theplatforms to operate the winches as one crew member fell through and injured his leg badly due to rust


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## john shaw

see the following re Kowloon Bridge

http://www.irishwrecksonline.net/details/KowloonBridge548-ImagePage.htm

http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/maritime/exhibitions/derbyshire/searchingfortruth.asp

the latter discusses Frame 65 etc.

Pic of Liverpool Bridge/Derbyshire at:

http://www.teesships.freeuk.com/051227liverpoolbridge.htm


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## broadbandylegs

*Structural faults?*

I was on the same class of ship - the Sir Alexander Glen (that ship was hard work!) - as a senior cadet after the Derbyshire incident. We sailed from Canada to Japan with a number of cracks in the pumproom bulkhead - ends all drilled and checked after each watch!

Once we reached Japan and discarged, we went to a repair berth and were swamped by a repair crew who worked continuosly until the job was finished - cut out huge sections of hull around the saddle tanks and replaced with pre fabricated repair sections - amazing to watch! I'm sure I have some photos somewhere - if I can find them, I'll post.


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## steviej

*Correct.*

Water entered the hatch in the severe storm after the hatch was forced off by the sea. I sailed on the Furness Bridge in 1974. The sea forced the hatch open and filled the foscle in a bad storm. Obviously this was a fault on all six of the ships built to this design. The Kowloon Bridge was the other sister ship to sink off Southern Ireland. The ships were a real nightmare. Cracks in the pumproom and rocker springs were always falling off.
steviej


LEEJ said:


> The latest version of the loss was down to a defective
> design of the focsle hatch.Apparently it was customary to secure the hatch with extra lashings as it was known to spring open in any weather. Unfortunately the lost crew were not aware of this defect and this started a chain reaction of events once water started entering the focsle.The discontinuation of the longitudinals was considered not a cause of the loss I believe. I think all the sister ships cracked here and one was lost through it.


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## michael higgins

quietman:: i to was on tyne bridge before the derbyshire disaster she was an absolute rust bucket,it was back in 1976 and she was only about 4 year old.do you know if theres any pics of her any where


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## DICK SLOAN

I remember it really well too, i was on the P&O Strathdoon SD14 and we were near her' the weather was terrible and the worse thing is you cant do nothing...it was a sad loss.


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## Dick S

I sailed on the Eden Bridge, built in Japan to same plan I remember seeing a picture of Eden Bridge broke in halfe alongside a quay somewhere in South America when the loading arm would not shut down. (new name by then)
Dick


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## Orcadian

she was alongside in Septiba in Brazil. I sailed on her as a cadet in about 1975


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## steviej

*Derbyshire. youtube*

Someone has put the assesors computor simulator on youtube.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0&mode=related&search=


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## JoK

I seen this when I was on a Lloyds hull course. If I hadn't seen the taping of the Gold Bond Conveyor going into a wave and never coming out the other side, I would never have believe a ship could sink in the time that simulation ran.


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## David Byrne

*Derbyshire Hatch Covers*

I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss. 

After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.

After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwate video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:

1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cacking that had been much talked about.

2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was agin proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).

3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as foward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.

4. Damage to the foocsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).

Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.

As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.

The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.

David Byrne


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## non descript

David,

Thank you for a particularly erudite comment on this sad case and it is more than useful to have a worthwile and accurate assessment of the real facts. Well done Sir. (Thumb)


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## pentlandpirate

I was on "Sevonia Team", 103,000 dwt OBO carrying iron ore from Peru to Korea in 1978 when we went into the heavy weather surrounding a typhoon off Japan at that time. The cir***stances were probably just like those experienced by the "Derbyshire" just two years later. I was only a 19 year old first trip deck cadet, and even on such a large ship, it took alot to scare me. But lying in my bunk at night, in the dark, feeling the ship crashing into the waves I was pretty scared. Even 29 years later I remember thinking, here we go again, as every minute or so we would hit a big one. Even 700 feet or so aft of the bows you could feel the shock through the hull, the flexing of the steel, and the pitching downwards. Time and again I thought as we tilted down, is this the one, the one where the bow caves in, and we just slip down and down into the fathomless depths of the Pacific Ocean. http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/gallery/showphoto.php/photo/52344/cat/500/ppuser/8383

With the iron ore sitting deep in the ship forming a great pendulum, dense piles of weight sitting centrally in each hold, you knew the ship was pretty stressed. None of us know exactly what happened to the Derbyshire, but I will not be alone on this website in knowing what it was like to go close to the point of disaster, that fine line between life and death. 

In some ways that was all part of the thrill of going to sea as a boy, and returning a man, having seen the world.


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## texasrv

I think the latest enquiry decided that the fo'castle had flooded due to an insecure manhatch, this put the ship down by the head and then the no1 hatch collapsed under heavy seas, then the ship was quickly swamped and wnet straignt under. I remember that some of the 'deductions' might have been flawed though. They found the manhatch on the sea floor and because the dogs were no bent decided they must not have been tightened?! also they found the no1 hatch cover folded like a piece of paper and decided it must have neen folded on the surface by waves. But if the hatch lid came loose as the vessel sank (very deep) couldn't the cover have folded ont he way down. I may be wrong but i don't think they found evidence of the ship cracking on the surface.
Unlike the MSC Napoli at the momemnt!


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## Hague

Nobody seems to be addressing alternate holds loading and its implications.
Brgds
Hague


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## tim frary

i saild on the sir john hunter 14 10 74 she was sister ship to sir alexander glen we had a crack appear on deck on route from brazil to japan and had a repair crew with us all the way back to cape town and that was only her second trip . all the best tim


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## Hague

Tim, 
I am afraid your story is common place on Iron Ore Carriers. The alternate hold loading (promoted by many ports to reduce shifting) exasperated an already poor position. Having sailed as Ch.Off and Master of these vessels (Cape Size and larger) in the 70s I became paranoid about 'crack developmment' and undertook a discreet daily inspection in order not to alarm the crew. Walking nonchalantly around the decks 'eyeing' all the corners of the hatches iwo main deck (invariably 9).


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## Janner100

pentlandpirate said:


> .....Time and again I thought as we tilted down, is this the one, the one where the bow caves in, and we just slip down and down into the fathomless depths of the Pacific Ocean. http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/gallery/showphoto.php/photo/52344/cat/500/ppuser/8383
> 
> With the iron ore sitting deep in the ship forming a great pendulum, dense piles of weight sitting centrally in each hold, you knew the ship was pretty stressed. None of us know exactly what happened to the Derbyshire, but I will not be alone on this website in knowing what it was like to go close to the point of disaster, that fine line between life and death.
> 
> In some ways that was all part of the thrill of going to sea as a boy, and returning a man, having seen the world.


Amen to that thought


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## Hague

David Byrne said:


> I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss.
> 
> After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.
> 
> After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwate video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:
> 
> 1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cacking that had been much talked about.
> 
> 2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was agin proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).
> 
> 3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as foward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.
> 
> 4. Damage to the foocsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).
> 
> Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.
> 
> As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.
> 
> The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.
> 
> David Byrne


Always get a little uneasy when inquiries state *'It most definitely was not' * as in 2 above.


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## Ventry

*Foc'sle Hatch Dogging*

Have issues with Dave Byrnes post.

3. The primary cause: Thought that would have been the 'root cause' which caused the vessel to Change her Trim! Not a consequence!

2. It most definitely was not ...leaves me a little uneasy also 


Maybe I too should get an EDUCATION!!


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## pete turner

liverpool bridge-regards


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## rossaspden

*Tynebridge*

I served on the Tynebridge ( Derbyshire sister ship ) I beleive she was later renamed Kowloon Bridge after we had a long lay up period in Greece. The ship was plagued with problems and a nightmare to work on.


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## Chouan

I was 2/0 on the Kona/Sir John Hunter in the late 80's, she was also a heap of s...e. The Pumproom was dangerous to work, the main cargo valve hydraulic pumps in the duct keel weren't strong enough to control the valves when under pressure and had to be helped with a big stilson, the pumproom bulkhead was doubled with repair patchhes and still had to be inspected in heavy weather in case the cracks got worse.
When I joined the Old Man greeted me with "Some of the valves don't pass, and some of the bulkheads are sound".
Wonderful! Whilst I was away the Kowloon Bridge broke up. My wife got even more worried when she realiosed that the Kona was a sistership!


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## M29

steviej said:


> Water entered the hatch in the severe storm after the hatch was forced off by the sea. I sailed on the Furness Bridge in 1974. The sea forced the hatch open and filled the foscle in a bad storm. Obviously this was a fault on all six of the ships built to this design. The Kowloon Bridge was the other sister ship to sink off Southern Ireland. The ships were a real nightmare. Cracks in the pumproom and rocker springs were always falling off.
> steviej


Steviej, can you name all six sisters for me? I was on English Bridge, brand new in 1973, was she a true sister to Derbyshire?
I assume English Bridge also changed her name later
Best Wishes
Alan


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## John Graham

David Byrne said:


> I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss.
> 
> After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.
> 
> After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwate video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:
> 
> 1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cacking that had been much talked about.
> 
> 2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was agin proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).
> 
> 3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as foward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.
> 
> 4. Damage to the foocsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).
> 
> Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.
> 
> As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.
> 
> The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.
> 
> David Byrne


I sailed on the Sir Alexander Glen and so can appreciate this subject is one that raises emotions. I was at Southampton Tech College at the time of the Derbyshire sinking and remember the reaction of some of the Bibby cadets who knew some of those that were lost. It was about a year later when I sailed on the Sir Alexander Glen. Like Broadbandylegs, I too sailed from Canada to Japan. Quite possibly the same trip. She was, as somebody else mentioned, hard work. 
Some years ago I saw a program on the TV about the Derbyshire. A Danish professor had conducted experiments on a large wave tank. If I remember the numbers correctly, he stated that the hatch covers were designed to cope with about 1.5m head of water on them. His experiments suggested that in certain conditions it was quite possible that the head of water on the hatch covers could have been as much as 5m. This could tie in with what you have said above. One other theory that might fit in with this is one I heard being expressed by a naval architecture. He was of the belief that in order to save money on construction, many ships built in the 70's and 80's didn't have raised bows, and this was a possible cause of the huge losses that occured in shipping at that time. A result of the bow going under the waves in heavy seas.

Whatever happened, it was a tragic loss for all concerned, and one can only hope that lessons were learned all round with regard to ships construction.


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## Chouan

My brother knew a bloke who was a welder at Haverton Hill at the time. There was considerable industrial unrest at the time and he told my brother that, unless they were closely supervised, they welded by stuffing the area to be joined with welding rods, then welding a skin over the top so that it looked like a sound weld. As they were paid piece work, in effect, it meant that they got more work 'done' in a given time. Obviously welds were inspected, but, how realistic is it to expect that every inch of a weld is tested.
It doesn't argue against the cause of the sinking, but it does speak volumes for the quality of the build.


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## LEEJ

I heard the same story years ago regarding the replacement Atlantic Conveyor.Hope those welders have a nice life.


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## 760J9

Dave Ramwell and Tim Madge wrote a very detailed book on the loss of the Derbyshire and accounts of her sisters. included are a lot of diagrams and several photos including the wreck of Kowloon Bridge that was sold to a scrap merchant for £1. The book is "A Ship Too Far, the mystery of the Derbyshire" published by Hodder & Stoughton. 
ISBN 0-340-56997-2


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## Stubbsy5050

M29 said:


> Steviej, can you name all six sisters for me? I was on English Bridge, brand new in 1973, was she a true sister to Derbyshire?
> I assume English Bridge also changed her name later
> Best Wishes
> Alan



This is a list of the ill-fated Bibby Bridge Class OBO's, including the foreign-built variants;

Pacific Bridge:
44,842gt. built Japan 1967. Sold 1974, renamed Petingo. Suffered damage to No.3 hatch in heavy seas off South Africa. Denied assistance, she drifted ashore, broke up and sank 1990.

Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.

Westminster Bridge:
44,842gt. Lithgows 1968. Sold 1973, renamed Proteus, then President Roxas. Broken up 1990.

Ocean Bridge:
66,057gt. Japan 1970. March 1971, suffered an explosion which burnt out the bridge section and blew a hole the size of a tennis court right through the ship, killing the master. After repairs costing £2.5m, renamed Gloucestershire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Oceanic Victory, later Ocean Victory, then China Victory. Broken up 1986.

English Bridge
78,527gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1973. Renamed Worcestershire 1977. Sold 1979, renamed Sunshine, then Murcurio, then Crystal Transporter, then Kowloon Bridge. Lost November 1986 when cracks appeared forward of the bridge, she lost her rudder, was blown onto the Irish coast and broke her back.

Australian Bridge:
78,527gt. Japan 1973. Renamed Somersetshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Enterprise Transporter, then Cast Puffin, then Chili, then Danmark, then Norman Hunter, then Leon. No current records.

Canadian Bridge:
65,135gt. Harland & Wolf 1974. Renamed Bedfordshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Tectus, then Bocita, then Shou An Hai. No current records.

Yorkshire:
60,814gt. Swan Hunters Tyneside 1975. Chartered out as the York Marine. Used as oil storage hulk. 1988 attacked and burnt by Iranian warships at Sharjah. Sold 1988, renamed Martontree. Broken up 1993.

Liverpool Bridge:
91,655gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1976. Suffered a serious engine room explosion. Renamed Derbyshire 1978. September 1980 sank in the Pacific during Typhoon Orchid with 44 on board. No survivors.

Mersey Bridge:
39,427gt. Sunderland Shipbuilders 1976. Renamed Cambridgeshire 1977. Sold 1983, renamed Festival, then Eastray, then Anemos. No current records.


The rest of the non-Bibby bulkers built at Swan Hunters Haverton Hill were;

Furness Bridge:
1971, 77,316gt.later renamedLake Arrowhead, then Marcona Pathfinder, then World Pathfinder, then Ocean Sovereign.Was the only one of the six built to the original design. Broken up 1992.

Tyne Bridge:
1972, later renamed East Bridge. 1982 in the North Sea, suffered cracks across her deck and had to be repaired.

Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired.

Sir Alexander Glen:
1975. Deck cracks repaired. 1989 renamed Ocean Monarch, then Ocean Mandarin. Broken up 1995.


Bibby's Captain Henry (Harry) Wilson Pyle collected the Japanese built Pacific Bridge, Atlantic Bridge and Ocean Bridge new from the yards. He was my father-in-law. He captained all three ships and was the master killed in the Ocean Bridge explosion in 1971.


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## Chouan

"Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired."
Whilst not criticising the above, the repair work on the above vessel was far more extensive. 
Certainly by 1986-7 when I sailed on her she also had extensive doubling plates, extra repair work, extensive large brackets etc etc in pump room along bulkhead. Much, MUCH, more than deck cracks repaired. The repairs, especially the cracks, were inspected every three days, according to the ship's standing orders, in case of the cracks re-appearing, or new ones making an appearance.


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## Stubbsy5050

I fully accept your correction. My list is in no way comprehensive but perhaps it can be seen as a starting point to catalogue the errors and tragic mishaps that accompanied this class of ships.


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## tim frary

i saild on sir jonh hunter in 1974 -75 we had two cracks on deck between 8 and 9 hatcher .then we got to japan we took on 20 japanese welders how stayed with us all the way to oz and thay left in cape town....... tim


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## Chouan

Terrible isn't it though, and a damning indictment of British shipbuilding in general, and Haverton Hill in particular, that a ship has to have significant repairs within a year of delivery.
"Unfortunate" wasn't it that the modified design drawings were all "lost".


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## marinero

Chouan said:


> My brother knew a bloke who was a welder at Haverton Hill at the time. There was considerable industrial unrest at the time and he told my brother that, unless they were closely supervised, they welded by stuffing the area to be joined with welding rods, then welding a skin over the top so that it looked like a sound weld. As they were paid piece work, in effect, it meant that they got more work 'done' in a given time. Obviously welds were inspected, but, how realistic is it to expect that every inch of a weld is tested.
> It doesn't argue against the cause of the sinking, but it does speak volumes for the quality of the build.


I was told by one of Hadleys Shipping Co. Eng. Supts. that the welders were not all of a high quality whilst building these ships at Haverton Hill. The North Sea oil boom was taking off at the time and the wages paid there were a lot more lucrative. Consequently, he said the quality of workmanship was low. Mind you though guys, I doubt if we will ever get agreement on all aspects of this affair.
I tend to go with David Byrne as a reasonably structured chain of events.
Regards(Thumb) 
PS Whilst Hadleys had no ships involved, their association with Houlders(Furness Bridge) being in the same office was very close.


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## M29

Stubbsy, thanks for the information.
Sorry about your father in law. I was about 80 miles away when Ocean Bridge exploded. There is a thread about that in the BP forum.

Regards Alan


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## Bill Davies

Much has been written in previous threads about sub standard build of ships but less about the manner in which these vessels were loaded. We have all heard about the practice of infilling welds with a welding rod and other stories but, I would be more interested in the practice of alternative hold loading which would aggravate an already bad condition.
I can't remember being on an Ore Carrier, OBO or Ore/Oil Carrier that did not suffer from cracking iwo of hatch corners however, loading in alternate holds at the behest of the commercial department /loading terminal was not an option as I would simply not do it.
All these theories about the loss of the 'Derbyshire' are exactly that. It was in my opinion quite simply Human Error from the loading to the 'dogging' of the foc'sle hatch.


----------



## David Byrne

Bill, I agree with your comments on alternate hold loading - it needs to be very carefully managed on ships that have been specifically designed and Classed for it.

As for the DERBYSHIRE: we no longer need to guess what caused the loss, there is an abundance of evidence, probably as good as a normal visual survey, from the seabed video footage. It can be shown that the loss was not caused by human error on the part of the crew; it was not alternate hold loading; it was not the focsle hatch being inadequately dogged; it was not poor welding. The primary failure points were Inadequate hatch cover strength on the forward two hatch covers; no focsle; weak foredeck vent pipes.

David Byrne


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## Bill Davies

David,

I would disagree. Forgive me but I am always suspicious about people who 'definitely' discount certain events as you have done here and in your previous thread on this matter. I believe that it was 'human error' and the 'root cause' was ingress through the foc'sle hatch through insufficient 'dogging'. This initial flooding changed the 'trim' sufficiently for other elements (vents, etc) to be subjected to 'green water' which they would otherwise not have been. The above was exascerbated by the lack of a traditional foc'sle.
With respect to the Hatch covers. When the subject vessel was built the criteria regulating Hatchcover strength was ILLC 66 which has since, I believe , been revised by IACS under URS 21.
However, the subject vessl satisfied this new criteria and without getting into a debate about the Safety factors and Yield Strenth of these criteria sufficient to say that the Event tree would have followed the path I have suggested. I think the scenario given by your goodself satisfied certain parties and was was an attempt to bring 'closure' on this terrible accident.


----------



## muldonaich

Bill Davies said:


> David,
> 
> I would disagree. Forgive me but I am always suspicious about people who 'definitely' discount certain events as you have done here and in your previous thread on this matter. I believe that it was 'human error' and the 'root cause' was ingress through the foc'sle hatch through insufficient 'dogging'. This initial flooding changed the 'trim' sufficiently for other elements (vents, etc) to be subjected to 'green water' which they would otherwise not have been. The above was exascerbated by the lack of a traditional foc'sle.
> With respect to the Hatch covers. When the subject vessel was built the criteria regulating Hatchcover strength was ILLC 66 which has since, I believe , been revised by IACS under URS 21.
> However, the subject vessl satisfied this new criteria and without getting into a debate about the Safety factors and Yield Strenth of these criteria sufficient to say that the Event tree would have followed the path I have suggested. I think the scenario given by your goodself satisfied certain parties and was was an attempt to bring 'closure' on this terrible accident.


hi there i have an old shipping magazine with the report and photos if you want it a lot of information on it ill send it to you if you want bill regards kev.


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## Bill Davies

Kev,

Many thanks. I have many downloads from various websites.

Brgds

Bill


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## graymay

I sailed on the Cast Petrel, was she not an ex 'shire boat' of the same design? (she may have been the Eden bridge)

Graham


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## Gulpers

Graham,

*Cast Petrel* was originally *Eden Bridge* which was indeed an OBO however, she was built in Sumitomo's Uraga yard.


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## Pat Thompson

Greetings,

The now defunct Radio satirical programme "Weekending" had a poem about the Derbyshire after one of the failed attempts to get a full enquiry. I just remember this bit but it was very appropriate,:-

"When the Derbyshire went missing there was silence on the Tees,
Where the ship had once been launched amid the cheers."
There was silence from the owners there was silence from MPs,
There was silence for another seven years".

It went on a good bit longer but the last line was the most telling :-

"It they have this enquiry (blah blah blah),
There's a danger they might still find something out".

Aye

Pat Thompson

You can't get enough photos of "O'Boats"


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## Bill Davies

Pat,

I believe the outcome of the 'Final Enquiry' was merely to give closure to the subject.

Bill


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## M29

Hi All
At one time, you could view the complete high court report including pages of evidence by all the witnesses on the web but I have been unable to find it recently. I am sorry I didn't download it at the time.
Can anyone say if there was any conclusions in the final enquiry as to why Derbyshire found herself so close to the centre of the Typhoon?
Regards
Alan


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## Bill Davies

M29,
The conclusions of the 'Final Enquiry' are in the public arena. However, accepting them is another matter. The Human Factor element was not addressed as robustly as many would have liked. 

Bill


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## M29

Thanks for reply Bill. I was asking about the position of the ship, as a colleague of mine said there was some possibility of poor reporting by the Weather Routing service, so I would like to have read the report but as I said, I don't seem to be able to find it. 
Cheers
Alan


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## tacho

There seems to be a quite comprehensive report here


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## Bill Davies

tacho said:


> There seems to be a quite comprehensive report here


This report summarises my post #60 in this thread. Throughout this enquiry, Human Error, to my mind the root cause of this dreadfull disaster was not addressed and treated as a 'no go area'. This incident was close to me as I was Master of several OBOs and O/O carriers before and after the incident. 

Bill


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## blobbybluey

(EEK) you really do get off on abusing facts dont you bill read the reports view the videos bill .human error was never a factor poor design ,sunk the derbyshire ,but you seem intent on blaming personnel of whatever form,find the photos of the sister ships,where the chief officer who had sailed on this and sister ships ,where they had to put a " cats cradle" over the hatch for gods sake this ship was built in the late 20th century.practices used on sailing ships 200 yrs previously should never ever come in to it ,so quit trying to besmirch the names and memories of those that died ,who i know personally,and who by the way forced all authorities to come up with final proof of the derbyshires fate,instead of nods and winks about failings of personnel onboard and ashore. and mystery losses of bermuda triangle proportions get a grip bill.(Cloud)


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## Chouan

"The primary failure points were Inadequate hatch cover strength on the forward two hatch covers; no focsle; weak foredeck vent pipes."

The only human error here is design error and perhaps build error, so why the constant focus on the crews' human error?


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## blobbybluey

because in bills univerese,all funnels would be blue and every ship would be accident free,and would sail forever without the need for "poolies" to muck up and kill themselves and every captain would have his superior knowledge ,although the only skippers who sailed f.o.c in the 60s + 70s ,couldnt get a job on red flag ships because of dodgy certificates and past aberrations(Thumb)


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## LEEJ

YeeHaa!!(Thumb)


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## geforce72

Hi everyone i am new here so i would like to just like to say hi, in relation to the derbyshire i thought this would show a intresting insight to what they said happened,what a shame...
regards
keith

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0


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## Bill Davies

Blobbybluey,
Thanks for your erudite and kind reply. I have taken the liberty of looking at your profile before replying in order to pitch it at the right level. I will attempt to answer your post in a chronological manner.
§	Human Factors is a broad topic and would of course incorporate the design element (Naval Architect input) amongst others. You are however adamant in your opening statement that human error was never a factor which seems to leave the designers ‘off the hook’. I am however, more interested in the operational human error which was not addressed robustly enough in the enquiry. There were associations that ‘forced’ (as you put it) a certain point of view throughout. Initially it was the infamous Frame failure and subsequent to the ITF sponsored expedition which removed the Frame failure argument attention was directed at total exoneration of any fault on members of the crew. Whilst this is understandable, could it be that the findings of ‘Final Enquiry’ were merely buying peace as some organisations would never rest until they got the outcome ‘they wanted’. We do a disservice to others who continue to sail in these vessels if we do not put emotions aside and look at all aspects of human error. Alternative loading has come under strong criticism. Securing (dogging arrangements) of the foc’sle access hatch was similarly criticised. Positive steps came out of the incident. See SOLAS Chapter XII Additional Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers
Interesting picture of the foc’sle hatch open and mooring rope flaked on deck, don’t you think??.

§	Your second post is written in a similar vane but a little confused. Universe ships never had blue funnels . They did however have black funnel (halfway there!!) and on six ships Grey Funnels with a GULF logo on them. Their safety record was excellent and I was proud to sail in them. There was never a consideration of me sailing for a communist flag (red flag) company in the 60/70s as the wages were less than the British Flag (reason one goes FOC). 

§	Dodgy Certificate?? You could describe the certificate as such if you wish. I did not have to sit for it. It just arrived in the post. The FOC vessels I sailed for those days were mainly Liberian and Panamanian and the certificates which you describe as ‘dodgy’ were available at examination level ( syllabus approximating to that of the USCG) although I obtained mine on the strength of a British equivalent. Disgraceful I hear you say. I was more than a little ‘miffed’ on this point as the Liberian/Panamanian Authorities did not issue a like for like certificate. 

§	We do however have something in common which I know you will be pleased to hear. Dennis O’Brian who tried to train you in Odyssey Works was a good friend and we celebrated my first command in April 1970 in the Roscoe Arms, Liverpool. But that’s another story and happened before you were even at sea. 

All the very best 

Bill


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## blobbybluey

im not going to get all personal on this bill ,i love the condescending way you have summed up me my intelligence ,character etc on the basis of a few lines of of a profile, but as usual you want to prove how far you raised yourself from the gutter/or scupper,i was not being facetious in raising the f.o.c certificate theory it was merely personal experince over seventeen yrs going to sea .one thing bill i didnt just work as a lowly ab/bosun i worked and obtained qualifications that were at or higher than any of youre certificates, in mining and construction in australia,hotel management, in new zealand and the u.s.a and i am at the moment partner in two very succesful buisnesses in new zealand which by the end of this year will have oulets al over the north island and into south island where i will be moving permanently in the near future with my kids and grandkids. and a curse on you for continually besmirching the name of all those that died on the derbyshire i know the facts anybody else that matters knows the facts you just carry on with your bitter tirades. one thing that dennis obrien did apart from training me very well was to tell every one of us was to beware of the likes of you, and always look the devil in the eye .i am not going to reply to any more of youre posts because i think you just use the turmoil you cause to fill youre sad and lonely existence regards


----------



## Guest

geforce72 said:


> Hi everyone i am new here so i would like to just like to say hi, in relation to the derbyshire i thought this would show a intresting insight to what they said happened,what a shame...
> regards
> keith
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0


good find keith, thks


----------



## Bill Davies

blobbybluey said:


> i know the facts anybody else _*that matters *_knows the facts


Many thanks yours

Bill


----------



## oceangoer

QUOTE
In 2001, Prof. Douglas Faulkner, Emeritus Professor of University of Glasgow, published a lengthy and highly analytical paper examining the Derbyshire's loss in light of the emerging body of scientific evidence regarding the mechanics of freak waves. Among other things, it is now becoming more widely accepted in the scientific community that such rogue waves are far more common than previous mathematical models (and the older ship-building standards that stemmed from them) had suggested. Prof. Faulkner's paper won the "Royal Institution of Naval Architects" award for excellence that year. Prof. Faulkner took direct issue with the conclusions of the original assessment, noting that given the meteorological conditions, and the length of time she was exposed to the peak conditions of the storm, it was almost certain that Derbyshire would have encountered a wave of sufficient size to destroy her. He concluded: "Beyond any reasonable doubt, the direct cause of the loss of the m.v. DERBYSHIRE was the quite inadequate strength of her cargo hatch covers to withstand the forces of typhoon ORCHID.'
UNQUOTE


----------



## Chouan

I think, Oceangoer, that that says it all.


----------



## gbig1

i stayed on the lincolnshire and done a double header many of the crew that paid off joined and went down with the derbyshire so there but for the grace of god go i


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## oceangoer

Those of you who are interested in another analysis of the sinking which comes to substantially the same conclusion as Faulkner can look here :-

http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml

Thanks to Bill Davies and others who have re-awoken my somnolent mind on this issue. I now recall that following Derbyshire I stayed away from big bulkers and stuck to tankers and general cargo (chicken).

The question I'd be interested in discussing is .... how did the Master find himself in this situation re typhoon Orchid. He had weather routing etc yet still found himself in the dangerous semi circle.

Here's something to start you off ..... http://www.ocean-systems.com/pdf_docs/Safety at Sea.pdf


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## Santos

I really do not see the point of resurrecting something which official judgement has already been passed on and which invites those still seeking to blame someone revel in their own and nobody elses importance.

The Derbyshire is gone with all her crew, the relatives of those lost fought hard and long for justice and hopefully are now at some kind of peace. 

No ammount of personal speculation on who or what was the cause of the loss is going to serve any useful purpose, on the contrary it is just going to raise blood pressures and perhaps cause pain to anyone personally involved in the tragedy who sees this thread. Those that are gone cannot answer for themselves so only speculation can be put forward.

Leave it alone and move to another subject which is not as delicate as this one.

Chris. (Cloud)


----------



## Bill Davies

Oceangoer,

I am well conversant with Faulkners findings and I have met him but, he is an academic. I am always mildly surprised when these men are often dismissed 'out of hand' but embraced with a passion when it suits. I sailed in OBOs before and after this dreadful incident and have a vested interest in pursuing the truth. Improving safety at sea is what interests me. Emotions and burying one head in the sand do not help.


----------



## Orbitaman

Providing the 'truth' echoes Bills opinion?


----------



## Chouan

"I am well conversant with Faulkners findings and I have met him but, he is an academic."

And....?

I know that my reply is invisible to Bill, but why is Faulkner being an academic prefixed by a but? Does this make his years of research and study irrelevant because he doesn't have a pre-1970's Master's Certificate?


----------



## Santos

Bill Davies said:


> Oceangoer,
> 
> Emotions and burying one head in the sand do not help.


No we must find a fall guy, must'nt we Bill, no matter what pain we inflict on undeserving people. 

Obviously to you, structures dont fail through overburden, nor do elements overwhelm , it has to be someones fault, someone who according to you must suffer for this publicly. You live in a sad, sad, world.

Chris.


----------



## non descript

Santos said:


> I really do not see the point of resurrecting something which official judgement has already been passed on and which invites those still seeking to blame someone revel in their own and nobody elses importance.
> 
> The Derbyshire is gone with all her crew, the relatives of those lost fought hard and long for justice and hopefully are now at some kind of peace.
> 
> No ammount of personal speculation on who or what was the cause of the loss is going to serve any useful purpose, on the contrary it is just going to raise blood pressures and perhaps cause pain to anyone personally involved in the tragedy who sees this thread. Those that are gone cannot answer for themselves so only speculation can be put forward.
> 
> Leave it alone and move to another subject which is not as delicate as this one.
> 
> Chris. (Cloud)



Chris
I thank you for your excellent and very wise words - as you say: *"it is just going to raise blood pressures and perhaps cause pain to anyone personally involved in the tragedy who sees this thread"*
So please, would everyone take full note of these words and make an effort not to add comments that make nothing but trouble and sadness.
There a plenty of people on this Site who have good reason to comment, but have the kindness and style NOT to, they also deserve thanks and understanding.
Mark


----------



## oceangoer

Bill,


Bill Davies said:


> Oceangoer,
> Emotions and burying one head in the sand do not help.


I suggest you re-read my posts 81 and 84. If you can find "emotion" or even a sand buried head, please advise.

The "hands off, don't touch" requests of some contributors leave me a little puzzled. Without enquiring minds we'll never move forward. 

I have no interest in hanging someone out to dry. As I said in an earlier post, I'd be interested to know how she finished up in the dangerous quadrant of Orchid. 

I spent much of my seagoing career in the typhoon and cyclone affected longitudes of the East and had a number of disagreements with Charterers who wanted me to follow "their" routing instructions regardless of conditions. Were such instructions a factor ?

The latest timecharter decisions can place the Master in an invidious legal position vis-a-vis weather routing services.


----------



## Bill Davies

Oceangoer,
The 'hands off, don't touch' obviously comes from a certain contributor who, as in Blue Funnel Reborn cannot handle a topic and therefore wants it removed. 
Without the moderator 'quoting' this individual I would have no indication what he or his colleagues have to offer.
I am not in the slightest bit interested in looking to apportion blame to any individual as their is no point as they are gone. I am however interested in inquiring along the lines that you have suggested and learning from others mistakes if indeed such mistakes were made. That is the only way we will learn. There are too many questions that remain unanswered to sweep this under the carpet. Whether it is done here or elsewhere it will not and should not remain silent.


----------



## oceangoer

Bill,



Bill Davies said:


> The 'hands off, don't touch' obviously comes from a certain contributor who, as in Blue Funnel Reborn cannot handle a topic and therefore wants it removed.Without the moderator 'quoting' this individual I would have no indication what he or his colleagues have to offer.


Don't worry about that. It's all part of lifes' rich tapestry, I'd drink it out at the pub in Bleddfa.



> I am however interested in inquiring along the lines that you have suggested and learning from others mistakes if indeed such mistakes were made.


The thing that intrigues me is the part that "TheWeatherRouter" (TWR) played in this disaster. I'm trying to get hold of a copy of her time charter and the pre-charter correspondence attached thereto. 

As you know, Bill, you can be pressed (by the terms of the CP) into a route which has a higher risk than you'd normally be prepared to accept.

The arguments I normally had with Charterers were to do with a certain weather routing company which was brilliant in PR and awful in delivery. When I get some pox doctors clerk telling me what my fuel consumption will be (or else) it engages my phooh phooh valve. As a shipMASTER I did my level best for my Charterer and Owner. 

Have a look at some of the recent decision on time charters

I can't help but feel (and that's all it is, just a feeling) that in the case of "Derbyshire" the Master may have been influenced .......


----------



## andysk

oceangoer said:


> The question I'd be interested in discussing is .... how did the Master find himself in this situation re typhoon Orchid. He had weather routing etc yet still found himself in the dangerous semi circle.
> 
> Here's something to start you off ..... http://www.ocean-systems.com/pdf_docs/Safety at Sea.pdf


It all depends on the accuracy of the information provided by the owners to the Met Office. I was on a bulk carrier and was weather routed from Rotterdam to 7 Islands in January, north about Scotland to avoid a deep depression in the Atlantic. We ran smack into the middle of it because our speed was overestimated to the Met Office, and the low changed course. That was back in the 1970's though, so one would expect things to be a bit more accurate nowadays - or perhaps not.


----------



## MARINEJOCKY

I was going to start this off by saying "with all due respect" however I have no respect for those that sit at home and will not let the Derbyshire rest. 

What are you trying to achieve by now going on about weather routers, the other day it was masters and crew, then it was the professor, how about the welders, how about the guy loading the cargo, how about the junior who was making the tea, 

Why don't you lot send a load of private messages between yourselfs and get off on that, because all you are doing here is taking up space

Was it one of you Masters on FOC's who meant to send a telegram to the company saying "ships engines stopped yet again, have told the charterers that lost 18 hours due to weather" but actually sent it to the charterers. Lets start a thread about those who could not get a job on a British ship and used the excuse of more money on FOC's to justify there newly found position and see how the insults start to fly. 

What ever information you think you may learn you are in no position to use any of it. Who is going to listen to you. You are masters of your own lair and no body else is interested in you. So read and listen to what the majority are saying to you and shut the h--l up. 

Go get a life and leave those others in peace.


----------



## Bill Davies

Very eloquently written Marinejockey .


----------



## Santos

Bill Davies said:


> Oceangoer,
> The 'hands off, don't touch' obviously comes from a certain contributor who, as in Blue Funnel Reborn cannot handle a topic and therefore wants it removed.
> Without the moderator 'quoting' this individual I would have no indication what he or his colleagues have to offer.


I am obviously on your ignore list Bill, great, then everyone can see that you stick your head in the sand and cant take any criticism of your views. How sad that you cant defend yourself and must ignore any difference in opion by blanking it out. I REALLY FEEL SORRY FOR YOU.


----------



## oceangoer

MARINEJOCKY said:


> Go get a life and leave those others in peace.


What a useful addition to the sum of maritime knowledge you propose ..... when there's a marine accident don't investigate or even do a little digging in case it upsets someone.

It is my intention to continue to probe this particular case and a number of others which have some commonality. 

When I've finished I'll post what I've found out.


----------



## Sister Eleff

geforce72 said:


> Hi everyone i am new here so i would like to just like to say hi, in relation to the derbyshire i thought this would show a intresting insight to what they said happened,what a shame...
> regards
> keith
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0


Thank you for posting this link geforce, it certainly helps an amateur like myself to understand a little better. What chance would any have, when it all happened in 2 minutes from the first implosion.

Why do you attack each other over this type of thing? One member put forward a very good question, yes the findings answered one area but did not fully examine all questions, therefore these were not answered. If they had been, the loading or whatever, could have been exonerated or found wanting.

It is not a case of letting those gone, rest in peace but protecting the lives of those still to come. The souls that were lost would not have wanted their passing to go in vane.


----------



## ddraigmor

There was a huge study done by Captain DC Ramwell, together with the 'Derbyshire Families Association. Frame 65 was blamed. 

The research was faultless, based on marine observations and many seafarers contributed to it. It was discounted. The Academic angle was preferred.

I still reckon something smells rotten - but hey, I was just an AB with an interest in the whole affair who hapened to like the way captain Dave Ramwell stood his ground and fought for answers. Seafarers know ships. Academics know facts. 

Sometimes the two don't quite meet in a tidy explanation.....but don't shoot me; I'm just having my say.

Jonty


----------



## MARINEJOCKY

Oceangoer,

Far from not investigating marine accidents I have spent the last twenty years as a surveyor and "investigator" into marine accidents. Sometimes one has to move on so what good are you or your fellow retired "Masters" going to do by casting out theories when you have no facts. 

How many ships are being built to the same design as those lost, how many loading computers are still the same, are weather routers still using the same source of information, are the crew still trained in the same way as they were back then.

How many inquiries have there been into this one accident. 27 years have past and you think you can find something that has been missed. 

Instead of looking into the distant past why do you not look at new builds and new ideas to keep those safe. Do a study on the various types of ships to see if there is a pattern on newer ships that may fail and those are the ships that the crews are on now. 

The bottom line to me and many others is that I do care if a Captain sent a AB or cadet out on deck to take soundings before a storm and he forgot to dog down a hatch, I do not care to know if the hatches were not secured with the right type of catches because we all know that all of us could have been there but for the grace of God. 

The important thing for all to know is that we have all learnt from every disaster. 

Try doing something Constructive instead of Destructive.


----------



## Bill Davies

*Oceangoer,*

I am in total agreement with what you say and I will continue to probe and will post here or anywhere else I choose.


*ddraigmore,*
It is clear you have admiration for the individual you named. He stood his ground but would have had greater credibility if he had more *actual *experience of the ship type under question.

*Marinejockey*,

Your latest post and post #95 are without doubt the most ignorant and ill informed post I have ever had the displeasure of reading on this site. No doubt a suitably flowery and eloquent post will follow.


----------



## ddraigmor

Bill,

His angle was that of a concerned seafarer who just happened to believe in what he researched, having taken many accounts of crews who had sailed these ships. He also did the RTE Radio Programme as a presenter and, in my opinion, would have made an excellent Master to have sailed under.

Dealing with academics every day - and having recently written a paper (co-authored) with one - I know that the majority of them mean well, have an interest - but no experience.

At the end of the day the seafarer has a 'feel' for their ship. many Masters I sailed with knew something was up before it happened. That kind of experience cannot be duplicated. My point was that academics work on dry data. It is seafarers who work with the 'end product', with all its foibles and ways. Their voice should never be discounted when looking at facts.

Jonty


----------



## tacho

If the forepeak became flooded how much would the trim have been effected. A couple of thousand tons right forward would have quite an effect. In "normal" conditions this might not be catastrophic but in a Typhoon it could tip the balance.
I'm sure this post will attract the usual opprobrium; but we should remember; and recent events have shown that the sea is a completely unforgiving environment where the smallest mistake can be fatal. We all make mistakes all of the time and it is better to learn from them, and less painful to learn from other peoples'. The loss of the Derbyshire was without doubt due to a series of errors...... in construction, operation etc etc and I don't see any harm in discussing them.


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## ddraigmor

Well said Tacho!

Jonty


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## Bill Davies

Jonty,

Good post and I would agree with its content. 

Brgds

Bill


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## MARINEJOCKY

Bill,

Yes I will follow up with a "flowery and eloquent" post just as you knew I would. You may think that you are achieving something by posting insulting posts on just about every thread that I have read where your name appears. No matter how much you insult me I would rather you did that than pick on others who are not so fortunate so I say bring it on.

Do you and your buddies think that you are the only ones who had a feel for their ships. Do you not think that we did not also wonder what happened. 

In 1981 I was on a small container ship with a drunken "English" master on a FOC who certainly had no feel for his ship as we left Singapore for Japan. This experienced Captain had all the information at his finger tips and yet still sailed into the path of two typhoons. Where was it that the Debyshire went down. As I already stated in another post I ended up sending my wife and son a telegram as I thought I was not going to make it home. We went 23 miles back wards in 9 days and in the eye of the first storm during our inspection of the deck we discovered massive cracks from the hatch coaming down on the side deck and over the side to about 8 feet above the water line. Try sitting on a bosuns chair drilling the end of the crack and then welding as fast as I could and you soon get a feel for a ship or something. 

Thankfully we made it into Japan, discovered the "Master" passed out in his cabin with 14 empty bottles of whiskey around him and he was fired. 

As the ship made it we could all take our time to find out why the cracks appeared and I hate to say it but due to the longitudinal side coaming on the hatch being compromised at the vertical post for the hatch covers the crack started. Further tests and checks discovered that when the ship was fully loaded the stress points were not in that location but due to us only have a few very heavy containers in the bottom of each hold this caused the problems. 

This was one of nine sister ships and all but two had been built in the same way. 

Trust me the Derbyshire was certainly in my mind as we went through that experience and that sparked my interest in the forensic investigation of marine accidents and I have spent the last 20 years discovering many design faults and have been instrumental in making many changes in my field. 

I however take greater pride in creating things and improving equipment and would like to think I have helped in improviong the working enviroment for those going to sea. 

I think we should start a thread for bitter old men and let them insult each other.


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## Bill Davies

Unbelievable!!!


----------



## tacho

Agree Bill, although "unbelievable" wasn't the first word that came to mind.

Another one for the "igbore" list I think.


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## Bill Davies

Agreed, No.7!!


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## oceangoer

"9 September 0930 GMT; Now hove to due to severe tropical storm; estimated time of arrival Kawasaki 14th hopefully"

That was the last heard from “Derbyshire”.

Through the late 70’s to mid 80’s my ever growing pile of delayed delivery “Lloyds Lists” contained ever more frequent reports of bulk carriers simply vanishing or breaking up and I opted out of that type of vessel for the balance of my seagoing career which ended on 30th June 2002.

Have a look at Woinin’s collection of casualties here ……….

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sbchron+.htm

He also provides some useful commentaries ………….

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sdbyxsto.htm

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sderby.htm

On 8th Nov, 2000 the findings of the Re-opened enquiry were announced which exonerated the crew. Unfortunately the cost of the enquiry transcript is 180 pnds so I haven’t obtained one.

From personal experience I was concerned about the effect on ships Masters of Charterers Weather Routing requirements under Time Charters and started to do this little bit of digging.

It is, perhaps, unfortunate that I chose to retire when I did. Had I waited another 6 – 9 months then I’d have had my answer. By that time MSC/Circ. 1063 would have been in my Regs file …………

http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id=6562/1063.pdf

I find the Annex particularly interesting as it indicates that there was more than a little concern about the standard of weather information supplied to the Master of Derbyshire and also the “charter pressure” that he may have been under.

It took them 2 years to come up with this (and the revised SOLAS Regs), but they DID address the problem.

Would Masters of bulk carriers today be any safer by the IMO adopting the “hands-off” attitude advocated elsewhere in this Thread? I think not.

It took over 20 years from the date of the casualty to the publication of the various MSC’s which are intended to increase the degree of safety experienced by ships crews on bulk carriers. If this process had been halted along the way (for whatever reason) we would have been perpetuating a serious problem.


----------



## Bill Davies

Oceangoer,

Good post. Let us hope that others who contribute to this thread follow in a similar style.

Bill


----------



## ddraigmor

Captain Pierre Woinin was involved with Captain Dave Ramwell and Captain Pete Heyboer into looking at bulker losses. I corresponded with all three in my time and was pleased to assist Captain Heyboer in looking closer at the result of an enquiry into the loss of a crewman's life when a stand-by boat launched her FRC off the Dutch coast in a storm 6 with two crew.

All good men. All seamen - and all responsible for the closer look at the appalling safety record of the bulk carrier fleet when it seemed every week brought news of yet another 'failure' leading to loss of life.

Jonty


----------



## Chouan

I also corresponded with Dave Ramwell about the loss of the Derbyshire, having sailed on a sistership, and I was interviewed by the BBC for a radio 4 programme about her loss (not that that makes me any more qualified than not being interviewed). However, the particular causes and factors of the loss of the Derbyshire should not detract from the other design and build faults of the class as a whole, especially the departure from the original design for reasons of cost. 
That she was lost because of failure of the hatchcovers should not mean that the rest of the catalogue of failures shouldn't be forgotten, just because they didn't contribute directly to her loss.


----------



## Chouan

ddraigmor said:


> There was a huge study done by Captain DC Ramwell, together with the 'Derbyshire Families Association. Frame 65 was blamed.
> 
> The research was faultless, based on marine observations and many seafarers contributed to it. It was discounted. The Academic angle was preferred.
> 
> I still reckon something smells rotten - but hey, I was just an AB with an interest in the whole affair who hapened to like the way captain Dave Ramwell stood his ground and fought for answers. Seafarers know ships. Academics know facts.
> 
> Sometimes the two don't quite meet in a tidy explanation.....but don't shoot me; I'm just having my say.
> 
> Jonty


There can be a connection between the two, but too often there is a mutual antipathy, which both sides perceive, which causes unnecessary problems. The academics know that they are held in contempt, let us say, by the seafarers as not being practical men, and the seafarers know that the academics think them less than intellectual giants. Both sides, therefore, find it hard to cooperate.

I gave Dave Ramwell all of my information about the weaknesses of the "Kona", the repairs, buckling, cracking etc that had occurred around frame 65, and the excessive flexing that occurred at that area, as evidenced by the condition of the deck in way of that frame, as well as the frequency of inspection that the standing orders required. 
All of this argued that that the inherent weakness of that area of the ship was well known. All of this added to the massive weight of evidence that he was able to bring to bear. That it was discounted and subsequently "proven" to be "irrelevent" is of little consequence in the overall picture of the appalling story of these ships.


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## ddraigmor

Chouan,

Amen.

Jonty


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## M29

Hi all

Reference the ships position and Typhoon, this quote from Justice Colman after the 1980 Enguiry seems to answer it

_The judge said that the Derbyshire had been manned by a "competent and very experienced" master and crew. The allegation that the crew had failed to secure the hatches "clearly involved the imputation of serious negligence," he said. It was deeply upsetting to the families of those on board. 


The captain did not change course to avoid the storm because available weather forecasts showed sea conditions that would let him keep ahead of the typhoon, the judge said_

Some data from the story puplished elsewhere:

_The Charter Party required the ship to comply with recommendations from a weather routing service. Weather routing would advise course and speed, to minimise fuel consumption, based on expected weather. The ship sent messages to the weather service every two days giving her position and speed. September 3rd, ship's speed increased to 12.5 knots to pass ahead of a tropical depression indicated in Japanese weather fax. Weather service confirmed the existence of the tropical depression and recommended that the ship take a northerly course to clear it. 5th Sept, weather service advised Master that route was still valid and that the tropical depression would reach storm intensity by the following day. 6th September the ship reduced speed to 10 knots as the tropical depression had apparently subsided. But during the course of that day typhoon Orchid developed close to the tropical depression. In the enquiry, the weather sevice was criticized for not warning the ship about Orchid._

All this information is freely available from various web sites. Also, a met report on "Orchid" shows that it "looped" 3 times! As well as the 44 on Derbyshire, it cost another 100+ lives when it came ashore.

Alan


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## John Cassels

Despite a very strong impulse to post on this thread , I have not done so up
to now. Boy , am I glad I didn't get involved. Some of these posts defy any
logic .


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## andy dunn

hi,
wonder if you on the tyne bridge same time as me.seven months in 76,catering boy at the time,couple guys i remember, ronnie abraham second steward,rocky wilson,ab, think bertie shields bos,on,
joined her in japan,think there had been a fire in the galley just berfore i joined,,also think there had been some explosion on the deck.
bye ,andy dunn


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## randcmackenzie

*Me Too*



John Cassels said:


> Despite a very strong impulse to post on this thread , I have not done so up
> to now. Boy , am I glad I didn't get involved. Some of these posts defy any
> logic .


Me too John, and I gave some evidence at the Reopened Formal Enquiry. For my trouble I did get a copy of its findings without paying the £180 quoted elsewhere. 

Best regards, Roddie.


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## oceangoer

The fact that there seems to be little interplay between the judiciary and a ships Owners/Master was amply demonstrated in this Leading Case decision of the House of Lords of December 2000 ............

TOPIC MOVED TO MESSDECK to avoid further reference to Derbyshire.


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## geforce72

Hi "Jonty" what uve stated does make sence something does smell about the cause why she went down & how/why so quickly, @ the end of the day WE all just want the truth especialy the family's,I am not sure if there is any hiddeness in the truth but maybe one day someone might read this who does know & before they die tell the media cause its damn horrible to "go" that way even the sight of been on the bridge & seeing the ship get swallowed up like that must of been seen by someone & it would of been HORRIFIC!!!


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## Chouan

I was just taking over the watch on the "Avenger", an OBO managed by Tradax, in the N.Pacific, 2000, 23rd of December having sailed from Tacoma the previous day with a cargo of grain for Taiwan. The weather was atrocious, very cold, high winds, very high seas. The Mate and Dad were on the bridge. Whilst we were doing the hand over, we went into the trough of a wave, all three of us were looking at the bows descending into the abyss, and the crest of the next wave rising above us. Dad had the presence of mind to call the look-out into the wheel house, and we closed the bridge wing doors, and waited. The focsle went into the wave and the green sea passed along the deck, hitting the bridge front, stopping us dead.
I thought, quite consciously, "so this is how it ends".

However, she recovered, we regained momentum, the water drained off the bridge wings, and after a few minutes, 5? 10? the Old Man said "Well, I thought that we were gone then." 

Whenever I think of the Derbyshire I think of that.


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## K urgess

Makes me glad I avoided the dreaded OBOs.
It was bad enough going around the Cape in a VLCC and watching it flex while dodging the spray.
It didn't take much to persuade me to swallow the anchor after I'd seen the state of Big Geordie in drydock in Singapore after only skirting the edge of a typhoon.
Give me a nice little general cargo ship every time.


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## Chouan

We were carrying a relatively light and buoyant cargo as well, not the dead weight of iron ore.
Perhaps I lacked the intelligence or imagination to come ashore.
Details of the ship here http://www.wellandcanal.ca/salties/t/tradenomad/nomad.htm


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## marinero

Marconi Sahib said:


> Makes me glad I avoided the dreaded OBOs.
> It was bad enough going around the Cape in a VLCC and watching it flex while dodging the spray.
> It didn't take much to persuade me to swallow the anchor after I'd seen the state of Big Geordie in drydock in Singapore after only skirting the edge of a typhoon.
> Give me a nice little general cargo ship every time.


I know exactly what you mean Kris. I experienced the same on the IronBridge when it flexed and twisted in a hurricane. The Old Man nursed it through like a baby. I was glad I was wearing brown trousers at the time.
Regards
Leo(Thumb)


----------



## Bill Davies

Marinero,
Nursing these vessels through is the only way. Some of my most memorable experiences in a fifty year career happened in these ships.
Bill


----------



## marinero

Bill Davies said:


> Marinero,
> Nursing these vessels through is the only way. Some of my most memorable experiences in a fifty year career happened in these ships.
> Bill


Hi Bill.
I only served on two of this type "IronBridge" (6 months) and "Furness Bridge" (2 years) and although not being in the Deck Dept I was very aware of what what could happen if care was not taken in such dangerous cir***stances as we are talking about in this thread. Mind you though Bill, the Masters we had on both ships at the time were very responsible in their outlook and also in keeping all crew members in touch with what was happening.
Regards(Thumb)


----------



## Bill Davies

Marinero,
Maintenance on these ships was ongoing (as it is on all ships) but to a greater degree on this type and even more so in O/O as opposed to OBOs (Gas freeing in TSTks). Cracking iwo of main deck hatch corners was a regular occurrence as did the drilling and welding that ensued. Alternate hold loading exacerbated these cracks and although I loaded in this manner several times between 73-80 I never felt comfortable when doing so. Bending Moments were acceptable (although always Hogging) Shearing Forces were invariable at Max (and over). Quote: _Masters always responsible in their outlook_ unquote: Marinero, you had to be. Whether it was Dampier/Rotterdam or Sepitiba Bay to Redcar I could be found doing a morning inspection as discretely as possible (whilst talking to 'the crowd on deck) I would consciously 'log' little cracks and note there growth. Ant they grew! (no need for Calculus here)

Brgds

Bill


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## John Cassels

Yes , you're right Bill. Deck fractures in way of hatch coaming corners were
all too common on these ships. They were also among the worst abused
ships for commercial reasons. Alternate hold loading was pushed by owners
and ( more so ) charterers to reduce the cost of hold cleaning. Load and
discharge installations demanded it so as to reduce the number of moves -
lifting on and off of bulldozers and cleaning gangs was just an inconvenience
to them.
Another point of contention was the "harbour condition " , again a favourate
of charterers especially with multiple load or discharge ports .
What about the use of High Tensile steel ( with the subsequent reduction in
scantlings) in the '60's and '70's. We have all stood up top during inclement
weather and in ballast and watched the forward part actually bouncing.

Now put all these factors together during say a span of 10 years with perhaps 20 load/discharge cycles per year. Is it any wonder that the structure of these ships became far weaker than any of us realised at the
time ?.


----------



## cawky

Chouan said:


> My brother knew a bloke who was a welder at Haverton Hill at the time. There was considerable industrial unrest at the time and he told my brother that, unless they were closely supervised, they welded by stuffing the area to be joined with welding rods, then welding a skin over the top so that it looked like a sound weld. As they were paid piece work, in effect, it meant that they got more work 'done' in a given time. Obviously welds were inspected, but, how realistic is it to expect that every inch of a weld is tested.
> It doesn't argue against the cause of the sinking, but it does speak volumes for the quality of the build.



Hi all,

I did a bit of work in 1991 doing shot recovery , after the shotblasters we had to clean up the shot,

and I can say i have definately heard the same story from the older men I was working with about filling in the welds .


----------



## Chouan

Horrible isn't it, to hear such a story corroborated.


----------



## oceangoer

John Cassels said:


> put all these factors together during say a span of 10 years with perhaps 20 load/discharge cycles per year. Is it any wonder that the structure of these ships became far weaker than any of us realised at the time ?.


Rather like aircraft isn't it. It's not the age that matters so much as the number of landing cycles it has done that matters. For aircraft of equivalent age the short haul one will usually command a lower price.


----------



## RayJordandpo

cawky said:


> Hi all,
> 
> I did a bit of work in 1991 doing shot recovery , after the shotblasters we had to clean up the shot,
> 
> and I can say i have definately heard the same story from the older men I was working with about filling in the welds .


That is quite scary to say the least!


----------



## DICK SLOAN

Very upsetting indeed, botched welds even worse, not even spotted! by foreman, or were they!!!


----------



## alastairrussell

*More Misinformation*

I do not know when this was written but I found it yesterday and it appears to have come from the USA. It is a cover up and hides the real truth. The sinking was brought about by defective and substandard changes made to new legislation introduced at an International Load Line Convention in 1966. This allowed all new ships to be built with a reduced freeboard. 

From my experience these changes along with the use of high tensile steel in high stress area of the hull, had a major impact on the lifespan and safe operation of all new bulk Ore carriers. It should be noted that the defective formulae quoted below was developed in the USA! 

I quote: 

In the final inquiry the Hon. Justice Colman overturned the earlier inquiry conclusion that laid the blame of the sinking on ‘operator error’ and blamed it on bow flooding caused by changes to the Load Line rules introduced in the 1966 convention. I quote Hon. Justice Coleman: 

*“ My report concluded that the 1966 Convention was seriously defective in as much as it very substantially under-estimated the minimum forward hatchcover strength and in as much as the methodology of calculation was conceptually defective" *

Alastair Russell

*New Tools Yield Clues to Disasters at Sea*________________________________________
________________________________________
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
There were no distress calls or survivors. The sea that brutal night claimed the lives of 42 men and two women. Six weeks later, one lifeboat was found afloat, empty and broken, torn from its davits. 
The Derbyshire had been one of the largest and safest ships ever built, a star of the British merchant fleet. Her great size, longer than three football fields, was seen as vital to survival in rough seas. But all that meant nothing in September 1980, when the big ore carrier sank in a typhoon.. 
Since then, interest in the ship's mysterious fate has grown into an epic of scientific debate and sleuthing, a high-stakes detective story that is still unfolding. The work is made possible by robots and other advanced technologies, some kept secret during the cold war, that are now allowing investigators to peer deep into the sea's darkness, illuminating much that was once lost or hidden. 
Recently, a British-American team lowered robots down 2.6 miles to view the ship's shattered remains at the bottom of the Pacific some 500 miles south of Japan. It was the third such foray and cost nearly $3 million. 
The findings have prompted London to reopen a formal inquiry on the Derbyshire, the largest British merchant ship ever lost at sea. But the implications are wider, involving the whole class of vessels known as bulk carriers. Since the Derbyshire went down, the sea has claimed 180 of the ships and 1,465 lives, according to Lloyd's Register of Shipping, which tracks maritime safety. 
The vessels have been sinking, often mysteriously, at a rate of nearly one a month, fleets of Titanics quietly disappearing from view. 
A rogue's gallery of suspects has been proposed to explain the disasters, including fire, explosion, collision, old age, navigational error, design flaws, structural failure and even scuttling by owners so eager for insurance money that they don't mind murdering their crews. 
The Derbyshire inquiries have identified a surprising culprit, and they have already begun to shake up ship design worldwide, giving investigators hope that the long string of maritime disasters is at last coming to an end. Marine authorities "now have the evidence for the first time," said Richard Pittenger, head of operations at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution on Cape Cod, which led the recent Derbyshire inquiry. "It will have a big impact." 
In a letter thanking President Clinton for American aid, Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, called the deep probe "one of the greatest feats of underwater detective work ever undertaken." He called the results amazing. 
The findings are also bringing some comfort to the lost sailors' families and friends, whose pressure and protests, carried on for years, finally provoked the British authorities to act. Crew families say their main hope is that the investigators improve the lot of all seafarers, who are often disregarded, especially if they come, as many do, from poor countries like Pakistan, Honduras and the Philippines. 
"When a tanker goes aground, and sea creatures die, everybody screams," said Paul Lambert, whose 19-year-old brother was lost on the Derbyshire and who now heads the Derbyshire Family Association. "But a bulk carrier goes down and nobody cares. It took a British ship with a British crew and British families agitating about it to highlight the fact that all these bulkers have been sinking." 

The New York Times
________________________________________
The Ships
A Global Fleet for Raw Transport 
Bulkers, as ships like the Derbyshire are known, haul dry cargoes like ore, grain and coal around the globe. The work is punishing and hazardous, especially for ships weakened by decades of hard use and poor maintenance. Life on oil tankers, freighters and even fishing boats is safer. Few bulkers fly the American flag or carry American crews, but thousands of the giant vessels are registered in countries like Cyprus, Liberia and Panama. 
The Derbyshire was only four years old when she went down and had won Lloyd's highest general rating. The 47-year-old captain, Geoffrey V. Underhill, was a master mariner who had completed many voyages. Besides, at 965 feet, the ship was one of the largest afloat and was viewed as very safe. As bulkers go, she was comfortable -- each crewman had his own cabin and shower. Wives were welcome, and two had joined what would be its last voyage. 
After a stop in New York in July 1980, the ship went to Canada and loaded thousands of tons of iron ore concentrates bound for Japan, where they were to be turned into cars, ships and girders for skyscrapers. 
A typhoon intervened. Winds of up to 100 miles per hour drove waves to heights of 60 to 100 feet. 
"Vessel hove to violent storm," the Derbyshire radioed hours before she disappeared. The signal meant she was moving forward just enough to maintain steerage way, struggling to keep her bow into the waves, the safest pose in heavy seas. 
The Agony
Families Push for Investigation 
After the Derbyshire vanished, family pain was sharp for Peter Ridyard, whose 25-year-old son, David, had been aboard. Ridyard was a ship surveyor for the Salvage Association, a group based in London that assesses damaged vessels for insurance companies like Lloyd's of London. 
Experts say his tireless hunt for the truth helped advance the case. In particular, Ridyard warned that the Derbyshire, and sister ships, might have had structural flaws at a heavy wall that separated engine from cargo spaces and lay astern, near the ship's vast superstructure. 
Weakness at this spot, called frame 65, would have left the Derbyshire and her sister ships prone to breaking in two, he suggested, and that might explain why the ship had vanished so quickly without any calls for help. 
In 1986, his hunch strengthened as a sister ship ran aground on Irish rocks and split in half near frame 65. But an inquiry drew no firm conclusions, stating in 1989 only that the Derbyshire was probably lost to rough weather. 
It was at this point that Lambert of the family group began saying that the Derbyshire sank twice, first in bad weather, then in a bucket of whitewash. But family members kept up their pressure and the International Transport Workers' Federation, an umbrella group of labor unions, hired Oceaneering Technologies Inc., a Maryland company that has worked for the American Navy, to find the ship. In 1994, in a two-week expedition, the company succeeded, its robot surveying a blur of scattered parts on the ocean floor. 
The families and union group concluded that the survey bolstered the frame-65 theory and the evidence prompted British authorities to step in. 
London conducted a preliminary survey in 1996 and found the stern, including a large piece bearing the words "Derbyshire" and "Liverpool." The next year, the Woods Hole team aided the British effort by lowering a pair of advanced robots to map and inspect the wreckage thoroughly, snapping more than 137,000 pictures. 
"It's more than we've ever taken" of any seabed area, said Andrew Bowen, who led the Woods Hole team during a grueling expedition that lasted 49 days and was interrupted by a typhoon. 
The star of the probe was Jason, a seven-foot robot sent on a long tether into the deep. Built by Woods Hole and financed by the Pentagon, the $5 million robot has a mechanical claw, motors and many lights and cameras that flash signals back to the surface through a long fiber-optic cable, allowing investigators watching televisions to feel like they're flying across the bottom of the sea. 
But instead of strengthening the frame-65 theory, the work found new evidence that put it asunder. 
The Discovery
Wide Evidence of a New Culprit 
The End to the Mystery?
After an extensive examination, an investigative team determined that the Derbyshire sank not because of faults in frame 65, a favorite theory, but because of a slow introduction of water into the bow of the ship.
The Likely Culprits
During the storm, an unsecured hatch cover may have allowed water into a small bow storage space. Additional water may have come in through the ventilator heads.

The New York Times
1 Over the next 12 hours, as wave after wave of the storm washed over the deck of the ship, the bow storage areas filled completely, lowering the angle of the ship's bow. 
________________________________________
Frame 65 had never been a sole suspect. Forensic experts in London had come up with 13 possible ways to explain the Derbyshire's loss. Among the other suspects were explosion, fire, engine failure and so on. 
The robot surveys eliminated most of them. Surprisingly and unambiguously, moreover, the evidence also ruled out frame 65. It showed that the tragedy had begun at the ship's bow rather than at frame 65 near the stern. 
Most of the Derbyshire, the team discovered, had been torn into thousands of fragments. But not the bow, which after its fall had plowed deep into the mud. As revealed by robotic floodlights miles down, the ghostly intactness meant the bow had flooded slowly, allowing it to hold its shape while sinking. By contrast, the other structures of the ship had obviously plunged while full of air, imploding violently under the crushing pressure of deep water. 
Robin A. Williams, a British maritime expert who led the Government assessment, said the team did find flaws in the remains of frame 65, including alignment errors of more than an inch. In some situations, he added, such flaws would be enough to cause deadly fractures. But not in this case. "It was not a contributory factor," Williams said. 
Other possible causes were also ruled out. Williams said there were no signs of fire, explosion, foul play or the like. 

The New York Times
2 As the front of the ship dipped, the waves struck at a more violent angle, smashing the metal cover into the first cargo hold. The hold filled immediately with some 10,000 tons of water. 
________________________________________
But there was wide evidence of other trouble. At the bow, many ventilator heads were missing, seemingly torn off. And in the wreckage, giant hatch covers nearly the size of basketball courts lay shattered, twisted and bent, apparently pummeled by killer waves. 
The team concluded that many protective covers at or near ship's bow had failed, letting the sea in slowly at first, then quickly. Ultimately, Williams said in an interview, "She sank because the hatch covers failed." 
The assessment, written by Williams and his colleague Remo Torchio, was laid out in an exhaustive report released last year in London by the Department of Transport. 

The New York Times
3 With the bow sinking rapidly, the remaining cargo holds imploded under the weight of the water. As the ship sank further the ocean's pressure crushed unflooded space. 
________________________________________
The Death Throes
A Slow Tip to a Fast End 
Drawing on all the evidence, the team came up with a blow-by-blow view of the Derbyshire's final hours and minutes: 
As the typhoon raged, an unsecured forward hatch was lost, letting water into a small bow storage space, which filled in less than an hour. Growing waves then smashed off ventilator heads. Over 12 hours or so, these openings let water flood such larger areas as ballast tanks. 
The tons of added water left the Derbyshire sluggish and down by the bow. But the ferocious winds and waves hid the peril. From the pilothouse in the stern it would have been impossible to even see the bow. 
A big wave or series of them then crashed over the ship and smashed the metal cover of the first cargo hold. In less than a minute, the report said, the big hold filled with 10,000 tons of water. 
The Derbyshire was doomed. 
The bow pitched down and huge waves pounded the deck, rolling up like breakers on a beach, some approaching the bridge. Masts were torn off and other hatch covers collapsed in succession under a barrage of towering waves, letting more water rush in. 
As the ship sank, unflooded spaces imploded violently one by one along the length of the vessel. 
Ultimately, the experts estimated that only two or three minutes elapsed from the time the first cargo hatch failed to the disappearance of the ship's stern beneath the waves. But the water was so deep that Derbyshire's remains probably fell for an hour before reaching the bottom. 
The Debate
Monster Waves and Major Flaws 
New light on the Derbyshire has not ended debate. Douglas Faulkner, an expert on the assessor team, resigned in protest, saying the inquiry had ignored the possibility of a more direct assault on the bow by rogue waves as high as 115 feet. 
And some family members are still said to be suspicious of frame 65 and other possible structural flaws. 
In London, the reopened inquiry is to have its first preliminary meeting today. But experts say the enormous mass of evidence and the testimony to come, including that from assessors and families, may push the main proceedings deep into next year. 
The findings could have financial repercussions for the families if serious negligence is found, British experts say. But family sympathizers note that quick restitution is unlikely in a case nearly two decades old. 
"This Government has done the right thing," said Mark Dickinson, an official of the International Transport Workers' Federation. "Whether justice will be done is a bit more difficult to say." 
American experts praise the British probe as unusual and important, despite the lingering questions. "It's a milestone," said H. Paul Cojeen, head of naval architecture at United States Coast Guard headquarters in Washington. 
For their part, British authorities so admire the American deep-sea equipment that they want their own, in particular a deep-diving robot. London is talking to Washington about jointly developing one whose estimated cost is $2.5 million. The British see it as vital for probing cargo ships that haul radioactive waste. The British have a fleet of six such vessels and worry about public reaction to a loss. 
"If one sank, we want to be capable of investigating it quickly," said James F. Wall, a Department of Transport official. "We take our responsibilities seriously." 
More generally, the British success with Derbyshire will prompt more investigations of modern shipwrecks in deep water, said William H. Garzke Jr., head of the marine forensics panel of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, a professional group in Jersey City, N.J. 
"Naval architects can no longer say, 'If a ship sinks, it's out of sight, out of mind,' " he said. "Now we can find the truth." And, the Derbyshire tragedy is already helping bring change in the bulk carrier industry, experts say. Most significantly, new rules call for stronger hatch covers, especially those closest to a ship's bow, where waves pound the hardest. 
In their assessment, Williams and Torchio called for "urgent review" of many other potential safeguards, including stronger ventilator heads as well as the use of forecastles or large breakwaters to fend off waves. The International Maritime Organization, a safety group chartered by the United Nations, "is already making serious moves to implement the recommendations," Williams said. 
Lambert of the family association said the global reaction is still inadequate. Changes of ship design, he said, are often voluntary and apply only to new vessels, not the fleets of older ones. 
"Nobody's looking at them," he said. "They disappear and nobody seems to care."


----------



## Dave Wilson

alastairrussell said:


> I do not know when this was written but I found it yesterday and it appears to have come from the USA. It is a cover up and hides the *real truth*. ."


Are you sure about that?


----------



## alastairrussell

Dave

I found that the above article was published in the New York Times on the 16 March 1999 before the last and final Court of Inquiry in UK.

I suggest you google the names ‘MV Derbyshire’, ‘Ships of Shame’ and ‘Doomed Bulk Ore Carriers’ and have a read. Then you can put a search through ‘YouTube’ with the words ‘Derbyshire’ and then watch an animated video produced for the last Court of Inquiry showing the last minutes of the Derbyshire. 

As an old, retired ex bulk ore carrier engineer I have nothing but admiration for the relatives of those lost on the Derbyshire, for their efforts and their tenacity in taking on the British Shipping Establishment and winning. I am sure that many international crews working on bulk ore carriers right now are also very grateful for their good works.

I quote from the Derbyshire Family Association website the following:

This type of ship is called a Bulk Carrier. These web pages hope to arouse interest in order, not only to discover what happened to the Derbyshire, but to inform the general public of the appalling safety record of large bulk carriers worldwide. Between 1980-94 the total losses of bulk and combination carriers was 149, with 1,144 lives lost.


regards

Alastair


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## Bill Davies

And what would you say were the initiating events??


----------



## georgeretired

I did some considerable time as Bosun in Sir Alexander Glenn after Hudson Steamship Co. took her over from Denholms. A regular weekly check was crawling into the cofferdam between the pumproom and number 9 hatch to check bulkhead 65 for stress marks as this was considered the weak point on these ships as the longitudinals stopped on one side of the bulkhead and continued on the other. Welding cracks in the maindeck around this area was an ongoing job.


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## Bill Davies

Indicative of my posts in 'Hogging and Sagging'.


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## Ngaio 62

I have just finished reading that. I saw the afore mentioned do***entary but the aftermath was as shocking as the event. 
Criminal is the only word I can use her to describe the turning of a blind eye to the safety of a ship and its lives aboard. The whole thing sounds like a disaster waiting to happen and you are all very brave to have persevered in taking these things to sea.

best regards

Martin


disclaimer: The above remarks are my _opinion_ on maritime safety and should be viewed as such. protected under New Zealand Bill of Rights


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## John Cassels

georgeretired said:


> I did some considerable time as Bosun in Sir Alexander Glenn after Hudson Steamship Co. took her over from Denholms. A regular weekly check was crawling into the cofferdam between the pumproom and number 9 hatch to check bulkhead 65 for stress marks as this was considered the weak point on these ships as the longitudinals stopped on one side of the bulkhead and continued on the other. Welding cracks in the maindeck around this area was an ongoing job.


George , can you remember if the longitudnal girders were continued in the
same fore and aft line or were offset ?. Was there an insert girder used ?.


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## Bill Davies

JC,
Interesting post. Hope we can generate healthy debate on this very important topic.

Bill


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## John Cassels

Bill , there are many on this site who are capable of generating debate on
this matter just as there are many with the necessary experience to
contribute.

Unfortunatly , many of us seem to have been put off after noting a strong
underlying current prevelant in previous postings to leave the matter alone.
I cannot understand why but it has made me wary.


----------



## Me45

I would like to clarify a few points.

1 Frame 65 was found in one piece when the photo mosaics were taken. Although if Frame 65 had not cracked in the other ships then the search and the second inquiry would not have taken place. A section of frame 65 from the Kowloon Bridge was cut out and taken to first inquiry, although the wreck commissioner would not allow this or any other evidence of the 5 sister ships to be heard during the first public inquiry in 1986/87

2 The bosun and chief officer's families had letters describing the cat cradle used to tie down the focsle hatch as the bosun and the chief officer had sailed on the Derbyshire on previous trips

3 After a great deal of work and time studying the photos was undertaken to establish the rope in the picture of the focsle hatch open and mooring rope flaked on deck had floated upwards in the 18 years between the ship sinking and the photo being taking.

4 The ship had changed course to avoid the typhoon, due to the weather forecast supplied, unfortunatley the typhoon also changed course, if the Derbyshire had not changed from the initial course she would not have been caught in the storm


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## alastairrussell

Bill

What do you mean by the initiating events? Are you referring to just the Derbyshire, or were you referring to the catastrophic failures on many of the tired and sub standard bulk carriers being used to ship iron ore round the world. Do you think the classification societies and the ship owners have done the right thing in the past to assist and encourage the crew on board to operate and maintain their ships in a proper fashion? 

When the increase in draft and the reduced reserve of buoyancy was introduced with the 1966 Load Line Convention, did the IMO, the classification societies, the shipowners and the shipbuilders show real concern about ship and crew safety. Did they design, build and maintain their bulk carriers to safely operate in all sea conditions over a period of say twenty years? 

I have read some of your inputs to this forum and I have to say that I agree with most of your thinking on the problems all senior staff on bulk ore carriers experienced during the 70’s and 80’s. I would like you and me to be able to sit down and share a bottle of good Australian red and have chat and swap a few good and bad bulk carrier experiences. I was quite shocked to find out that one of my favourite bulk carriers the MV Iron Endeavour under another name ended up sinking off South Africa with high loss of life. She was a Panamax and built to the questionable 1966 LLC. She was built like a barge and used to bend and flex excessively when crossing the Australian Bight in big seas. She did develop a few cracks in the end and I did see her name on the ‘Ships of Shame’ register! 

I do get the feeling that you lean more towards operator error with the Derbyshire, this I feel puts you more in line with the shipowner and the classification societies. I myself get quite annoyed every time that I read in marine engineering journals that 80 % of all shipping casualties and insurance claims are graded as being caused by operator error! Everyone knows that the easiest way to get your claim settled is to place blame on either heavy weather damage or point to a tired and overworked ships crew member! 

Over the last three decades there have been many major improvements in protective paint coatings, machinery lubricants, material quality, marine engine and ship design. Recently with the introduction of computers and the use of top design software packages, the science of hydrodynamics has been improved, and this along with finite element analysis programs can check and find the high stress points in a loaded steel structure like a ship’s hull. You can now fit strain gauges to the ships hull which set off an alarm when the structure is being over stressed. So why have so many of these second hand bulkers been lost with high loss of life? 

Surely if the international shipping establishment had got together and carried out a basic risk management process to the iron ore shipping operations, the alarm bells would have gone off years ago. We should not have had to wait for the last Derbyshire Court of Inquiry to get all the classification societies to work together and correct the wrongs of the past overnight! If all these iron ore carriers that suffered catastrophic failures had been oil tankers there would have been a massive uproar and the problem would have been fixed straight away.

I feel the reason for these bulk carrier catastrophic failures, structural cracking and in some cases reduced service life is as follows:

1.	The 1966 Load Line Convention changes which reduced the vessels freeboard and the reserve of buoyancy, and allowed the removal of the forecastle and allowed under strength hatch covers to be fitted.

2.	No protective paint coatings in the sea water ballast tanks.

3.	No high level water alarms in the dry spaces up forward to detect rising water levels.

4.	Over stressing of the hull during loading because the ships ballast pumps could not discharge ballast quicker than the ship loader could load the ore!

5.	Poor communication between the loader operator and the ships staff when loading.

6.	The failure of the shipping companies to offer proper salary packages and a decent career structure in an effort to hire and keep competent senior staff. 


I always thought that the Derbyshire had loaded iron ore in Port Hedland before she was lost on her way to Japan and not in Eastern Canada as mentioned in this forum? Who is right?


----------



## non descript

alastairrussell said:


> I always thought that the Derbyshire had loaded iron ore in Port Hedland before she was lost on her way to Japan and not in Eastern Canada as mentioned in this forum? Who is right?



She was enroute to *Kawasaki *having loaded her iron-ore cargo at the Canadian port of *Seven Islands*.


----------



## John Cassels

Thanks for your interesting post Alastair. If I may make just a few comments ;

1. And the intoduction of the use of HT steel ( with reduced scantlings).
2. " Floatcoat" was used throughout the industry in the '60's as an internal
coating for ballast tanks . How effective it was is open to conjecture.
3. Good point.
4. Assuming you needed so much ballast to get under the loader or for
manoeuvering .
5. Surely the loading foreman is the contact between the deck and loader
operator ( or am I just old fashioned ).
6. Would this have really have helped on those old , tired , worn out bulk
carriers ?. 

Your points , read together with my post #130 are all admissable.

Tonga is correct , she loaded Eastern Canada - not sure if it was 7 islands or
Port Cartier for discharge Kawasaki.


----------



## non descript

John Cassels said:


> Tonga is correct , she loaded Eastern Canada - not sure if it was 7 islands or
> Port Cartier for discharge Kawasaki.


In case anyone needs it more specifically, the Derbyshire loaded and sailed from *Seven Islands on 11th July 1980*

The rest of her itinerary up until the last dreadful days was:

_1980-July 29
Forward 6-men life raft of DEBYSHIRE washed free from its storage position by green seas. 

1980-July 31
DERBYSHIRE reduces speed to about 69 rpm as per Charterers instructions. 

1980-Aug.8
DERBYSHIRE stored off Cape Town. 

1980-Sept.3
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =4°56'N 125°11'E. 
At 1030 Z increases speed to 12.5kn to pass ahead of a reported Tropical Storm. 

1980-Sept.4
Ocean Routes advises DERBYSHIRE to take Northerly course. 

1980-Sept.5
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =12°17'N 129°12'E. 

1980-Sept.6
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =16°47'N 129°12'E. 

1980-Sept.8
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =23°34'N 132°57'E. 

1980-Sept.9
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =25°19'N 133°11'E. 
0930 Z Last message from DERBYSHIRE advising owner he has to heave-to. 

1980-Sept.16
Oil upwelling observed near position where DERBYSHIRE vanished, no survivors found._


----------



## Lemschout

ME45 wrote:

"The ship had changed course to avoid the typhoon, due to the weather forecast supplied, unfortunatley the typhoon also changed course, if the Derbyshire had not changed from the initial course she would not have been caught in the storm."

Not so sure about it. Marion Bayliss, the widow of the chief officer, gave me many weather charts of the time, and I made the attached sketch of the track of the Derbyshire and of the TD16 / ORCHID which could have been confused by the local weather services. It shows that the only way for the Derbyshire to avoid the storm would have been to stop the ship a few hundred miles south of the predicted tracks. 

In those days the sailing directions show that from September onward the typhoons are never going West, are always recurving to the North East. 

In 2000 I read many of the proceedings of the re-opened inquiry and one guy from a weather routing company stated that those services have to kind of contract: one for the optimization of the speed for an early arrival, and the others for the maximum safety by avoiding the storms. Needless to say that charterers most often pay for the first type. But when the second kind was used, that person confirmed the ships were never caught in a tropical storm!


----------



## Bill Davies

Quote: Alaltairrussel:Bill
_What do you mean by the initiating events? Are you referring to just the Derbyshire, or were you referring to the catastrophic failures on many of the tired and sub standard bulk carriers being used to ship iron ore round the world._Unquote
The initiating event...The root cause.!
What caused the vessel to trim 'by the head'?


----------



## Lemschout

Read further the posts on this issue, and regarding the welding seams filled with welding rods I can confirm to have seen such a picture where the rod was even protuding out of the welding material! I cannot find back the photo which was taken in a British shipyard.

Regarding the initiating event they are still many unanswered questions as the LR succeeded to waste a lot of time time during the re-openned inquiry. 

It could have been the weakness of the vent pipes fore, a water ingress through the spurling pipes,
(see http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/spumpbow.htm )
the landing on the fore deck of one of these many drifting logs coming out of Borneo, or the destruction of the fore mast. 

There is no tentative explanation yet for the "V" notch that damaged the fore hatch of the boatswain store (see photo 1), nor for the dissapearance of the starboard windlass as it can be seen . 
These damages that cannot easily have been caused by the final plunge of the vessel as the "V" notch is on the aft side of the coaming; on the picture of the fore castle of the sunken ship it appears that the fore bulwark on starboard side had been flattened outward (see photo 2).

It is here that naval architects should help by calculating the forces needed to cause these damages. They will do a better job than coming forward with the ridiculous allegation that the crew started to prepare the mooring ropes for berthing in Japan 3 days before the scheduled arrival and with a typhoon just ahead, leaving the coaming open at the end of the day! (Cloud)


----------



## Bill Davies

Lemschout,

I think most people will agree that the 'initiating event' or 'root cause' was ingress of water via the foc'sle store access hatch. Let's leave the 'finite analysyis'(URS21)/ILLC 66 to others. As soon as people accept that this disaster was down to another 'Human Error' (as most are) we can learn, move forward and make sure it does not happen again.


----------



## Lemschout

Thansk to Bill Davies for his comments, unfortunately I cannot agree to "leave the 'finite analysyis'(URS21)/ILLC 66 to others" (Who?). More than two decades of bulkers and other shipping casualties have shown that those we should trust to build sound vessels failed to do so, and in the scope of my job in observe it several times a week while inspecting ships. 

The situation will even worsen as the new ship masters are even more afraid to speak out. The ISM code normally require them to communicate their concern about hazardous conditions to the management, but this is the last thing they do. When I check the ISM reports, 95pc of their content is to show that they did what the management ask them to do, the rest is devoted to triffle defficiencies. When I see this I tell the master that he and his staff are knowing the ship hundreds of time better than any inspector like me, and if they do not mention the real problems their ISM is a total failure.
Once I found a bulker master who was not even aware that his ship nearly broke in two a few years earlier. 

There is of course a lot of 'human errors' in the Derbyshire tragedy, most of them ashore, but some have not yet been evoked in all the formal enquiries. How can we then learn from them? 

One of the most common human error in shipping, is the rejection of suggestions from the men on the field, here the seafarers, by so called "experts" ashore. 

Some years ago I exchanged a few letters with Faulkner who did an excellent job regarding the (lack of) resistance of the hatch covers, but he focused so much on this issue that he minimized the other contributing factor of the longitudinal inertia which prevents many vessels to raise with the waves. It is the only factor that can be still influenced by the staff by changing the cargo distribution within the limit of the stresses. 

Unfortunately most bulkers and tankers are built with larger maximum "Still Water Bending Moment" for hogging than for sagging, which fits also a larger cargo intake. Up to now I did not see a single book in which this issue has been dealt with, except somewhat in the "Tankship Tromedy" of the naval architect Jack Devanney, but it was about the construction of tankers. 

Now when I go on board any vessel, I try to always ask the staff about the water ingress in the chain lockers through the spurling pipes. On the ships where they have no problem at all, where they do not even bother to put ciment or foam, the longitudinal inertia is also small thanks to a lof of buoyancy forward and aft. 

But in the aftermath of the Derbyshire inquiry, the IMO excluded the chain lockers from the compartments that must be emptied from a remote location aft. Of course if they are filled, on a large bulker it is only one or two extra hundred tons fore, but its influence on the inertia is proportional to the square of the pichting radius. If the chain locker are full, the designers assume they will stay so, but on several bulkers they leak into the boatswain store or, much worse, into the empty fore peak. Then the ship is doomed.

If there is still a lot to be discovered and learned from the Derbsyhire tragedy, there is also a lot more to be learned from the re-oppened inquiry, including the poor reaction of the shipping community and the IMO to the recommendation of Justice Colman. 

However some at least learned quickly from all the affair: the bulker owners and managers. They understood that having a whole crew from a single developped country is asking for trouble in case of accident. 

Better to have some people from the third world whose relatives cannot easily communicate, have little support from their government and unions, and do not have anyway enough money to use decent lawyers. 

Maybe it will slowly change with the recent death of 25 indians on the freighter Rezzak in the Black sea.


----------



## John Cassels

An interesting post Lemschout. I see you also make reference to still water
bending moment or harbour condition.
Chain lockers usually had a manual drain pump ( not much use in an 
emergency I grant you) and could flood into the forward spaces.

I do not think that things will change.

Where were you in the "80's when we needed guys like you in Antwerpen ?.


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## Bill Davies

Lemschout,
My implication in saying *"leave the 'finite analysis'(URS21)/ILLC 66 to others"*was that I do not accept the notion in any shape or form in the context of the 'Derbyshire'. It was a 'red herring' in the inquiry. 
Interesting comment re SW 'Hogging' allowance especially when one considers 'alternative Hold Loading'
Would concur with JC. Let's keep this thread alive with good debate.

Brgds

Bill


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## thobshropshire

*List of Bibby Line OBO's*



Stubbsy5050 said:


> This is a list of the ill-fated Bibby Bridge Class OBO's, including the foreign-built variants;
> 
> Pacific Bridge:
> 44,842gt. built Japan 1967. Sold 1974, renamed Petingo. Suffered damage to No.3 hatch in heavy seas off South Africa. Denied assistance, she drifted ashore, broke up and sank 1990.
> _*Bulk Carrier not OBO*_
> 
> Atlantic Bridge:
> 44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.
> _*Bulk Carrier not OBO*_
> 
> Westminster Bridge:
> 44,842gt. Lithgows 1968. Sold 1973, renamed Proteus, then President Roxas. Broken up 1990.
> _*Bulk Carrier not OBO*_
> 
> Ocean Bridge:
> 66,057gt. Japan 1970. March 1971, suffered an explosion which burnt out the bridge section and blew a hole the size of a tennis court right through the ship, killing the master. After repairs costing £2.5m, renamed Gloucestershire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Oceanic Victory, later Ocean Victory, then China Victory. Broken up 1986.
> 
> English Bridge
> 78,527gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1973. Renamed Worcestershire 1977. Sold 1979, renamed Sunshine, then Murcurio, then Crystal Transporter, then Kowloon Bridge. Lost November 1986 when cracks appeared forward of the bridge, she lost her rudder, was blown onto the Irish coast and broke her back.
> 
> Australian Bridge:
> 78,527gt. Japan 1973. Renamed Somersetshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Enterprise Transporter, then Cast Puffin, then Chili, then Danmark, then Norman Hunter, then Leon. No current records.
> 
> Canadian Bridge:
> 65,135gt. Harland & Wolf 1974. Renamed Bedfordshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Tectus, then Bocita, then Shou An Hai. No current records.
> _*Bulk Carrier not OBO*_
> 
> Yorkshire:
> 60,814gt. Swan Hunters Tyneside 1975. Chartered out as the York Marine. Used as oil storage hulk. 1988 attacked and burnt by Iranian warships at Sharjah. Sold 1988, renamed Martontree. Broken up 1993.
> _*Tanker not OBO*_
> 
> Liverpool Bridge:
> 91,655gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1976. Suffered a serious engine room explosion. Renamed Derbyshire 1978. September 1980 sank in the Pacific during Typhoon Orchid with 44 on board. No survivors.
> 
> Mersey Bridge:
> 39,427gt. Sunderland Shipbuilders 1976. Renamed Cambridgeshire 1977. Sold 1983, renamed Festival, then Eastray, then Anemos. No current records.
> _*Bulk Carrier not OBO*_
> 
> 
> The rest of the non-Bibby bulkers built at Swan Hunters Haverton Hill were;
> 
> Furness Bridge:
> 1971, 77,316gt.later renamedLake Arrowhead, then Marcona Pathfinder, then World Pathfinder, then Ocean Sovereign.Was the only one of the six built to the original design. Broken up 1992.
> 
> Tyne Bridge:
> 1972, later renamed East Bridge. 1982 in the North Sea, suffered cracks across her deck and had to be repaired.
> 
> Sir John Hunter:
> 1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired.
> 
> Sir Alexander Glen:
> 1975. Deck cracks repaired. 1989 renamed Ocean Monarch, then Ocean Mandarin. Broken up 1995.
> 
> 
> Bibby's Captain Henry (Harry) Wilson Pyle collected the Japanese built Pacific Bridge, Atlantic Bridge and Ocean Bridge new from the yards. He was my father-in-law. He captained all three ships and was the master killed in the Ocean Bridge explosion in 1971.


The list above is incorrect please see my alterations in italics. Apologies if this list has been corrected elsewhere.

I sailed on the English Bridge in 1973 and the Liverpool Bridge in 1977.


----------



## Lemschout

Thanks for the various comments.

Regarding the SWBM I always use the one for sea conditions.
Some guys succeeded to break a bulker alongside, but it is much less hazardous for those on board.

For those who are interested the book of Devanney is available for free o internet, just type "Tromedy" in a search engine. 

It is not only highly instructive about the shipyard practices, but funny also for somebody who understand shipping, with many remarks such as "Since the rise of Flag of Convenience, Flag State regulation has been an oxymoron.", "Each yard has score of bright young naval architects who do nothing more than work on beating the Rules. Once a contract is signed every kilogram of steel, every meter of welding, every gram of copper that they can save goes directly to the yard's bottom line" (this I see regularly on bulkers, I compelled already two companies to lentgthen their vent pipes fore as they were too short, nobody noticed after many years of service, this in site of scores of annual Load Lines certificates), speaking about shipyard guarantee: "You will get a much better guarantee when you buy a toaster". 

At first I made a print out of the 400 pages, but then I ordered three copies of the real book from Amazon. I keep one full of notation for my personal use , sent one to Captain Ramwell and keep the last for our Maritime Museum. 

It goes mainly about the construction of 4 ULCC for Hellespont in South Korea. In 2004 they were brought under Belgian flag, but 2 of them we reflagged again 2 years later to please the financial interests. 
Devanney succeedd to have all the deck painted in white in order to reduce the temperature inside the tanks. Plenty sunglasses are available for all those who need to walk fore. Here a photo of the result.


----------



## non descript

thobshropshire said:


> The list above is incorrect please see my alterations in italics. Apologies if this list has been corrected elsewhere.
> 
> I sailed on the English Bridge in 1973 and the Liverpool Bridge in 1977.


*thobshrophshire*,

Firstly my condolence for the sadness of the loss of your father-in-law; secondly thank you for seeking to add to this thread with constructive news and comment.

To be as accurate as one can, there is/was no _"Bibby Bridge Class OBO's". _There were SIX OBO oil-bulk-ore ships built at Haverton Hill for various owners, some of whom contributed some of them at various time to the commercially ill-fated *Seabridge Pool*, hence their adopted names. - Using texts from this site and elsewhere the list is as follows:

1. Furness Bridge Built 1971 for Furness Withy renamed _Lake Arrowhead_ then _Marcona Pathfinder_, then _World Pathfinder_, then _Ocean Sovereign_ - Scrapped 1992

2. Tyne Bridge Built 1972 for Hunting Line later renamed _East Bridge_. Scrapped 1987

3. English Bridge Built 1973 for Bibby Line Re named _Kowloon Bridge_ 1985 Lost 1986

4. Sir John Hunter Built 1974 for Hilmar Resksten Scrapped 1997

5. Sir Alexander Glen Built 1975 for Hilmar Resksten Scrapped 1994

6. Liverpool Bridge Built 1976 for Bibby Line re named _Derbyshire_ 1978 Lost 1980.

+
Mark


----------



## Bill Davies

Mark,

'Marcona Pathfinder'.....what a ship!!


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## DICK SLOAN

Lemschout,
Your post's are very interesting and very much welcomed on this sad tragic loss of the Derbyshire, I myself being in the same area at the time of this loss,
I will never forget!.
Regards Dick.


----------



## alastairrussell

Thanks for all the ‘info’ on the Derbyshire, I see I was wrong in thinking she was loaded in Port Hedland.

John

The introduction of high tensile alloy and toughened steel in various high stressed parts of the hull was to reduce the scantlings. The Iron Endeavour had a special strong alloy steel radiused plate fitted along the sheer strake. It required a special weld procedure when the ship was constructed. We were told that the plate and the welds had been specially fracture mechanically tested and the plate would arrest any cracks propagating into the hull. Is this true and were there corrosion problems with alloy steel in bulk carriers?

The IE had all her ballast tanks float coated in the early 70’s and she was 24 years old when she perished under the name MV Nagos (a hatch cover was washed away in heavy seas) 

In Port Hedland they would occasionally put the two loaders at full blast on our relatively small IE and we were really pushed to pump out and strip the ballast tanks. I think there was also a wee bit of bad feeling between our shipping company and the management of the loader then! I am trying to remember the tonnage rate of the loaders, I think it was 7500 tonnes per hour per loader and our ship was only a Panamax. 

Bill

I think the International Safety Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution was introduced in 1993 as a result of some serious shipping accidents in the late 80’s. Most of these accidents were blamed on human error but I think it was the Herald of Free Enterprise inquiry that found the human error actually reached as far as the ‘shoreside’ management. I believe some of the shoreside team were charged with manslaughter . 

I agree with you that someone has to be responsible for initiating the start of the failure, but surely an effort must be made to carry out a proper and competent investigation which looks into all the relevant facts. How does one know that the ship was not down by the head when she left Canada? On the voyage she lost the forward life raft when a green wave came aboard and tripped its hydrostatic valve. There were also problems with the Focsle access hatch on previous voyages and I believe they used to lash the hatch closed from down below, this problem should have been noted in the handover notes. See the following attachment which I found in a USA Ships Structure Committee report. It says that one of the requirements in the 1966 ICLL was that ‘the ship must survive flooding of one compartment without loss of sea keeping’. The other attachments are from an Australian legal practice and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.

Tell me did any of the Derbyshire class load iron ore in Canada in the winter when the sea temperature was below 0’C, because I am really interested in low temperature embrittlement of carbon steels. There has been a few technical papers written recently on the subject and the problem goes back to the SS Titanic and the Liberty ships. Google the words ‘ Bulk Carrier Lake Carling ‘ and have a read. 



_]Hatch Cover Collapse 

The hatch cover design is another frequently discussed failure argument. In 1966 the International Convention of Load Lines, (ICLL), categorized a new freeboard class B-60, where the freeboard requirements of the ordinary B class may be reduced by 60 cm. The only requirement is that the ship survive flooding of one compartment without loss of sea keeping. The new B-60 class resulted in a decrease of freeboard in the majority of newly built bulk carriers. The smaller freeboard caused an increase of wetted deck occurrences and pressure head experienced by deck plating and hatch covers. The design pressure was set to 1.75 tonne/m2 at the same conference, but it can be questioned if this pressure is high enough. _


_Natural Resources Law - September 1998
Shipping - ISM Code

The International Safety Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships ("ISM Code") became mandatory on 1 July 1998 for passenger ships, oil and chemical tankers, bulk carriers, gas carriers and cargo high speed craft of 500 gross tonnage. The ISM Code will be extended to other cargo ships and mobile off shore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage and above not later than 1 July 2002.
The objectives of the ISM Code are: 
	to provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment; 
	to establish safeguards against all identified risks; 
	to continuously improve safety management skills of personnel, including preparing for emergencies. 
The obligation to ensure compliance with the ISM Code is on the person who has taken on the duties and responsibilities for operating the ship, such as shipowners, bareboat charterers and ship managers._


_Proper Procedures Needed

Marine incidents had emphasised the need for the establishment of procedures on ships to ensure that the operation, maintenance and repair of main and auxiliary machinery and associated equipment were carried out in a planned, safe and timely manner.
A recent Marine Notice issued by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority said that the necessity for such procedures was also a requirement of the ISM Code which becomes mandatory for certain ships on 1 July 1998.
This Code also required those responsible for the ship's machinery operation to make sure all persons were familiar with and understood the importance of these procedures and their functions and responsibilities under the safe management system. Failure to adhere to safety procedures could lead to serious incidents and casualties.
Ten common causes of casualties in machinery spaces have been identified by AMSA whose goal is to ensure that national and international ships working in Australian waters were seaworthy and operated safely. The health, safety and welfare of personnel on board ships were paramount in achieving this objective.
Seafarers were also reminded that they had a duty of care, not only to work safely themselves, but to make sure that whatever they did not put others at risk. Close attention to procedures and sound working practices would go a long way towards realising this obligation._


----------



## Chouan

Lemschout said:


> Thanks for the various comments.
> 
> Regarding the SWBM I always use the one for sea conditions.
> Some guys succeeded to break a bulker alongside, but it is much less hazardous for those on board.
> 
> For those who are interested the book of Devanney is available for free o internet, just type "Tromedy" in a search engine.
> 
> It is not only highly instructive about the shipyard practices, but funny also for somebody who understand shipping, with many remarks such as "Since the rise of Flag of Convenience, Flag State regulation has been an oxymoron.", "Each yard has score of bright young naval architects who do nothing more than work on beating the Rules. Once a contract is signed every kilogram of steel, every meter of welding, every gram of copper that they can save goes directly to the yard's bottom line" (this I see regularly on bulkers, I compelled already two companies to lentgthen their vent pipes fore as they were too short, nobody noticed after many years of service, this in site of scores of annual Load Lines certificates), speaking about shipyard guarantee: "You will get a much better guarantee when you buy a toaster".
> 
> At first I made a print out of the 400 pages, but then I ordered three copies of the real book from Amazon. I keep one full of notation for my personal use , sent one to Captain Ramwell and keep the last for our Maritime Museum.
> 
> It goes mainly about the construction of 4 ULCC for Hellespont in South Korea. In 2004 they were brought under Belgian flag, but 2 of them we reflagged again 2 years later to please the financial interests.
> Devanney succeedd to have all the deck painted in white in order to reduce the temperature inside the tanks. Plenty sunglasses are available for all those who need to walk fore. Here a photo of the result.


Excellent posts, most illuminating, and fascinating reading. I shudder everytime I read more about these ships, not because I sailed on one, but because I let my wife join me on one.


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## John Cassels

I sailed as Mate on the Cast Puffin ex Australian Bridge in 1980. Do not
remember any construction abnormalities in way of the pump room cofferdam
but again she was not one 6 Haverton sisters. She was however in a very
poor condition before being taken over into Denholm management having
been operating in dry trading for many years. When the owners ( Cast ) 
decided to reactivate her for oil, I leave it to the imagination the horrors
involved. I did even worse than Chouan, as well as the wife , also took
along my oldest son who was only 4 years old at the time for a 5 month trip.

Next year , I came ashore to work for Cast and got involved with the Cast
Kittiwake ( ex Sir John Hunter ) and it was there I saw construction 
abnormalities for the first time.


----------



## Chouan

John Cassels said:


> I sailed as Mate on the Cast Puffin ex Australian Bridge in 1980. Do not
> remember any construction abnormalities in way of the pump room cofferdam
> but again she was not one 6 Haverton sisters. She was however in a very
> poor condition before being taken over into Denholm management having
> been operating in dry trading for many years. When the owners ( Cast )
> decided to reactivate her for oil, I leave it to the imagination the horrors
> involved. I did even worse than Chouan, as well as the wife , also took
> along my oldest son who was only 4 years old at the time for a 5 month trip.
> 
> Next year , I came ashore to work for Cast and got involved with the Cast
> Kittiwake ( ex Sir John Hunter ) and it was there I saw construction
> abnormalities for the first time.


Horrible weren't they!


----------



## John Cassels

Chouan said:


> Horrible weren't they!


I still have dreams about that 8 months . Not exactly nightmares but not
far short. Some of the things I had to do , I would have indicted by
Greenpeace for ten life sentences .


----------



## John Cassels

For indicted pls read endited , in case I be accused of spelling/gramatical
errors


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## Bill Davies

Alastairrussel,

Yes, the ISM did seems to focus on the 'HOFE' but she was of course the latest in a catalogue of disasters.The 'corporate ' manslaughter implementation was a long time coming and if memory serves me correctly was first muted in the Lady Gwendolyn/Freshfield case. (The 'blind Eye Maxim).
1. _How does one know that the ship was not down by the head when she left Canada?_ Unless she was seriously by the head it would have been able to correct the 'trim' with ballast for the voyage and bunkers for arrival .
2. _There were also problems with the Focsle access hatch on previous voyages and I believe they used to lash the hatch closed from down below, this problem should have been noted in the handover notes_. I would say here lies the 'root cause' and water ingress the 'initiating event. This allowed the ship to alter trim sufficiently to render vents, 'dogging arrangement to be more vulnerable.The lack of a conventional foc'sle did not help.
3. I seem to remeber 'brittle fracture was addressed by Bill R (Lakercapt) some time ago.
I have loaded in Seven Islands/Port Cartier many times in deepest Winter and discharged in the Mississippi a relatively short time later and did not experience anything worth commenting on except Ballast discharge was 'iffy'

. 
Brgds
Bill


----------



## jimmys

*Ships steels*

Hi Alistair,

You are indeed correct the introduction of high tensile steels in these vessels was to reduce the scantlings and so reduce the weight.
The steels used were AH,BH,DH and EH.
The increase in tensile strength was in the region of 500MN/M**2 to 650MN/M**2. The use depended on thickness.
They were used on the bottom,turn of bilge, turn of deck and deck.
Welding of these plates is carried out according to procedures which include preheating and drying of rods, use of low hydrogen rods, continuity of rods and preheating of steel.
All repairs are carried out using same procedures. 
These plates do indeed have a higher fracture toughness but will not resist cracking if the stress is high enough.
You need Arctic D steel to resist temperatures below freezing.

regards


----------



## Chouan

Look at post 48 for comments on the quality of welding on the Derbyshire.


----------



## jimmys

*Welding*

Your "Bloke" is indeed correct there were welding problems severe ones.

I was not in Haverton but I was in the Tyne yard attending a VLCC.

I will discuss any engineering problems but there were two deaths I know of on the vessel I was involved with at the Tyne therefore you will understand my reticence for names.

I was involved in an extended docking of the vessel at Verholme's yard in Rotterdam in an attempt to remedy the problems with welding.

regards


----------



## Chouan

You'll understand my cynicism when I read about British Shipyards and "the good old days" in this Forum.


----------



## Dave Wilson

I don't think it is cynicism at all. Most readers on this site are aware of the highly regulated 'unionised' thing that was British Shipbuilders could not survive against foreign competition. It was nothing to do with anything other than 'quality' and the Japanese have everyone beat in this respect.


----------



## Chouan

But was the "Derbyshire" built by British Shipbuilders? I thought that the Haverton Hill yard was taken over and nationalised later, some time afterwards?


----------



## Dave Wilson

'Derbyshire' was built by Swan Hunters. My refereance to British Shipbuilders was generic rather than specific corporate.


----------



## jimmys

I never saw the Derbyshire nor did I sail in her. The welding problems at Swans Yards had still not been sorted out by 1971.
The welding and structure in our VLCC was so bad it could not be repaired it was a patch up. I sailed on the vessel a lot. She was a death trap.
She nearly foundered in the Atlantic in 1981. It was 10 years old.
The vessel was being towed to scrap dead ship and there was problems.
I was called from a T2 in New York to lead an emergency flash up team at Penang with a Super ashore to help.
We steamed her to Kaohsiung for scrap, she was a steam ship. A Stal Laval.
She went to the breakers in Aug 1981 we put her astern on the beach.
There is nothing cynical about it. It was a dangerous disaster. No one was killed getting her to scrap and that was good luck.

regards


----------



## Dave Wilson

jimmys,
What a great occupation we have!


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## Bill Davies

The combination carriers were hard and often dangerous work. The self dischargers (Universe , Phosphor and Marcona Conveyor) were equally hard work but with the bonus they did not carry oil.


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## alastairrussell

Jimmy, Lemschout, Bill, Dave, John and Chouan 

Thanks for all the ‘info’ on the Derbyshire and on the use of high tensile steel in bulk carriers. I think shipbuilding welding standards must have been dropping all over UK in the 60’s and 70’s. If I remember right they also had a few catastrophic weld failures on some shoreside welded boilers and pressure vessels then. A superheater header end blew off in a new large ultra high pressure boiler in a Power station at Cockenzie in Scotland.

The Navy even had problems with the pressure hull welds in the first British built nuclear submarine built at Barrow in Furnace (I think it was the HMS Dreadnaught)? I read somewhere that the welds started cracking after the submarine’s first deep dive and she was withdrawn for service early to be re-welded in Rosyth. It appears that the problem lay with poor supervision of the welders in welding the high tensile steel plate. Apparently they did not preheat properly or take care in their handling of the low hydrogen welding rods.


With regard to the low temperature embrittlement cracking problems, I am told that the crack starts in the weld and propagates into the parent metal of the plate!! See the following warning below from the Canadian Transport Safety Board. All the early liberty ships that failed catastrophically on there first voyage during WW2 were in heavy weather and all had sailed from Canada in the winter months. One finished liberty ship actually broke in two on a very cold day in the shipyard it was built in!

_*Risks Continued*

All ships, especially bulk carriers, operating in cold waters and having their side shell of metal with characteristics similar to those of the Lake Carling are at risk. The damage tolerance could be less than adequate and cracks could remain unnoticed or discounted as insignificant, yet they would still pose a significant risk when exposed to low temperatures. Given the uncertainties and variability of fracture toughness for some grade A and B steels, it would appear that residual risks for unstable brittle fracture are still present in hulls constructed of these steels, especially when operating in colder climates._

I have always been a believer in the saying “Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough” In taking this line, I expect to see a few design and construction faults appearing during the ships life. The problem lies when any faults found, are not reported on, or repaired or nothing is done to correct the operating procedure. I feel to take part in a cover up and not acknowledge or correct any major errors in the ship’s operating procedures or the design rules, is a criminal action. 

On some of the ships that I have sailed on I have been wary of some crew’s lack of regard to the basic safety standards and to the proper operation of the ship’s machinery. In consequence, engineers have had to be very vigilant in trying to protect the ships cranes, deck machinery and hatch hydraulics from their substandard activities.

I remember when I was Chief Engineer on the iron ore carrier Iron Sirius (ex Sig Silver) I would always go forward after full away when leaving Port Hedland to check that all the hydraulic power units for the winches, hatch opening and windlasses etc. had not been left running and had been shut down properly. I used to check and make sure all the water tight doors to these machinery spaces were dogged down properly (I used to take my own hammer). A few times I had to report to the bridge that a hold access door had been left open!!! I do remember suggesting politely to the master, would it not be a good idea for the shipwright and the deck officer, after full away, to come back down either side of the hatches checking that all the hatch cleats and hatch doors cleats were all employed properly! This was well before the term ‘Bow Flooding’ came into use

Regards

Alastair


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## Bill Davies

Alastairrussel,
“_Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough”_
I spent the best years of my career with NBC whose owner built ships which were overbuilt and this philosophy worked. Classification societies would fit the second part of the caption above and look what happens!


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## jimmys

At that time they could design a structure that was light and just strong enough and thats what they did. The structure had a reduced mass and this affected the stiffness, this is what the Old Men saw when they rounded the Cape, the flexing. This is one of the major reasons as Bill say's you must have a care at loading. The ship can be flexed easily passed yeild. Once you pass yield there is a permanent set you cannot stop it and you cannot reverse it.

The tankers had other problems due to tank cleaning, crude oil washing,inert gas acid attack. Need a book for it all. What it did to the VLCC I was talking about was that you could paddle a 12 foot RIB from the port shipside to the starboard shipside. A little wiggle took you through the bulkheads.

regards


----------



## Iain B

Dave Wilson said:


> 'Derbyshire' was built by Swan Hunters. My refereance to British Shipbuilders was generic rather than specific corporate.


She was built by Swans' but Swans at Haverton Hill on the Tees, not Swans on the Tyne.


Iain


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## Lemschout

Allastairussel wrote: 

"_I have always been a believer in the saying “Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough” _" 

But the problem is also that "strong enough" must be properly calculated. The more I study the bulker, the more I find parameters that were neglected, never studied, or simply ignored for the convenience of the designers. 

One of the most dangerous mistake was the use of the elasto-plastic theory that shifted the calculation of the plate thicknesses from the maximum "yield stress", where the steel starts to be deformed, up to the much higher maximum "plastic stress", the one where the steel looses all elasticity. This why we see so many modern vessels where anybody can count the frames from the berth. 

And when the steel loses its elasticity, fatigue cracks are appearing more rapidly, and if for some reasons this maximum plastic stress is exceeded, the side plate simply explodes as it happened on so many bulkers, and most probably recently on the Rezzak. 

These excessive forces, poorly studied by the naval architects, are occuring when the ship is rolling heavily. 
( see 1st page of http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sdbyxsto.htm )

Thanks to the computer the classification societies have now much better software tools to calculate the stresses, and they use it... their way, again to play with the result. Again Devanney explains it nicely in the "Tankship Tromedy" in chapter 5.6 "The Misuse of Finite Element (FE) Analysis ". Some quotes: 
"If you outlined the tanker industry's standard FE model to an aircraft designer at any time from 1995 on, he would either look at you in disbelief or die laughing". 
"A 40,000 ton tanker built in the late 50's ad a bottom plate thickness of about 35mm. A very good mid 70's 400,000 ton ULCC - ten times larger - hd a bottome plate thickness of 28 to 30 mm."
"When you go to sea you need margins, and we don't have those margins".


----------



## jimmys

The design of ships has never involved post yield mechanics. Where there are heavy alternating stresses post yield mechanics is not possible.
There has been a reduction in safety factors in the pre yield stress positions.

I am an acknowledged stress engineer fully qualified and have worked in the field using finite element analysis.

It is best you do not read too many books.

regards


----------



## alastairrussell

Sorry, I wish to clarify and change my quote:

_"I have always been a believer in the saying “Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever *and competent *man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough"_

I would like to make it quite clear that I have always wanted a highly qualified and competent professional engineer using the best and most appropriate technology available to design the maritime structure. I also believe it’s not the designer’s job but that of the international shipping authorities and/or the classification societies to carry out a proper risk management process and then publish all the safety factors and the allowable stresses in their construction rules. I do not want anybody to inappropriately cut into the declared safety margins at any time. There has to be certain amount of redundancy built into all marine structures and ships machinery to enable small human error problems to be absorbed. I accept that the safety margins could be variable depending on the amount of weld NDT, construction supervision and the type of corrosion protection the structure receives when being built. I want every piece of equipment on the ship, manufactured to some competent and approved National Standard Code.

From past experience, I am very aware of the problems in operating and maintaining very large bulk carriers with their reduced port time and manning. I have even gained some ‘seatime’ paddling a rubber ducky around in ballast tanks. 

I have sailed on many large post 1966 LLC bulk carriers in heavy weather. I remember looking out of an accommodation window at hatch level on a very flexible bulk carrier. I watched the whole foc’sle deck disappear from view and then watched as the wave moved down the hull, a hatch would pop up and then disappear. I can tell you it was not just the master that was concerned about the flexibility it was everyone who was game to look out of that particular window.

Jimmy, which books don’t you want me to read? I take it you don’t like me reading the IMarEST publications or their technical papers. Do you want me to stop looking at all the shipping accident investigations reports from the Transport Safety Boards from around the world? 

Prior to retiring I used to design verify boilers and pressure vessels to various National Standards for a government department but don’t worry, when I approved a FE designed pressure vessel, I made sure all the red bits in the photo were below the allowed stress levels for the declared design pressure. I am still a licensed boiler inspector and have in the past, carried out investigations and reported on some substantial pressure equipment failures and gas releases. I have completed at my own expense a few courses on material failure analysis and I am still very interested in reading anything to do with a maritime material failure.

Regards 

Alastair


----------



## Bill Davies

Jimmys,

The thread has turned into an interesting read with excellent contributions by Alastair , Lemschout and yourself. However, I think your last post re _I am an acknowledged stress engineer fully qualified and have worked in the field using finite element analysis. It is best you do not read too many books_ a little unnecessary and hardly conductive to ongoing debate. It is a bit of a dampener.


----------



## jimmys

*Publications*

Stress analysis is my job, my speciality I have now retired. I started in the late 1950's in gears and transmissions. I have read thousands of publications in engineering I still do.
The vast majority of technical publications come from people in the academic world. They may be well qualified but you can take it from me they are not experienced.
The whole raft of Naval Architects are lucky between them if the have enough sea time to sit a master ticket. Most of them do not know what a wave is.
I worked with the PAFEC suite of Finite Element Analysis, not so popular now but very efficient. I started in late 1980's. The failure of wind turbine blades. They were composite material. It is not homogeneous. I was recruited into the MCA from University. As well as survey I did more of the same, stress analysis, boilers, machinery, lifting gears , lifeboat hooks and davits, structures of all sorts.We approved it all. The persons with a deep knowledge of this field do not write books, they sell their knowledge for lots of money.
The persons who write the books often do not have the level of knowledge they profess.
Do not read too many books!!!!

regards


----------



## Bill Davies

Jimmys,

I agree with your above fully. With the greatest respect it was just the way your post #185 was written. To my mind this thread is the most interesting on the site. 

Brgds

Bill


----------



## John Cassels

I must profess to not having sufficient knowlege or experience to be able to
contibute on what Alistair , Jimmys or Lemschout post ; but I wholeheartedly
agree with Bill Davis that this has become a most interesting thread.

Well done gentlemen.


----------



## John Campbell

jimmys said:


> I never saw the Derbyshire nor did I sail in her. The welding problems at Swans Yards had still not been sorted out by 1971.
> The welding and structure in our VLCC was so bad it could not be repaired it was a patch up. I sailed on the vessel a lot. She was a death trap.
> She nearly foundered in the Atlantic in 1981. It was 10 years old.
> The vessel was being towed to scrap dead ship and there was problems.
> I was called from a T2 in New York to lead an emergency flash up team at Penang with a Super ashore to help.
> We steamed her to Kaohsiung for scrap, she was a steam ship. A Stal Laval.
> She went to the breakers in Aug 1981 we put her astern on the beach.
> There is nothing cynical about it. It was a dangerous disaster. No one was killed getting her to scrap and that was good luck.
> 
> regards


Jimmys, _ think , from your post above, that I too served on that vessel as Master. I agree with you she was very badly designed and built. It was a wonder she lasted as long as she did. Testament to all the brave fellows that served on her.
JC_


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## jimmys

You may rest assured nothing I write in a thread like this is meant to upset anybody. If it does I apologise.

Bill ; your posts around #127/#128/#129. When you were loading did you have all the hatches open.
Were there conditions in the stability book for loading which allowed you a slight sag. You only mention hogging.

In order to minimise the conditions for deck cracking it is best to have a slight sag which places the deck in compression and the bottom in tension.
As you know the bottom is much stonger. I know some of the stability books at that time were very basic and there was more commerce than safety.

regards


----------



## jimmys

*Vlcc*

Hi John,

As you know the reason she lasted as long was good crews and a company that poured money into the vessel. A fortune was spent on that vessel.
Due to the problems with the vessel I do not wish to go into names, you of all people realise the reason.
You would have wept if you had seen her on the beach.

regards


----------



## Bill Davies

Jimmys,

1. During the loading process all hatches would be open.
2. For homogeneous loading the vessels naturally 'sagged'. The BMs and SFs were acceptable. The 'sag' rarely exceed 5/6" on a Cape size. 
3. Alternative hold loading was a different matter. The BMs were (as would be expected) fine but, the SFs were always high(when using Loadmasters - off the scale). 
4. Compression/tension was clearly the cause however, the cracking seemed to be worse when loaded in Alternative Hold mode.


----------



## Lemschout

Thanks for all those answers and especially Jimmys who perfectly illustrates the quote from Jack Devanney when he wrote: " ... he would ...at you in disbelief..."

Jack Devanney is a naval architect who cannot be accused of being an academic as he has bult several VLCCs and ULCCs. Although I disagreed with him on some issues outside his field of expertise, he has the great merit of being the first to explain at large the reality of shipyards practices.

And the best support I know for Jimmys remark _The design of ships has never involved post yield mechanics. Where there are heavy alternating stresses post yield mechanics is not possible._" is the one of the academic professor Higgins in his book "Engineering metallurgy" when he wrote "Although tensile strength is a useful guide to the mechanical properties of a material it is not of paramount importance in engineering design. After all, the engineer is not particularly interested in a material once it begins to stretch plastically... (beyond the yield limit)" 

So far so good, but Higgins could not graps the willingness of the naval architects to keep saving on steel weight, using their skill not to make safer ships, but more profit for the shipyard, their pay master.

That is how some years ago, still ignoring this prudent warning not 
to read books, I found in the 3rd edition of "Basic Ship Theory" by K.J.RAWSON & E.C. TUPPER the following:

"There can be no doubt that after the first onset of yield, a great deal of strength remains. Unless he has good reasons not to do so (like keeping a safety margin to take into account unknown factors) the designer would be foolish not to take advantage of this strength to effect an economical design. ... Deflection considered unacceptable for reasons of appearance, to avoid starved horses look, might nowadays be thought an uneconomical criterion. ... Elastoplastic theories are appropriate for large areas of the shell, for decks, bulkheads and tanks."

It would be quite interesting to know the path of such economical theories in the minds of the designers, classes, teachers in naval architects academies...

The result of this is a cape size bulker with 200000 tons displacement for a light ship weight ten times less. A good freighter of the 60s could carry only 3times its weight, but already the Hight Tensile Steel (HTS) was appearing, and it nearly sank one of the ship on which I sailed.

But this is another story.


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## djw1

Gentlemen,

No one living can say for sure exactly the sequence of events that
caused the loss of the Derbyshire. Based on the pictures
and Faulkner's analysis, I personally think the most likely cause
was failure of the forward hatch cover in a not particularly bad
Pacific storm.

But one thing is certain. The Derbyshire was a deeply flawed ship.
And in that she had a great deal in common not just with her sisters,
but with just about all tankers and bulk carriers built in recent years.
To me the interesting question is: why are the ships we are building
so unreliable and fragile?

I think the answer is obvious. The key regulatory body is Class.
And the Classification Societies must compete for the owners and yards
which they are supposed to regulate. The Class which gives
the owner/yard the best deal wins the ship. The only somewhat similar
regulatory structure that I know of is auditing, See Enron, et al.
The difference is that auditors are playing with people's money,
Class is playing with people's lives.

Keep the faith,

Jack Devanney


----------



## MM²

*Classification Societies*

Shipping needs to adopt something along the lines of Certificates of Airworthiness in Aviation.


----------



## Dave Wilson

MM² said:


> Shipping needs to adopt something along the lines of Certificates of Airworthiness in Aviation.


Very interesting! Can you expand? as I assume there is more to it than the 'Seaworthiness' we are all familiar with.


----------



## MM²

*Certificate of Airworthiness*

Aircraft have a Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A). This is issued by an Authority such as the FAA or CAA. For the C of A to be in force the aircraft has to be operated within approved parameters and have a regular maintenance and inspection schedule. Reading this thread I should think a lot of ships wouldn't qualify for a Certificate of Seaworthiness (C of S) if one existed and that probably includes some new buildings.


----------



## Dave Wilson

*CERTIFICATE OF SEAWORTHINESS*

Interesting...


----------



## djw1

In our case, the supposedly equivalent certificates
are issued by the flag state who are also competing
with each other for the owner's business. In fact,
the Classification Socieities are pillars of professionalism
compared to yr basic FOC.

We have much to learn from commercial aircraft regulation,
but the most basic lesson we need to learn
is that effective regulation can only come from the port/coastal states.

KTF

Jack


----------



## MM²

*Don't hold your breath*



> We have much to learn from commercial aircraft regulation,
> but the most basic lesson we need to learn
> is that effective regulation can only come from the port/coastal states.
> /QUOTE]
> 
> A really major accident involving great loss of life involving 1st World nationals combined with a 500k oil spill somewhere very public like the English Channel might (?) do the trick.


----------



## MM²

*Don't hold your breath*



> We have much to learn from commercial aircraft regulation,
> but the most basic lesson we need to learn
> is that effective regulation can only come from the port/coastal states.


A really major accident involving great loss of life involving 1st World nationals combined with a 500k oil spill somewhere very public like the English Channel might (?) do the trick.


----------



## Bill Davies

*djw1*Quote:_*In fact,the Classification Socieities are pillars of professionalism compared to yr basic FOC.*_.. please clarify!!


----------



## Lemschout

An easy answer to Bill Davies, just quote the Tankship Tromedy:

[_7.2.2 Forget the Flag State
Since the rise of the Flags of Convenience, Flag State regulation has been
an oxymoron. ... The Flags are competing for owners. The successful Flags are the ones which offer the shipowner the best deal. *It’s not regulation; it’s an auction.* (Captain Ramwell likes to quote this one). Forget about Flag State control. It is not worth discussing....
Anyway compared to the Flags of Convenience, the Classification Societies are pillars of professionalism. Whenever we wanted something important from Class, I usually led the effort myself. When we needed a concession from the Flag State, I could delegate the job to just about anybody in the organization and know that approval would be forthcoming_.]

Must say that some FoC's are weel aware of their quality in order to say in business. One clue to this quality is the target factor of the Paris MoU. Falling on the Black list of this PSC organisation forces a Flag to leave the registration business or just accept the wrecks that were kicked out by the other flags.

When after a 4 hour inspection we arrest a ship of one of these FoCs, say for one week, they send their own inspector on board, usually an experienced Western surveyor. he checks the ship during a few days, and keep it alongside for a few more weeks. If the owner does not like it, it is quicked out of that flag and he can go to one of these black listed register, with all the consequences for the insurance, chartering and further PSC inspections.


----------



## Bill Davies

Lemschout,
_Not so easy. _The Flag state and the Classification Societies are independant of each other. Prefer not to comment on a certain Captains likings for certain quotes. Get concerned when Flag State (FOC) 'smoke screens' are brought into the debate.

Bill


----------



## djw1

Bill.

Not really. The flag states (not just FOC's) delegate most of their
inspection responsibilities to the ship's Class.

More importantly, both Flag and Class must compete for the owners
they are supposed to regulate. As long as the owners (and yards)
get to choose whom they are going to pay to regulate themselves,
you cannot have effective regulation.

KTF

Jack


----------



## jimmys

Hi Bill,

Your stability book is looking at the Shear Force and Bending Moment as separate forces which they are. A shear force acts across the area resisting shear which is the trasverse area of the ship, shear force divided by area is the shear stress. When the hatches are open we cannot credit the hatch area as resisting shear.
Bending Moment is different. We need to calculate a neutral axis of the ship where the bending moment is zero and depending whether hog or sag loading the deck would be in tension or compression and the bottom similar.
Where the resistance to shear is area of metal, the bending stress is more complex and depends on the Moment of Inertia of the transverse area and the distance to the extreme fibre from the nuetral axis.
If the hatch is open again we cannot credit the hatch in Moment of Inertia calculations and due to this the neutral axis is driven deeper into the ship.
The distance to the extreme fibre, the deck, increases. This again causes higher stresses at the deck.
The size of these hatches is considerable and the increases in stress can be significant.
Where your stability book keeps the SF and BM as separate, as engineers we do not accept this and we compute the forces together because they occur together. This means an element of steel on the deck has SF and BM occuring simultaneously. When we calculate we get a lot higher stresses than your stability book shows.
The hatch as explained has a massive bearing on the ship safety and stress.
We can look at loading using these techniques up until the ship sails once it sails they do not work. They are using static loads.
Once it sails it becomes dynamic, it moves and we need new mechanics.
The Derbyshire was dynamic. Stability books dont work.

regards


----------



## gadfly

Jimmys

An interesting post, but are you not mixing the content of the ships stability book with that of its loading manual?

Of course the ships stability book and its loading manual are frequently combined and we now also have ships with loading and stability computers onboard that do the whole business..............

Stresses, steel and thicknesses, elastic failure, plastic failure, buckling, bending, shear, tension, welds, cracks and suchlike on ships (especially bulk carriers) are not really a black art.

They are a matter of design - stresses are capable of being determined mathematically and structural failures should not occur!! - As Jimmys has noted earlier, stress is simply load divided by the area of the steel.

However when you consider poor shipyard workmanship, welding defects, constructional errors, corrosion and ineffective periodical surveys, that's when the problems start to arise.

Best regards 

gadfly


----------



## jimmys

What you load in a ship creates the factors of stability, therefore the loading manual has a direct input on stability. Direct stress is load over area, the loads on a ship do not create direct stress that is simplistic.
Any computer in order to compute stress needs an input of loads, that is available when the ship is static and alongside.
The danger loads are not static loads but dynamic loads, when the ship comes out of the water the buoyancy force is removed. There is massive increases in dynamic shear and dynamic bending. As the ship twists we have torsional shear.
The computer does not know what the loads are, someone has to tell it what the loads are, who knows what the loads are every spell of bad weather is different.
I have tried this before I can only complete the analysis alongside, I cannot complete it for sea I can only estimate the loads. I cannot determine it mathematically and neither can anybody else. We do not have the parameters.
When I started in engineering factors of safety were 5 to 6 and design life 52,000 hours now we have factors of safety of 2 to 3 and design life 30,000 hours. It been driven down by costs.
With all the computers aboard they are still breaking up. The computer should be able to take all the factors into consideration. It cant.

regards


----------



## alastairrussell

I have to agree with everything that Jack Devanney has stated in his post. The Classification Societies (CS) have to be held mainly responsible for most of the bulk carrier failures. During construction the ship was designed to their rules and prior to it being built, the design drawings were approved by them. Then during construction, the ship was surveyed and signed off by their surveyors. During operation of the ship, it has to be regularly inspected by their surveyors if it is to remain in class.

Even now, with all the bad publicity from the last Derbyshire Court of Inquiry findings and the ‘ships of shame’ fiasco, the Classifications Societies have failed to lift their game to a high enough level. The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) which was formed to correct the high shipping failure rate at the time by getting all the relevant societies working to one standard has also failed. 

The Classification Societies appear to realise that they have a poor image problem and I see they are placing full page adverts in the shipping publications at the moment trying to correct this. There has also been a lack of faith shown by some of the National Transport Safety Boards towards Classification Societies survey standards. Some of the TSB’s have responded with the introduction of more port control inspections and I think Australia still has a ban on loading iron ore into bulk carriers more than 15 year old. 

Is it not time that all shipping rules, codes and standards should be handed over to the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). The ISO shipping standards could be broken into two sections, construction and operational. I think all the CS should then be restricted to just surveying and signing off the ship to the relevant ISO standard. ISO and other countries standards associations are already producing maritime standards. See below: 

ISO 18072-1:2007
Ships and marine technology -- Ship structures -- Part 1: General requirements for their limit state assessment 

ISO 18072-1:2007 provides general requirements for the limit state assessment of ship structures primarily used in the transport of commercial goods and cargos. For the purposes of assessment, the effects of actions on ship structures are considered in respect of the following limit states: serviceability, ultimate, fatigue and accidental.

ISO 15401:2000
Ships and marine technology -- Bulk carriers -- Construction quality of hull structure

ISO 15402:2000
Ships and marine technology -- Bulk carriers -- Repair quality of hull structure. 

ISO 5778:1998
Ships and marine technology -- Small weathertight steel hatches.

I have always shown an interest in studying aircraft systems and safety procedures and I have been impressed with the way they carry out accident investigations and any engineering failure investigations. I also like the way they have built in plenty of redundancy into their important and crucial systems. I agree that the shipping industry could learn a lot from them. I think our bulk carrier problem has a few similarities to the early failures in the De-Havilland Comet airliner. They had a fatigue cracking failure designed into the early comets when they fitted square windows. They solved the problem by increasing the skin thickness in the window area and fitting round windows to the fuselage. Maybe the aircraft boys would want us to fit round hatch coamings and hatch covers to stop the cracks in the deck!

I feel we as a group should maybe stop pointing the finger at the welders, shipyards, ship designers, naval architects and structural engineers (stress men) and mainly blame the classification societies. IMO and the shipowner would have to take the rest of the blame, remember that old WW2 excuse ‘I was only following Orders’ I am surprised that no one has yet targeted the ship owner’s financial accountant. It was the accountants who swung the ship owner towards the company’s bottom line and away from taking advice from their experienced superintendents’ and of course towards the cheapest tender. 

I really think if the international shipping industry moved over to having competent ISO standards committees laying down the rules, there would be a major improvement to the unsatisfactory situation that we have at the moment. I feel this, along with having *yearly *safety equipment inspections carried out by government TSB inspectors and also having more Port Control inspections, would lead to fixing the problems of the past.

Regards


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## Bill Davies

alastairrussell,

All valid points. However, even with the best built ships if your shore side Management team coupled to onboard training, management falls short of acceptable standards we will see the 'Derbyshire' incident happening again.


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## jimmys

A Classification Society produces a book of rules for guidance. The rules produce in general minimum scantlings which produce a rule ship. The owner has full choice what standards he builds his ship to as long as it is minimum or above. He chooses not Class.
He can have the level of survey that he wants, there are statutory times where he must have surveys to maintain certification. He chooses not Class.
What stresses the ship is put under is the decision of the owner. They control this not Class.
The thought that a Class Surveyor or any other Surveyor can come down to a ship and see ***ulative damage due to misuse is mad. By the time the crack or other damage is there it is too late the metal is gone.
No one can see ***ulative damage due to overstressing it is not visible until it is too late.
The ship belongs to the owner and he operates it not Class.
Class do not design ships Naval Architects do.

regards


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## Ron Stringer

Alastair,

As we all know, increased standards and additional requirements/inspections go hand-in-hand with increased costs. When I go to make a retail purchase I wouldn't consider researching how the object has been transported (from the manufacturer to the seller) so that I can exclude any item that has been carried by a sub-standard ship. Having decided on my requirements, I look for the lowest cost item that meets them. In that, I believe that I am typical of many others.

As long as at least one shipper can avoid the use of vessels that do not meet the higher standards, his goods can be sold at lower prices (or give him a higher margin). So the pressure is always there to cut costs (and standards) and evade regulatory and inspection requirements. 

You criticise the accountants (I have never been one and have suffered at their hands) but they are only following the dictates of the open market. Overall, lowest cost wins the business. The cir***stances where other, longer term, factors come into consideration tend to be in specialised applications. Most goods carried by ships don't come into this category; there is no consideration of 'lifetime cost of ownership' in bulk cargoes or containers of consumer goods. 'What it will cost to deliver the goods from A to B on time?' is about as far as most shippers will enquire. Market forces work to reduce costs, not to improve safety standards.

Although the aircraft industry may or may not have higher standards (technical and ethical) than those of in maritime practice, we still read of investigations into aircrashes and other incidents arising from problems and bad practices that were known about but covered up. Air crashes tend to attract a lot of adverse publicity that does not seem to follow marine incidents, other than a very few.

I agree that it would be better if the industry operated to a single set of adequate design and operating standards, backed up by an effective in-service inspection regime. That is what IMO set out to create but the very nature of an international organisation that operates on the basis of consensus between its member states, results in constant compromise of standards. What you finish up with in every case is the lowest common denominator. 

Speaking of the part of the ship with which I was familiar, when the UK set its own standards independently of any other organisation, for many decades the radio carriage requirements for ships under the UK flag were well in excess of ITU/IMO minimal recommendations. However, throughout the 1970/80s, UK shipowners lobbied the UK Government on the grounds that the additional costs of meeting the UK's higher standards were putting them at a trading disadvantage. 

Consequently the UK requirements were steadily reduced until they were identical with those of IMO. Furthermore those government departments and agencies (e.g. MCA) responsible for preparing and applying maritime requirements were told that they could no longer demand anything more than was required internationally (e.g. by IMO or the ITU). The most that they can do is propose higher standards and press for their adoption in the various working parties and committees of the ISO, IEC, IMO, ITU etc., trying to persuade other countries of the validity of their arguments and seeking support. However when push comes to shove at IMO, each member country has only one vote and the UK's vote for, can be cancelled by a vote against from say Cambodia or Somalia.

I would hope that your logical and reasonable suggestions could be adopted by the maritime world, but fear that the reluctance of the politicians to upset big business and the public's pressure to buy more for less, are working against you.

I think I have strayed quite some way off the original intent of this thread and apologise if that offends. The moderators may remove this post if it is not considered suitable.


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## non descript

Ron Stringer said:


> I think I have strayed quite some way off the original intent of this thread and apologise if that offends. The moderators may remove this post if it is not considered suitable.


Ron,
No Sir, not really and it is a well written piece and thank you for your consideration.
(Thumb)
Mark


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## MM²

*I'm not sure that we really have a lot to learn .......*

.....from aviation. It isn't as though we don't know what the problems are just that we choose to ignore them.

Naval architecture and stability become complicated and critical at the margin where we now appear to be, IOW minimum structure for maximum deadweight.

Class are just commercial organizations acting commercially and the outcome is predictable.

There is nothing to learn. We already know the answers and choose not to apply them - simple as that.


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## Bill Davies

Bravo MM2. Agree with you totally!
Bill


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## muldonaich

so answer the question who should be responsible to apply them and i mean world wide we cant get that for whaling ps check out zimbabwee elections what chance have we got brgds kev.


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## John Cassels

Ron , would agree with Tonga , a most intersesting post.


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## Lemschout

Two days ago I prepared a long answer to some messages, but it was wiped out by a wrong input on the keyboard. Did not try again. 
My opinion regarding the classes is, beyond the fact that they are basically constrained by commercial incentives, that they are also unable to cope with the exponential increase in regulations, for sure at the surveyor’s level.
As the large classes must keep a world coverage, they cannot employ the best experts everywhere and these make more and more mistakes. The PSC inspectors find in the certificates, and in the way the inspections are carried out. 
Also the surveyors have to cope with weaker and weaker ships which need more and more inspections, the result is a kind of saturation of these guys on the field.
I believe that the only solution is to reduce the number of general inspections by Flag states Recognized Organizations (RO), by vetting companies and PSC, all those putting an heavy burden on the staff during a short port stay, and increase the depth of inspections by specialized experts who shall take the time to made thorough checks.
For instance each time I inspect a bulk carrier, I check for sure the efficiency of the new pumping system in the fore compartments recommended by Justice Colman after the Derbyshire RI, and find out that on one ship out of two the crew cannot use it or it was not properly installed. Must say that the drafting of these new rules by the IMO is another mess. 
Regarding the pumping of the boatswain store, it should not have been required on ships where this store lies above the main deck, or at least it should have included a suction fore, but when this store is under the main deck, as on many capsize bulkers, it must work, and quite often it doesn’t.
Regarding the activation from a safe place aft of the collision bulkhead valve, the drafting of the new rule is such that this valve has simply been removed, and we cannot say anything about it. 
That brings us to the remark of Ron STRINGER who wrote rightfully:
[Consequently the UK requirements were steadily reduced until they were identical with those of IMO. Furthermore those government departments and agencies (e.g. MCA) responsible for preparing and applying maritime requirements were told that they could no longer demand anything more than was required internationally (e.g. by IMO or the ITU). The most that they can do is propose higher standards and press for their adoption in the various working parties and committees of the ISO, IEC, IMO, ITU etc., trying to persuade other countries of the validity of their arguments and seeking support. However when push comes to shove at IMO, each member country has only one vote and the UK's vote for, can be cancelled by a vote against from say Cambodia or Somalia.]
I do not know all the details of the voting system at the IMO, but even when a new rule has been issued, generally its implementation is submitted to its adoption by a certain number of countries which can gather a certain percentage of world sailing gross tonnage. It gives an enormous power to a FoC like Panama, as it can block an inconvenient rule for a long long time. 

There is also an ugly political fight going on for countries to be part of a particular IMO council, with as result that it is even a wonder that some rules are working. 
Anyway it makes very difficult to propose new rules, change the mistakes of the existing ones and remove the obsolete regulations.
One possible option could be for the most dedicated experts to make their findings public, and then recommend the masters to use the ISM code for implementing such known hazardous conditions in their review of the ISM system on board. 
That will be all according to SOLAS, but the masters have never been so devoid of power in the commercial shipping history, and the first one who shall attempt to make a substantial remark will quickly meet his replacement. The masters are told that the ISM code is just good enough to show that they do all what the management ask them to do to protect it from the lawyers. 
Furthermore the experts, save for a few one like Faulkner and Jack, will not publish their findings for free, so we can say bye bye to this kind of Glasnost.


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## Bill Davies

_*and find out that on one ship out of two the crew cannot use it or it was not properly installed*_ see my post #212


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## jimmys

You are indeed correct Lemschout the Masters are devoid of power, they are the owners representative it works against them.
When an expert is involved in a large case and it goes to court all of his methods, techniques and know how are made available to the court and hence the public for free. They will not make themselves available. Why sell it all for court fees they would need to be mad.
When I was hired by the MCA I had to make my knowledge availabe, thats what I was hired for. I sat at precognitions and told everyone what the problems were and then I was grilled in the witness box by the same persons. You had no alternative it is our legal system.
People outside the system do not believe you when you tell them of the problems.

regards


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## Bill Davies

Jimmys

_People outside the system do not believe you when you tell them of the problems._I think the MCA are as guilty of that as anyone.


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## alastairrussell

Bill

You said:

_All valid points. However, even with the best built ships if your shore side Management team coupled to onboard training, management falls short of acceptable standards we will see the 'Derbyshire' incident happening again._

I am all for the onboard training for everyone and for both ship and shore side management working to an acceptable standard. In saying this, are you not creating a legal bun fight in the use of the words ‘acceptable standard’? I feel the whole International shipping industry has to work to *the same international standard.* All the standards created have to be kept totally separate from IMO, Anything else would surely mean that there would not be enough ‘best built ships’ to go around. 

All similar ships, their machinery and equipment, must be designed, constructed, manufactured, operated and maintained to the same international standard. The past use of double standards by the classification societies towards their class rules and survey standards has to stop. Survey standards should not be varied depending on the flag, ports of registry, nationality of crew on board or the type of cargo. All the standard committees are made up of experienced and competent professionals who will represent all areas of the shipping industry and not just the classification societies and the ship owners.

I see there was another bulk carrier bow flooding incident sinking near the Azores in December 2001. The large capesized Christopher was carrying coal and sank with all hands shortly after the Master had reported flooding up forward through a ventilator and that a hatch cover had collapsed. The incident was very similar to the Derbyshire and she was also classed with LR and this sinking was *21 years after the Derbyshire *and 3 and bit years after the ISM safety code was introduced to stop things like this happening! Google the words Derbyshire – Christopher and have a read and then we can decide if we want to put this one down to shipboard human error?

Jimmys and Lemschout

I always preferred when working shore side as an accident investigator to work only to an Australian Standard and not to an old government regulation or rule. All pressure equipment here is manufactured, installed, operated and inspected to an Australian Standard or some overseas code or standard. This made my job so much easier especially if the accident ended up going to prosecution and put me in the witness stand. In my written report I only have to list all the non-conformities found and refer to the appropriate standard. I like the standard association’s clear and concise plain english written text and their use of the words shall, should or may. 

Working to standards also made it hard for my superiors to go against my recommendation. I used to make sure I took heaps of photos and collected plenty of statements from witnesses to back up my conclusion. I remember investigating a defective and dangerous boiler where the owner had ignored previous warnings. He had apparently made a donation to a political party prior to an election, thinking that the money paid was a form insurance against prosecution from OH and S and environment matters. He complained to his local member of the State Parliament about me. He apparently thought I was taking too many photos and asking too many questions and this was in the days before digital cameras! I had to front my Chief Inspector of Boilers with a please explain. I did not have to say much, I just showed him all the photos and said what do you think?

I feel that if the international shipping game moved fully over to creating and using ISO shipping standards and away from the present confusing mess created by the shipowners, IMO and the classification societies, many problems would disappear. All types of surveyors, Government, Classification and Port State surveyors would surely find their tasks much easier. ISO could even have a standard to cover ship detentions! 

I have been away from the shipping game since 1985 and I have been reading everything I can find and of course I am googling like mad trying to get myself up to strength on what’s been happening in the shipping game in recent years. I was amazed at some of the changes, I see there is no more DOT or MOT, and my old school, Leith Nautical College is no more. Does no one from the East of Scotland go to sea any more? 

Also, has anyone investigated the rumours (Googling again) that some of these sub-standard bulk carriers are insured for substantially more than they are worth on the open market? I am thinking that if I was to write off my car accidently, I would get paid out at an agreed value, and that the insurance company reduces this figure every year to keep it in line with its market value. If the insurance assessor finds that the tyres are worn or the car is in an unroadworthy condition they could refuse to pay out, even that figure!

Regards


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## djw1

Alastair,

There are plenty of cases where the ship was insured for more than her market value. See Hooke. When the Brair lost power and drifted onto the Shetlands
in 1993, the 17 year old pre-Marpol Aframax had a market value a good deal
less than 5 million USD. She was insured for 12.7 million on top of which
the owner had 6.3 million of Loss of Hire. The problem is that in the very
volatile tanker and dry bulk markets a ship's market value can change
by a faqctor of four or more in a matter of months, up or down.

Re JimmyS's commnet on owner responsibility. Of course, the owner
has a moral responsibility, but any regulatory system has to assume
that the owners will do the minimum legally permissable.
There are some owners who attempt to build ships to somewhat
better than Class's execrable standards, but in a strong shipbuilding
market this is next to impossible. The yards have a choice of customers,
they think they make the most money building a standard design,
and the standard designs are all Class minimal ships.
You either order a standard design or the yard sells the berth 
to someone else.

KTF

Jack


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## jimmys

That report Derbyshire/Christopher is very interesting.
They are having the same problems I had with the estimation of forces.
I have never heard hydrostatic pressure forces refered to as "bagging" and "reverse bagging".
Just for interest Force in Newtons is a product of mass in kgs times accelleration in M/s2. When you consider the mass of the cargo of say iron ore the forces are massive.
Bill will be able to estimate the weight of the heap in a hatch.
We call these forces in the UK inertial forces.

For an idea of the hydrostatic pressure as the shipside dips roughly 27 inches of salt water give 1 psi pressure. a fifty foot dip gives in excess of 20 psi enough to collapse a bulkhead.

Leith College plus the Dolphin shut down in the eighties and everything moved to Glasgow Nautical College. Not many Scottish Cadets going through now a lot are foreign.

regards


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## Lemschout

Heard about ‘bagging’ for the first time in an article from the Dutch Naval Architect Vossnack (now deceased). His last fight was against the use of the Gross Tonnage to fix so many things from port dues to the compliance with regulations. The dramatic results are vessels without buoyancy, no room for the crew, the stores, and no forecastle! 
‘Bagging’ is also not exactly describing the hydrostatic pressure forces, it only provides a nice description of the resulting effects of these forces on the hull. 
[I have never heard hydrostatic pressure forces refered to as "bagging" and "reverse bagging". Just for interest Force in Newtons is a product of mass in kgs times accelleration in M/s2. When you consider the mass of the cargo of say iron ore the forces are massive. Bill will be able to estimate the weight of the heap in a hatch.
We call these forces in the UK inertial forces.]
I still wonder if the naval architects takes those inertial forces on bulk carrier into account. The longitudinal ones which affects the ability of the ship to raise above the waves, and the transversal ones which are provoking an huge pressure on the tanktops when a bulker is rolling heavily. 
Once I took me a lot of patience and many emails to explain to a captain who read these web pages that the highest stresses occur when the heel of the ship is maximum and the direction of rolling is reverted. He thought that these forces were at their minimum value, zero, because for a short time there is no rolling speed. I believe that he understood after I told him that somebody falling from a building and reaching the ground achieves also a zero speed at that moment! 
Wondering also if the bulker designers are assuming that the iron ore is evenly distributed in the cargo holds, or if they know that there is always a sharp heap there. In case they have still to discover it, that will be an interesting case for a new Finite Element Analysis. 
A few days ago I had another case of a small bulker with no functioning pumping system fore, this while there was a compartment for the emergency fire pump going all the way down to the pipe tunnel! It gave me one more argument to detain a ship that had been delivered only last year. And for once I found something good coming from the IMO. When I checked the anchor spurling pipes I was so p… to see them totally inaccessible, even for the fitting of a cover, not even speaking about putting and removing cement, that I wrote a remark in spite being unaware of any regulation to cover this deficiency. But when I finalized my report, I checked once more the ILLC and found out that on all bulkers built (keel) after the 1st January 2005 such a cover must be fitted on the spurling pipes, the construction of that boat started some months later. 
That is the fun with this job, we have always new surprises with things that seemed unbelievable one year earlier. Some months ago I used to say that the future PSC inspectors will have an interesting work when the vessels built in some of the actual cheap shipyards will reach ten years of age. Now I have to revise this opinion, ten months is enough.


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## Iain B

alastairrussell said:


> Bill
> 
> You said:
> 
> 
> Also, has anyone investigated the rumours (Googling again) that some of these sub-standard bulk carriers are insured for substantially more than they are worth on the open market? I am thinking that if I was to write off my car accidently, I would get paid out at an agreed value, and that the insurance company reduces this figure every year to keep it in line with its market value. If the insurance assessor finds that the tyres are worn or the car is in an unroadworthy condition they could refuse to pay out, even that figure!
> 
> Regards


Hull & Machinery policies are often 'valued policies' that is the premium is set at a value to reflect the value of the ship insured and ....... of course the risk. 

It is possible that a ship will be insured for a value which is more than it may be worth at a particular time, but you should consider that the 'value' of a ship can vary enormously and very quickly. Consider also that the H&M policy cannot include any commercial value (i.e. a good charter attached) that has to be insured separately. 

H&M insurance is not quite like auto insurance, but yes the underwriters can avoid paying in similar ways to your house or car. In simple terms the most obvious is; if the ship was not 'seaworthy' at the commencement of the voyage then the claim does not have to be paid. 

I have not heard of any such 'over insured sub standard ship' rumours, I have heard of long expensive fights to establish if the casualty was or was not 'seaworthy'. Marine underwriters don't like giving money away without a fight, and many will spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to see if they can avoid paying tens of millions. 

The concept of what is a sub standard bulk carrier is another subjective question. Some people would say any bulk carrier over 20 years is sub standard, some others (including some charterers and shippers say 25 yrs) some say over 20 or over 25 is ok if you have CAP or what ever.

There have been significant improvements in the loss rate of bulk carriers since the implementation of the post Derbyshire IACS and SOLAS regs. 

The boom market has meant that there are more old ships out there, and the risk must have increased, but recent losses due to structural issues and foundering have typically involved smaller bulk carriers.

The risk of a casualty or loss due to grounding or collision is at the moment considered to be much more likely than massive structural failure (of the type we saw so many in the late 80's and early 90's) 

This high bulk market has a few more years to run and we will see how it develops, but everyone I speak to talks about crew quality and competence issues as the big issue.


Iain


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## Bill Davies

Ian B,
*crew quality and competence issues as the big issue*
At least I'm not on my own on that belief.

Bill


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## non descript

Iain, another quality posting from you - thank you for such an accurate assessment. - As you wisely comment, in today's amazing and very volatile market,_ "the 'value' of a ship can vary enormously and very quickly",_ and a very serious consideration in terms of the bulk carrier market.
(Thumb) 
Mark


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## alastairrussell

I have just been reading the March edition of the Shipping World and Shipbuilding and three articles have me shaking my head and thinking what a mess the shipping game is still in. 

The first is for Bill and was sourced from my favourite classification society, DNV (so it must be true). They state that they are concerned that collisions and groundings are on the rise. To quote _*“Despite the introduction of myriad regulations aimed at improving ship safety, there has been a two-fold increase in ship groundings and collisions over the past five years” *_ 

They say that human error is once again the major contributory factor and the boom in the shipping market has created a shortage of officers and this is putting crews under pressure and has also resulted in a lower retention rate and faster promotion and this is creating a lack of experience on board the ship. They say that “ _*the maritime industry has to focus more on avoiding accidents by creating a good safety culture on board”. *_I say “why is there a shortage”? Remember that old saying “if you pay peanuts you get monkeys” 

Another article states that a French court has ordered the French Total Oil company to pay 197 million Euros in compensation to the victims of the pollution caused by the ERIKA oil spill. I quote Total *“As a charterer, it is not its role or business to act as a substitute for inspection companies and classification societies, the shipowner or the flag state”* They go on to say that *“it forces the users to become inspectors, potentially weakening the responsibility of those who have the expertise, duty and actual power to inspect tankers especially their structures.”*

The third article was a real screamer, apparently the EU commission inspectors have raided some European shipping classification societies’ offices. They are I quote *“probing for potential violation of competition rules against restrictive business practices”* I have to ask why is the EU commission getting involved and interfering in the operation of the international shipping industry? Do they not like the classification societies getting together to charge the same fees and work to a common standard? I see the IACS has thrown out a Polish classification society over poor standards!

I have placed four of the Derbyshire underwater photos in the Gallery under ‘shipping accidents’.

Tell me, did they ever find the cover of the focsle hatch? The hinge side of the hatch coaming has the appearance of having been ripped away, why? This hatch was referred to as being ‘old fashioned’ in the last Inquiry report. Is it possible that when it was struck by green water that the rubber gasket was compressed allowing some of the swing bolts to be washed out of their clamping position? I do see that some of the other swing bolts have been over stressed and failed at some stage.

I would have liked to have been able to paste the magazine articles into this post but I am having trouble with my scanner. Bill, my better half blames it on human error but I of course blame it on my lack of training!

Thanks Ian and Jack for your posts.

Alastair


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## Bill Davies

Alastair,
As usual an interesting post. I am afraid things are going to get worse. The caliber of individuals who are now attaining senior positions in record time is only going to exacerbate an already bad situation. Recently spoke with the MD of a NW Ship manager who is concerned at the demands from young people wanting promotion based on the certificate they hold. Experience is something they are not willing to discuss.


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## MM²

*If Emloyers are worried about the standard.......*

....of person they employ. 

This must be because the current examination system is of insufficient rigor to ensure the standard of those passing through it.

If the employers are that worried they should institute their own certification system which even if not statutory will at least address the standards issue.


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## Bill Davies

There are companies out there who are interested in 'Competence Assurance' but unfortunately the wrong institutions (NI et al,.) are getting involved which have a vested interest to promote the present regime. Further, there are now people in middle management roles in some Ship Management companies who have qualified relatively recently who certainly do not 'Competence Assurance'.


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## stequantum

*Newcastle*



John Rogers said:


> Where were the ships built Pat?
> John


Hi John they were built in Newcastle as far as I know I was on the maiden voyage of her sister ship the Linconshire we sailed to Houston that was enough for me and most of the crew we all signed of the second we got back

Arthur Richards Assistant Steward


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## M29

stequantum said:


> Hi John they were built in Newcastle as far as I know I was on the maiden voyage of her sister ship the Linconshire we sailed to Houston that was enough for me and most of the crew we all signed of the second we got back
> 
> Arthur Richards Assistant Steward


Hi Arthur, I think you wandered into the wrong thread. I also sailed on maidens of Lincolnshire to Houston as R/O.
Pity you left as we had a great voyage including Santos, BA and Capetown (a week in each!!)
Lincolnshire was an LPG carrier and has no similarity to the OBO's being discussed in this thread.
Lincolnshire was a very special build, to the latest technology and extremely well built. She was in service until just a few years ago.
Best Wishes
Alan


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## non descript

M29 said:


> Hi Arthur, I think you wandered into the wrong thread. Lincolnshire was an LPG carrier and has no similarity to the OBO's being discussed in this thread.
> Best Wishes
> Alan


Alan, thank you for helping Arthur out with some kindess. - For anyone who remains unsure, the details are well do***ented in this thread and worth reading. *#160* makes some effort to clarify who, what, where, etc.
(Thumb) 
Mark


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## Paul_Lee

I've just read the wikipedia page on the Derbyshire, where it mentions the "strange orientation" of the wreck, but it doesn't give any details. What does this mean?


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## stequantum

*MV Licolnshire*

(Thumb) Ah sorry not to sure how this site works pleased you had some good runs on the lincolnshire gas masks were a bit to much fo me if memory serves me right when we got to houston we were all treated to a trip to a large department store to spend our money ?


Tonga said:


> Alan, thank you for helping Arthur out with some kindess. - For anyone who remains unsure, the details are well do***ented in this thread and worth reading. *#160* makes some effort to clarify who, what, where, etc.
> (Thumb)
> Mark


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## non descript

stequantum said:


> (Thumb) Ah sorry not to sure how this site works pleased you had some good runs on the lincolnshire gas masks were a bit to much fo me if memory serves me right when we got to houston we were all treated to a trip to a large department store to spend our money ?


*Stequantum *- No worries, we all get a bit confused in the initial stages. - If it helps, a useful guide is contained *here*, where there is a catch-all comment from Admin requesting that we: 
- *"Please stay on topic as far as possible. If you want to discuss a different subject, start a new thread - don't hijack someone else’s thread.
Hint: If your comments don't match the title of the thread, you are probably off topic." *

Please do not be taken aback, we are not here to criticize, merely help try and keep the Site running as the Owners have outlined.
(Thumb) 
Mark


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## non descript

Alastair,
Having just made a passing comment on the posting in the thread about "Lincolnshire" it would be fair to try and make a similar, and of course gentle, plea in respect of your postings that were initially called *#239* to *#279*.

We do accept that the extensive list of Capesize Bulk-Carriers that have suffered hull damage is well meant and in their own right most interesting, but they are nevertheless considered as an off-topic posting. 

So, in order not to lose the information you have carefully gathered, but ensure that the Site does run in the spirit of the rules, the postings have been moved to their own thread, which is in your name and appear *here*.
(Thumb) 
Mark


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## alastairrussell

Mark

Your re-direction of my post is OK with me. I did not collect the information in the post and I am concerned about some of facts used as I have been unable to acknowledge the person or organisation responsible for the collection of the data. I have gone through all my paperwork on the suspect 1966 Load line convention which I feel affected all bulk carriers and not just capesized, built after 1968. 

I am sure that someone has collected them from the ‘Lloyds lists’ newspaper as all the ‘casualties’ mentioned in my do***ents are mixed up with quotes from the LL editorials. Are you in a position to confirm that the facts are from Lloyd List casualty page? 

I have to say that I prefer the use of the words ‘structural failures’ as against your use of the term ‘having suffered hull damage’. 

Alastair


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## non descript

alastairrussell said:


> Mark
> Your re-direction of my post is OK with me. I did not collect the information in the post and I am concerned about some of facts used as I have been unable to acknowledge the person or organisation responsible for the collection of the data. I have to say that I prefer the use of the words ‘structural failures’ as against your use of the term ‘having suffered hull damage’.
> Alastair


I have made the edit so it now reads *"A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure"*
(Thumb) 
Mark


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## Paul_Lee

Regarding the Derbyshire, has anyone inspected the MAIB files? If you write and ask for them, they'll provide them.

When I was doing research for my Titanic/Californian book, I obtained some
files on the 1990-92 re-appraisal, and in the summer of 1990, Legal Advisor 
Geoffrey Beetham wrote to Cecil Parkinson, saying;

“Perhaps of more significance to the Department [of Transport] is the precedent which the reopening of the evidence would provide in other cases. It would not be difficult for interested parties to come up with 'new evidence' in other cases, such as the Derbyshire or the Marques. In both these cases there are numbers of people who could well benefit financially from a reopening of the investigation. There are parties eager to have these investigations reopened, and it would be difficult to resist their arguments on the basis of new evidence if we have reopened the case of the Titanic which is of much more 'academic' interest.”


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## RHP

Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.


We chartered the Miss Vicky out of Ilyichevsk back I guess around 1994? when she was on her final voyage before breaking. Massive vessel.... loaded the last 2 holds (7 and 8 was it?) with cotton. She carried fertilizer in the others if I remember correctly. She ran aground off Piraeus, apparantly she had no intention of every completing the voyage. The cargo value was great and the hull value far less. The owners demanded a TCL before they'd release the cargo. It took me 8 weeks to discharge those two holds and sort the marks and containerizing the bales. I guess we had 30 x 40' containers open alongside at any one time and we worked from first light until last.

We were screwed royally by that vessel which knowing she was a sistership of the Derbyshire left a bitter taste in my move. To read that she subsequently was renamed the Ivy V and no doubt continued to rip off other charterers is disappointing to say the least.

At least containers helped reduce the number of bulker cowboy owners.


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## M29

RHP said:


> Atlantic Bridge:
> 44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.
> 
> We were screwed royally by that vessel which knowing she was a sistership of the Derbyshire left a bitter taste in my move. To read that she subsequently was renamed the Ivy V and no doubt continued to rip off other charterers is disappointing to say the least.
> 
> At least containers helped reduce the number of bulker cowboy owners.


Hi RHP
The "Atlantic Bridge" was not a sister of "Derbyshire". "Atlantic Bridge" was, as you say built in Japan, not on the UK NE coast, she did have serveral sisters including "Pacific Bridge"
These were bulk carriers and much smaller than the "Derbyshire" class.
"Atlantic Bridge" had a long career with Bibby Line before being sold on, you can't blame a ship for the way the owners operate it

Best Wishes
Alan


----------



## non descript

M29 said:


> Hi RHP
> The "Atlantic Bridge" was not a sister of "Derbyshire". "Atlantic Bridge" was, as you say built in Japan, not on the UK NE coast, she did have serveral sisters including "Pacific Bridge"
> These were bulk carriers and much smaller than the "Derbyshire" class.
> "Atlantic Bridge" had a long career with Bibby Line before being sold on, you can't blame a ship for the way the owners operate it
> 
> Best Wishes
> Alan


Thank you Alan - well done (Thumb)


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## Keckers

I think I sailed with the "chief steward" who went down with the Derbyshire. Cracking chap, one of the best. A sad loss indeed.


----------



## M29

Keckers said:


> I think I sailed with the "chief steward" who went down with the Derbyshire. Cracking chap, one of the best. A sad loss indeed.


Keckers
The Purser/Ch Steward was William Buckley.

For any other friends and colleagues, here is the full list of those lost. List from the Liverpool Maritime Museum Web Site and other sources.

Best Wishes
Alan

Kevin Allis (junior engineer) 
Francis Arthur Bayliss (chief officer) 
Philip Joseph Best (steward) 
Paul John Bindon (extra 2nd officer) 
Thomas Victor Blease (PO) 
Richard Bond (PO) 
Terence Brown (GP1) 
William Buckley (purser CO) 
Ali Bin Bujang (GP1) 
Timothy Burke (GP1) 
Nigel Coates (GP1) 
Leo Thomas Mackenzie Coltman (3rd engineer) 
Frederick James Chedotal (electrician) 
John James Crone (2nd steward) 
Mark Freeman (junior catering rating) 
Andrew Gordon (steward) 
Alexander Turner Gordon (steward) 
Joseph Henry Graham (2nd cook) 
John James Greenland (steward) 
Barry James Hardman (chief cook) 
Anthony Jack Hodges (CPO) 
William Leonard Hunt (4th engineer) 
Graham Hutchinson (extra 3rd engineer) 
Anne Marie Hutchinson (wife of Graham Hutchinson) 
David Hugh Jones (2nd engineer) 
Mary Jones (wife of David H Jones) 
Norman Gibson Aiken Kane (GP1) 
Paul Desmond King (junior engineer) 
Peter Lambert (GP1) 
Bernard Langton (GP2) 
Norman Marsh (chief engineer) 
Ali Bin Haji Musa (GP1) 
Ronnie Musa (GP1) 
James Noblett (GP1) 
Clive William Rapley (extra CO) 
David Michael Ridyard (extra 4th engineer) 
Badarun Bin Sekah (GP1) 
Adrian Keith Stott (junior seaman) 
Peter John Taylor (PO) 
Raymond William Taylor (2nd officer) 
Geoffrey Victor Underhill (master) 
Royal Alfred Waller (R/O)
Griffith Wyn Williams (GP1) 
Edward Frank Williamson (junior engineer)


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## Keckers

M29 said:


> Keckers
> The Purser/Ch Steward was William Buckley.
> 
> For any other friends and colleagues, here is the full list of those lost. List from the Liverpool Maritime Museum Web Site and other sources.
> 
> Best Wishes
> Alan
> 
> Kevin Allis (junior engineer)
> Francis Arthur Bayliss (chief officer)
> Philip Joseph Best (steward)
> Paul John Bindon (extra 2nd officer)
> Thomas Victor Blease (PO)
> Richard Bond (PO)
> Terence Brown (GP1)
> William Buckley (purser CO)
> Ali Bin Bujang (GP1)
> Timothy Burke (GP1)
> Nigel Coates (GP1)
> Leo Thomas Mackenzie Coltman (3rd engineer)
> Frederick James Chedotal (electrician)
> John James Crone (2nd steward)
> Mark Freeman (junior catering rating)
> Andrew Gordon (steward)
> Alexander Turner Gordon (steward)
> Joseph Henry Graham (2nd cook)
> John James Greenland (steward)
> Barry James Hardman (chief cook)
> Anthony Jack Hodges (CPO)
> William Leonard Hunt (4th engineer)
> Graham Hutchinson (extra 3rd engineer)
> Anne Marie Hutchinson (wife of Graham Hutchinson)
> David Hugh Jones (2nd engineer)
> Mary Jones (wife of David H Jones)
> Norman Gibson Aiken Kane (GP1)
> Paul Desmond King (junior engineer)
> Peter Lambert (GP1)
> Bernard Langton (GP2)
> Norman Marsh (chief engineer)
> Ali Bin Haji Musa (GP1)
> Ronnie Musa (GP1)
> James Noblett (GP1)
> Clive William Rapley (extra CO)
> David Michael Ridyard (extra 4th engineer)
> Badarun Bin Sekah (GP1)
> Adrian Keith Stott (junior seaman)
> Peter John Taylor (PO)
> Raymond William Taylor (2nd officer)
> Geoffrey Victor Underhill (master)
> Royal Alfred Waller (R/O)
> Griffith Wyn Williams (GP1)
> Edward Frank Williamson (junior engineer)


My mistake - Jimmy Crone - 2nd steward. A gent.


----------



## RHP

M29 said:


> Hi RHP
> The "Atlantic Bridge" was not a sister of "Derbyshire". "Atlantic Bridge" was, as you say built in Japan, not on the UK NE coast, she did have serveral sisters including "Pacific Bridge"
> These were bulk carriers and much smaller than the "Derbyshire" class.
> "Atlantic Bridge" had a long career with Bibby Line before being sold on, you can't blame a ship for the way the owners operate it
> 
> Best Wishes
> Alan



Hi Alan, thanks your post and of course there is no blame on the vessel or previous operators for the problems we encountered.

If the Atlantic Bridge/Miss Vicky was a smaller vessel than the Derbyshire then my goodness she must have been big!

The Miss Vicky was a rust bucket and descending the ladders into the holds was a real risk every time we did it. Going down into the holds in Piraeus in summer was like entering an oven, it was oppressive.

Anyway, one episode I would willing forget.

Cheers
Richard


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## chadburn

Can anybody tell me what the loading situation was with the Derbyshire as I believe she was also carrying water ballast in no2 hold and more than likely No8?


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## Lemschout

The Derbyshire was fully loaded for the allowed draft in destination port, thus it would have been a sin to have any ballast.

Holds 2 and 6 were empty, for more info see:
http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sderby.htm


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## John Cassels

Lemschout said:


> The Derbyshire was fully loaded for the allowed draft in destination port, thus it would have been a sin to have any ballast.
> 
> Holds 2 and 6 were empty, for more info see:
> http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sderby.htm



Not to the designated load line ?????????.


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## Lemschout

The maximum deadweight for the summer loadline of the Derbyshire was 173000t, its cargo weight was less than 158000t.

As limited information is available about the limitations it can reasonably be assumed that it was the arrival draft which was liminting the intake as that vessel for sure did not need 15000t of bunker, provision and eventually, for trim purpose, a little ballast in the after peak on arrival to eventually compensate for bunker consumption, but some fuel was located in the fore deeptank.

Anyway taking any ballast water, even in the ballast tanks, would have been foolish it would have futher decreased the freeboard, increased the fuel consumption and the quantity of sprays and seas shipped. Furthermore it is not sure that all the ballast eventually shipped in the double bottoms could have been pumped out before arrival.


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## chadburn

Thank You both for your input regarding my question, can you confirm or otherwise as to whether her main engine fell out and is in a seperate crater some distance from the main wreckage.


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## Lemschout

The bow section was found 590m away from the stern section.
There is no report that the engine had been detached from the stern section.


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## chadburn

I will have to dig the book concerned out (if I can remember where I put it!) my own view of the missing vents and the open hatch just looking at the state of the dogs is that it/they was blown open/off due to the outside water pressure on the way down as I am sure the Crew would have made certain that the ship was secured for bad weather, I will go on to say in my view she lost her main engine, broached, her cargo shifted and then she rolled over during the night. If this vessel was the same as Har Addir her engineroom would have been unmanned which was something else that put me off staying too long this type of vessel, to big and to much reliance on automated systems including starting the Main Engine from the Bridge if required. No Thanks


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## chadburn

If I remember correctly the book was possibly written by an Australian Salvage Master, on the cover it shows a rather nice Cruise Ship stuck on the putty in the South Sea's, I may have borrowed it from the library. As one of the few people who was unfortunate/lucky to get away with it, to be on an O.B.O. the Har Addir which suffered a major structural failure it was very alarming how far she went over on her beam end and how long she stayed there considering all her Ballast, Saddle and No2 hold were filled with Ballast Water. We were lucky we were in a calm sea and nothing had fell off her B&W to bring her to a stop.


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## Brian Locking

OBOs and Ore/Oil carriers were notoriously difficult ships to sail in. Could mention a few incidents during my time on them in the 1970s. Termination of cracks in way of Hatch Corners was fairly usual.


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## fringe

*The Bridge Boats*

I sailed as Second Mate on the Tyne Bridge. It was horrendous. If I might add my two penno'rth about this class, I do recall the Bos'un doing his nut about the foredeck booby hatch. It would 'magically' open itself and we couldn't work out why. Until that is, one day going across (loaded) from Australia to Europe I went down the fore peak with the Mate and saw the ships side physically moving as the vessel butted into the seas. The panting breams were moving a good eight to ten inches vertically and you could feel the changing pressure on your chest whilst you breathed. The same could be felt in the lower and upper forecastle stores - so no wonder the hatch kept popping! Why had we gone down? Because, whenever in ballast the lower forecasoutle store bilge alarm would keep going off when there was no apparent ingress. It was later traced to a tiny weep around the gasket of the manhole. Everytime the bows buried in the seas the pressure on the shell plating pressurised the fore peak and caused a tiny trickle to run almost directly into the bilge alarm well. So pump out during the day and an alarm at night - I think we wedged it with a pencil in the end.


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## chadburn

Hello Fringe, what sort of Ballast system did "Tyne Bridge" have, was it air operated from a schematic panel in the engineroom?.


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## Bill Davies

Fringe,
Interesting post. I have much experience of OBOs and Ore/Oil carriers in the 70s and 80s and although you have exercised a little editorial license with the degree of flexing iwo panting beams the point is well made. One of the Bridge class passed into Marcona ownership in the late 70s early 80s. In all the ships I sailed in irrespective of type it was stndard practice to secure the Foc'sle access hatch from within. This could vary from the use of a spare 'chain stopper' lashing and padlock on a BF boat to elaborate steel claw devices fitted on Marcona Pathfinder and many of the other similarly sized combi's. 
*Question:* What went wrong on the 'Derbyshire' *????*


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## randcmackenzie

Hello Bill.

The Derbyshire didn't have a foc'sle, and the hatch was the only means of access.

It couldn't be lashed from inside.

Best regards.


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## Chouan

Quite.


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## thobshropshire

chadburn said:


> Hello Fringe, what sort of Ballast system did "Tyne Bridge" have, was it air operated from a schematic panel in the engineroom?.


This class of vessel had a cargo control room all the ballast pumping was controlled from there.
Remotely operated valves were hydraulic I seem to recall.
Regards


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## Bill Davies

randcmackenzie,

You know exactly the access hatch I am referring to and it could be lashed from the inside


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## NoR

Having secured the hatch from inside how did you get out?


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## Bill Davies

Steel Claw device


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## thobshropshire

Bill Davies said:


> Steel Claw device


Bill,
For those of us unfamiliar with "Steel claw device" can you describe its operation. 

Also you exactly the access hatch you are referring to in your reply to randcmackenzie's post.
Is there another way out of the foc'sle space on this class of ship other than the hatch access onto the flush foredeck?
Regards


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## Bill Davies

There are numerous inovative devices for the securing this access hatch. The Steel Claw Devices I refer to was similar in operation to the Claw Locking Device on Kvaerner Trans Roto Hatch Covers and McGregor copies.


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## randcmackenzie

Bill Davies said:


> randcmackenzie,
> 
> You know exactly the access hatch I am referring to and it could be lashed from the inside


I'm sorry Bill, the only hatch I know of was the single hatch forward of the windlasses. Please enlighten me on how it could be lashed from inside.

You also have to remember that hindsight is perfect, and nobody then knew that well dogged down hatches could mysteriously open in heavy weather.

I experienced this twice on a half sister to the Derbyshire, fortunately without flooding, and took steps to prevent recurrence.

An incoming sea lands on the hatch, compresses the packing, and dislodges the dogs. 

Take a look at the Derbyshire Re-opened Formal Inquiry if you haven't already done so.

Best Regards.


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## Bill Davies

Read #271.Quote: *An incoming sea lands on the hatch, compresses the packing, and dislodges the dogs.*Unquote

This very reason is in my belief the initiating event (root cause)

As for steps to prevent this occurring see post #271


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## randcmackenzie

Quite correct, these devices exist, but Derbyshire didn't have them, nor was she required to by Class or Flag.

Also to prevent recurrence, you have to know about the occurrence first.

Best Regards.


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## chadburn

From what I have read previously there seems to be some sophisticated hatch locking systems put forward,no,no, this hatch is of the bog standard type which have been used for many years without major problems. They cannot be locked from the inside like a Submarine hatch and are clamped by "Butterfly" nuts with either a 1/2 or 5/8 thread. Bearing in mind the year she was built it is unlikely the hatch seal would be of the "balloon Type" and was more than likely made of strips of rubber insertion jointing or "Sorbo" rubber which does not have "bounce" especially when the butterfly's have been tightened down with a length of tube or the end of a ring spanner which was the norm on the ships I have served on especially when bad weather was approaching. The Forks on the hatch cover in which the butterfly bolt section slides into are normally turned up at the end to prevent the butterfly clamp slipping off unless you back the butterfly nut off far enough to go over the top of the raised edge of the fork. Before the terrible accident this hatch would have been opened and closed like a "Fiddlers elbow" and the lip of the hatch coming would have been well seated into the joint material so in my view hatch "Bounce" is a non starter and it is unlikely that the amount of water coming in even if the joint was passing could not be coped with in the usual way.In my view this hatch and the vent tops were blown off on the way down (like Safety Valves) and were not the "Root" cause. My own view is that she got caught out her cargo shifted and she rolled over very quickly which accounts for the large spread of the cargo/debris field which woud not happen if she went straight down by the head even if her ballast tanks were imploding. This is my own view of this tragic accident.


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## chadburn

After some reflection I think that "FRINGE" may have hit on the answer as to the possibility of the hatch seal leaking water. The leak would not be caused by outside forces (heavy seas over the Bow) dislodging the hatch or it's fittings but by an internal force and that is through pressure panting with the movement of the ships sides, this "panting" over a period of time could stretch the threads on the holding down bolts or within the wing/butterfly nut or even bend the fork shaped clamp arms which could cause a gap between the seal and the hatch coaming, although I must admit that I cannot remember as to whether we had this problem his words sound plausable to me.


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## jmcg

An interesting post. Now I sailed on the English Bridge (one voyage only thank God) and can recall a conversation between the 2nd Mate, 3rd Engineer and myself rounding the Cape. At the time it was a query regarding any noticable issues down below whilst we on deck were wallowing and creaking from wave to wave. She was bending like a banana -not riding the troughs like other lesser vessels. No more was discussed when we cleared the Cape en route in ballast to Ras Tanura. The English Bridge subsequently foundered off Bantry in Eire as the Kowloon Bridge and was then sold as wreck to a local chap for £1.00 -yes £1.00.

I followed the inquiry, and initally it blamed the Master for putting to sea with the focsle hatch open or failure to ensure when at sea that it was closed. No Master in the world would be stupid enough to allow that in the Pacific - yet the initial findings were never challenged on this fundamental point. When the roving sub took the sub sea photographs (subsequently published) there was clear evidence that the hatch was open and that the ropes were strewn across the focsle leading from the opened hatch. The lawyers and many other actors in the "inquiry" seized the "evidence" to confirm their ignorance of basic seamanship. They again laid the blame firmly on the Master for the reasons set out above.

Anyone who has been to sea will surely know that poly prop (Polyproelene) ropes float on the water. The fact that that the rope locker hatch was shown to be open support this submission and the ropes are clearly shown "floating" out of the rope locker.

The rope locker hatch or focsle hatch as it erroneously decribed on this post was of the traditional "dog" type. If my memory serves me corrrect there would be a minimum of 8 - all of which would be "hardened down" as soon as possible after rope stowage for the voyage. On some short sea or coastal voyages where heavy weather was not the norm the ropes would remain on the focsle but securley lashed down.

As discussed no sane Master would permit opening of the rope locker hatch whilst at sea until say 6 hours before they would be required i.e arrival at port. Because the locker hatch was shown to be open these actors jumped to a wrong conclusion that the Master was at fault for permitting his vessel to be at sea with the hatch open. They leaned heavily on the mooring ropes as shown leading from the rope locker hatch and out on the focsle to suggest that the Master was culpable. 

It was with all credit to John Preston MP (two jags), the member for Hull that the second inquiry was ordered. This inquiry threw up more monkies. It seemed to cast some doubt on the quality of build of that class.

The second inquiry also concluded that it was the ingress of seawater that caused the loss of the ship. Notwithstanding the many other theories and conclusions one thing is certain - that rope locker hatch would not be deliberatley or inadvertenly open in mid Pacific in a typhoon.

The second inquiry also appered to clear the Master of any blame for the loss. I use the word "appeared" because there are some still persons about who will not and do not accept that these ships were unseaworthy and that the Master was culpable. 

Regarding the internal securing of the rope locker hatch on the Derbyshire - I cannot offer a definitive yes or no. I can however confirm that rope locker hatches correctly hardened up or dogged down (usually confirmed by the bosun after using a hammer or piece of heavy gauge metal tubing) will withstand any typhoon in the Pacific or China Sea. It would not be necessary to afford further internal hardening or dogging. I state that with conviction after sailing through many on much,much smaller but better built vessels than the Derbyshire class.

The rope locker could possibly be further accessed via the Bosuns' Locker in the focsle head. This would facilitate additional hardening up and permit egress from the bosuns locker. Unfortunately I cannot remember the exact configuration on the English Bridge for reason set out below

My one trip on this class of ship did not permit much deck work for us AB's sailing as GPSI's. Such were the problems in the engine room that save for our deck watch keeping duties almost all of us would be "turned to" down below to assist the engineers. Lub Oil used to pour out of her engine on all levels - 40 gallon drums were the normal recovery items before returning the oil to the seperators. These would be emptied on each watch. Although designed to operate as "unmanned" this was not the case.

As mentioned I did one trip (Voyage 3 if my memory serves me well) and some short time afterwards I was told that she couldn't get a crew from Liverpool to sail her.

I have quite a volume of historical paperwork on the loss of the Derbyshire and that class of OBO. Some published and some not so. 

I went on to take a Masters degree in Health and Safety and European Environmental Law and have acted as expert witness in two shipping fatalities and other marine incidents.

So steady on you two - Bill and Rand........!!

BW

John


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## Bill Davies

JCMG,
It would appear that you have sailed in one ship of this type as AB. Is that correct?


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## MM²

jmcg

I'm not exactly sure what the point of your post is (apart from advising us of your 'superior' qualifications); however the fore peak hatch was open and the ship had sunk.

Either its not possible to dog this type of hatch efficiently. Or it is and it wasn't.

Poly Prop floats - so what?


----------



## jmcg

Bill

Sailed on the English Bridge as GPS1 (General Purpose Seaman 1). I think there were about 3 traditional AB's including me + Bosun, Bosuns' mate and Chippy. Very much undermanned with AB's. The remainder of the GPS1's were traditional engine room chaps - donkey-men, greasers etc. Certainly on that ship the Chief Engineer ran the "crowd". The Chief Officer (appeared) to have little influence or control of the day work crew activities. Whether this was a consequence of the real engine room problems I do not know, although I can recall Fyffes vessel "Musa" (also GPS1) following a similar pattern although there were no abnornal issues down below. 

Jebsens (MV Binsnes) was also GP crewed - I was only one of two English speaking AB's on her. Such was her deck machinery (5 or 6 cranes and self loading attachments i.e.(grabs etc) I don't believe I was down below more than two or three times.

As to the comment from MM. I dont have any "superior" qualifications as suggested. When my career at sea ended I studied law - simple as that. Like all other professions one has to keep ahead and this included studing at the highest level - not for any "superior qualifications" nonsence as suggested - but to earn a decent living! 

As the years rolled by and the decline of the British Merchant Navy there were fewer British seafarers. Consequently when incidents and or losses occurred there were fewer individuals to provide "expert" or other opinion on certain practices and procedures. This was and is particularly so when lawyers and insurers become embroiled and cannot find a solution. 

My comment on the Derbyshire is based on my experience and recollections of the English Bridge and a variety of other vessels - nothing to do with "superior qualifications". 

Hope this clarifies.

Bw 

John


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## chadburn

There is no doubt the hatch is open the photographic proof is there for all to see, but the question has always been why? From the very start I have never believed that the Crew were negligent, it could and does happen with some Foreign Crews who's attitude to Safety is a bit lax but I believe that this Crew would have made damn sure everything was securely battened down. I have never believed that (dare I say it)a perfect wave took the hatch cover and vent tops away, my personal belief is as I have previously said is that she rolled over, (B&W are not the most reliable of engines we had a host of problems with ours) and on the way down this cover and the vent covers blew off with the pressure on the hull however, "Fringe" has opened my eye's to a highly plausable reason in regards to internal pressure build ups inside the Compartment due to Hull deformation. This vessel would be slamming in pretty hard and with everything securely battened down any sudden deformation on the hull would give a significant pressure increase inside the compartment (like squeezing a pair of Bellows), the weakest parts of the structure are the vents and this hatch cover which is held down by large wing nuts on forked brackets, it is not inconceivable that the open ended brackets could be ripped out from under the wing nuts and the hatch fly off if the sudden pressure increase was high enough then I would agree she would go down by the head. The ore carriers I served on had "proper" forec'sles which are considered by experts to be a plus point and I must admit that I had not give a thought to "pressure Panting" highlighted by "Fringe" but in my view it could well be the answer to this type of hatch in the Bow area passing water as others have previously said and not what is as previously believed to have been large greens coming over the top loosening the hatch dogs.


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## jimmys

I have only been on one bulk carrier and I was Chief Engineer.

These hatches are being by screw threads and in this one probably whitworth threads about one inch diameter, 8 threads per inch.
When a screw thread is tightened it is held in position by friction forces between the flanks of the thread and the nut. These are all internal and they all balance. As movement of the ship comes on these forces hold the nut tight. Grease reduces friction as does wear. The nut thread is approx one inch long and the bolt six inches. The nut in this situation becomes distressed first through use and the flanks wear. The flank angle of the nut is not the same as the bolt and it tends to slacken. Chippie cant see the inside of the nut, it may not be able to screw off. Nobody knows its worn they do not have the special thread gauges required to check a nut flank angle. It tightens and everyone thinks its OK.
The natural movement of worn threads is to slacken and to stop it you need to lock them. Anything held by screw threads can have this natural opening you do not need massive internal or external forces to cause it.

regards
jimmys


----------



## Bill Davies

Jimmys,
Most experienced mariners would readily recognize what your saying and I would venture better described in an anomaly with the stretching of cylinder head studs. However, what exactly is the point you are making??
This all falls under Human Error!!


----------



## jimmys

Bill Davies said:


> Jimmys,
> Most experienced mariners would readily recognize what your saying and I would venture better described in an anomaly with the stretching of cylinder head studs. However, what exactly is the point you are making??
> This all falls under Human Error!!


We stretch studs to stop this natural opening. If there is wear on the threads the stretching does not work. There is no human error involved. It is wear and tear
We fit a new nut and stud. If we don't and we did not check the threads, that is human error.

If the person on deck cannot ascertain the wear and he has no means to check the threads, it is not human error. It may possibly be a design fault and that is not human error either.

I am saying the opening of previously secured hatches in weather can be laid down to simple thread faults, I am not saying that is what caused it here but it could have. It has not been put forward before and it is put forward purely for discussion. 

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Jimmy

Good point and well made! Would not a competent marine surveyor pick up on the "wear" during the routine and mandatory survey?

BW

J.


----------



## chadburn

Jimmy S, A good solid engineering explanation on the interaction between bolt and nut however that is not really the point I am making which is as follows; the "opened fork clamping Bracket" over a period of time and due to "harding down" will have been bent into the downward position and although the fork mouth is turned upover to prevent the nut "walking"out of the clamps through wear and tear when being tightened if there is sufficient pressure and and the clamps are already most proably bent downover to start with the clamps would slide out from under the wing nuts given there was sufficient pressure under the hatch cover.


----------



## Bill Davies

Even if these dogs were new and by definition the ship on her maiden voyage the devices were inherently unsafe. Green water on top of these hatches will compress these hatches to such an extent the dogs can an will 'spring off'.

I have commanded no less than eight of these vessel in the period 73/85 and experienced enough prior to the 'Derbyshire' for me to know they (the dogs) were inherently unsafe. Fortunately, the type of companies I worked for allowed me 'greater freedom' than British Flag companies and I always fitted 'external steel strapping' where no exotic internal devices were fitted or design precluded other internal securing arrangement.
Hopefully, we can move on from Youngs Modulus of Elasticity. I left that with Ozzie Steward in 68 when up for Extra's


----------



## jimmys

jmcg said:


> Jimmy
> 
> Good point and well made! Would not a competent marine surveyor pick up on the "wear" during the routine and mandatory survey?
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


It should be picked up in the load line survey which has closure of all openings as a specific. They have all got to be checked and initialed.
The nuts tend to rock and lift, you would slacken off all the winged nuts and rock and lift them. Once there is excessive play the thread is no good. If you test a new nut and bolt you can feel the requisite play. It is not much, screw threads are quite closely toleranced.

regards
jimmys


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## chadburn

At least one person read the Modulus possibly two


----------



## Bill Davies

Chadbourrne,
If this thread is to have any benefit to the membership of the site and not wanting it to go off on a tangent I think it important that contributors 'keep our eye on the topic' and not introduce 'smoke screens'.


----------



## jimmys

chadburn said:


> Jimmy S, A good solid engineering explanation on the interaction between bolt and nut however that is not really the point I am making which is as follows; the "opened fork clamping Bracket" over a period of time and due to "harding down" will have been bent into the downward position and although the fork mouth is turned upover to prevent the nut "walking"out of the clamps through wear and tear when being tightened if there is sufficient pressure and and the clamps are already most proably bent downover to start with the clamps would slide out from under the wing nuts given there was sufficient pressure under the hatch cover.


I thorougly agree with what you are saying, it is all very reasonable and it should be picked up at the loadline survey as well. I have seen this before it is all wear and tear.
If hatches are being pressurised from below or from above to any degree we have another problem there is design limitations. This type of hatch as you know is very limited in its ability to take pressure. It will blow open with quite modest pressures.

regards
jimmys


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## chadburn

Bill, I have read your comment and this discussion is about the Derbyshire, fortunatly my experience comes from standing by and then sailing on the series of OBO'S built Just before the Derbyshire at the same yard which you have no knowledge off so I am well aware of the type of hatch jointing material used and I am sorry that your lack of engineering knowledge precludes you from being able to understand that "bounce" is a red herring in my view on this type of hatch.


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## Bill Davies

Chadbourn,
You assume a lot. Another 'smoke screen'


----------



## chadburn

I have been a Professional Marine Engineer in both the R.N.& the M.N. it,s a matter of knowing and doing my own job without telling other people how to do their's, complaints about smoke I leave up to Deckies who in the event of a real emergency can always open "Envelope Tango" to tell them what they have to do.


----------



## Chouan

I think you'll find, chadburn, that its nothing to do with any difference between Deck and Engineroom, but more to do with an individual refusing to accept that his pet theory is wrong, or indeed that anything that he might say can be open to criticism or question. My posts are invisible to him now in any case because of this same problem. Please don't condemn a whole department with the same brush because of the intolerance of one member of that department.
The member in question in convinced that the "Derbyshire" was lost through human error, and will not be convinced otherwise.
I also sailed on one of that class when I was with Denholms , as 2/O, and I can't remember any means of securing the foc'sle hatch from the inside either.


----------



## fringe

Whey Aye! Yer bugger ma Chadburn!
The ballast system was supposed to be hydraulic. Operated from the cargo control room where there was a mimic diagram and various pneumatic open/shut indicators made by Dobie McInnes (correct spelling?). But only the indicator bit worked. Opening the valves was a long job. Down the duct keel, up into the stool, sit astride the pipe (36" dia) and hand crank it open with a 24" long ratchet. I remember it well. It was 90 double throws from open to shut. You had muscles on your spit by the time you'd done a load/discharge.


----------



## fringe

Just spotted another bit that needs a response. The flexing on the Tyne Bridge (and probably the others) was such that the British Ship Research Association (Wallsend) had fitted torsion meters - long rods clamped to the structure at one end and an electronic sensor fitted to the other end. These were fitted all over the vessel and fed up to a magnetic tape recorder in the accommodation. On the bridge, there was a separate set of receivers (20?) from different rods in the duct keel. The readings - just counters really - had to be logged every hour. In heavy weather you could actually hear them clicking round.

As for being able to secure the booby hatch from inside. No it wasn't possible. As has been stated, the vessel didn't have a separate raised forecastle deck from which it would have been possible to secure from underneath then exit aft. Nor, if memory serves, were there any lugs or pad eyes that could have been used to secure some form of strongback. The other thing I remeber was that it was not of your typical booby hatch dimensions - it was a big lid which even Bertie Shrieve (bosun) had difficulty moving sometimes.

I do concede that eight to ten inches movement for a panting beam is a bit much. But I was working on what I remember - that it moved about half the length of my forearm. So in fact I was right - I just forgot to subtract the depth of the beam! My apologies - I stand corrected.

ABs and GP ratings down below? You have my sympathy, or rather would have had at the time. Such a mess was the engine room that we had a double compliment of engineers (except for the Chief) and I can only recall the dayworkers - engineers and ratings - getting one day off during the five months trip. They certainly had a much worse time of it than we deckies had - yet at the same time, I don't recall that much squealing.


----------



## jimmys

*derbyshire*

Hi Fringe,

I note you do not seem to believe the movement of panting beams. It is a function of the length.
I joined a vessel as second engineer, a front line tanker company where one of the boilers, a mono wall boiler. The panting beam or in engine talk, explosion beam was deflected eighteen inches and was in permanent set. A senior person on that vessel told me this is how these boilers were built.
I did not stay on that vessel for long.
There had been a furnace explosion it was evident, a build up in pressure, not a large pressure but enough to bend the beam.

regards
jimmys


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## jmcg

We never had a day off -arrived Ras Tanura Christmas eve. I remember some crankcase work shortly after mooring stations and "finished with engines". Chrismas day we sailed for Rotterdam. Had a few hours "off" at about 11pm when the fire alarm sounded just off the Canaries. The "leckie" had set his bunk alight triggering the fire alarm. Believe he was dismissed Bibbys upon arrival Europort.

No, we never complained. But for us "traditional" deck crowd it was tough. I might add that there was more "comradiarie" down below than was the case with Deck Officers on that vessel.

Such was the appalling running operations of the engine I would welcome some postings from engineers or others who sailied on these classes. 

Please, this is a discussion forum (of which I have enjoyed) not a ****ging off match. 

BW

J


----------



## Chouan

fringe said:


> Whey Aye! Yer bugger ma Chadburn!
> The ballast system was supposed to be hydraulic. Operated from the cargo control room where there was a mimic diagram and various pneumatic open/shut indicators made by Dobie McInnes (correct spelling?). But only the indicator bit worked. Opening the valves was a long job. Down the duct keel, up into the stool, sit astride the pipe (36" dia) and hand crank it open with a 24" long ratchet. I remember it well. It was 90 double throws from open to shut. You had muscles on your spit by the time you'd done a load/discharge.


My memory is that the main valves in the duct keel _were_ hydraulic, just that the motors weren't strong enough, so they had to be started with a big stilson. Once hand started they moved alright. Obviously, I can only talk about the one ship of the class (Sir John Hunter/Kona) that I sailed on.


----------



## fringe

Yes, Chouan they were built to be hydraulic. But after just a couple of years the hydraulic deck lines had rotted through. The only ones that still operated by hydrauulics were those aft of number six hold. And even then we had to use the deck bypass and a hand pump. I just wish I'd taken more photographs. I've got a few, but none that really tell the story of how bad they were - unless you count the one I have of sparky (John Kellerher) looking like a Somali fireman 'cos he'd volunteered to help out down below!


----------



## Chouan

The pumproom was a complete abortion as well, and dangerous to work; having to stand on pipes to swing valves with a straight drop to the bottom plates beneath you. 
I was told by an emloyee of Haverton Hill that lots of the fittings were left overs utilised to "use up" what they had lying round.


----------



## jmcg

Chouan/Fringe

Wasn't her main engine a B&W built under licence by MAN. Other details gratefully received on this thread.

BW

J


----------



## thobshropshire

jmcg said:


> Chouan/Fringe
> 
> Wasn't her main engine a B&W built under licence by MAN. Other details gratefully received on this thread.
> 
> BW
> 
> J


The engines on this class of vessel were B&W 8K98FF built under licence by Harland&Wolff
Regards


----------



## jmcg

Thobshropshire

Thanks for this. Any notable memories-good or bad -from your time down below on this class? 

BW
j.


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## jimmys

*Derbyshire hatch*

Hi Fringe,

Just a test of your memory about these booby hatches.

You said it was quite a large hatch, what was the approximate size.

Was the coaming 600 mm high around the hatch.

When you lifted the hatch cover in any of these vessels was there longitudenal stiffeners on the underside of the hatch cover. A good sized hatch we would expect to see two stiffeners. The stiffeners would run between the inner packing retainers. The packing would off course be in a substantial retaining channel all the way round.

These are covered by loadline rules and this hatch is a penetration to the weather deck.

Whatever you or anyone else can remember. Thanks

regards
jimmys


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## jmcg

Jimmys

Can't help with the actual dimensions of the hatch cover or opening but have now re-vistited old paperwork and photographs and can confirm that the hatch was fitted with 8 "dogs".

BW
J


----------



## alastairrussell

*Foc'sle Access Hatch*

Gents

I have been reading all the recent posts about the problematic foc’sle access hatch on the Derbyshire. Someone said in their post that the small hatch in the photograph was the only access to the bosun’s store, rope locker or the forward below deck space, is this so? Surely there was another larger access door and if there was, what type was it? If they had to lash this access hatch down from below deck to keep it from accidently opening at sea in heavy weather, why was this access hatch not modified, repaired or replaced?

I align myself with Chadburn and Jimmys post and feel Chadburn’s description of the in-service problems when access hatch closures are fitted with swing or toggle bolts, is totally correct. If a comparison and also a basic risk assessment was carried out on the four possible access door options that I have had experience with, the type of hatch shown in the underwater photograph would have failed miserably. If I remember correctly the last inquiry judge referred in his report to this access hatch as being ‘an old fashion design’.

The hatch access options that would have been available when the Derbyshire was built are as follows:

1. Swing/toggle bolts fitted with wing nuts clamping onto flat plate lugs welded onto the hatch as fitted to the Derbyshire. 

2.	As in 1, but the flat plate lugs are thicker and braced with gussets and has a recess machined into the lug to capture the wing nut and stop it being push off accidentally.

3.	Hatch or door having pivoted dogs that land on a taper. These dogs can be lightly hammered up or tightened using a piece of pipe. Thought to be foolproof.

4.	As in 3 but the dogs are all linked together and operated by a central wheel which can be locked. Most access hatches of this type have a large counter weight to make it easier to open the hatch. Completely safe and foolproof.

I would like to add to what Chadburn and Jimmys have already said in their posts and say that the type 1 hatch is not foolproof like the other doors and should be treated with respect. Unskilled crewmembers used to hammer up the wing nut overstressing the cover lugs and taking the material outside its elastic limit. This would put a permanent bend or strain on the lugs and caused the swing bolt to slide off, especially if anti friction grease like Molybond had been used to grease the bolt thread and landing surface. 

I remember having problems with a large engine room hatch with swing bolts like the type1 on a panamax bulk carrier. Many of the lugs had been bent because of over tightening in the past and we had trouble with the bolts sliding off when tightening them up and compressing the rubber gasket. I fixed the problem by having a heavy bead welded at the outside of the lugs to make the swing bolts captive.

I do not think comparing a hatch bolt with a cylinder head bolt is quite right. The cylinder head gasket is relatively hard and needs the cylinder head bolt to be strained and stretched permanently to keep the cylinder head to liner joint sealed against the high pressures within. Hatch access cover bolts do not need any strain or stretch to seal the joint as the elasticity of the thick rubber gasket does the job.

Regards

Alastair


----------



## jimmys

*Fo'castle access door*

When the fo'castle head was dispensed with the fore part of the deck became the weather or loadline or watertight deck and it was open deck similar to the main deck. In the older vessels the deck below the fo'casle deck was the weather deck that was main deck level the fore part was not open.
Booby hatches were not penetrating the weather deck on the older vessels they just penetrated the fo'castle deck. If there was a leak they leaked on to the weatherdeck. No problem.
A hatch penetrating a weather deck I would expect 600 mm high coamings. Sustantially braced coamings. In excess of 11mm (the minimum)thick. Coamings in this size of vessel probably 20mm thick. Enhanced top to the coaming to facilitate joint landing. If it is not enhanced it cuts a groove in the joint.
The joint in a proper channel. A substantial closure mechanism as describe above probably driving on to tapers.
At post 153 (pictures) I do not see that.
We need more info on size in the pic it looks a good size maybe 1.2 metres. Difficult to say.

regards
jimmys


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## Brian Locking

What happened to this Frame 69 people were talking about for so long?


----------



## chadburn

During my time on Standby at the Furness yard then owned by Sears Holdings (Charlie Clore of shoe's fame) all the H&W B&W's were "reconstructed" by a dedicated and (somewhat closed shop) Main Engine team of Furness employee's, as far as I remember this team was given a TOTAL BUILD PRICE for each engine and they drew their weekly wages from this "pot", when the ship was handed over after Owners Trials what was left in this "pot" was then divided amongst the team as a bonus payment. The rest of the Yard was on piecework, as to whether they worked the same system under Swans I could not say. The uncomplicated "Kiss" type 1 hatch was normally fitted on the deck and as previously said is fine as long as it is not abused, it has been in use since steel shipbuilding began and has been modified over the years "but not a lot". I would say


----------



## alastairrussell

*The Foc'sle Access Hatch*


----------



## jmcg

Another good picture Alastair.

Considering the minimalist dogging mechanisms on the hatch would it not be possible when she was consumed that the tremendous forces of sea water within the forepeak and rope locker burst this hatch upwards and open . This could explain the "floating" of the polypropelene rope as shown.

I have always held this view since, at first instance, it was generally held that the Master was responsible for permitting the hatch to be open at sea.

Only my opinion - would welcome robust response and other views but please no inter party slanging matches.

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

*Derbyshire hatch*

The damage to the aft end of the hatch coaming is in my opinion mass impact damage. It was initiated by something not a part of the hatch and heavy.
The stb.windlass is missing the chain intact and out of the cable lifter, it lies inboard of the windlass. See Lemschout post 153 pic no2.
The hatch dogs all look to be in a similar position on the screw indicated they were dogged down. When they are loose they are in all positions depending on the run of the threads.
The coaming height looks to be not 600mm but 450mm the next size down. The coaming thickness is not 20mm but minimum rule 11mm.
The port hinge is splayed open stb looks OK. I am not sure if some of the dogs are bent.
Will come back.
Where is the fore mast in relation to the windlasses??
What hit the hatch I think came from the stb side.

regards
jimmys


----------



## Bill Davies

Post#308
Quote:*I do not think comparing a hatch bolt with a cylinder head bolt is quite right*:Unquote
I used the comparison as an analogy and well you know it.

These forays into academic style analysis is where in my opinion the formal inquiries lost there way. Too much emphasis was placed on finding answers to an ACCEPTABLE conclusion.


----------



## Dick S

Sailed on EDEN BRIDGE twice as 3/O, & as such did not spend so much time on deck or any in the engine - except for checking fire kit and turning the occassional ballast valve! But do remembe the the Deck flexing in a seaway!
Ref the rope locker damage could not ingress of water from another source caused the pressure to lift the access hatch and also force up some of mooring ropes through the trap?

Dick


----------



## jimmys

*Derbyshire hatch*

When this vessels hull hits a large wave the vessel decelerates. The mass of the windlass in the light of this deceleration is flung forward, large forces are produced in a forward direction. It breaks loose and travels forward. The position of the cable lifter tends to turn it over. It turns into the natural position of the booby hatch and impacts. It deflects to stb and continues into the bow. It would then impact in the area of damage around the panama leads on the stb bow. The movement would bend it outward which we see.
Is the fore mast in between the windlasses and did the windlass carry it away as well.??
I have never seen any of these vessels, its difficult to work from pictures we do not have many.

regards
jimmys


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## jmcg

JimmyS

When you refer to the "cable lifter" are you referring to what we knew as the "Gypsy". This is a part of the windlass formed to accommodate the dimensions of the anchor chain and over which the chain is hauled before entering the chain locker via the spurling pipe.

Bill: I agree with your comment re the emphasis on finding an "acceptable" conclusion during the formal inquiry(ies). Acceptable to whom I might ask? 

Academics and lawyers in cahoots will always baffle some of the people some of the time but not all of the people all of the time. Recall the "Herald of Free Enterprise" but that is for another thread.

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

*derbyshire*

Hi JCMG,

By cable lifter I mean gypsy. I served my apprenticeship ashore in Reid Gear which had a division called Thos Reid & Sons they were windlass makers. We had slightly different terminology for the parts.
The stb windlass is gone completely I cannot see a motor for the port windlass. What drove these windlasses. The motor should drive on to warping drum shaft which runs across the windlass. From that shaft the gypsy is clutched in and out. The large cover adjacent to the gypsy is the cover of the reduction gear wheel, a spur wheel. The spur pinion is on the warping drum shaft. The warping drums could usually be clutched in and out as well.
Is that pad in between the windlasses the doubler plate for the foremast??
To drive that windlass loose you need to hit a brick wall of a wave. We are talking two and a half to three inch diameter high tensile bolts here and lots off them.

regards
jimmys


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## Brian Locking

Was this vessel loaded alternative holds or homogenously???


----------



## jmcg

Brian

2 and 9 mt.

BW

J


----------



## Brian Locking

jmcg said:


> Brian
> 
> 2 and 9 mt.
> 
> BW
> 
> J


John,

Now that is interesting!
I wonder how the class addressed that.
In my experience of Panamax and Cape Size Bulk Carriers (Combi's inc) I only ever loaded 9 hold vessels homogenously or with 2,4, 6 & 8 MT.

Brian


----------



## non descript

*Haverton Hill OBO’s*

With reference to an earlier posting, I would very politely venture one small word of caution. Whilst the phrase _ ‘The Bridge Boats’ _has been used here and even appears in other pages elsewhere on the web, added by equally well meaning people, it does not make its use any more correct. The suffix ‘Bridge’ as part of a ship’s name merely covered any bulker, regardless of size, builder or class, that was operated within the somewhat unfortunate Seabridge Pool, so we have nice (safe) ships like Clyde Bridge, built at Scotts of Greenock, and also the more suspect (in my opinion) and wholly different Tyne Bridge, which is one of a class of SIX OBO’s built at Haverton Hill, but in no way are they “The Bridge Boats”.

Just taking the Bibby Line ships alone _(courtesy of Stubbsy5050 who posted at *#51*)_ where his excellent list shows what a varied group of ships there is with that common suffix:

_Pacific Bridge:
44,842gt. built Japan 1967. Sold 1974, renamed Petingo. Suffered damage to No.3 hatch in heavy seas off South Africa. Denied assistance, she drifted ashore, broke up and sank 1990.

Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.

Westminster Bridge:
44,842gt. Lithgows 1968. Sold 1973, renamed Proteus, then President Roxas. Broken up 1990.

Ocean Bridge:
66,057gt. Japan 1970. March 1971, suffered an explosion which burnt out the bridge section and blew a hole the size of a tennis court right through the ship, killing the master. After repairs costing £2.5m, renamed Gloucestershire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Oceanic Victory, later Ocean Victory, then China Victory. Broken up 1986.

English Bridge
78,527gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1973. Renamed Worcestershire 1977. Sold 1979, renamed Sunshine, then Murcurio, then Crystal Transporter, then Kowloon Bridge. Lost November 1986 when cracks appeared forward of the bridge, she lost her rudder, was blown onto the Irish coast and broke her back.

Australian Bridge:
78,527gt. Japan 1973. Renamed Somersetshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Enterprise Transporter, then Cast Puffin, then Chili, then Danmark, then Norman Hunter, then Leon. No current records.

Canadian Bridge:
65,135gt. Harland & Wolf 1974. Renamed Bedfordshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Tectus, then Bocita, then Shou An Hai. No current records.

Yorkshire:
60,814gt. Swan Hunters Tyneside 1975. Chartered out as the York Marine. Used as oil storage hulk. 1988 attacked and burnt by Iranian warships at Sharjah. Sold 1988, renamed Martontree. Broken up 1993.

Liverpool Bridge:
91,655gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1976. Suffered a serious engine room explosion. Renamed Derbyshire 1978. September 1980 sank in the Pacific during Typhoon Orchid with 44 on board. No survivors.

Mersey Bridge:
39,427gt. Sunderland Shipbuilders 1976. Renamed Cambridgeshire 1977. Sold 1983, renamed Festival, then Eastray, then Anemos. No current records._

Stubbsy5050 goes on to also accurately record the non-Bibby Line OBO’s built at Swan Hunters Haverton Hill as :

_Furness Bridge:
1971, 77,316gt.later renamedLake Arrowhead, then Marcona Pathfinder, then World Pathfinder, then Ocean Sovereign.Was the only one of the six built to the original design. Broken up 1992.

Tyne Bridge:
1972, later renamed East Bridge. 1982 in the North Sea, suffered cracks across her deck and had to be repaired.

Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired.

Sir Alexander Glen:
1975. Deck cracks repaired. 1989 renamed Ocean Monarch, then Ocean Mandarin. Broken up 1995_.

++
So before the phrase takes on a life of its own and gains credence just through frequent misuse, it might be helpful to underline that there is a class of ship, built by Swan Hunter, all of which were 169,000 deadweight OBO’s, the names of which were:

*Furness Bridge
Tyne Bridge
Sir John Hunter
Sir Alexander Glen
Liverpool Bridge
English Bridge*

If there is a need to give them a generic title, then *Haverton Hill OBO’s *might be more accurate name for this class of ship, and one that avoid confusion with all the bulkers in the Seabridge Pool.


----------



## Chouan

Well said and a well thought out post.


----------



## chadburn

Just a comment about Windlass mountings, the base of the Windlass's were not normally mounted face to face on to a deck plate but had "chocks" between the two faces with the holding down bolt going through the middle of the @ 6"x6" chock which meant that there were gaps in between and around the Windlass base plate and the deck plate which given a strong force could I suppose provide a "Shearing point". The main engine was chocked in the same way. Re my comment and deckies it should be taken as the usual banter between engine and deck departments although I must admit the "put down" by Bill #278 of a genuine contribution by jmcg#277 smacked of arrogance not normally found amongst Senior officers who have always respected the views of what he appears to feel are the "lower deck" and have certainly in my case learnt by them as they normally know more about the ship than anyone!! In my time at sea I can think of a number of C/E's who would have thrown him and his lashing over the side as it makes the ship look "Crabby" and gives the impression of poor maintenance by the engineroom something they would not allow, a access hatch becomes a non access if you lash it to death and is about as much use as the preverble "chocolate fireguard", this type of hatch is basic engineering and although I cannot remember having a small hatch "bouncing" the obvious solution is to put a check nut under the fork, tighten the hatch up and then bring the check nut up to grip the fork like Christine Keelers thighs to take care of wear and tear till it could be looked at properly as a simple engineering rectification. Job Done!!


----------



## jimmys

*Derbyshire windlass*

The windlass is indeed chocked as Chadburn states and similar to an engine. We level the windlass with jacking bolts machine the chocks to thickness and bolt it down. The bolts run through the chocks, windlass and bracket. There is no collision chocks.
Collision chocks stop the engine coming forward in a collision. It helps to prevent bolt shear.
If we hit a large wave and the vessel suddenly decelerates persons are thrown forward. Especially on the bridge. The reason being they are under the action of a couple. The reason for this couple is the forces on the hull are not in line with body forces on the person. Similarly with the windlass there is a couple. The hull forces are not in line with the windlass forces.
These couples amplify the problem.
If we look at the stb windlass we see the outboard warping drum bearing supports and the bottom keeps are there. The drum shaft and top keeps and the rest of the windlass are gone. There is no bending of the supports. This indicates a lifting action shearing the bearing housing keep bolts. Which indicates a turn inboard of the windlass.Which would lift the outboard drum. She turns right into the area of the foremast and the hatch.
The hatch is a poor hatch for a weatherdeck and I do not think it should have been allowed. It is easily repaired, Any competent engineer would have bracketed it on the outside and the lid. and fixed the securing using locknuts and a new joint. Just an upgrade, its a mornings work.
If it had been upgraded it would have stood up to the impact better.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Chadburn

Wow! That would be some crunch if it reflected Christine Keeler's crutch!

Nevertheless you described good solid engineering practice - much used in the refineries I worked in.

BW

J.


----------



## Bill Davies

Tonga,
Not good memories of the 'Marcona Pathfinder' except that Marcona paid in DMarks and that was very welcome at the time. Money not as good as Ludwig but only 4 month trips (been longer on a message)
Bill


----------



## alastairrussell

Gents

With reference to JMCG’s post 313 where he requests views on the reasons for the initial cause of the sinking. I will throw my hand in with the second inquiry report findings and also the attached David Byrne’s post (no 33). 

I feel the focsle access hatch problem, when it appeared, should have been addressed immediately by senior staff on the ship in a more professional manner. I think the problem was the movement in the lid caused by the action of green waves rolling over the lid and compressing the rubber gasket and pushing off the toggle bolts. I would have tried using a harder gasket material and modified the end of the toggle bolt lugs to make them captive when under tension. I do not see a need for lock nuts on the toggle bolts or lashings or metal bands round the bolts. I believe there is now an ISO standard do***ent out on weather deck access hatches which if complied with, should help to improve the quality and reduce any operational problems with these units in the future.

It does not matter that the frame 65 fault was found later not to be the cause of this particular catastrophic failure. The use of this possible cause I believe helped and served to assist and give creditability to the families in their fight to receive a proper inquiry which eventually found the real reason. Surely, that is what formal inquiries are for, to stop speculation and find what caused the accident. It was fortunate that at the same time as the fight for the inquiry to be re-opened other iron ore carriers were also experiencing major structural problems. These were rightly blamed on alternate hold loading of iron ore carriers and also the legislated reduction in the reserve of buoyancy introduced in the defective 1966 Load Line Convention. 

With regard to the fight to get the Derbyshire Formal Inquiry re-opened I totally agree with David Byrne that the families were quite remarkable. I would also like to add that their actions have resulted in major improvements in the way that bulk carrier shipping is operated and is policed now and there has been a reduction in the bulk carrier failure rate over the years. I feel there must be many ships crews who should be very grateful for their actions and also the support of the British Minister of Transport at the time, John Prescott, in reopening the inquiry.

Regards 

Alastair

*attachment:*

_Derbyshire Hatch Covers 

David Byrne post 54___
_____________________________________
I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss. 

After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.

After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwater video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:

1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cracking that had been much talked about.

2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was again proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).

3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as forward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.

4. Damage to the focsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).

Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.

As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.

The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end._

David Byrne


----------



## Bill Davies

Quote: *2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was again proven in the Enquiry.*:Unquote
The above worries me!


----------



## jmcg

Would not the Master be aware of the damage (or potential damage) to the cargo hatches during this critical period and send out a Mayday or other call for assistance. 

I would submit that very little was or could be proven at the inquiry (for very obvious reasons) - just legal and academic speculation.

Bw

J.


----------



## jimmys

*Derbyshire hatch*

I must ask the question are these picture of a hatch we are looking at in this thread the hatch of the Derbyshire.

The hatch we are looking at :-

1) The coaming has failed
2) The threads have failed, the lid is gone
3) The hinges have failed

Anyone who says this hatch has not failed must be mad. It is a total failure. I do not see a constituent of this hatch that has not failed.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Jimmys

Yes damage to all components as shown. I paste below some notes I have retained. These were made up from various sources of reliable information. I do not claim to be the author of the material. 

You will note that nothing was proven (which quite rightly Bill appears to be stressing) - the Court "believing" or "concluding" but not "finding" or "proving."
The Derbyshire's last message was to her owners on 9th September 1980 it read.

"9 September 0930 GMT; Now hove to due to severe tropical storm; estimated time of arrival Kawasaki 14th hopefully"

0n 17th December 1998 the Government announced that there would be a full re-opening of the Formal Investigation in the High Court. The hearing commenced on 5th AprIl 2000 and lasted for 54 days. Evidence was taken from a number of experts. The Court decided that the cover to the bosun's hatch had not been left open by the crew.

The Court concluded that the cover to the bosun's hatch had probably been destroyed when one of the massive windlasses on the fore deck was dislodged. Evidence about the alleged unsecured hatch to the bosun's store was given by a previous Chief Officer of the Derbyshire. He explained that on leaving port the forward mooring ropes would be stowed away in the bosun's locker. Before, lowering them into the locker the end of each one would be lashed to the following one. Then, to make it easier to get them out of the locker when they were next needed, the end of the final rope to be stowed would be lashed to a special bracket on the underside of the hatch cover. It was the end of this rope which the Assessors saw protruding from the store hatch that caused them to draw the wrong conclusions.

This Chief Officer also explained that the hatch dogs had a nasty habit of working loose, especially when heavy seas, landing on top of the lid, compressed its rubber seal. He knew that the ship's carpenter habitually secured the lid with a "cat's cradle" of rope to prevent the dogs from working loose and it was most unlikely that the "cats cradle" was not in place.

The Court learnt from weather hindcasts (backward looking weather forecasts) about the sea conditions that the Derbyshire probably encountered during Typhoon Orchid.

Before making its decision the court heard the results of tests on a model of the Derbyshire which were conducted at the MARIN Research Institute, Wageningen, Netherlands. These were designed to measure the forces exerted by heavy seas on the forward hatches under different conditions of trim and wave heights. It was established that if the Derbyshire had been bow on to the very high waves, and if the wave length was similar to the length of the vessel (about 1000 metres) then, she could have pitched down into the trough of successive waves. Before the bow had a chance to rise back to the horizontal, it would have been submerged under the next wave crest.

On the basis of the condition of the wreckage, the model tests done by MARIN and the weather hindcasts, the Court believed that the initiating cause of the loss was the destruction of the ventilators and air pipes on the foredeck by continuous green water loading over many hours on the 8th and 9th September 1980. The seas then flooded the bosun's store and the forward ballast tank causing the ship to trim down by the bow and eventually sink. This trim was not perceptible from the bridge because it would have been obscured by the extremely poor visibility that was likely at the time due to driving wind and spray. Also the bridge was over 260 metres (850 feet) from the bow. The sea started crashing onto No I hatch cover as the bow dropped lower in the water. No I hatch cover was not designed to withstand such enormous pressures and eventually gave way. This caused No I hold to flood and so the bow went down even more. The same thing then happened to the other hatches, one after the other, until each hold filled with water and the ship finally sank. The Court also concluded that it was most unlikely that the ship had been lost due to any other cause - including faults at Frame 65! The Court believed that it was most unlikely that she ever went beam on to wind and sea as was suggested in the Formal Investigation held in 1987-1988.

Over to you Bill and others! Bill what is your view on no distress call(s)?

BW

John


----------



## jimmys

We can off course not furnish any proof of what happened the same as the court.
If the forward store was intact when she went down we would expect to see different damage due to head pressure. We dont see it. I think the forward store was flooded when she went down. This would indicate the windlass and hatch damage occured on the surface and contributed to the flooding. It may have carried some vents etc. as well.
Hove too in very large seas means large wave impacts with a high level of pitching. There is a good possibility the windlass sheared away and moved forward. The shearing happens very quickly micro seconds and the windlass is moving before the green water falls on it. It cuts thro' the water once it moves. It will wreck everything in its path.
The later conclusion looks very reasonable. When you are in that kind of weather and you are hove too there is very little you can do about deck damage.
I consider it most unlikely a ships master would not send a distress message if he could.
If all power was lost what was distress message situation, could he get something away at that range ?? I dont know these ships.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

jimmys said:


> We can off course not furnish any proof of what happened the same as the court.
> If the forward store was intact when she went down we would expect to see different damage due to head pressure. We dont see it. I think the forward store was flooded when she went down. This would indicate the windlass and hatch damage occured on the surface and contributed to the flooding. It may have carried some vents etc. as well.
> Hove too in very large seas means large wave impacts with a high level of pitching. There is a good possibility the windlass sheared away and moved forward. The shearing happens very quickly micro seconds and the windlass is moving before the green water falls on it. It cuts thro' the water once it moves. It will wreck everything in its path.
> The later conclusion looks very reasonable. When you are in that kind of weather and you are hove too there is very little you can do about deck damage.
> I consider it most unlikely a ships master would not send a distress message if he could.
> If all power was lost what was distress message situation, could he get something away at that range ?? I dont know these ships.
> 
> regards
> jimmys



Most unusual - but not unknown in modern day shipping -no further message(s) or Mayday. The answer may lie in previous indications - that she was hopelessly crippled (no power) before she was consumed. Or that she went over. 

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

The reason I am mentioning power supply is due to the problems we can see.

We have flooding in a store with power supply,
We have a mast that is down with input to the nav lights
We have various deck lights with input to a different system

That is us into the main and emergency boards. This can be very problematic.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Jimmys

Good point.

BW

J


----------



## chadburn

The point Jimmy is making I certainly agree with as the most important factor which remains an unknown, was she under power or not, did she lose all power ? As far as I am aware these ships were built to have unmanned enginerooms at night, is that how she was run? because it is "Sod's Law" that the problem will occur during the hours of darkness and if you are not down there you are already on the "Back Foot" or (Firefighting as it is known), a small problem that would have been picked up by an Engineer on Watch in the engineroom has become a major incident by the time the "Standby Engineer" gets himself down there in an unmanned situation. In regards to having an "Enquiry" into an incident you will most probably hear the Chairman say " The purpose of this Enquiry is not to apportion blame but to look into the events leading up to the incident in order to see what happened and as to whether changes can be made to prevent a re-occurance". Don't you believe it! the first thing you notice is that the Owners and their Legal Team come in with steel plates strapped to their backsides and are there to make sure that they are in no way liable for what happened and indeed they latched on to the suspect hatch being open therefore the Crew must have left it open despite the obvious damage to it, a somewhat simplistic overview and the Tribunal went along with it. Where is the proof that when the Derbyshire was at sea that on this particular occasion the Crew had left the hatch open, obviously the Owner's were happy with that result and if it was not for the Family's pressure group who bravely took them on that is how the verdict would have remained. Then we came on to "phase two" the building and testing of a model, now I can understand the use of model's when determining the underwater profile of a hull and I see we are on to the " X bow" now (which looks very much like a Red Indians canoe bow) but I fail to see how it can help when the most important factor is unknown, Did the Derbyshire still have power, It seemed very handy to blame the people who built the ship bearing in mind that the yard had gone out of business and forgetting that other OBO's built by other Yards were also going to the bottom, but of course they were not on the British Register. For me the whole thing was done on assumptions, but you will notice at no time was any blame laid at the Owner's door where legal recompense can be taken by the Crew's family's. This is of course my view.


----------



## jimmys

On looking at the crew list for this vessel it would seem she had no Radio Officer.

Is this correct??

regards
jimmys


----------



## thobshropshire

*Derbyshire R/O*



jimmys said:


> On looking at the crew list for this vessel it would seem she had no Radio Officer.
> 
> Is this correct??
> 
> regards
> jimmys



The list on Merseyside Maritime Museums site is alphabetical by surname with rank stated after the surname.
Royal Alfred Waller was the R/O on the Derbyshire at time of her loss.
He is listed on the Maritime museums site but has not been given any rank.
Post 249 also lists him as R/O.
Regards


----------



## jimmys

I am afraid I must now ask.

"Who was Royal Alfred Waller". Why was his rank not posted. Was he a fully qualified British Radio Officer.

regards
jimmys


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## jmcg

Jimmys

It is indeed strange that all known and currently available literature re vessel compliment (officers and crew) do not assign or otherwise attribute a rank to Royal Alfred Waller!

Is it not also bizarre that a Mr Tony Cuthbert of GEC-Marconi, wrote to Capt.Ramwell ( a campaigner for the DFA) that all the records of the radio equipment of the DERBYSHIRE had been previously destroyed ?

BW

J


----------



## K urgess

GEC - Marconi destroyed most of the records concerning ships and radio officers so I should imagine that would include the details of the Liverpool Bridge.
It would be not too difficult to find out what she had on board if she was a Marconi vessel because it was posted in the house magazine about a month after sea trials. What you need is a copy of the magazine for July- August 1976.
The lack of rank may just be an oversight. The vessel would have had a full radio station when built in 1976 and would still have required one by law in 1980.
If he was in bed and she sank very quickly there would have been no chance for him to send any form of message.
If she was as badly maintained as some modern vessels I was on and had float off beacons fitted, the lids were most likely either rusted on or painted over.


----------



## jmcg

Marconi

I do not believe that a 4 year old vessel (actually 3 years service as she was laid up in Stavanger for 12 months) would be in such a condition resulting from 'bad maintenance' although it is possible.

I cannot comment on the condition or maintenance regime of the radio equipment. However, I can comment on the deck maintenance regime on my one voyage on her sister ship, English Bridge - later Kowloon Bridge under different owners. I can hardly recall a few days traditional deck work (other than watchkeeping) on her. Such were the appalling operating conditions and problems in her engine room all available GPS crew were tasked with "down below" duties. I was much in demand both on deck and down below simply because of my size (then 6" 6' and 13 stone) . One particular job springs to mind down below - there was a cooling water v/v situated about 15ft above a banjo fleet with no access to it. The EoW would have me loaded with a much, much smaller guy about 5ft 1 or 2 on my shoulders to "make up" the shortfall of reach. Our combined height allowed easy operation of the v/v.

I will, however, offer a quote from Frank Cook then and now Labour MP for Stockton North. He said " ..... the Derbyshire was built in my constituency of Haverton Hill, Teeside, and I was the Union rep for many of the technical staff. I had people to my surgery who told me about the bad standard of workmanship that management enforced on the workforce because they were determined to meet their budgetary targets.

I was told about lower grade steel that was put in that did not meet the specification ........................." End quote.

Her last reported message indicated her position and that she was hove to. This is at extreme variance with the position where the wreck was found. 
If the R/O was in his bed surely there would be other means /mechanisms available for those on the bridge to send out a Mayday or other distress call as the vessel was floundering and being overwhelmed.

There remains a lot of unanswered questions regarding this tragedy.

BW

J


----------



## Bill Davies

John,
Quote:_There remains a lot of unanswered question regarding this tragedy_:Unquote

Well said. Since joining this site there have been many attempts to have this thread closed down by various members (not the moderators I might add).
Perhaps by debating the incident in the manner it has been recently some sort of acceptable closure can be achieved.
I have many reservations about how the Final Inquiry was conducted. In fact all aspects of this dreadful loss. 

Brgds

Bill


----------



## K urgess

Don't know if this link has been submitted before but is worth reading.
http://www.north-country.co.uk/derbyshire.htm
or this one
http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#Summary%20of%20Structural%20Failure
I sailed on a Swan Hunter VLCC and that was falling apart.


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## jmcg

Marconi

Yes, well do***ented. It would appear that lots of "answers" were provided to questions that were never asked and no answers to questions that were. 

BW

J.


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## jimmys

Just a bit more on the Swan Hunter electrical system which was more or less standard on these bigger ships. There was a problem there.
When the vessel was steaming normally the main switchboard fed the emergency switchboard thro' an interconnector on the main switchboard.
The emergency alternator was not running, it was on standby and was not closed to the emergency board.
If faults occurred on the emergency board in certain cir***stances the interconnector would trip to protect the main board. The standby emergency alternator run up automatically and attempted to close to the emergency board. It could not due to the faults and there was no emergency power.
The main switchboard would be functioning as normal and the vessel would be under way. There would be steering but not a lot else. A lot of the bridge gear is fed thro' the emergency board including the main radio.
We have already laid out the possible problems in the electrical system. I have seen this fault happen before and not only in Swans ships.
When you have faults about a large vessel like this and you cannot get to spaces to check it can be difficult to repair these faults.
Radio communication can be difficult and as mentioned above the auto systems may not be in good condition.
It is a damage fit for lack of radio signals and the vessel being able to move.

regards
jimmys


----------



## K urgess

I've been trying to find out what this was.

_"Derbyshire had been equipped with the latest electronic equipment capable of transmitting a May Day call at the push of a button."_

Maybe one of our sparkie members who was at sea in 1980 can tell us. I left marine radio at around this time and cannot think of any equipment that fits the description except the electronic autokey but the transmitter had to be fired up first. GMDSS was in the future and would not have been fitted until the shipowners were forced to.
Anything would have been powered by the radio emergency batteries.


----------



## jmcg

jimmys

A succinct summary of the "panels". Was that arrangement considered to be "state of the art" technology in the 70's?.

BW

J


----------



## jimmys

Yes that was the latest gear at the time and as far as I know has not changed much to this day.
I do not have any knowledge of radio gear and any ships I was on inspecting or suveying where we suspected there was radio problems we sent for a specialist radio surveyor, he did radar and bridge electronics as well.
I thought on the older ships at least there was a standby radio that was battery powered, I do not know. Until this came up I have never really thought about.
There are plenty of reason why the Old Man or Sparkie may not have been able to send messages.

regards
jimmys


----------



## K urgess

There was always a battery powered emergency transmitter run off 24 volt DC from the radio room battery locker.
There was also a set of numbered instructions telling non technical personnel how to operate the emergency equipment.
The only thing I can think of on the bridge would be the VHF which was mains powered and not an awful lot of use 200 miles from land especially in a cyclone.


----------



## chadburn

I watched the programme again on Discovery Knowledge last night and although I was wondering about my feelings about her possible roll-over with the "Fringe" hull panting theory coming up, after last night and the fact that Robin Williams does state that the stern is just an "empty shell" I am still of the view that she did go over and very quickly too, I was left with the impression that although the initial theory concerning frame 65 proved to be groundless I was also left with the feeling that because so much money had been spent on the Diving programme that they had to come up with "some answer" in order to justify the cost of it all when really in my view because of the many unanswered questions it should have said "Lost during Typhoon cause Unknown". God Bless All The Crew and the Wives on board.


----------



## thobshropshire

*Derbyshire R/O*



jimmys said:


> I am afraid I must now ask.
> 
> "Who was Royal Alfred Waller". Why was his rank not posted. Was he a fully qualified British Radio Officer.
> 
> regards
> jimmys


I have been in touch with Geoff Valentine a former Bibby Line R/O, his reply below:

*Hi Terry,


Royal Alfred Waller [Bish] was indeed a qualified British Radio Officer, that was one of the major criteria to be
able to sail on British flag vessels. 

I actually was in touch with Bish as they sailed from Canada towards Japan whilst I was on the Lincolnshire/GOVX.
We had a few Morse contacts on the company schedules, and I only lost them about a week before the Derbyshire/GULK
foundered. We used to exchange crew lists and our non or latest positions. I think Bish also served in the MN as R/O during
the war years.

Cheers

Geoff Valentine

ex Bibby Line Radio Officer *
Regards


----------



## jmcg

Good to note that others are contributing to this sad but captivating thread. 


Thobshropshire: As an engineer on the "Bridge boats" as you refer the class to, I'm sure you would have a tale or two to tell from working on these abominations.

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

It was obviously an oversight that Royal Alfred Waller was not posted on these various sites as Radio Officer. When I looked I saw the name but no rank. His was the only name without a designation.
With an experienced Master and an experienced R/O on board I think it lends weight to what was stated before that they could not send a message. The R/O would be looking for whatever ships were in the area when they were in dangerous weather, he was not able to.
I have been involved with windlasses for many years and I have never seen one break loose like that. The second windlass is damaged as well. It leads me to think we are dealing with incorrect fitting or poor materials. 
I think the windlass breaking loose could be the initiator of the problems. It seems it has been ignored in the past as a source for further serious problems on this vessel.
I have sailed on VLCC's without a fo'castle head and if this had happened on them I would fully expect to have difficulty surviving.
We need more pics if anybody has them.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Jimmys

Yes- as per the enquiry, we can now conclude that she was fully and ably manned with experienced officers and crew.

Like you, I have never known a windless to come adrift in heavy seas. However, on a Blue Funnel vessel (Autolycus) we lost the mainmast (aft) Jumbo derrick during a typhoon. It crashed out from its retaining cradle clamp on the "table" right down on No.5 hatch taking sections of the tarpaulins and hatch boards with it. The hatch coaming was also damaged. On review of the incident it was apparent that the "carrot" inserted throught the cradle closure had popped out during a period of when her stern was out of the water. 

I will try dig out some more pics and notes of the Derbyshire.

BW

J.

The Master; Capt. Edwards - a fine seaman and a gentleman in every respect.


----------



## thobshropshire

*Bridge Boats*



jmcg said:


> Good to note that others are contributing to this sad but captivating thread.
> 
> 
> Thobshropshire: As an engineer on the "Bridge boats" as you refer the class to, I'm sure you would have a tale or two to tell from working on these abominations.
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


Bridge boats in Bibby Line did not refer specifically to the Haverton Hill built OBO's but to any of the vessles that were chartered to the Seabridge shipping consortium.
However sailing on the English Bridge and the Liverpool Bridge which were Haverton Hilll built OBO's was an experience I'm sure non of us will ever forget. 
I had sailed with almost everyone that was lost on the Derbyshire. 
I was one of the almost complete crew that was waiting in a Hotel in Tokyo to join her.
You can appreciate therefore that I am reluctant and feel uncomfortable when asked to talk about my experiences sailing on these vessels.
Regards


----------



## jmcg

thobshropshire.

Yes - I do, and just hope that with the passage of time it becomes a little easier for you. Was not aware of the intended crew relief in Japan. 

One trip was sufficient experience for me to get out of Bibbys. Of course it was much, much easier for us as the "Pool" was available for our next job.

I concur with your remarks re the engine room. Such abominations could not be considered progress (even in the 70's) -that is why I asked JIMMYS in an earlier thread if the electrical system (boards and panels) were "state of the art."

With very best wishes.

J.


----------



## alastairrussell

Gents

With regard to the failure of the Derbyshire I think we have to _attempt_ to differentiate between damage caused by:

1. The green wave damage up for’d when she was steaming very slowly at an angle into the very large waves.

2.	The 2.5 knot dive 4000 odd metres down to the sea bed 

3.	The hull’s sudden bow down impact with the sea bed 

The problematic foc’sle access hatch and the tank vent caps could have gone with either the green waves or on the plunge to the bottom? I have not read the report but I am under the impression that there is no definite proof that the forward end did flood through vents or the access hatch during the green wave period. If this is true, there would have been one hell of a lot of compressed air followed by a sudden belt of solid water striking the vent tops. I think that the access hatch has gone with the foremast during the plunge period. There is no evidence that were problems with the actual toggle bolt or their threads previously and on the bolts that are missing it’s the bolt hinge pin or bracket that has failed. I feel that the design of the lid and coaming was substandard and it should be noted that in the photos there were indications of distortion of the flat sides which signifies a lack of thickness and I would have liked to have seen a much larger radius on the corners of the coaming. 

There is a possibility that the relatively heavy windlass was sheared off when she hit the bottom. Did they find the windlass on the seabed? Some organisation in the USA calculated the Derbyshire would be doing 2.5 knots during the plunge and it is a known fact that the anchorage systems in ultra large tankers and bulk carriers are more overstressed when compared with the systems on smaller ships. I read in an accident report that if a single screw ultra large ship loses it main engine in tidal waters, the anchoring system would fail catastrophically somewhere if the anchor is dropped when the ship is moving over the ground at more than 2 knots. 

Chadburn, surely the Derbyshire’s engine room would have either been manned or on standby when moving very slowly through the big waves. I myself preferred sailing on ships with a well equipped and approved unmanned machinery spaces to ships with a manned engine room. The UMS system releases skilled and competent engineers to do productive maintenance work rather than sitting around watching gauges. With all that iron ore on board lying low in the hull how would the ship roll over in the plunge?

Since the Derbyshire failure there has been a lot of research carried out into bulk carrier problems and I feel there is now definite proof that the for’d end of the ship did not have enough reserve of buoyancy and as a consequence 1 and 2 hatch covers were not strong enough to withstand the green water waves. This was all blamed on the decisions made during the 1966 Load Line Convention. 

Regards

Alastair


----------



## jimmys

A sinking body in salt water at these depths achieves a terminal velocity of approximately 20 feet/second or 12/15 miles per hour. Even though when the parts of the vessel land on the seabed there is an impact it is not so severe as when a body passes though air and there is ground impact.
The debris field of the Derbyshire is 1.3km long and indicate any breaking was on or near the surface not upon impact on the sea bed.
I was not aware the Derbyshire was steaming at an angle into very large waves, I thought she was hove to, her last cable indicated this and as far as we know she was intact at that time.
As far as I know there was no sign of the windlass in the area of the fo'castle head. There would be a search for it as soon as they discovered it was lost.

regards
jimmys


----------



## Lemschout

Thanks for the detailed comment and suggestions of Alastair, and I believe that I can answer a few points. But first I propose those pictures from the official reports, one from a sister ship and the other from the Derbyshire, which rather well illustrating the weaknesses of an unprotected forecastle on a large vessel. 


“The problematic foc’sle access hatch and the tank vent caps could have gone with either the green waves or on the plunge to the bottom? I have not read the report but I am under the impression that there is no definite proof that the forward end did flood through vents or the access hatch during the green wave period.”

This is easy to answer: the proof comes from the simple fact that neither the boatswain store and the fore peak were not crushed by the pressure when the ship went down.

…

“There is a possibility that the relatively heavy windlass was sheared off when she hit the bottom. Did they find the windlass on the seabed?”

This is a good question, but if the windlass had been found near the ship it would have been mentioned somewhere. That is why I rather support the idea that it became lose at the surface. Another possibility is that the fore mast broke at the surface and caused most of the damages to the access hatch (V-notch) and starboard windlass. The V-notch is more than enough to explain the opening of the hatch in spite of the extra securing by the crew. But the damages caused by the starboard windlass are more strange. It could not have gone over the bulwark, on the surface of at the bottom, without damaging it. On the picture the bulwark on starboard side appears intact, on port side it is probably bent inward, which fits with the pressure of the plunge, and it is only fore/port that it is bent outward, likely by the passing windlass. If it occurred at the bottom, the windlass would have been very close to the ship. 

More studies of the damages forward are needed to have a better picture of the sequences of events.

Finally I recall again one possibility that has never been considered : damages caused a floating log. In this area they are plenty of them poured in the ocean by the rivers of Borneo or some other island, and then pushed by the Kuro shio.

Looks like the inquiry is far from finished.

And once more I can confirm that the implementation of Judge Colman recommendation remains a sad joke. On at least two third of the bulkers I have to inspect, the pumping system of the boatswain store is not functioning properly, or not at all.


----------



## jmcg

Jimmys

Yes - the last message from Derbyshire indicated that she was 'hove to'. The wreckage site is almost 50 miles from her last reported position. From this we must dedcuce that she was either under motive power or drift from loss of power. The period from her last positional message to when she was consumed will never be known simply because we can't answer the above power issues. Hence my interest and queries on the radio operations.

Of course the computer programmers and "scientific" researchers can create all sorts of artificial answers with programmes and simulation. The "answers" would be based on the information punched into these computers and, dare I say, might not be entirely relevant or correct.

It cannot compare with sound engineering calculations and hands on experience. Perhaps this why we remain with so many unanswered questions.

I am not persuaded by the official conclusion - my view is that that she was seriously damaged for'wd , then lost power and finally broke her back or rolled over and then broke in two. I will take some convincing otherwise.

BW
J.


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## Bill Davies

Alastair/Jimmys et al,

With all due respects I would say that the majority of practicing mariners are not in the slightest bit interested into these academic forays into the three points and others you all make above. We are interested however, in discussing the initiating event so that this dreadful accident never happens again. In the 28 years since the incident happened we have been sidetracked by assumed frame failures, smoke and mirrors and comparisons of ILLC 66 and UR 21. The access hatch has in the main remained a ‘no go area’ because of its contentious nature.
Quite simply,
§	This vessel suffered water ingress through forward access hatch.
§ Her trim changed to such a degree that the No1. Hatch was subjected to full ‘green wave’ effect subjecting the ‘dogging arrangements therein to stress (internal and external) they were not designed for.
Actions:
§	Chapter XII.

There were many incidents leading up to the loss of the ‘Derbyshire’ on similar ships. It is a scandal that those in a position to be proactive in addressing this ‘weak area’ did nothing.
Those of us who experienced these ‘weaknesses’ addressed then in the best way we could by fitting external strapping iwo access hatch .

Part of the problem of addressing this topic has always been the concern over the reaction to the people who get rather emotive when one talks of the possibility that ‘Human Factors’ just might be touched on.



Bill


----------



## jimmys

Thanks to Lemschout for the further pics.
These confirm the damage to the bulwark right forward on the stb. side. It stretches from just aft of the breasthook to aft of the four panama leads, where the steelwork above the panama leads is gone. It is bent outwards.
The only piece of equipment forward that can fit this damage is the stb. windlass. The fore mast is not a fit for this damage.
I see an open vent just in that area the mushroom is gone, it could be the fore peak. I can see the cross of the nut which closes the vent. Well open to the sea.
The pics show again the bearing supports for the warping drum shaft, they are not bent and have been left behind. The shaft lifted out of these supports.
I think the windlass went forward into this damage area.
Lemschouts other picture shows the vents damaged by the weather and the bosuns hatch and windlass still intact on another vessel. The small handy billy davit is there intact. I think it tells a story.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jimmys

Lemschout's first thumbnail shows us a sister ship in bad weather with the vents being damaged by the weather.
The water is welling behind the bulwarks in the area of the vents and everything that should be a freeing port is filled by rollers,leads or something else. No 1 hatch coaming impairs the flow of water aft.
If you cannot free in between waves there is a serious problem.

regards
jimmys


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## jmcg

Which brings us back to the essential question. 

Continuous shipping of green water could possibly have compromised her integrity, but if damage was noted to be progressive over a period would it not be in***bent on the Master to have the R/O on stations.

If this Master had the remotest inkling of the fate to befall his vessel and crew he would have been prepared for each and every requirement to call for assistance.

The absence of distress calls suggests (to me at least) that her demise was not a case of progressive damage caused by continuous shipping of green seas. On the contrary - she was lost before there was time for anyone on board to react. 

May God bless all who perished in her.

BW

J.


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## jimmys

As everyone knows I am not a Radio Officer nor a Master Mariner. Therefore I am not familiar with the duties of a Radio Officer or a Master mariner.

I would say anyone so crassly stupid as to be in a typhoon and not find the position of any ships near them should not be on a ship. This is the first thing anyone would do in case you need to rescue or be rescued.
No one at any time said Radio Officer Waller was to initiate distress messages.

Radio Officer Waller is the ships Radio Officer not the Master's Radio Officer.

He as any other Officer has a duty of care not to the Master but to the vessel. He can act as he see's fit as long as it is reasonable and practicable.

regards
jimmys


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## jimmys

I was not aware the Radio Officer did not sign the vessel' s articles (Not the Master's)the same as the rest of us with the same obligations as the rest of us. I thought he did.

The vessel was hove to in a typhoon and was not in any danger. Anyone who thinks that should not be at sea.

Regards
jimmys


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## K urgess

I've been hove to in a hurricane and slept quite soundly.
One didn't go looking for other vessels in the area needlessly.
One knew roughly where vessels where by the strength of signals on 500kc/s.
We signed the same articles as everyone else.
By this time the eight watchkeeping hours worked by R/Os were flexible and no longer limited to totally fixed hours depending on area.
In a cyclone in that area with attendant thunderstorms and high levels of static the radio officer could well have tried to send a distress message and not been heard if it was on emergency equipment.
He would NOT have sent a distress message without direct orders from the Master unless he was the only ranking officer left and lives were in danger.


----------



## jmcg

jimmys said:


> I was not aware the Radio Officer did not sign the vessel' s articles (Not the Master's)the same as the rest of us with the same obligations as the rest of us. I thought he did.
> 
> The vessel was hove to in a typhoon and was not in any danger. Anyone who thinks that should not be at sea.
> 
> Regards
> jimmys


Jimmys

Keep on this thread - I, and I suspect very many others, enjoy and value your contributions.

Now this R/O issue - I might be oceans wide of the mark here but seem to recall that certain companies employed their own R/Os as opposed to "hiring" 'Marconi Men'. "  The "China" might have been one such company.

Would this impact on signing or not signing articles? Would he sign on as a supernumerary if a Marconi Man?

R651400 Can you confirm if the above was possible and how were the Marconi men appointed. If this is for another thread please ignore.


My memory is being challenged now!

BW

J.


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## K urgess

Didn't matter if you were direct employed or radio company employed.
The same articles were signed. The rate of pay just differed.
Even if signed on as supernumerary rank in dis book was still R/O.
Duties did not normally differ as far as the radio service was concerned.
The only difference would be in extra duties such as Captain's secretary or accounts. That could even be asked of Marconi R/Os if necessary. Example being Mobil where I did the menus, crew lists, slop lists, etc., for duplication.
The "China" were direct employed as were BI I believe.

Kris


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## jmcg

Marconi Sahib

Thanks for the confirmation and clarification. Now back to the essential issue....................................

Bw

J.


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## jimmys

I was on a tanker down off Aussie in a typhoon/willy-willy I was Senior Second Engineer, she was a midships and aft job. These were the strongest ships I have ever sailed on.
Due to problems on deck we had in excess of a dozen men injured, myself and number one fitter pulled them all off the deck, it was the whole deck crowd. The ship was hit by a huge lump of water. I saw it happen. The midships accommodation was like a butchers shop.
The third mate was aft on the poop the chief was on top of the steering gear. The mate was down. I will not go into where the Master was. The bridge was out.
Sparkie a proper Marconi man after one look knew where his responsibility lay. Find a ship with a doctor to help and advise us. I had been on the Ship Captains Medical course. Within fifteen minutes he knew where every ship was within range and had found us a Russian Doctor there was no one to help him or absolve him of responsibility. A real Radio Officer signed on the ship. He knew what to do in typhoons. I knew what to do in typhoons I did not need anyone to tell me what to do and being in bed was not a part of it.

regards
jimmys


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## Roger Bentley

*Re R A 'Bish' Waller*

I sailed with him on the old Cheshire for two trips in 1951. He was the 2nd R/O with a 1st Class PMG. He was a very responsible and reliable officer and attentive to all his duties. When the Derbyshire went down he would have been one of Bibby's most senior R/Os and probably looking forward to retirement. 

I do not like the uninformed comments now starting to appear on this thread that appear to doubt his capability or make conjectures as to what he was doing at the time of the catastrophe. Come on Gentlemen lets be fair. 

Radio Officers were not allowed to initiate any distress or medical traffic without direct orders. I can recall getting a tremendous bollocking when I did answer a ship calling for a doctor before showing his XXX message to the bridge.


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## Brian Locking

Can we not please leave personalities out of this.The topic is contentious enough without getting personal.

Brian


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## jmcg

Brian Locking said:


> Can we not please leave personalities out of this.The topic is contentious enough without getting personal.
> 
> Brian


Let us hope so - we know that the unfortunate Master and his crew (including the Sparkie) were in no way responsible, culpable or could be charged with a dereliction of duty .

Let us focus our debate and comments on why be believe she was consumed and factor in the cir***stances of radio silence. The reasons could be many fold - but all lead to her almost immediate & catastrophic demise.

Good post Jimmys - keep on with robust debate. 
BW
J.


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## jimmys

As a Junior Engineer in Blue Funnel I was responsible to the Senior engineer on watch.
As a Senior watchkeeping engineer I was fully responsible for the engine room for the period I was on watch ( in full charge). I had a responsibility for and to the vessel equally
As a Second engineer I was fully responsible for the engine room.(in full charge). I again had a responsibility for and to the vessel
As a Chief Engineer I was fully responsible for the engineering for the whole vessel including the hull, all deck machinery even the galley.
I have never been responsible to the Master of any vessel for anything engineering wise. A class one engineer is certificated in his own right and carries full responsibilty.
When the enquiry comes on engineering matters he stands before it the same as a second mate who is a certificated bridge watch keeper. He takes full responsibility when on watch. He stands before the enquiry not the master.
I realise it was an obscure tanker but we did the best we could.
The Radio Officer did not get a bollocking he was applauded same as we were.
I do hope this answers your question on engineering responsibility.

regards
jimmy


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## K urgess

Being a proper Marconi man who after one look knew where his responsibility lay I slept quite soundly while going through a cyclone on a VLCC despite the fact that she had been patched twice on the way from Europe to the Gulf and had a crack in the deck at the manifold.
I knew that should there be a sudden need I would be in the radio room with the transmitter fired up before I was fully awake. 
That was what we were ALL trained to do and no-one can say that the Derbyshire's Radio Officer was any different. It was so ingrained in all of us that even the alarm clock going off while on leave would cause us to move very quickly.
It boils down to a matter of trusting the navigation department to keep you out of danger and the engine room department to keep you moving in the required direction. Plus those departments trusting you to be there when needed.
It didn't entail panicking at the first sign of a slight blow.


----------



## jmcg

RESPONSIBILITY

singular, joint and several.

BW

J.


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## Brian Locking

jimmys said:


> As a Junior Engineer in Blue Funnel I was responsible to the Senior engineer on watch.
> As a Senior watchkeeping engineer I was fully responsible for the engine room for the period I was on watch ( in full charge). I had a responsibility for and to the vessel equally
> As a Second engineer I was fully responsible for the engine room.(in full charge). I again had a responsibility for and to the vessel
> As a Chief Engineer I was fully responsible for the engineering for the whole vessel including the hull, all deck machinery even the galley.
> I have never been responsible to the Master of any vessel for anything engineering wise. A class one engineer is certificated in his own right and carries full responsibilty.
> When the enquiry comes on engineering matters he stands before it the same as a second mate who is a certificated bridge watch keeper. He takes full responsibility when on watch. He stands before the enquiry not the master.
> I realise it was an obscure tanker but we did the best we could.
> The Radio Officer did not get a bollocking he was applauded same as we were.
> I do hope this answers your question on engineering responsibility.
> 
> regards
> jimmy



jimmys,

Can you ever answer a question directly! What comes through so many of your posts is a deep seated 'oil & water' complex. I don't think anyone is in the slightest bit impressed with academic qualifications. Answer the questions
put to you without 'red herrings'.

Brian


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## K urgess

"*The Merchant Shipping (Signals of Distress) Rules 1954*, paragraph 3 -
- (I) No signal of distress shall be used by any ship to which these Rules apply unless the master of the ship so orders."

*The Post Office Handbook for Radio Operators* 14th edition (1975), Chapter V, section 118 -
"The distress call and message shall be sent only on the authority of the master or person responsible for the ship."
This applies also to the Urgency signal (XXX) and applies exactly the same to radiotelephone Mayday distress and Pan urgency messages.


----------



## jimmys

Brian Locking said:


> jimmys,
> 
> Can you ever answer a question directly! What comes through so many of your posts is a deep seated 'oil & water' complex. I don't think anyone is in the slightest bit impressed with academic qualifications. Answer the questions
> put to you without 'red herrings'.
> 
> Brian


What is the question you wish to put to me. I have no academic qualifications only engineering qualifications. I am not, nor have I ever been an academic.

regards
jimmys


----------



## Brian Locking

Exactly!


----------



## jimmys

At the time the Derbyshire disappeared I was again second engineer on the Texaco Liverpool. I was not in Japan. We were enroute to the Carribean. We are poor relations in your shipping calender. Lacking ability and qualifications. We were fitting a segregated ballast system for the American Coast at sea.
Its always easy. I had a First Class Steam Certificate and a First Class Honours degree. The old man on the vessel was Peter Stead an excellent Master. We thought for the Derbyshire we knew she was lost. The danger of working ships at sea.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Jimmys

In your post no.372 did you really mean to say quote "The vessel was hove to in a typhoon and was not in any danger." 

Hope you meant to say that being hove to was the best available option not entailing excessive risk.

Typhoons in the SCS worried me big time - hove to or even running from them.

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

Off course I thought the vessel was in danger, any vessel in a typhoon is in danger.
Anyone who thought it was not in danger should not be at sea. Every vessel in bad weather and hove to is in danger.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

The website listed below provides further possibilities and sound engineering data.

www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

R651400 said:


> jmcg.. I came to the defence of the Derbyshire R/O issue after the idiotic question "was he qualified?"
> Anyone who asks such a question of a Red Ensign registered ship has obviously never been to sea.
> I can only comment on this and to which Roger Bentley has admirably quantified.
> Radio Officers on British registered ships were under two definite on board mandates.
> *Secrecy of Correspondence and the Master has absolute control in all emergency traffic*.


During my duties as a Registered Surveyor of Ships, which I still am and a former port state control officer for the MCA I automatically inspect the qualifications of every officer on board ships I survey including the Master. It is not an idiotic question to ask. It may surprise you how many officers on Red Ensign ships and others are not qualified. Masters included.
I inspect any articles, original certificates, insurance do***ents and other legal do***ents concerning the vessel.
If I am asked to by a Flag state or a Port State or Class, I can undertake legally on their behalf any duties they require. I am fully qualified.
I have been to sea in all ranks in the Engine Room.
I am required legally to ask these questions when I carry out my duties.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jimmys

R651400 said:


> jimmys.....
> It's very rare I quote verbatim.
> Are you not possibly being blown away with your own piddle and importance?
> The demise of "Derbyshire" is a subject of controversy if not extreme delicacy.
> There are people out there who are still suffering this tragic accident.
> I doubt they will draw any succour from yours or any one else's "professional"/heavy handed/ amateur view on what happened?


"Its very rare I quote verbatim". What is "it"
It has taken you well over 300 posts on this thread for you to discover the Derbyshire. I came in on post 170.
The suffering persons have still not been answered properly by GovUK.
If some of these suffering persons wish to contact me about anything I have said they are welcome to do so.
Thr members on this thread are I think all professional or ex professional mariners, they are not heavy handed and they are most certainly not amateurs. The vast majority of this thread is very high quality and even though I do not agree with some of it I would certainly not discount it as you seem to do.
If you thought so much about the Derbyshire and the people why were you not finding out about the vessel and noticing the radio officer was not being credited as such on the crew lists on other sites. It gave the impression of no Radio Officer.
A person like you who cares so much should have found that out. If you had an amateur engineer like me would not have to notice it.
I piddle like everybody else. Perhaps you dont.

regards
jimmys


----------



## K urgess

Can we put this thread back on track please, Gents.
One thing no current or ex professional seagoing person must forget is that all this occurred in 1980 and things were slightly different.
Anyone who sailed at this time will know what rules were in force and what was happening in the British Merchant Navy.
Today's conditions do not apply in any way.
Let's concentrate on a logical explanation of why there was nothing but scattered bits of vessel on the seabed between the focsle and the accommodation.
And remember the souls that were lost irrespective of rank, given or not.


----------



## jimmys

Bill Davies said:


> John,
> Quote:_There remains a lot of unanswered question regarding this tragedy_:Unquote
> 
> Well said. Since joining this site there have been many attempts to have this thread closed down by various members (not the moderators I might add).
> Perhaps by debating the incident in the manner it has been recently some sort of acceptable closure can be achieved.
> I have many reservations about how the Final Inquiry was conducted. In fact all aspects of this dreadful loss.
> 
> Brgds
> 
> Bill


I think you maybe correct about the thread. I do not think you are correct about the moderators.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jimmys

Marconi Sahib said:


> "*The Merchant Shipping (Signals of Distress) Rules 1954*, paragraph 3 -
> - (I) No signal of distress shall be used by any ship to which these Rules apply unless the master of the ship so orders."
> 
> *The Post Office Handbook for Radio Operators* 14th edition (1975), Chapter V, section 118 -
> "The distress call and message shall be sent only on the authority of the master or person responsible for the ship."
> This applies also to the Urgency signal (XXX) and applies exactly the same to radiotelephone Mayday distress and Pan urgency messages.


In the above Regulation what is the definition of a "signal of distress"

Was the Radio Officer on the Derbyshire,a First class Cert Holder, in full charge of his equipment similar to the watchkeeping engineer in the engine room and the bridge watchkeeper. Was he a responsible officer.

Could he at his discretion send all other traffic or was it controlled by the Master.

We are only interested in matters of law not handbooks.

regards
jimmys


----------



## K urgess

What a totally irrelevant comment.
If you need to ask the above questions you have no idea of the prevailing rules and regulations at the time which is strange for someone with your seatime. I suggest you read the Merchant Shipping Acts, NMB Agreements, SOLAS rules, etc., that were in use in 1980.
This has nothing to do with the Radio Officer's competence or otherwise. This has to do with the total structural failure of a vessel in bad weather.


----------



## jimmys

R651400 said:


> *1.* Signal of Distress SOS/Mayday.. Urgency XXX/Pan... Less Urgent TTT/Security
> Before the oblique stroke sent in morse and after the o/s by radio telephone all of which can only be sent on the direct instructions of the Master.
> *2.*The Derbyshire's R/O as per BOT requirements was fully qualified if not beyond for the type of vessel he was assigned.
> *3.* Since our mutual employer was Blue Funnel you may have a memory lapse that each and every telegram not originating from the Master himself had to be signed by the Master before transmission.
> *4.*The handbooks referred to previously were issued by HMSO and were law.
> Your final sentence are you per chance referring to the royal "wee"?


That is not a definition from a Regulation. What is the definition from the regulation? A moderator is quoting it.
When the Derbyshire sunk I was not employed by Blue Funnel I was employed by Texaco and I do not recall any Master with that company signing my telegrams. I would be most upset if anyone other than the RO. saw them. I paid for them. It was a private business transaction.
The vessel was off Japan and outwith the remit of the Post Office.
The fact a handbook was published by HMSO does not enter it into British Law. An Act of Parliament, A Statutory Instrument and a Commencement Order do.
By we I mean the readers of this thread. (Wee is pee).

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Shortly after M.V.Tyne Bridge (sister of Derbyshire) left Hamburg in ballast (March 1982) she cracked just for'rd of the superstucture. The Italian classification society diagnosed the damage as being caused by the methods/materials used at Swan Hunter to effect construction in the region of Frame 65.

Ship repairers (Blohm & Voss, Hamburg) repaired her in that area to the intentions of the ORIGINAL (my emphasis) design, presumably departed from to facilitate ease of building following the problems encountered during the building of the first of the series - Furness Bridge.

At Blohms the following repairs were carried out:-

Hatchside girders, which were inboard of the wing tanks, were carried through to the bulkhead where, originally they had terminated.

To avold connected members of different sizes creating stress points, scarping pieces and and gradual integrating reductions were employed.

L.R. surveyors were present (at Blohms) when these repairs were carried out and agreed with the treatment.

The surveyors saw fit to report to Lloyds what had been revealed. Lloyds contacted owners of two other sister ships - Cast Kittiwake and Sir Alexander Glen - to suggest inspection of their vessels. The two vessels named above received the same remedial treatment as Tyne Bridge.

Further research and damage (post repair) was noted and recorded in the area of Frame 65 in ALL the vessels - even the strongest and only one built to "as designed" specifications - Furness Bridge.

The Department of Transport ignored all of this evidence but still thought fit to warn the Liberian Maritime Authority, when looking for information on the World Pathfinder (ex Furness Bridge) of "the possibilty of failure of the ship in the region of Frame 65". 

There then followed a 'Report' to "interested parties" after preliminary investigations concluded in July 1985 that serious errors had occurred in the building of M.V. Derbyshire and that she "could well have cracked" in the region of Frame 65.


Swan Hunters were worried. The potential for enormous compensation was real and likely to bankrupt an ailing builder. 

They needed not to be anxious.

In the privatisation deal the Government guaranteed indemnity against claims arising from the loss of Derbyshire. Convenient ???????????????

I factor the above in to this thread for further professional debate.

BW

J.


----------



## alastairrussell

*Time Please Gentlemen*

Lemschout

Thanks for all your information along with the two top photographs in your post. I now accept that the forepeak and the store were flooded. I found the photo of the sister ship’s foredeck in heavy weather quite amazing and very enlightening. What was that saying ‘a good picture is worth a thousand words’. To see the foredeck equipment and No1 hatch so close to the bows without even a breakwater and exposed to heavy wave action is a real worry! 

To see conclusive evidence that two sister ships suffered from the same problems and then have senior officers on the ship and the various responsible British shipping organisations do nothing to fix an obvious design problem in a series of ship, is really quite disgusting. Remember how the masters on the Spirit of Free Enterprise wrote letters of complaint to their shoreside managers on the ship’s substandard loading practices and how this helped them later on when things got nasty. 

I printed both pictures and then had a good look, it shows how close to the bow and the green stuff No1 hatch cover was in this class of ship. With regard to the amount water on board I agree with Jimmys, when the shot was taken it appears from the shape of the bow wave that the forward end was on its way down with still a heap of water on board. This is bad and suggests to me that there are not enough freeing ports. Would she not have been better off fitted with more of these non return type ports? I suppose that it is because the ship is too big to transit the Panama Canal she does not need to be fitted with the smaller and better Panama leads.

Gents

I agree with everything Lemschout states in his post and add that the mast must have gone in the plunge and that it was swept back and away from the access hatch. If you have a close look with a magnifying glass at where the mast was fitted you will see two lines going aft coming out of the deck. I reckon the wriggly one is the power cable for the nav lights and the straighter one was a metal pipe for either for a hydraulic oil header tank or an air line to a foghorn (if one was fitted to the foremast). 

A capesize ore carrier that I was C/E on in the early 80’s had 1.3 tonne of hydraulic oil in a header tank installed up in the foremast. On the protected after side on the mast there was a gauge glass so you could read the oil level and keep a check for any leakage in the system. She was built in 1966 prior to the LLC so she had a foc'sle deck and yet we had trouble keeping the sea out of the electric and hydraulic systems!

With regard to some of the other posts I submit the following:

*Hove–to *. I apologise for jumping the gun a bit, I appear to have managed to get my investigations mixed up. I do realise that different types of vessels use different methods to remain stationary. I was under the impression that in heavy seas bulk carriers and tankers preferred to keep steerage way on by steaming into large waves at a slight angle at ‘very slow speed’. I think Jimmys has misquoted me here.

*Initiating Event.* In my mind the main event was the defective decisions made at the 1966 Load Line Convention and to a much lesser extent the classification society and the various shipowners of this class of ship for not foreseeing the future problems. When the problems did appear they ignored them and did not make any repairs or modifications to the major defects and this is criminal.

*Responsibility. * In the early 70’s major changes were introduced to reduce the manning on ships. As a consequence some highly complex machinery and devices such as self tension mooring winches, deck cranes that could be linked together, one person opening and closing of hydraulic operated hatches and of course unmanned engine rooms were introduced. It was then that an effort was made to spread the load and responsibilities of the reduced number of crew members on board, if possible. As C/E the shipping company I was with changed my responsibilities to being responsible to the _*Master and the Company *_for all the machinery on board. This included all the cranes, winches, windlass and hatch operating machinery.

During the early period of the introduction of automation to ships, the only bloke on the ship that was allowed to carry on doing the same old thing was the RO. In his home port he was first down the gangway when the ship arrived and you never saw him until a couple of hours before we were due to sail. Even the local Government radio inspector used to work in with him and carry out any inspection he had to do, just before sailing time. I remember the inspector found a defect once so we had to delay sailing while we got a big crane in to install a whip aerial on top of the DF loop. The third mate was hoisted up to do the job and where did we find the whip aerial, under the RO’s day bed! 

I gave the shipping game away in 1985 and started working for a government department, I was shocked with their (the Govt) management techniques, no one was responsible for anything and everyone spent their time ducking for cover. It was then that I realised that the old and well tried shipboard management system was unique and has worked very well in the past and should work well in the future.

Everybody on a merchant ship then, had their duties and responsibilities laid down clearly depending on rank. The master will always be on top of the triangle and I would not dream of sending in a report to the company without getting him to sign it and then give him a copy. We all worked and lived together and there might have been a few minor personality clashes now and again but the comradery was always there. 

Regards 

Alastair


----------



## Brian Locking

jimmys said:


> That is not a definition from a Regulation. What is the definition from the regulation? A moderator is quoting it.
> When the Derbyshire sunk I was not employed by Blue Funnel I was employed by Texaco and I do not recall any Master with that company signing my telegrams. I would be most upset if anyone other than the RO. saw them. I paid for them. It was a private business transaction.
> The vessel was off Japan and outwith the remit of the Post Office.
> The fact a handbook was published by HMSO does not enter it into British Law. An Act of Parliament, A Statutory Instrument and a Commencement Order do.
> By we I mean the readers of this thread. (Wee is pee).
> 
> regards
> jimmys


jimmys,

This is a friendly site with the membership addressing issues in a professional and friendly manner. You are forever having 'pop shots' at either the Master's authority (Oil & Water Complex??) or more recently the moderators. Carrying on like this and people will just ignore you. Friendly advice from a former Ship Master ( not BF I might add but non the less respectableish!)

All the best 

Brian


----------



## jmcg

alastairrussell

Good posting! Concur with almost all of it. 

Just one minor point and slightly off thread, but important none the less. 

Responsibilities cannot be delegated. Duties can be.



BW

J


----------



## K urgess

alastairrussell said:


> During the early period of the introduction of automation to ships, the only bloke on the ship that was allowed to carry on doing the same old thing was the RO. In his home port he was first down the gangway when the ship arrived and you never saw him until a couple of hours before we were due to sail. Even the local Government radio inspector used to work in with him and carry out any inspection he had to do it just before sailing time. I remember the inspector found a defect once so we had to delay sailing while we got a big crane in to install a whip aerial on top of the DF loop. The third mate was hoisted up to do the job and where did we find the whip aerial, under the RO’s day bed! .........
> 
> Everybody on a merchant ship then, had their duties and responsibilities laid down clearly depending on rank. The master will always be on top of the triangle and I would not dream of sending in a report to the company without getting him to sign it and then give him a copy. We all worked and lived together and there might have been a few minor personality clashes now and again but the comradery was always there.


I think a lot of us (sparkies) would appreciate it if you qualified the first paragraph above with "In your experience". I would be the first to admit that I had no confidence in *some* of my fellow Radio Officers but by no means all of them, in fact a small minority who, in my opinion, should have taken their responsibilities more seriously.
As an Electronics Officer my job changed out of all recognition and it was no longer "feet up, reading a book".
Your second paragraph above seems to be at odds with a Radio Officer who skives off without making sure his station is ready for sea. Be he direct employed or from a radio company. At the end of my seagoing career the chance to skive off in my home port was gone forever.

Regards
Kris


----------



## jimmys

Brian Locking said:


> jimmys,
> 
> This is a friendly site with the membership addressing issues in a professional and friendly manner. You are forever having 'pop shots' at either the Master's authority (Oil & Water Complex??) or more recently the moderators. Carrying on like this and people will just ignore you. Friendly advice from a former Ship Master ( not BF I might add but non the less respectableish!)
> 
> All the best
> 
> Brian


Hi Brian, 

When I joined the grubby tanker (as described)the Texaco Southampton in Bahrain in 1978 as 2/E I was asked to pick up a Deck Cadet who was travelling as well.
I did and his first words were "You are in for a hard time, the Mate, The Mad Dog eats 2/E's for breakfast". I had never met the Mate.
I was soon to and he made his boast often in the next two weeks. He hit me hard in the bar. The Mad Dog only struck one blow, I struck all the rest.
His appetite was affected.
During the accident on that ship he was driven by the sea from aft of the midships accommodation along the maindeck against the aft accommodation. It was just like Lemschout's first picture with water.
I went in and pulled him off the deck. He was hurt. Lots of pipes etc.
I never felt I should have left him. I would be surprised if he thought there was an "oil and water" problem, there certainly was a water problem.
It seems to be a problem with deck personnel "oil and water". I have never heard an engineer bring it forward.
I give my opinion and call it as I see it.
I am always the only person in authority concerning anything I do on ship or off it. (other than my good wife).

regards
jimmys


----------



## Bill Davies

Alastair,

Quote:_Initiating Event. In my mind the main event was the defective decisions made at the 1966 Load Line Convention and to a much lesser extent the classification society and the various shipowners of this class of ship for not foreseeing the future problems. When the problems did appear they ignored them and did not make any repairs or modifications to the major defects and this is criminal_.Unquote
* See my post #364*

Brgds

Bill


----------



## jimmys

I agree with most of what Alistair is saying and it is quite clear that the Master of a vessel is the representative of the company aboard and as such is the company.
On some of the vessels I was C/E on I even had to fix the radars plus all electronics and there was plenty of it.
I think the forward mast was impacted by the movement of the stb windlass and broke loose but that is not here nor there.
It is generally accepted by the pattern of the wreckage that this vessel broke up near the surface and did not sink intact.
In order for a vessel to break up the strakes of plating that make up the shell must fracture at the butt welds, they hold the strakes together.
In order to give the members some idea of the speed of weld fracture I will say from first hand tests that once the fracture become critical ie. major break up is imminent the crack moves at the speed of sound.
The crack moves until it meets something that arrests it ie. good material.
Break up can be quite fast.
When you view this break up it is as though the strakes have been ripped apart.
That is I think what they are viewing on the undersea cameras, we cant see the pics.
These vessel's are not freeing properly it should have been picked up by anyone sailing on it. Us amateurs can see it. Easy job to fit freeing ports. A riding crew job. The head of the vessel cant come up.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Bill

I wonder how these same people would view the new Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. It would certainly focus their minds.

I believe that instead of prawn sandwiches in the boardroom it should have been 'porridge' in Bellmarsh for certain individuals.

BW

J

Jimmys

I guess (with the benefit of hindsight) we picked up on it -see 1st sentence thread# 277. Possibly one of the many reasons we all got out after one voyage. It has haunted me ever since 15th September 1980. 

Bw

J


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## jimmys

The Derbyshire may have been better to put her backside into the typhoon and run before it. I don't know? Any comments.

regards
jimmys


----------



## Lemschout

The bulkcarriers have so many weaknesses that a lot of them are doomed in they are caught in bad weather.

The master of the Derbyshire hove to because he thought the fore ship was stronger than aft part with all the weaker openning of the accommodation, but in those days it was not yet well known how fragile this large vessels were. The men were 8 months per year at sea, had no information about the other casualties, and when they were on vacation they forgot about the sea for a while. I started sailing in 1963, but had to wait until I was superintendent in 1987 to discover a newspaper like the Lloyd's List which provides a lot of information about shipping. 

Anyway in spite of the new regulations stupid casualties will keep occuring as long as the ships are built by naval architects who are focused on the most economical design at the expense of safety.

Most of the naval architects I worked with were very good to quote the regulations, they must have a fantastic memory, but when it goes to logic thinking I failed to be impressed ( I heard one of them suggesting that to slow down the rolling of a bulker fully loaded with iron ore, it would suffice to fill the top tanks).

They need this excellent knowledge of regulations, not to build safer ships, but to save a few tons of steel weight where they believe it was possible.

And this keeps going in most shipyard. On most new ships, often with a very high accommodation and no lift, you find only one railing in the inner staircase. This because SOLAS does not require a railing on both sides if the starcase is less than 1,7 wide. A few dollars are saved this way, but the crewmember who has to climb those stairs twenty times a day can only use one arm to help himslef up.

Some days ago I was on such a ship, the captain fully approved my unofficial remark (no regulation then no offence), and when I used to outside stairs to go down from the bridge to the main deck, I was stunned to see that the railing of those stairs had only one upper bar, with a gap of about meter under it. If somebody fell from those stairs and goes slightly to the side, he could fly several decks lower.

I did not know about any regulation for the railing on such stairs, but anyway after seeing a few deadly accident, I put a defficiency as it is simple common sense to have a safe railing. Thereafter at the office, I searched again some regulation, but found none for the large ships. This is not the first time that I use logic without rules and that I got some protest from the management. My answer is to go back to the ISM code which complies the management to have safeguard against all known hazardous conditions. If the crew is aware of an obvious risk and issue the relevant ISM report, the only thing the management can do is to follow.

Now I see that more and more crew are p... by what is put on their shoulder and are quite enthusiast to endorse such remarks. 

Two days later I was on an vintage vessel, with much less decks, but the outside stairs had nice railings with intermediary bars.

Those creasy savings, coupled to the gross tonnage issue, explain also why most of the capesize bulkers are build without raised forecastle. The designers did not consider the effect of green seas, of longitudinal inertia, they just saw that could build a much cheaper ship this way.

Back to the naval architects, things will probably change the day they will have to sail for a while, until they have the opportunity to meet a typhoon on a loaded bulker. 





Now I understand


----------



## John Campbell

Lemshout,
your post #417 is one with which I most heartily concur - well said.
JC


----------



## jimmys

I think with the weaknesses we can see in this thread the vessels are doomed in bad weather.
Approx. 20 years ago I was extensively trained in the 1966 Load Line rules. The person who trained me was the person who wrote the convention in London, a Senior Naval Architect. I was trained in the calculations, assignation and carving and marking. I thought the rules were OK. Engineers had to complete two cases, Naval Architects six cases. My trainer said engineers ten cases and Naval Architects twenty and if you do not get them all correct you will do more until you can complete them without error.
I am now having some second thoughts about the convention and need further info. 

1) did the vessels have different markings for different cargoes ie. oil, general bulk and heavy ore.
2) when you were at your marks for the cargoes what was the approx free space in the tanks, ie 50/50 for heavy ore.
3) concerning the sheer,did the vessels have a high freeboard ford and aft compared to midships. How much was it.
4) What was the draught at maximum.
5) what was the approx. camber on the hatch covers to allow them to free.

I did an OBO case it was marked OK. But I cant remember. Get some info and see what comes.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jimmys

In in the early 1970's I sailed on the Texaco German ships, Frankfurt, Hamburgh and North America. They were steam VLCC's. None of them had a Forecastle head and none of them were lost. Masters from the vessels are members of this forum. In bad weather there was no chance they would be lost. They were solid well manned ships. The people on them were competent.
They were maintained to a level that you in your grubby tanker comment had never seen. It was evident you had not.
I would not think these people would look at seamans correspondence nor in the incidence of the least danger to personnel, engineer or not,delay in sending an emergency signal, nor would they blame anybody who did send a signal.You have never seen top of the range people that is your problem.
You may like to note "The Mad Dog " I spoke about before, I did not disparage his ability.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

*Re post 344*

I offer the following authentic abstract from the Defense Research Agency and AN other based in Rugby (Warwics) on Fracture Toughness of Steel Plate from M.V. Kowloon Bridge.

*Abstract

*Chemical analysis, tensile, Charpy, DW NTD and fracture mechanics toughness data are presented for a Grade A steel plate from the Kowloon Bridge, ex English Bridge and a sister ship to Derbyshire.

The plate is shown to have poor toughness under dynamic loading conditions. The results leave open the possibility that brittle fracture could have contributed to a structural failure in the Derbyshire, even at the highest temperature of +30 degrees C which is reported to have existed at the time of the vessels' disappearance. The results are felt to support the proposition that present classisification rules need tightening to reduce the risk of brittle fracture in ships.

PLEASE NOTE: THE ABOVE IS FROM PAPERS DATED 13-14 JULY 1992 . It is not my work but I do have the names of the authors.


Over to the Engineers (and of course all others) for sensible but robust comments.


BW

J


----------



## Lemschout

Cannot answer all the questions of Jimmy, except the one about the permeability of the hold of a normal bulk carrier loaded with heavy iron ore.

It is for sure not 50pc as suggested, but at most 75pc (meaning the iron ore will take only 25pc oif the space) or even more.

That also is why it is not possible to compare bulkers with tankers. When these last are loaded, the holds/tanks are full, while on the bulkers they are almost empty. That is why all the load lines "B minus" allowances sealed the fate of hundreds of seafarers. 

The Panamax bulkers on which I sailed, had a freeboard slightly higher fore, but that was not enough to prevent green seas to make some damage and partially flood the boatswain store on two ships. This not via any access hatch, but through the chain lockers which were quickly filled in spite of some protection on the spurling pipes, and some water seepep through the closed wt doors of these lockers in the store.

To compare these ships with the Liberty is also difficult as the ratio between the length and the mass is quite different.

A fully loaded Liberty of 135m(?) long displaced probably 15000 tons at most.
A fully loaded Panamax of 220m, not even the double, has a displacement of 75000 tons, or 5 times as much.

Most of the times our full load was limited by the Panama canal, some 39 feet.
A few times we were loaded to our maximum of 42 feet, only 3 feet more, but that was enough to be badly surprized by the slughishness of the ship. It made a lot of difference!

That is why I pity those who have to sail on the fully loaded capesizes build like a striking iron.


----------



## Bill Davies

Lemschout said:


> The bulkcarriers have so many weaknesses that a lot of them are doomed in they are caught in bad weather.
> 
> The master of the Derbyshire hove to because he thought the fore ship was stronger than aft part with all the weaker openning of the accommodation, but in those days it was not yet well known how fragile this large vessels were. The men were 8 months per year at sea, had no information about the other casualties, and when they were on vacation they forgot about the sea for a while. *I started sailing in 1963, but had to wait until I was superintendent in 1987 to discover a newspaper like the Lloyd's List which provides a lot of information about shipping. *
> 
> Now I understand


Lemschout,
Rather a sweeping statement don't you think inclusive of which the statement I have highlighted which does tend to undermine the former opening part.
Anyone having experience in these type of vessels were aware of the continuous 'cracking' which I have made dozens of reference to in previous posts. I can assure you from 73 when I first commanded this type of vessel repairs /modifications were to be expected .
Brgds
Bill


----------



## Bill Davies

Lemschout,
Ref your post #423.
I have tried onseveral occasions to steer the contributors in the direction of Homogenous loading and Alternative hold loading.
Some pages back a member suggested the 'Derbyshire ' was loaded in a most unusual manner. I think 2 & 8 MT.
I have never loaded in this manner.

Bill


----------



## jmcg

Bill

Some reports suggest that 2 & 9 were MT, others 2 & 6 MT. Depends on what post loss report one reads.

BW

J.


----------



## Bill Davies

John,

Many thanks yr prompt reply.
I think it was you who probably posted the info.
However, be it OBOs, Ore/Oil or Cape Size Bulk Carriers carrying Iron Ore it was either Homogenously or 2, 4 6 & 8 MT (Alternate Hold Loading). I cannot conceive how the plan you mention was accepted. Further, I refused to load alternate holds in the late 70s when the 'cracking iwo Hatch corners became too much to accept. Alternate hold loading only came about through commercial pressures from the Charterers and the Loading Terminal who were more concerned about reducing the shiploader moves in loading all 9 holds homogenously. 
I believe he cargo disposition did not help a vessel being severely 'racked' in a heavy sea.

Bill


----------



## jmcg

Bill

Would that loading arrangement be always adhered to? Or would charterers /others have undue influence?

I shudder to think of what might have happened to Tyne Bridge - instead of light ship - had she been loaded with iron ore or MEC and in rough conditions when she started to "crack" just for'ard of superstructure.

BW

J


PS All "reports" I have studied indicate that no.2 was indeed MT but conflicting "evidence" re. nos.6 and 9.


----------



## Bill Davies

The Master always has the final say. Admittedly some ports can be a bit 'pushy' and you occasionally got an inexperienced Ch.Mate who needed support but once, I determined that Alternate Hold Loading was unsafe, nothing would move me. I can think of several Ore Ports where they became quite hostile when the plan was not changed to accomodate their take. Further, the situation is not helped in places like Redcar where the foremen showed their dismay when the ship was loaded homogenously. Their were occasions, not many when one loaded Itabira Fines and Pellets. Fines in 2,4,6 & 8 ( Redcar) and Pellets (1,3,5,7 & 9 Immingham) only to find that order were changed and the Pellets were discharged in Port Talbot (memories of Peter McCallister). On passage Port Talbot to Redcar to discharges the Fines you were out of Class i.e. the ship was not Classed to sail in any configuration than with 2,4,6, & 8 MT. Somebody of course will have sailed in an Ore Carrier where this rule did not apply._* I would like to hear it.*_


----------



## jmcg

*Re Loading*

Bill

Thanks for the correct arrangement/sequence. I'm sure there will be further posts where this arrangement would not be followed.

BW

J.


----------



## John Cassels

Bill:

Think I have refered to this subject in various posts over the years.
In my humble experience , alternate hold loading was just as you indicate -
purely commercial consideration from charterers and pressure from operators
and had nothing to do with safety of the ship in any respect.

One of the many occasions where I was involved directly was in the late
1980's when my employers took a cape size bulk carrier on a 5 year time
charter in which I had already done a pre charter survey. The first cargo
was to be ore from 7islands to ARA.and the master was very reluctant to
load alternate holds only ( 1,3,5,7 and 9). My head office sent me back to
the delivery port to "persuade "the master otherwise. This I did - to my
everlasting shame. 
I was greatly helped by the loading manual and stability information book
which contained a "bulkhead correction factor " to allow alternate hold loading
and also contained the proviso that hold 2,4,6 and 8 may remain empty.
I remember there were other pressures used; i.e.charterers would only pay for
cleaning 5 holds , the other 4 were for owners account - that sort of thing.

A well known bulk terminal in Rotterdam tried to put pressure on owners
( not us ) on a similar vein - extra shiftings of bulldozers etc would be for
owners account.


----------



## Brian Locking

Bill / John,

Commercial pressures both sides was the driver for this alternate hold loading and I am not too happy having accepted this configuration on the several times I loaded Iron Ore. 

The Shearing Forces on the Loadmaster were usually off the scale whilst the Bending Moments gave an 'acceptabe ' Hog.

You are right Bill, cracking at hatch corners was common place.


Brian


----------



## jimmys

Thank you Lemschout for your answers.
In you pic of a sister ship in #362 I notice a vent in the corner of no1 hatch cover. The vent cover is missing. In other pictures of the Derbyshire they show four of these vents, one at each corner of the hatch I assume they vent the hold. I estimate the vents to be 0.3 metres diameter. As a ballpark figure I would say this vent could pass 250 tons per hour of sea water into no1 hold. More if there is head pressure. If two vents are open to the sea it will be substantially more.
Looking at other pictures I cannot see much camber on the hatch lids they look pretty flat. Water will lie on them
The bow height on this vessel is extremely low.
Iron ore is the least buoyant of cargo's as against tankers with oil which is buoyant and the bulker needs a lot more freeboard to compensate for this.
No one will say they made a balls of it in the assignment that is for sure.
This lack of sheer and therefore less reserve buoyancy is also worrying. Hog loading makes it worse.
Loading no1 and no2 empty causes a shear problem at the bulkhead between them. It is not loadicator stuff but basic mechanics. Its all bad news. Bill is correct load in all hatches equally.

regards
jimmys


----------



## Peter4447

Gentlemen
I am sure that many members are following this thread with interest even though like myself they are not familiar with the ways of loading that are being discussed. 
I wonder if Bill or John could be so kind as to give a brief explanation of why alternate hold loading is frowned upon and what does homogenous loading actually mean.
Very many thanks
Peter(Thumb)


----------



## Bill Davies

Peter,
Consider a typical Cape Size Bulk Carriers of approx 150,000 DWCC, 9 holds and 9 hatches.

If the vessel were to load homogenously then we would be loading approx 16500 tonnes (150000/9) into each hatch.

If we were to load alternate hatches (1,3,5,7 & 9) then this same cargo is shipped between these *5* holds i.e. (150000/5) 30,000 tonnes each hold.

Consider the shearing force (Stress) on bulkheads forward and aft of No. 8 which it MT. Thirty k in 9 and thirty k in No. 7.??????????????? 

I hope you accept the simplification butI am sure you get the point.

Brgds

Bill


----------



## Ian

Just to clarify, for those of us interested but not qualified, MT means?


----------



## jmcg

*Mt*

MT= empty. 

Homogenous loading = all holds loaded -but not necessarily full.

Had a private message re MEC. MEC = Middle East Crude - but more often heard in the refineries.

BW

J.


----------



## Bill Davies

Yes, I should have clarified that.

Brgds

Bill


----------



## Ian

jmcg said:


> MT= empty. Had a private message re MEC. MEC = Middle East Crude - but more often heard in the refineries.
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


Thanks for the explanation J., appreciated.

And the reply from Bill, too.


----------



## Peter4447

Very many thanks Bill and jmcg - much appreciated.
Regards
Peter(Thumb)


----------



## jimmys

jmcg said:


> I offer the following authentic abstract from the Defense Research Agency and AN other based in Rugby (Warwics) on Fracture Toughness of Steel Plate from M.V. Kowloon Bridge.
> 
> *Abstract
> 
> *Chemical analysis, tensile, Charpy, DW NTD and fracture mechanics toughness data are presented for a Grade A steel plate from the Kowloon Bridge, ex English Bridge and a sister ship to Derbyshire.
> 
> The plate is shown to have poor toughness under dynamic loading conditions. The results leave open the possibility that brittle fracture could have contributed to a structural failure in the Derbyshire, even at the highest temperature of +30 degrees C which is reported to have existed at the time of the vessels' disappearance. The results are felt to support the proposition that present classisification rules need tightening to reduce the risk of brittle fracture in ships.
> 
> PLEASE NOTE: THE ABOVE IS FROM PAPERS DATED 13-14 JULY 1992 . It is not my work but I do have the names of the authors.
> 
> 
> Over to the Engineers (and of course all others) for sensible but robust comments.
> 
> 
> BW
> 
> J



There are 4 grades usually used for ships Grade A,B,D and E.

Grade A has the least resistance to brittle fracture while Grade E has extra resistance to brittle fracture. Grade D has as is termed sufficient resistance to brittle fracture ( not great but not poor). It is used a lot in main structures. The tensile strength of them all is constant around 440MN/m2. Low temperature reduces the resistance to fracture in them all.
When Bill Davis looks at his cracking steel he does not know what grade it is, unless he has a certificate. It all looks the same.
In bulkers we have a further complication, there is high tensile steels used these are AH,BH,DH and EH. There is a good chance his deck plate is DH.
You need special welding techniques for DH.
When a ship is trading in Canada we would want Arctic D steel it has high tensile strength and good brittle fracture down to minus 40degCent of 40 Joules.Grade E at minus40Degc is 25 joules (the energy it absorbs in fracture).
To improve performance improve grade but increase costs including special welding.
This is all basic metallurgy. Material properties.
The cracking is a different science fracture mechanics.

regards
jimmys


----------



## jimmys

Lemschout

I forgot to ask. I assume the Derbyshire was a B-60 ship That is a type B ship with a 60cm. reduction in freeboard. I have never seen the ship only pics.
Is this correct??

jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Similar to Schedule (ing) in pipework Jimmy ?

Are we returning to poor grade materials used during construction i.e Grade A ?

Would she not be built for general tramp trading *world wide*, thus overcoming the restrictions of a particular lower grade plate and trading areas?

In latter life these ships were tramping all oceans with many different cargoes - grades of steel would appear not to have been factored in to their suitability for purpose in hostile environments. 

Would this not reflect badly on the Classification Society?

A crack is a crack to all of us non Metallurgists. I dont think we would need a certificate to know what a crack is /was. Perhaps that is why you chaps get the extra money!

BW

J


----------



## jimmys

I do not think we are returning to Grade A steels in construction. The class rules preclude it. The disposition of grades depend on the position in the ship and the stress it is under. It is a matter of plate thickness In a bottom of a bulker the plate type would be governed by thickness, roughly 20mm would be gradeA, 20/25mm gradeB 25/40mm gradeD and 40+mm grade E .

She applies for loadlines in her trading area. The Derbyshire must have applied. That is why I asked about the loadlines. It is the owners who apply for consignation and the Masters to make sure she stays within these areas. The owners are not required to ask for B-25,B-60, or B-100, they choose to. They can ask for type B loadline. A safer ship.

The Masters and the companies tramped the ships not Class. They only calculated, consigned and marked loadlines. It was not their ship. 

Bill Davis knows a crack is not a crack. He is not a metallurgist, I am not a metallurgist I know a crack is not a crack. You need a very advanced certificate to know about cracks. A difficult subject. 

regards
jimmys


----------



## jmcg

Jimmys

Thanks for this. Much more clear now

BW
J


----------



## Lemschout

Jimmy asks:

"I forgot to ask. I assume the Derbyshire was a B-60 ship That is a type B ship with a 60cm. reduction in freeboard. I have never seen the ship only pics. Is this correct??"

Never paid much attention to this issue for the Derbyshire, but when trading as a tanker, obviously it must have been considered an "A" ship.

Anyway the longitudinal strength in way of the holds was never questioned, with a double hull it was certainly sound enough, down to the infamous frame 65.

The last inquiry revealed that the compartments inside the double hull resisted rather well up to a certain depth. 

Therefore for the Derbyshire keeping holds 2 and 6 empty was most probably not a problem. Nobody suggested that it had any influence on the sinking, except on the longitudinal inertia as I explain on my website.

Modern bulker have now a restriction for alternate loading if they were not re-inforced by design.


----------



## jimmys

Lemschout

What is a bit worrying to me in the vessel is :- the flooding forward of no1 hold in the forecastle area, these volumes must be intact for loadline purposes. This area has reduced upthrust or buoyancy due to the tapering and shape of the bow. no1 hold which has extra cargo due to intermittent loading and due to the volume of the cargo mass has ample room for sea water. We have a possible direct route into the cargo space through damaged vents for large amounts of sea water to enter.
No2 hold is MT. A large potential for shear stress at no1/no2 bulkhead exists. All the shear stress forward of this bulkhead, no1 hold cargo and water and the forecasle area water can come on to this bulkhead as the bow in certain situations leaves the water. To me this is very worrying.
The matters of consignation of loadlines seems very wooly as is the type. These OBO,s are all poor.

What is your site and I will have a read.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Lemschout

Jimmy,

Behind the fore peak and the boatswain store, the Derbyshire had also a bunker tank in front of hold 1. An intensive study was made of the damage to this bulkhead, but there is no evidence that water entered the hold at an early stage of the events, contrary to the filling of the forward spaces.

The relevant page of the website lies at:

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sderby.htm

with the details of the cargo distribution at the end.


----------



## jimmys

As you will no doubt note from my persistent questions I have never looked at the Derbyshire before. As I have already said I think the windlass moved with a turning action and fractured the mast backwards then impacted on the hatch rear during its movement.
Further to your tabular analysis I would doubt if any Naval Architect would respond. I am thinking about it, it is interesting.
I think she had a type B-60 freeboard as your site implies. She must have had another type A freeboard for tanker use.The B-60 was no doubt in use. Did she ever carry an oil cargo?

regards
jimmys


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## R58484956

Reading the above web-site (thread 448) is indeed very interesting, but looking at some of the links associated with it is a very demoralising story. one line states between 1990 to 1998 130 bulkers were lost with 731 lives lost, many tragic stories are also revealed, it makes you wonder how these ships manage to get crewed with their past history.


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## Lemschout

Jimmy,

It will take some time to review all my do***entation on the Derbyshire, but as far as I remember it lifted some oil cargo.

Regarding the question about the naval architects, I had only two reaction of some sort.

The first one was the simple fact that the article was translated in Japanese, thus they found it interesting.

The other one was a letter from Faulkner (directing a previous inquiry) to which I submitted the article in writing. His answer to the issue of the longitudinal inertia was somewhat disapointing as he suggested to reduce this inertia by shortening the next ships at the design stage! This while my point was that the crew could somewhat influence the seaworthiness by loading as much as possible in the middle, within the stress sagging limits of course.

This is the more important that nowadays the staff is pushed to bring the ship in hogging conditions for two reasons:

1) they can lift a few hundreds tons more as only the Plimsoll mark counts for the maximum immersion.

2) most bulkers & tankers are built with higher maximum SWBM f(Still Water Bending Moment) or hogging than for sagging. This was noted by Jack, the naval architect who participated in this thread, in his book "The tankship Tromedy" and it was further confirmed when I checked the loading manuals during my inspections. 

This week I had another clue that the crews are understimating the effects of longitudinal inertia on shipping green seas. While I was checking the pumping system of a huge boatswain store fore and entirely under the main deck, they say that once their fully loaded handysize had it flooded after a collision with a fishing boat, but the draft fore increased by only one meter! 

One meter less from a freeboard of some 6 meter in calm weather is for sure not a problem, but during a storm it can make the difference between remaining afloat or sinking.


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## jimmys

I am looking at your table method and I think you need to refine it a bit and add a further bit..
When we are looking at masses and moments of inertia which are in a sense rotating about a longitudenal centre of gravity we have an angular velocity. If the body did not have an angular velocity it would not be moving.
You need to look at kinetic energy

Kinetic energy =1/2 I W**2 joules

I is your moment of Inertia
w (it should be written omega) is the angular velocity in radians per second

Further away from the centre high Inertia and high energy.
This energy is dissipated by the bouyancy or upthrust. Therefore if there is lots off energy at the head is goes deep. Less upthrust at the head due to fine shape. So it has trouble recovering. Nearer the head with more cargo the worse you get.
Dissipate the energy quickly though bouyancy keeps the head up, I think that is the logical route. Sheer, tanks dry etc.

Something to think about, dynamics always think energy!!!

regards
jimmy

PS I'm not happy with this load line something bugging, cant get finger on it. Cant remember.


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## Peter4447

R58484956 said:


> Reading the above web-site (thread 448) is indeed very interesting, but looking at some of the links associated with it is a very demoralising story. one line states between 1990 to 1998 130 bulkers were lost with 731 lives lost, many tragic stories are also revealed, it makes you wonder how these ships manage to get crewed with their past history.


Some years ago an article about why so many bulkers were being lost in adverse weather conditions appeared in a non-maritime publication 'The Readers Digest'. I have no idea as to whether it is true or not, but one of the theories put forward as contributing to these losses is that as a type these ships are quite literally "battered to death" by the loading and unloading techniques involved, so that they quickly become structurally weakened.
Peter4447


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## chadburn

Peter, simply put, these types of vessels were "problematic" from new it was of course all to do with Money (build cost etc as the Japanese could build cheaper, not better, but cheaper) the designs in the early day's were very suspect as were the grades of steel used in certain area's (well put by jimmys) even before they started work. The ship I was on "Har Addir" had a major structural failure on it's Builders trials which caused a bit of "panic" not only for us on board but for the ships Designer's. They were and still are a hardworked ship because of the nature of their cargo's and especially the damage that can be done when they are loaded/ unloaded (regarding Hull stress which is not as straightforward as it might seem) , vessels less than 2 years old have suffered deck fractures and indeed the Company I worked for only kept them 4to5 years from new before getting rid. I would not want to work on one that was older than that!!


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## alastairrussell

Gents

I have just had a look an old at an out of date Australian standard that I have in my library AS 1548 – 1988 (Steel Plates for Boilers and Pressure Vessels). I agree with everything that jimmys has said but I think we should stop referring to all ships plate as grade A steel as if it is an equivalent to say A1 at Lloyds because it is not. 

I am of the view grade A only refers to a grade of the heat treatment the plate has received after its been rolled. Australian standard AS 1548 is based on ISO 2604/4—1975 and BS1501 part 1—1980. All grades of steel made normally have a designation just like say AS 1548-5-490NL20. AS1548 signifies the standard, the 5 tells us the type or make up of the steel, the 490 tells us the tensile strength in MPa and N means the plate has been normalised and L20 means it’s been successfully charpy impact tested when the sample was at minus 20 degrees C. 

I was under the impression that all steel plate used on the ships hull had to be tested and signed off by a classification surveyor. If a sample of steel plate taken from the Kowloon Bridge was found to have failed an impact test carried out at ambient temperature then the classification society should have been held responsible.

I keep pushing that all ships and everything on the ship should be built or manufactured to an international ISO standard. I do not want a naval architect to design the ship. I just want him to design a ship that complies with all the relevant ISO shipping standards. I myself would want Lemschout to be on all the relevant ISO standards committee especially the one that covers ships stairways and ladders. Why, because I injured myself once when I went under the hand rails during a heavy roll.

I have attached an abstract from an Australian article on low temperature brittle fractures problems on wartime built liberty ships.

Regards 


Alastair


PS Lemschout, I cannot imagine anyone wanting to put a bunker tank way up forward of No1 hold.? 


_STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

As the war, and the shipbuilding programme progressed, structural failure in welded ships began to rear its ugly head. By the spring of 1944, as the allies prepared to amass a huge Amada for the invasion of Europe, hundreds of recently constructed merchant ships were laid up for repairs in ports around the world. Liberty Ships were not the only ones affected but the problem was more pronounced with them purely because of the sheer numbers in service. 
Cracks in steel ships have been common place since the first steel ship was built, but due to the fact that the plates were riveted together, a crack in a single plate was not necessarily catastrophic and the crack would usually run only to the next riveted plate, typically not more than 20 feet in length. Of course some riveted ships did break up in heavy weather but failures of this sort were usually attributed to “A Bad Batch of Steel” or “Severe Weather Conditions”.

But it was now clear that something was badly wrong. It was showing up in a high proportion of welded ships operating in cold waters, while it seemed that there were few such problems occurring in warmer waters. A notable exception being refrigerated cargo vessels. 
Scientists on both sides of the Atlantic set out to solve the dilemma, but it took more than 15 years of research to fully understand why the cracking occurred. Without getting too technical, it was found that, with the steel used for the first half of the 20th century, temperatures below about 48 degrees F (9C) caused the steel to crack in a brittle manner, like glass, and it cracked at the speed of sound! With welded construction, the ship’s hull was in fact one single plate so, once the crack started to run, it only stopped when it ran out of steel. It was also noted that few cracks occurred along the actual welded joints. In the meantime, after inspection of salvaged ships which had suffered cracking, successful, temporary modifications were carried out to help overcome it. 

There were of course other issues such as types of steel used in various ships, quality control and standards of workmanship, but low water temperature was the nub of the problem._


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## jimmys

You are indeed correct Alastair Grade A is anything but Grade A as we know it. I was in about Swans in the early seventies at a new build, it was bad. Lot of problems with the steel. I sailed on the vessel regularly over the next ten years. Lot of steelwork went in on retrofit. Some of the steel in the first few years dissolved in front of you. It was like a chocolate soldering iron it just dissolved. Two years in we did not know what was wrong.
I am not at all sure that has not got a bearing on the windlass as you and I and the rest know something was far wrong there.
Years later some files were available, I was inside the system. The owner was offered Class quality control (QC)or alternatively yard QC. You pay for them,QC guy at every plate, welding inspector,certificates etc.
They declined both and opted for their own.
I dont need to go any further you know what happened, nothing, no QC, a disaster.
God knows where the steel came from, not Wollongong thats for sure.

regards
jimmy


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## Peter4447

Hi Geordie Chief
Many thanks for your post.
I think the article in Readers Digest focused on two particular aspects. Firstly the damage done when thousands of tons of iron ore is poured into the holds during loading and secondly, the damage done during unloading when grabs and bulldozers are constantly used. There was a third aspect mentioned which is linked to your comment that the Company you worked for got rid of its bulkers after 4 to 5 years. It is a sad fact of life, that so many bulkers were simply sold on and on and eventually to owners who put profit before people and money before maintainence. The loss of one of these aging, poorly maintained vessels together with 20 or 30 foreign nationals from Africa or the Far East in some distant ocean has, sadly, never been seen worthy of being regarded as headline news.
My apologies Gentleman for straying albeit briefly off thread with this post. 
Peter


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## chadburn

Hello Peter,From what I read on this Forum bad Maintainence was not only confined to Foreign Owned ships but suprisingly British as well, if they were with Grey Funnel they would spend their "Seatime" moored to the "Crabby Bouys" if you catch my drift!! There appears to be some accepted practises which would not be allowed with Grey Funnel.


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## Lemschout

First answering Alastair:

"PS Lemschout, I cannot imagine anyone wanting to put a bunker tank way up forward of No1 hold.?" 

That is regularly the case, for the Derbyshire I join a sketch of the forward arrangements as published in the Admiralty court formal report.


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## Lemschout

I was to quick to sent the answer.

The deep tanks on the setch was in fact a bunker tank.
One of the main problem at the inquiry was to know the amount of fuel remaining when the ship sank.

Regarding the ISO standards, I always wonder who is implementing them?

They are very expensive to buy and obviously cannot be found on internet.

They never, or very seldom, refer to them in IMO rules and of course the various PSC MoU have no idea what they are. As in fact the PSC is the main power which can check the conformity to some standards, what is their use? 

Once more these ISO standards are in fact a kind of business as the class system, and the seafarers have no input at all in their definition.


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## muldonaich

Lemschout said:


> First answering Alastair:
> 
> "PS Lemschout, I cannot imagine anyone wanting to put a bunker tank way up forward of No1 hold.?"
> 
> That is regularly the case, for the Derbyshire I join a sketch of the forward arrangements as published in the Admiralty court formal report.


i take it the bunkers were in the deep tank ive only ever seen ballast there kev.


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## Lemschout

Jimmys wrote "I am looking at your table method and I think you need to refine it a bit and add a further bit.." and suggests to make a thorough study on basis of kinetic energy.

This is of course impossible for me as I would have to give up my job, I have still to inspect some 400 ships before retirements, all going well (Thumb).

Anyway the purpose of the table was not calculate the exact forces applied on the structural members, but to offer a quick comparison of the effect of longitudinal inertia on a ship. Here I want also to add that a large ship with a smaller longitudinal inertia is not only safer to ride the waves, but also to maneuver, as it was likely a contributing factor in the sinking with all hands of the Mineral Dampier. 

A master cannot spent his time to consider elaborated details, but he must know the main forces acting upon his ship and how he can influence them.

That is probably one of the main skill of those who have been in command for some time: their ability to go quickly to the main points of the problems they have to face. Those who ask them to bother with too many details (ISM code!) are in fact putting the ship at risk.


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## jimmys

Off course the Master must know the main forces on his ship. The unit of force is the Newton. I have never seen this unit mentioned. It concerns metres, kilograms and time. Moment of inertia does not.
A consideration of this may make a difference.

regards
jimmy


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## jimmys

Where was the collision bulkhead. Surely no competent person would allow bunkers in that deeptank if it was forward of the collision bulkhead. 
Even my grubby tankers managed to keep ford bunkers aft of this bulkhead.
Is it loadline legal, no,no,no.

regards
jimmys


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## gadfly

Gentlemen

A lot of interesting posts and discussions here about cracks, frame 65, steel grades, buoyancy, freeboard (B-60%), bunkers, longitudinal strength, deep tanks, welding, workmanship etc.

But if we consider all of these things in the context of the findings of the Derbyshire formal investigation it is suggested that they are irrelevant - they were not found to be a contributory or causal factor in the vessel's loss. 

You will all be aware of the fact that the judicial investigation concluded that it was the mushroom vents at the fore end of the vessel that initiated the vessel's loss.

Perhaps some questions that should be asked are:

Were the mushroom vents on the Derbyshire adequate? - perhaps not - they failed
Did they comply with the requirements of the Load Line Convention? - the vessel was issued with a Load Line certificate
Was the construction and workmanship of these vents in accordance with the shipyard's or appropriate British standards???

Regards


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## jimmys

I have been looking a bit more into the loadline of this vessel,it seems the company applied for and were assigned a Type B-60 loadline.
In order that the members know the difference in range between the various types. I am giving an estimate of the freeboard for the Derbyshire, it will be in the region of what was issued. I have not got the files so it is not exact.

Type Freeboard
Type A (tanker) 3.2 metres 
Type B-60 (with allowance) 3.8 metres
Type B (Without allowance)  4.6 metres

A loadline certificate is not issued to the vessel it is assigned to the vessel under very stringent conditions of assignment, the certificate and the conditions of assignment are aboard the vessel. They are in the care of the Master. Matters of compliance with the conditions of assignment are the sole responsibility of the Master. He cannot delegate it.
The conditions of assignment would not allow bunkers in the forward deep tank, a ballast tank. 

Were there bunkers in this tank ??

regards
jimmys


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## alastairrussell

Gents

I had a good look through the ISO website and I came up with the following PR spiel. 218 standards from the TC8 ships and marine technology committee and its sub committees is a fair old number. I also read that the public and public groups are allowed to have access to the technical committees by email. Surely do***enting the appropriate standard in the building contract would help in the tendering process and also help solve any disputes later on. 

Regards 

Alastair

PS I would have liked to have had a read of the access hatch standard.

*TC 8

Ships and marine technology*

*Scope:*
Standardization of design, construction, structural elements, outfitting parts, equipment, methods and technology, and marine environmental matters, used in shipbuilding and the operation of ships, comprising sea-going ships, vessels for inland navigation, offshore structures, ship-to-shore interface and all other marine structures subject to IMO requirements. 

*Excluded: *

	electrical and electronic equipment on board ships and marine structures (IEC / TC 18 and IEC / TC 80); 
	internal combustion engines (ISO / TC 70); 
	offshore structures for petroleum and natural gas industries, including procedures for assessment of the site specific application of mobile offshore drilling and accommodation units for the petroleum and natural gas industry (ISO / TC 67 / SC 7); 
	steel and aluminium structures (ISO / TC 167); 
	equipment and construction details of recreational craft and other small craft (not being lifeboats and lifesaving equipment) less than 24 metres in overall length (ISO / TC 188); 
	sea bed mining; 
	equipment which is not specific for use on board ships and marine structures (e.g. pipes, steel wire ropes, etc.) and falling within the scope of particular ISO technical committees with which a regular mutual liaison must be maintained. 

Total number of published ISO standards related to the TC and its SCs: 218 

Number of published ISO standards under the direct responsibility of TC 8: 5 

Participating countries: 24 

Observing countries: 23 

*ISO committees in liaison:

*ISO TC 28, TC 67, TC 104, TC 154, TC 184, TC 204, TC 223 

*Organizations in liaison:*

BIMCO, IACS, IAPH, ICOMIA, ICS, IFIA, ILO, IMO, IMPA, ISMA, ISRA, ITN, RINA, SNAME, UNEP, WCO, WMO, World Shipping Council 
[
B]*Discover ISO *[/B]

*Why standards matter *

*Standards make an enormous and positive contribution to most aspects of our lives. *

Standards ensure desirable characteristics of products and services such as quality, environmental friendliness, safety, reliability, efficiency and interchangeability - and at an economical cost.

When products and services meet our expectations, we tend to take this for granted and be unaware of the role of standards. However, when standards are absent, we soon notice. We soon care when products turn out to be of poor quality, do not fit, are incompatible with equipment that we already have, are unreliable or dangerous. 

When products, systems, machinery and devices work well and safely, it is often because they meet standards. And *the organization responsible *for many thousands of the standards which benefit the world is *ISO.*

*When standards are absent, we soon notice.*

*What standards do *

ISO standards:

	make the development, manufacturing and supply of products and services *more efficient, safer and cleaner *
	*facilitate trade *between countries and make it *fairer *
	provide governments with a technical base for *health, safety and environmental legislation,* and conformity assessment 
	*share *technological advances and good management practice 
	disseminate *innovation* 
	*safeguard consumers*, and users in general, of products and services 
	make life simpler by providing *solutions* to common problems

*Who standards benefit *

*ISO standards provide technological, economic and societal benefits. *

For *businesses, *the widespread adoption of International Standards means that suppliers can develop and offer products and services meeting specifications that have wide international acceptance in their sectors. Therefore, businesses using International Standards can compete on many more markets around the world.

For *innovators* of new technologies, International Standards on aspects like terminology, compatibility and safety speed up the dissemination of innovations and their development into manufacturable and marketable products.

For *customers,* the worldwide compatibility of technology which is achieved when products and services are based on International Standards gives them a *broad choice *of offers. They also benefit from the *effects of competition *among suppliers.

For *governments,* International Standards provide the technological and scientific bases underpinning health, safety and environmental legislation.

For *trade officials*, International Standards create "*a level playing field*" for all competitors on those markets. The existence of divergent national or regional standards can create technical barriers to trade. International Standards are the technical means by which political trade agreements can be put into practice.

For *developing countries*, International Standards that represent an international consensus on the state of the art are an important source of *technological know-how*. By defining the characteristics that products and services will be expected to meet on export markets, International Standards give developing countries a basis for making *the right decisions *when investing their scarce resources and thus avoid squandering them.

For *consumers*, conformity of products and services to International Standards provides assurance about their quality, safety and reliability.

For *everyone, *International Standards contribute to the *quality of lif*e in general by ensuring that the transport, machinery and tools we use are safe.

*For the planet *we inhabit, International Standards on air, water and soil quality, on emissions of gases and radiation and environmental aspects of products can contribute to efforts to *preserve the environment*. 

*Who develops ISO standards *

ISO standards are developed by technical committees comprising experts from the industrial, technical and business sectors which have asked for the standards, and which subsequently put them to use. These experts may be joined by representatives of government agencies, testing laboratories, consumer associations, non-governmental organizations and academic circles.

The experts participate as *national delegations*, chosen by the ISO national member institute for the country concerned. These delegations are required to represent not just the views of the organizations in which their participating experts work, but of other stakeholders too.

According to ISO rules, the member institute is expected to take account of the views of the range of parties interested in the standard under development. This enables them to present a *consolidated, national consensus *position to the technical committee.

*ISO standards are developed by experts from the sectors which have asked for them.*


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## jmcg

*Ve*

Gadfly

Was this (judicial investigation) not a "convienent" conclusion to save the ar...s of many actors (not seagoing) in this terrible tragedy. 

If all the information, records, drawings, cir***stancial evidence + other oral input from key players to the Final Report was considered with rigour, I am confident that a different conclusion would have been be arrived at. There is still no closure on the time delay from when these "initiating" events occurred, continued to occur - with (surely) concern of those on the bridge and NO DISTRESS CALL. It just does not add up.


The more recent contributors are discussing such information that was or might have been available, or was available but not considered sufficiently persuasive to attract the *proper* conclusion.

For those of us who are following this thread with great interest may I suggest that the postings are most worthy and valuable. 

BW

John


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## thobshropshire

*1979-80 Timeline for m.v. Derbyshire*



jimmys said:


> I have been looking a bit more into the loadline of this vessel,it seems the company applied for and were assigned a Type B-60 loadline.
> In order that the members know the difference in range between the various types. I am giving an estimate of the freeboard for the Derbyshire, it will be in the region of what was issued. I have not got the files so it is not exact.
> 
> Type Freeboard
> Type A (tanker) 3.2 metres
> Type B-60 (with allowance) 3.8 metres
> Type B (Without allowance) 4.6 metres
> 
> A loadline certificate is not issued to the vessel it is assigned to the vessel under very stringent conditions of assignment, the certificate and the conditions of assignment are aboard the vessel. They are in the care of the Master. Matters of compliance with the conditions of assignment are the sole responsibility of the Master. He cannot delegate it.
> The conditions of assignment would not allow bunkers in the forward deep tank, a ballast tank.
> 
> Were there bunkers in this tank ??
> 
> regards
> jimmys




With reference to many of the recent posts I place an extract from the following website, http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sbchron+.htm

1979-April DERBYSHIRE Reactivated 

1979-July
On the DERBYSHIRE a fracture reported in 1977 is repaired in DAIWA. 

1979-July 3
Bulker KAIRALI loaded with 20000 tons iron lost in Indian ocean with 53 lives. 

1979-Oct.9
Last oil cargo of DERBYSHIRE discharged 

1979-Oct.22
Capesize O/O BERGA VANGA sank in the South Atlantic while loaded with 108,000 tons iron ore, no distress signal was received, 44 crewmembers were lost. 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


1980 
EXXON after conducting a research on ship's corrosion and discover "that generalised thickness measurements could not be relied upon to determine precisely the location and amounts of repair work which might be needed." [loyd's Ship Manager 83-1]. Twenty years later these thickness measurement are still carried out and relied upon. 

1980
Bulkers MARIA BACOLISTA, MOUNT HORIZON, SAM KWANG, GEORGIS G., DUNAV, POET, lost with 198 lives. 

1980-April Urgent repair carried out on the DERBYSHIRE at SASEBO. Some repairs are cancelled due to bad weather. 

1980
LR approves the deck plating on the DERBYSHIRE as fit for the next 5 years. [LLDN 95-C6]

1980-Apr.17
LR credited Annual & dry docking survey for the DERBSYHIRE, recommend Special survey for 1981. 

1980-July 11
DERBYSHIRE leaves Sept-Iles. 

1980-July 29
Forward 6-men life raft of DEBYSHIRE washed free from its storage position by green seas. 

1980-July 31
DERBYSHIRE reduces speed to about 69 rpm as per Charterers instructions. 

1980-Aug.8
DERBYSHIRE stored off Cape Town. 

1980-Sept.3
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =4°56'N 125°11'E. 
At 1030 Z increases speed to 12.5kn to pass ahead of a reported Tropical Storm. 

1980-Sept.4
Ocean Routes advises DERBYSHIRE to take Northerly course. 

1980-Sept.5
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =12°17'N 129°12'E. 

1980-Sept.6
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =16°47'N 129°12'E. 

1980-Sept.8
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =23°34'N 132°57'E. 

1980-Sept.9
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =25°19'N 133°11'E. 
0930 Z Last message from DERBYSHIRE advising owner he has to heave-to. 

1980-Sept.16
Oil upwelling observed near position where DERBYSHIRE vanished, no survivors found which means that 44 lives were lost, among them some spouses of the crewmembers. 

1980-Oct.24
TAIEI MARU sees an empty lifeboat by 21.14n 122.18e, 700 wsw of the last position of oil upwelling..



As to the forward deep I can only recall that it was used for fuel oil only both on the English Bridge and the Liverpool Bridge(Derbyshire) when I sailed on them.

I'm not sure if anyone has mentioned it before but the book, A Ship too far, The Mystery of the Derbyshire, first published in 1992, provides a lot of information on these vessels.

Regards


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## jimmys

Thobshropshire,

As far as I can see there is no forward pumproom, it would be difficult to pump that tank. This type of ship would have no steam that far forward to heat, it had hydraulic deck machinery.
There was no proper bunker tank vents and coamings on the forecastle, it was not a proper bunker tank.
How did you work the tank?

regards
jimmy


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## jmcg

The initial 'report' was prepared by the DOT in 1985 and was circulated to "interested parties" . It was not for public consumption. 

Nor was it placed where curious Members of Parliament might read it - in the Commons Library! My then MP, Sir Anthony Meyer, confirmed this in written correspondence.

That same "report" was subsequently *revised* in the light of *comments *received and of *further information *which became available. It was that "revised" report that ended up in the Commons Library on 21st March 1986.

One must wonder with great suspicion what these "comments and further informations" were and who provided them. I suspect not those with first hand experience of that type of vessel i.e. seagoing staff. 

Is it not an irony that information that can be made available on requests on current events and current decisions is still withheld as a matter of course for similar events and similar decisions that happened almost 28 years ago.

Perhaps we must wait for the 30 year secrecy rule to expire before we can really examine the evidence and bring a degree of finality to the loss of Derbyshire. 

BW

J.


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## Lemschout

Thanks for all the information about the ISO.
Theoretically it is a good initiative, if only it was more reachable and open, meaning that those who work daily with the stuff should be able to give their opinion, not only a pannel of designated experts.

During almost each inspection I have problem with some "type approved" piece of equipment. Not exactly the same as ISO, but more legal.

If one country of the EU gives the OK, all others have to follow and it is very difficult to change it thereafter, while for some items it is just a joke. This because those who approve often are not the user to the equipment.

Regarding the use of the fore deep tank as bunker tank, I am quite sure about it. I believe I read it in the minutes of the 45+ days of the re-hearing, but unfortunately I have no time now to check them all.

Finally to answer Jimmys about the use of Newtons, it is probably the right thing when making calculations, but the result are disastrous when it goes at indicating any SWL. The crew and longshoremen have no idea of the value and even those who in shipyards who are painting them make often mistakes.

One example from this container hoisting device sent by a German naval architect. If this gear can lift safely about 470 tons, I am Napoleon.


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## muldonaich

Lemschout said:


> Thanks for all the information about the ISO.
> Theoretically it is a good initiative, if only it was more reachable and open, meaning that those who work daily with the stuff should be able to give their opinion, not only a pannel of designated experts.
> 
> During almost each inspection I have problem with some "type approved" piece of equipment. Not exactly the same as ISO, but more legal.
> 
> If one country of the EU gives the OK, all others have to follow and it is very difficult to change it thereafter, while for some items it is just a joke. This because those who approve often are not the user to the equipment.
> 
> Regarding the use of the fore deep tank as bunker tank, I am quite sure about it. I believe I read it in the minutes of the 45+ days of the re-hearing, but unfortunately I have no time now to check them all.
> 
> Finally to answer Jimmys about the use of Newtons, it is probably the right thing when making calculations, but the result are disastrous when it goes at indicating any SWL. The crew and longshoremen have no idea of the value and even those who in shipyards who are painting them make often mistakes.
> 
> One example from this container hoisting device sent by a German naval architect. If this gear can lift safely about 470 tons, I am Napoleon.


thats why i asked the question was bunkers carried in the deep tank i have only ever seen ballast in this tank i have spent 30 years at sea on all kinds of ships and never ever saw bunkers carried in the ford deep tank as regards to the rope in the foto of the bosuns hatch on every ship i was on when stowing ropes after leaving port before the last eye went down you used a rope stopper to make the eye fast to the hand hold on the hatch lid therefor when the sea ripped of the booby hatch lid the mooring rope would have come out of the hatch with it i think bill davies or jc will know what im talking about sorry if im out of order here but fed up seeing this foto and reading about crews negligence i was on a ship in hamburg and the hydraulic ram burst at the top seal they put it down to crew negligence there was a reason for that im sure bill could explain why this excuse was always used no disrespect to bill or jc i sailed with jc i think i would have liked to hve sailed with bill as well rgds kev.


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## chadburn

Muldonaich, I totally agree with you in regards to the accusations of Criminal negligence by one member of this forum, I think it is a disgrace that because the hatch was found open (bearing in mind the obvious impact damage) that he has made the assumption that it was left open by the crew. I had intended that my #353 comment would be the last on the unfortunate "Derbyshire" subject in particular but felt I had to support you in regards what is a sickening unproven accusation of a Crew now all lost and unable to defend themselves. Sail with him? you must be joking I would want a Boilerplate strapped to my back first.


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## Brian Locking

Geordie Chief,

I would say it is your consistantly inflammatory posts on this topic needs to be addressed rather than throw accusations in other areas to take the heat off yourself. This pandering to the emotions of other members does not address the issues we are trying to discuss.

Brian


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## Chouan

"It is a sad fact of life, that so many bulkers were simply sold on and on and eventually to owners who put profit before people and money before maintainence."

Like Denholms, for example? Except that they were managers rather than owners. However, the condition of the Kona when I was on her was simply appalling, and if it wasn't for her flag and the nationality of her Officers, and the "good will" that the combination of the two created, there would have been no way that we could have survived the safety surveys that other ships needed to load at Sulom Voe, for example. She was a heap of sxxte, and only economic necessity drove me to sail on her, and, I suppose, some sort of loyalty to the flag.....


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## jimmys

It looks pretty certain that the forward deep tank was used for bunkers. What I am worried about is what was used to transfer the bunkers aft. In this type of ballast tank I would think only one tank valve used for both pumping out and filling the tank and connected to the ballast pumps. It might be the same line servicing the fore peak same one valve system.
Any bunkers in this area might put the forepeak pumping out as well. This leaves you two tanks open to sea that you cannot pump.
Any pipeline diagrams??

regards
jimmys


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## Brian Locking

Bulk Carriers in general have always been known as the 'workhorses of the sea'.
Their maintenance has always been in question and this to my mind is one of the problems. They change hands frequently and fall into unprofessional ownership who are in for the quick profit rather than long term.


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## chadburn

In regards to my last comment I was of course not refering to J.C.or B.F. In regards to Brian Lockings comments: it is a matter of decency and respect for fellow seaferer's who have lost their lives and nothing to do with "taking the so called heat off myself?.


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## Brian Locking

Chadburn,
Most people who subscribe to this thread are caring people who address the issue professionally and compassionately without becoming personal as you have done. Some time ago several members tried to have the thread closed down for much the same reason to your latest. Fortunately the moderators have allowed the thread to stay alive. I cannot read any posts from anyone who has asserted what you say in #474. It might not be popular but we must face up to the facts that virtually all maritime accidents have their basis in Human Error and I think that is what we are all addressing. If anyone has any problem to my last then please say so. Stop the sniping and add something constructive.


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## kevin morgan

a very interesting thread non the less guys, relevent to many here .


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## Steve Woodward

Gentlemen, 
I have just deleted two messages which were way to personal, we do not allow this sort of thing.
I would like to remind all who post on this forum, the entire crew of the Derbyshire perished when she went down, please show them the respect they deserve when posting in this thread.

Steve


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## benjidog

*Warning from Moderators*

Gentlemen,

This thread is very interesting and we do not want to close it down but some of the recent posts are really not in keeping with the ethos of this site.

Indeed some of the posts are verging on disrespect of the dead who cannot defend themselves. Making conjectures about the myriad things that MAY have happened is one thing, but without evidence to back them up they can be no more than possibilities. 

Please remember that there may be relatives or friends of the deceased belonging to this site or viewing these posts as non-members, word your posts accordingly.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Brian (on behalf of the Moderating Team)


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## randcmackenzie

To answer JimmyS - I sailed on a number of OBOs and tankers with a forward fuel oil deep tank.

They were all served by a steam heating system, whether or not the winches were hydraulic, and transfers were always by dedicated bunker lines and usually hydraulic pumps driven from power packs in the forward store.
On the better ships the pumps were fitted in the forepeak or cofferdam, the lesser ones had them in the fuel tank itself.
Nothing else satisfies class rules for complete segregation of cargo, bunkers and ballast.

Forepeak ballast tanks were sometimes connected to the main Permanent Ballast system, and sometimes they had dedicated hydraulic pumps and fire main powered eductors for stripping.


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## jmcg

A trip to Kew in 2010 is very much on my agenda.

Have just revisited a few more "archived" notes and materials -some of which referred to Ocean Mandarin (ex Sir Alexander Glen and fifth of the six vessel series.) 

In 1992 she was reported to be on her way to that mother of all breaker yards - Alang. It would appear that the demolition men sold her on before she arrived at Alang 

In July 1993 (18 years old) she was allowed to lift a full coal cargo at Richards Bay destined for Nationalist China - Taiwan. 

The South African Port authorities blacked her from ever returning to Richards Bay unless "she was blown up and completly reconstructed". She never made her intended destination, but turned up in South Korea at the end of April 1994 with no rudder - yes no rudder!

There are schools of thought that the cargo of coal lifted at Richards Bay was still on board. The owners refused to pay the tug handling owners for assisting her safely to port to discharge her cargo; after which she was arrested and sold "as is" for $137 dollars per light displacement ton. 

She was then sold on at a profit of $11 dollars per light displacement ton.

Mercifully the end came for her in October 1994 in China.

I offer the above to help focus our contributions on the build quality and classification of this series of vessels.

BW

J


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## randcmackenzie

The last message from Derbyshire stated she was hove to in a typhoon.

The general definition of hove to is maintaining just sufficient headway to maintain steerage, with wind and sea ahead or fine on the bow.

The class of six and other half sisters were all highly powered in comparison to other vessels. Of 160,000dwt they had B&W 980 ?? engines of 28,000hp, where a 270,000 VLCC had about 32,000hp.

Dead Slow Ahead was about 35 rpm with an equivalent speed of around 7 knots. 
This is quite a high speed for such a heavy ship in such weather, but to avoid the highly dangerous possibility of broaching across the sea, it would not have been possible to stop the engine at any time.

Though there was nothing else the Master could do, except perhaps run before, the speed may have been a contributing factor to her loss.

Hindsight is perfect, and at that time the master of a British built ship in full class and flag state approval had no reason to doubt the integrity and strength of his vessel's hatches and foreship.

It is because of her loss that some small improvements have been made, perhaps the only epitaph her crew can have.


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## Bill Davies

randcmackenzie said:


> It is because of her loss that some small improvements have been made, perhaps the only epitaph her crew can have.


Yes, I'll go along with that.


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## pete turner

2548hopw said:


> Was she called the "........... Bridge" before and had already suffered a crack between hull and accomodation block. The way I remember it she suddenly broke her back. Help me with the name. Memory isnt what it used to be. Cheers Steve.


it was the liverpool bridge-cheers pete turner(==D)


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## pete turner

i believe the kowloon bridge + another had faults similar to derbyshire


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## jimmys

randcmackenzie said:


> To answer JimmyS - I sailed on a number of OBOs and tankers with a forward fuel oil deep tank.
> 
> They were all served by a steam heating system, whether or not the winches were hydraulic, and transfers were always by dedicated bunker lines and usually hydraulic pumps driven from power packs in the forward store.
> On the better ships the pumps were fitted in the forepeak or cofferdam, the lesser ones had them in the fuel tank itself.
> Nothing else satisfies class rules for complete segregation of cargo, bunkers and ballast.
> 
> Forepeak ballast tanks were sometimes connected to the main Permanent Ballast system, and sometimes they had dedicated hydraulic pumps and fire main powered eductors for stripping.


I sailed a lot in tankers , including VLCC,s with forward bunker deep tanks, the better ones had forward pump rooms.
These tanks were not adjacent to the forepeak with a single bulkhead and the were aft of the collision bulhead.
The Derbyshire forward deep tank did not have the ventilation nor the segregation to be a bunker tank. We can see that. The two hydraulic pumps forward were for the windlasses, they are different from powerpacks. How did they pump it. How did they bunker it.
So your vessels had a hydraulic driven pump which pumped heavy bunkers and therefore had to be deep in the fore peak.
The forepeak would be contaminated by bunkers and hydraulic oil. Oil leaks,it all leaks. Thats why we have savealls. I can see the pumps being fitted in the tank that is OK.

Once the forepeak is contaminated you cannot use it for ballast and you cannot pump it to the sea. If the Derbyshire forward ballast deep tank was filling up they could not pump it to the sea. It was contaminated by oil.
This vessel, a very powerful vessel, well manned, should handle leaks in the fore end easily.It is imperative you do not contaminate the fore end with oil you very often need to pump a lot of water from there.

regards
jimmys


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## jimmys

Dead slow ahead is a manoeuvreing speed. When you do not wish to manoeuvre ie hove to, the proper procedure is to ask the engine room for a slower speed. In a B&W there is plenty of options to give you that. Possibly as low as 20 rpm or less on engine control on a large engine. As you get lower you may need to consider diesel fuel. Bridge control may not be available in this cir***stance.

regards
jimmys


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## Chouan

pete turner said:


> i believe the kowloon bridge + another had faults similar to derbyshire


If you look at some of the earlier posts on this thread you'll see a comprehensive list of faults, repairs etc to the ships of this class.


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## Bill Davies

jimmys said:


> Dead slow ahead is a manoeuvreing speed. Possibly as low as 20 rpm or less on engine control on a large engine.
> regards
> jimmys


Jimmys,

This DSA at 20rpm seemed to be the norm on virtually all the Seam Turbine VLCCs/ULCCs I commanded from 1970 through the 80s. It was standard Japanese and very handy when berthing in difficult ports like Jebel Dhanna before the days of SPMs. 20 rpm could give you a comfortable 2.5kts for your approach to the 'drop mark'. Try exceeding that and you would loose your 22/25 tonne anchor plus 14/15 shots. What say you Capilano???

Bill


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## Bill Davies

All,

For those who may be interested I have posted three illustrations of typical Bulk Carrier Loading Conditions. They are: 
1. Homogenous Hold Loading
2. Alternate Hold Loading
3. Block Hold Loading

I have tried to display on the one sheet but the image was 2mb.


I think it will explain the arguements better than my previous description.

They can be found *here*, *here* and *here*, under shipping accidents in the Gallery.

Brgds

Bill


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## randcmackenzie

jimmys said:


> Dead slow ahead is a manoeuvreing speed. When you do not wish to manoeuvre ie hove to, the proper procedure is to ask the engine room for a slower speed. In a B&W there is plenty of options to give you that. Possibly as low as 20 rpm or less on engine control on a large engine. As you get lower you may need to consider diesel fuel. Bridge control may not be available in this cir***stance.
> 
> regards
> jimmys


Sorry JimmyS,

On the ships I was on these early 980 engines would not run less than 30/35 rpm without the danger of stopping.

The long stroke engines of today certainly will.

Since the ship would be pitching heavily this danger would be greater.

On any motor ship, the maneouvering Dead Slow Ahead is always chosen as the minimum the engine will turn. Who wants to go fast on Dead Slow Ahead in approaches to buoys and other fixed objects?

Turbines had the advantage in that they could 'creep' at pretty much any revs you chose.


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## Bill Davies

Mark,

Thanks for the Hyperlinking.

Brgds

Bill


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## jimmys

Diesel engines are always in danger of stopping. Any engine is in danger of stopping.
Dead slow ahead in any motor ship is chosen so that the engine will not stall, stopping and stalling are different ,in a large bore it is usually around 30 rpm. This is not the stall speed nor is it near it.
When we run a large bore engine at lower speed we do not do it on bridge control nor control room control, we do it on engine control. As engineers call it on the sticks for a diesel and on the wheels for a turbine.
The engineer does it, he feels and hears the stall and notches up. If it stalls it costs him a case of beer. It does not stall much.
When it stalls he has direct control of the air start and he starts it by the stick. If he cant start it is is another case of beer, it always starts.
Hand controls are on all engines as far as I know at least up to approx 2003. It might have changed I dont know. I think handomatic is a Class requirement.There is no safer control of an engine. Do you have any experience of this, have you ever done it??
You cannot do it on the bridge.

regards
jimmys


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## jmcg

Jimmys

Excellent reading on last post!
BW

J.


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## Brian Locking

jmcg said:


> Bill
> 
> Some reports suggest that 2 & 9 were MT, others 2 & 6 MT. Depends on what post loss report one reads.
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


The quoted post considered in conjunction with Bill's diagram for Block Loading is very interesting. Stop and think of the enormous stress imposed at the aft bulkhead of No.1 Hold.

Brian


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## jmcg

Brian

A good barometer to suggest why she fractured in 3 key areas. 

The bow section was the only section (of the 3 main sections) found in one piece. 

The other two sections would appear to have disintegrated as a result of explosion/implosion. If this was the case, would it be possible that the bow section might not have been subjected to the same explosion/implosion forces and, if so, could this explain why the section (bow) settled as it did - save for foc'sle damage -intact on the seabed.



BW

J.


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## Lemschout

It is likely that all the considerations on the Derbyshire running deadslow for a long time are not relevant as within a typhoon the ship would have to run the engine full speed just to keep heaving to, while still drifting astern.

With a fully loaded Panamax off South Africa, during a force 12 wind but no established swell or waves, we were nearly stopped while having the engines on full power ahead. But typhoon Orchid had a lot more power, and the seas were well formed.

Another lesson that was probably not learn from the tragedy is that heaving to is not a good option for a loaded bulker without forecastle, and that the stern area of the bulkers should be raised, or at least be stronger built and made more watertight in order to run safely before the waves. 

Those who have been in category 4 or 5 hurricane say that, due to the wind pressure, water pushes its way through the smallest openning like a poorly sealing gasket. This could induce the master to think that the ship risks an engine flooding if a wt door fails, or a simple failure if water enters some electric circuits, and it could convince him to swing the vessel while the effect of the green seas would be much stronger when facing the wind and waves. 

As I wrote a few days ago, the design of all bulkers should be revised by a team which includes at least one naval architect who has been on such a ship in a bad storm.

A recent article published by the Lloyd's List this 12 August support this approach. Hereunder some quotes of the article.

QUOTE
... The best ship designs have come from naval architects who knew in practical terms just what they were trying to achieve....

But very few naval architects these days are able to get to sea as part of their education. They are too busy doing other things, and everyone knows that the ships modern naval architects have designed do not have a single spare bunk aboard. There would be arguments, in a world ruled as it now is by accountants, about who should pay for the extra crew’s food.
UNQUOTE


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## Brian Locking

Lemschout said:


> Another lesson that was probably not learn from the tragedy is that heaving to is not a good option for a loaded bulker without forecastle, and that the stern area of the bulkers should be raised, or at least be stronger built and made more watertight in order to run safely before the waves.
> 
> QUOTE
> 
> Would not totally agree but, a bulker 'hove too by the head' caused by water ingress into forward store. Now that is a different story!


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## chadburn

jimmys, your#497 is spot on. On both the Har Addir and the Har Saggi the Bridge never had control although the system was fitted, but of course that was in 1968,a lot of control auto systems were new and came across from static land based systems and did not transfer well to the marine enviroment with the juddering and jarrring of a ship, in most cases they failed miserably. Although I believe "Derbyshire's" engine was stopped which is the norm when you look at the losses of ships caught in a Typhoon, but like everybody else I have no proof of the events of that day/night that lead to her loss.


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## jimmys

Over the last few days I have been looking at the dynamics of this type of pitching. The results are quite startling.
Following up Lemschouts Moments of Inertia and adding in velocity. The energy involved is equivalent to a 5000 tonne hammer moving one metre.
This vessel may have fractured firstly across the cofferdam forward of number one.
The adding in off the flooding masses in volumes where there would be buoyancy ie. forward deep tank,fore peak and store make a massive difference. This in combination with the extra load in number one I think may have caused the vessel to fracture in this area.
Need pics of the fracture area ie. the cofferdam.
We can get an engine to run at very low to very high speeds in emergency control. If required we can take out the overspeed and the facility is there to run above MCR (Maximum continous rating). These facilities would only be used in safety of the ship situations when in the Master's opinion the ship was in imminent danger ie. typhoon situations.
Sometimes in this sort of weather you are on maximum power, exhaust temperature on the blood and you are turning 40 revs. There is very high torques on the engine and drive train. Torque is proportional to power over speed. Torque is what breaks parts of the engines. The engineer is in danger. 

regards
jimmys


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## Calsatch

The deep tank was a bunker tank and there was a transfer pump in the forward pumproom, the forepeak valve was inside the bunker tank. (Never seen that before or since!) The emergency fire pump was up inside the stool space between no 1 hold and the transverse. The forward construction was different to say the least like a box turned to make a bow out of a corner. very good tankers when the valves worked... Cal


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## chadburn

Can I ask this question of people who actually served on the sister-ships, I understand the ballast system was hydraulic and it is "normal" for the hydraulic pump and it's ac***ulator to be in the Engineroom, where were the operating valves Rexroth? (not the Ballast valves themselves) were they in the Engineroom, in the Duct Keel or in watertight boxes attached to the hatch coamings which was the system used on another 65,000tnr I served on


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## Lemschout

Jimmy wrote: 
"The adding in off the flooding masses in volumes where there would be buoyancy ie. forward deep tank,fore peak and store make a massive difference. This in combination with the extra load in number one I think may have caused the vessel to fracture in this area. Need pics of the fracture area ie. the cofferdam."

When the ship started to sink, there we not much buoyancy in the fore ship as the forepeak and the boatswain store were flooded. 

Regarding the deep (bunker) tank, there is some doubt about the quantity of fuel remaining inside at the time of sinking. 

Herewith a sketch of the damage to the bulkhead at frame 339, the aft on of the cofferdam separating the deep tank from hold 1.


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## jmcg

Chad

The label Rexworth has rekindled my memory and as I only sailed as GPSI on 3 vessels, English Bridge, Binsnes (Jebsons) and Musa (Elders & Fyffes) and spent liitle time down below on the latter two, I would suggest there is more than a coincidental connection here. Can count on my hand the number of days I spent on deck work (excluding watch keeping) on E. Bridge. 

Would this hydraulic pump arrangement be known as a "pack". The word "Pack" immediatly sprung to mind when I noted Rexworth in your posting.

I cannot remember the name of the CE on the E.B. but do recall he was a man of much phlegm. He mucked in with the rest of us just to keep the ***** going.

Like the rest of us, he "got out" after one trip. 

Hope this helps.

BW
J.


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## jimmys

Lemschout

If there is no buoyancy the ship will drive to the bottom which is what happened. Nothing to stop it, buoyancy is the restoring force. The energy in the forecastle will drive her down. It is a matter of equilibrium. The basis of mechanics and the basis of naval architecture.
I think she split in the cofferdam.
Need physical pics.

regards
jimmy


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## chadburn

jmcg said:


> Chad
> 
> The label Rexworth has rekindled my memory and as I only sailed as GPSI on 3 vessels, English Bridge, Binsnes (Jebsons) and Musa (Elders & Fyffes) and spent liitle time down below on the latter two, I would suggest there is more than a coincidental connection here. Can count on my hand the number of days I spent on deck work (excluding watch keeping) on E. Bridge.
> 
> Would this hydraulic pump arrangement be known as a "pack". The word "Pack" immediatly sprung to mind when I noted Rexworth in your posting.
> 
> I cannot remember the name of the CE on the E.B. but do recall he was a man of much phlegm. He mucked in with the rest of us just to keep the ***** going.
> 
> Like the rest of us, he "got out" after one trip.
> 
> Hope this helps.
> 
> BW
> J.


jmcg, yes to that, it is known as the hydraulic power pack, can you tell me where it was located, I am also curious to know as to whether the signal operating valves were in the Duct keel next to the ballast/bilge valves themselves. Although the system on the Har Addir was air (martonair valves) because of the structural failure which ripped open 7/8 bulkhead, the cofferdam and the tank bottom which flooded the Duct keel the electrics to these valves blew and we had no control of the ballast/bilge system at all (barring for one hand operated valve in the forepeak which saved the day). If the hydraulic valves were in the same position on the "D" he would not be able to use his pumps, on the hydraulic job I was on the ballast valves were inside the tanks themselves. Hove to on a large diesel, engine stopped, these engines did not take kindly to prolonged "slow" running. I was always a "hands on" Chief, I would not expect anyone to do what I could not do myself, that was the way I was taught in the traditional way.


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## muldonaich

Bill Davies said:


> randcmackenzie,
> 
> You know exactly the access hatch I am referring to and it could be lashed from the inside


hi bill if that was the only acces hatch how could you secure it from the inside and then get out i fail to understand that no disrespect meant kev.


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## Bill Davies

muldonaich said:


> hi bill if that was the only acces hatch how could you secure it from the inside and then get out i fail to understand that no disrespect meant kev.


Read the subsequent posts!


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## jmcg

Jimmys

Have e mailed you a drawing - am not tech savvy enough to upload it here. It is a pdf file.

Chadburn.

Am trying to clear the mist of time as to identification of location of the " Rexworth Pack". May need another divine prompt though. Failing that it will be a trip to Kew in 2010.

BW

J.


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## Brian Locking

Uncle Bill,

The 'strapping' you refer to as a retrofit to the access hatch. Can you provide sketch? Was it padlocked or more substantial?

Brian


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## chadburn

When I answered jcmg I knew that the word Rexworth was possibly wrong but given the long period of time since he served on this type of vessel I LET IT PASS. but for information I was refering to the Ballast Valve hydraulic operating valves which were REXROTH, as to who made the Ballast system hydraulic pack and the ac***ulator which went with it your guess is as good as mine and I was trying to compare a type of hydraulic system I have worked on with that of the "D" to see if they were similiar.

Getting back to the theme, if the "D" was having valve problems then it it is possible that he had the access hatch open in the engineroom to the Duct Keel, given a major failure as outlined previously by lem it would flood the Duct keel and therefore the engineroom which could account for the vessel going down so quickly, fortunatly the BOLTED INSERTION JOINTED HATCH in our engineroom was closed otherwise we would have been turned into a salvage job.

Now before anyone jumps in and say's that access to the Duct Keel at sea is a no,no, I can write from PERSONAL EXPERIENCE that it is incorrect because the aftermath of our Duct Keel flooding not only resulted in a change of the "Action Valve" soleniod positioning into the engineroom but a week into our Maiden Voyage we started to have problems with the system which resulted in our entry into the Duct Keel to find that the shipyard had not cleaned out the air system resulting in the valve air operating head pistons had siezed in the bores (think steam winches but without salt) this meant that the Chief had to take the 4-8 and the 2nd, myself and two large Enginemen spending most of the voyage stripping cleaning and oiling the air operating heads within the Duct keel, bearing in mind that this vessel had already suffered one major structural failure already and we were in Ballast. Our Reward? a rather nice bonus some of it spent at a lovely place outside Rotterdam called the "Dutch Barn" with a chap playing the Harpsicord, all very nice. So a further question is did any crew work on the ballast valves in the Duct Keel on a sister ship whilst at sea?


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## chadburn

Jmcg, see your pm.


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## jimmys

Thanks for the drawing John I cant get it loaded on either. I think it is important. If one of the Moderators gets in touch though email to either of us with an address we can mail it up and they can put it on.
It may give us a better explanation for the windlass and the foremast and show a clear path of fracture in the cofferdam. Bulkhead 339 (no1 hold ford bulkhead) is pretty intact and bulkhead 341 (deep tank aft) is pretty intact. They are joined to their requisite parts.
I think she fractured under load on the surface and the forecastle head detached there. It is not damage due to sinking it happened on the surface.

regards
jimmy


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## Brian Locking

jimmys,
I would suggest that your last post and several peripheral posts from others seem to have lost direction.
Brian


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## K urgess

The size and allowable types for attachments is explained when you try to attach.
Attachments cannot be added in the "quick reply" window, only by using the "Post reply" green button.
Moderators are not capable of adding attachments of a greater size than members can attach.
If you can't do it then neither can we.


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## jmcg

Jimmys

Hope this works. Bow section jpeg. Not sure of its genesis - but worthy of consideration following post no. 500.

BW

J


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## Bill Davies

There is clearly a great interest in this tragic incident and I have just posted a sketch of the Access Hatch *here* which might help those who are not so conversant with some of the terms being used. I have posted the sketch on Shipping Accidents and have tried to illustrate some measures I took after a few near disasters in the mid 70s. I have indicated the modifications in red.
Initially, they where mere strengthening iwo the padlock clasps (C) to hinged 'strapping' (Brian) again to a chunky padlock (A) to a 'rolled steel bar supplementing the former (B). _I hope I have remembered correctly._
The modification were many and I found that each Chief Engineer was always eager to show his own ingenuity. That was the German mentality and I am thankful to have sailed with some excellent Chiefs from that part of the world.
Hope the sketch clarifies some arguements.

Bill


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## Brian Locking

Happy to see we are back on course. Doubtful if I could ever receive approval to do modifications like your illustrations although I would estimate it would tahe competent engineers a couple of hours to do. The Block loading diagram is particularly interesting and would concur with jmcg that this needs closer attention. So, it could be a combination of water ingress through the access hatch (initiating event), change of trim, additional weights through flooding of forward section, exacerbation of the Block loading?????????
Over to you Uncle Bill


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## chadburn

Your right B.L. you would NOT get permission to go and "just do" do the suggested "mod" of your own bat neither would the C.E., the Engineering Superintendent would need to approve it first as any mods of this sort come under his remit and that goes for most Foreign Companies as well unless it was a one off emergency situation, but it would appear that the "Mod" is a security mod rather than a Safety one.


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## muldonaich

chadburn said:


> Your right B.L. you would NOT get permission to go and "just do" do the suggested "mod" of your own bat neither would the C.E., the Engineering Superintendent would need to approve it first as any mods of this sort come under his remit and that goes for most Foreign Companies as well unless it was a one off emergency situation, but it would appear that the "Mod" is a security mod rather than a Safety one.


when i was on the seatrain ships the hatch into the bosuns store and up to the mooring deck then the one up to the focsle were all dogged by a centre wheel witch you spun round and locked in place inside or out with a bolt and nut once secured it was impossible to open without a couple of spanners the night aisafreighter got the mast torn out of the deck there was no ingress of water past the mooring deck all that went down the hawse pipes and the scuppers could all ships not be fitted with this type no disrespect bill but the one you drew is really just a big hasp and padlock it would serve the purpose but it would still let seawater in when the dogs jumped off kev.


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## Brian Locking

Chadburn,
Re your post #523. I would not agree that I am right. Perhaps we were in a system totally different than the FOC ships Bill sailed in when you were clearly left to your own resorces/devices which is evident in so many of Bills posts.
If you waited for Engineer Superintendants to make up their minds and approve everything where would you be?
Anyone with any experience of these ships knew you had ongoing maintenance. I am sure we did not seek approval from some 'joker' in head office to approve drilling and welding a developing crack.
I would say the modification was a good idea and may have saved many a Bulk Carriers from flooding. No matter what degree W/T integrity it is certainly better than letting the hatch 'spring open'.


----------



## muldonaich

Chouan said:


> "It is a sad fact of life, that so many bulkers were simply sold on and on and eventually to owners who put profit before people and money before maintainence."
> 
> Like Denholms, for example? Except that they were managers rather than owners. However, the condition of the Kona when I was on her was simply appalling, and if it wasn't for her flag and the nationality of her Officers, and the "good will" that the combination of the two created, there would have been no way that we could have survived the safety surveys that other ships needed to load at Sulom Voe, for example. She was a heap of sxxte, and only economic necessity drove me to sail on her, and, I suppose, some sort of loyalty to the flag.....


i sailed with denholms for thirty years i am not standing up for them but iwill say i sailed with some of the best deck officers eng officers and all other crew members some of the best old men in fact the present ch/eng on qm2 is ex denholm i sailed with him a great lad he was one of the team on the gas turbine ships i also sailed on warwick fort a disaster of a ship they had an italian engineer on her from day 1 but everybody just got stuck in and made the best of it in fact she was one of the happiest i was ever on dont think she ever did any more than ten knots biggest motor tanker in the world when she came out her and the fort st cathrine brgds kev.


----------



## Bill Davies

Muldonaich,

Doing nothing is never a defence when one knows their is a problem. 

I have said before that I experienced enough early in my command time and in these very ships in particular that they were difficult. The access hatch was just one. The illustration attempts to show one of the many ways we dealt with a known weakness. It worked. 

Consider 'dogging down' on leaving port and making fast the device. Even if the 'dogs' did 'spring' following some green water onslaught the 'mod' would ensure the lid did not lift more than a few mm more than in their fully dogged state and as such ingress would never be such to cause catastrophic flooding. It is a second line of defence. It might just save your life. It worked.

One thing I learned from D.K. Ludwig was _*'ACT and don't just think and talk about it'. *_


Bill


----------



## muldonaich

Bill Davies said:


> Muldonaich,
> 
> Doing nothing is never a defence when one knows their is a problem.
> 
> I have said before that I experienced enough early in my command time and in these very ships in particular that they were difficult. The access hatch was just one. The illustration attempts to show one of the many ways we dealt with a known weakness. It worked.
> 
> Consider 'dogging down' on leaving port and making fast the device. Even if the 'dogs' did 'spring' following some green water onslaught the 'mod' would ensure the lid did not lift more than a few mm more than in their fully dogged state and as such ingress would never be such to cause catastrophic flooding. It is a second line of defence. It might just save your life. It worked.
> 
> One thing I learned from D.K. Ludwig was _*'ACT and don't just think and talk about it'. *_
> 
> 
> Bill


hi bill thats what ive been doing all my life i think you will find mr ludwig had a saying that every merchant seaman remembers i was only pointing if the owners spent a little more money a lot of these things would never happen the type of booby hatch securing system i was talking about has been in exsistence for years they had it during ww1 so why in gods name could they not put it in the likes of these ships with no focslehead stop loading them the way you explained but sadly its money that talks not what you or i think bill rgds kev.


----------



## Bill Davies

muldonaich said:


> hi bill thats what ive been doing all my life i think you will find mr ludwig had a saying that every merchant seaman remembers i was only pointing if the owners spent a little more money a lot of these things would never happen the type of booby hatch securing system i was talking about has been in exsistence for years they had it during ww1 so why in gods name could they not put it in the likes of these ships with no focslehead stop loading them the way you explained but sadly its money that talks not what you or i think bill rgds kev.


Kev,
I totally agree with your last.
Bill


----------



## John Cassels

Morning Kevin , who is the cheng you are talking about that is now on QM2 ?.
If he is ex GTV , maybe I know him as well.


----------



## Brian Locking

Bill Davies said:


> Muldonaich,
> 
> Doing nothing is never a defence when one knows their is a problem.
> 
> One thing I learned from D.K. Ludwig was _*'ACT and don't just think and talk about it'. *_
> 
> 
> Bill


Bill,

I think most of us are like minded but we in British Flag did not get the back up/autonomy you seemed to have had.

It is heartening to hear the philosophy of perhaps the greatest shipowner of the last century but his British colleagues were not 'in the same boat' pardon the pun. 

British companies were from the 60s to their demise run by Engineers (following Accountants) who in the main exercised total control and just about found time to have a brief chat to the Master on the port visits. I think this is well illustrated in post #523. 

If we all translated what we talked about over a beer into Action then we could have saved lives as well as our jobs.(Cloud) (Cloud) 

Brian


----------



## Brian Locking

R651400 said:


> To put D K Ludwig in the same category as a long established and excellent British shipping company such as Shaw Savill and Albion is derisory.
> Unlike four-year old "Derbyshire," here's a shipowner whose second hand shipbuilding practices and crewing were as shady as the man himself.
> Pity Ludwig hadn't stuck by the quotes above then he wouldn't have lost four out of five of his Bulkpetrol class, not saying how many unfortunate crew members, mostly recruited from the poorer regions of the Carribean ie Cayman Islands.
> 
> http://www.t2tanker.org/ships/bulktrader.html


Your post which is clearly directed at me leaves me a little perplexed as it quotes another site member.

The post is all the more interesting in that Shaw Savill I know from experience and would not put them on any pedestal. I don't think it say's much for you to engage in character assassination of a man who was clearly at the top of his tree and acknowledged as being so by most mariners.

The purpose of our posts are to offer constructive dialogue which you are not keen to do judging by your previous on this thread.


----------



## Brian Locking

Does anyone have any knowledge of the dogging/securing arrangements of the cargo hatches on the 'Derbyshire'


----------



## K urgess

Brian,
I suggest you read some of the information available by Googling the subject and study the pictures of the hatch.
Also the court's conclusions regarding this matter after seeing the photographs and hearing evidence from a previous deck officer on the vessel.
Regards
Kris


----------



## muldonaich

*booby hatch*

as far asi can see on the foto it was just dogged down by ordinary dogs that had a habit of falling off in hit by a big sea compressing the seal it seems they used to have to tie the dogs to stop them doing this but when you see the foto the booby hatch has been ripped off we can all say what we like on the site only god knows what happened that nite nobody else kev.


----------



## jmcg

Brian

Just 8 wingnuts or "dogs" to some people. (English Bridge)

If the rope locker hatch was blown off by green seas as some people suggest this would not have contributed to the almost immediate consumation of the Derbyshire. She would have drawn water to the fore peak, her trim and going would have changed significantly and increased as she took on more. If all this was going on it seems rather odd to me that a vessel with all the latest electronic detection devices failed to warn the Bridge of the perilous situation developing.

Jimmys suggested that there could possibly have been a blackout (electrical) and of course this is feasable. But a blackout in itself would not lead to total destruction.

There remains three essential questions to be resolved; 1) why no distress signals, 2) why was she found 52 miles *North East *of the last reported message and, 3) why was the Bridge unaware of her deteriorating situation.

Remember, the bow section, save for surface damage - was intact. The other two main sections had destructed into hundreds of pieces. One post disaster simulation indicated that if flooding occurred in Nos 1&2 holds it would take at least four hours for her to lie perilously low in the water. As mentioned earlier a lot can be done with computers and simulators to arrive at any given "acceptable" result. That sort of analysis is not the type I have been accustomed to. 

Perhaps the Masters and Navigation Officers of S.Nostalgia can open up some robust debate on the 3 points above.

BW

John


----------



## muldonaich

John Cassels said:


> Morning Kevin , who is the cheng you are talking about that is now on QM2 ?.
> If he is ex GTV , maybe I know him as well.


hi john ronnie keir he was on eurofreighter with me i think he was 3rd then he was a real brainy guy but also a great laugh hope ive got his name right rgds kev.


----------



## Brian Locking

jmcg said:


> Brian
> 
> Just 8 wingnuts or "dogs" to some people. (English Bridge)
> 
> If the rope locker hatch was blown off by green seas as some people suggest this would not have contributed to the almost immediate consumation of the Derbyshire. She would have drawn water to the fore peak, her trim and going would have changed significantly and increased as she took on more. If all this was going on it seems rather odd to me that a vessel with all the latest electronic detection devices failed to warn the Bridge of the perilous situation developing.
> 
> [
> BW
> 
> John




_*Hence, SOLAS Chapter XII*_

Earlier, I was asking for the 'Dogging/Securing arrangement for the Cargo Hatches not the Access hatch which is well established. Were hydraulic cleats fitted?


Brian



Brian


----------



## muldonaich

Brian Locking said:


> _*Hence, SOLAS Chapter XII*_
> 
> Earlier, I was asking for the 'Dogging/Securing arrangement for the Cargo Hatches not the Access hatch which is well established. Were hydraulic cleats fitted?
> 
> 
> Brian
> 
> 
> 
> Brian


sorry brian i thought you meant the booby hatch i dont know what type of securing arrangement was on the main hatches someone who sailed on the sister ships might answer that kev.


----------



## combo

I was at Gravesend in 1980 when she sank, a letter arrived from the derbyshire the day we heard about her from a catering boy on his first trip.


----------



## jmcg

Muldonaich

Capt Ronnie Boyle was Master on E.B. when I was on her.

Brian. Cargo hatches had hydraulic securing cleats. Cannot recall whether these were Bridge or E.R. operated.

BW

J.


----------



## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> Muldonaich
> 
> Capt Ronnie Boyle was Master on E.B. when I was on her.
> 
> Brian. Cargo hatches had hydraulic securing cleats. Cannot recall whether these were Bridge or E.R. operated.
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


Cleats would be locally controlled from beside coaming.


----------



## Brian Locking

muldonaich said:


> sorry brian i thought you meant the booby hatch i dont know what type of securing arrangement was on the main hatches someone who sailed on the sister ships might answer that kev.


Kev,

That's OK. The Access Hatch details I was aware of and in any case well illustrated by Uncle Bill.
I would agree with John (JC). The cleating arrangements would have been locally controlled.

atb

Brian


----------



## muldonaich

John Cassels said:


> Cleats would be locally controlled from beside coaming.


thats right john they were on all hydraulic cleats i sailed with by the way did you know ronnie the 3rd rgds kev.


----------



## Brian Locking

This is becoming interesting as I do not think this element was considered in the enquiry. Does not distract from the initiating event of course.


----------



## jmcg

Brian Locking said:


> This is becoming interesting as I do not think this element was considered in the enquiry. Does not distract from the initiating event of course.


Brian

All will be revealed in 2010 if you visit Kew as I intend to do.

BW

J


----------



## Brian Locking

I might not be around
Brian


----------



## muldonaich

*hatches*

i was on two ships where the hydraulic locking devices walked back or slacked during the voyage we used to check them on a regular basis kev


----------



## Bill Davies

All,
The Hatch Cover securing seemed to be pretty standard and if similar to 'Marcona Pathfinder' (see Tonga's Post #323.....Furness Bridge) and a host of others.
Read my post #364 and consider the 'green water' effect of these questionable securing devices once the vessel has 'gone by the head' to such an extent that there is no resistance to the sea. She had no foc'sle to start with. The seas no longer impacts from above. They impact on the hatch coaming from the side and dissipate _*upwards*_. 
Nothing _'clever'_ above . Just common sense. Think about it.


----------



## muldonaich

dont follow you on this one bill no focsle down by the head hove to the seas would have been rolling aboard up the deck towards the accomadation breaking up against the ford end of the hatches as they came onboard rgds kev.


----------



## Bill Davies

muldonaich said:


> breaking up against the _*ford end of the hatches *_as they came onboard rgds kev.


_*Exactly!*_


----------



## jmcg

And then-----------

Rolled over to a point of no return......... to her final demise?

BW

J


----------



## Brian Locking

Bill,

Your premise, initiating cause, event tree, sits well with much of what I have read on the various websites wrt the break up (block loading?) etc.

Are there any ports where this loading is still practiced?

atb

Brian


----------



## gadfly

Gentlemen

You may have cracked it..............! ! ! 

Regards


----------



## Bill Davies

Brian Locking said:


> Bill,
> 
> Are there any ports where this loading is still practiced?
> 
> Brian


I don't think 'Alternate' or 'Block' Loading is practiced anymore. It would be most interesting to hear if this is not so.

Bill


----------



## John Cassels

Am afraid it is Bill. Alternate hold loading still common for discharge in
the ARA range.


----------



## Bill Davies

That does surprise me John. This can only be a commercial company directive and done in full agreement with the vessels master.


----------



## Brian Locking

JC/Bill

The following is a Cut & paste from the DNV website. There is a similar one on the IMO website.

*Alternate-hold loading ban for bulk carriers *

Most bulk carriers in the iron ore trade are designed to carry a full cargo in alternate holds (e.g. in holds 1-3-5-7-9) or in a block load condition (e.g. in holds 1-3-4-6-7-9). There are several reasons for designing a bulk carrier to be able to carry a full load of cargo in this manner. One reason is to raise the centre of gravity, thus making the vessel less “stiff” and more comfortable for the crew on ocean voyages. It can be shown, though, that loading in alternate holds, as compared to loading homogeneously in all holds, has very little effect on the vessel’s roll period. 
Alternate-hold loading is more commonly driven by a desire amongst charterers for a faster turnaround time at terminals. The general view is that bulk carriers can be loaded and discharged much more quickly if they are operating in the alternate-hold loading mode than if they are homogeneously loaded. It can be shown, though, that this may not always be the case. In fact, loading in alternate holds may require more shifts of the conveyor than when loading homogeneously. Still, in today’s iron ore market, it is very common, if there are two otherwise comparable bulk carriers, for the one that can carry a full load in the alternate-hold mode to obtain a premium compared to the one which must load the cargo homogeneously distributed. The pros and cons of the alternate/ block loading condition have been discussed since its invention. 
From a structural stress point of view, the alternate-hold loading condition is more demanding than the homogeneous one. Basically, the vessel’s hull girder strength is utilised 90–100% in the alternate hold loading condition, whereas homogeneous loading may only utilise some 50% of the bending strength and even down to 25% of the shear strength. Therefore, everything else being equal, the vessel has a substantial reserve strength when loaded homogeneously. 
DE 47 thus agreed to ban bulk carriers from sailing with any hold empty unless the structural requirements for new ships stated in SOLAS Chapter XII are complied with and the hold frames comply with IACS UR S12 Rev. 2.1 or the equivalent. The ban applies only to the full load condition, which is defined as “a draught corresponding to 90% of the ship’s deadweight at the relevant freeboard”. Finally, in order to avoid loopholes, the term “empty” is defined as “a hold loaded to less than 10% of the hold’s maximum allowable cargo weight”.


----------



## Bill Davies

Well Brian, I was of the opinion that legislation had been drawn up from IMO recommendations around 6 years ago. Things happen slowly in the marine world. It still does not absolve Masters who knowingly load in this manner and put their crews at risk.


----------



## Brian Locking

I haven't look too closely into it but I believe IACS have laid down certain requirements for Bulk Carriers to load in the Alternate Hold configuration. So what's new? I have always understood Bulk Carriers to be permitted to load alternate holds under certain conditions before and after the 'Derbyshire'.
This arrangement should be stopped!


----------



## John Cassels

Bill , Brian.

Just back from another trip to the good ol' UK ( 2nd wedding in 3 months) ,
so had not seen your comments.

Still having some connections in chartering circles - mostly Hamburg - have
been told that notwithstanding any sort of legislation , a great deal of
pressure is still being put on owners to load in alternate holds. This appears
to be mostly on the ore trade from the St.Lawrence to ARA.

Reading between the lines , I get the impression that recievers are the
pushing factor as the manpower ( and time factor) requirement for cleaning
gangs for all hold , extra shifts of bulldozers etc etc is eating into their
discharge rate.

On this note , the only positive side for the ship would be less grab and
bulldozer damage during discharge. This used to be a pet hate of mine both
when being mate and then ashore as owners ( or disponent owners ) rep.
Some of the damage caused caused by these large bulldozers was horrendous
and in many cases , needless.


----------



## Bill Davies

John,
Your post #562 does not rest easily with me as it is these commercial pressures on Ship's Masters that we can do without. Make no mistake it is compromising safety. I have said in other posts, I would refuse. Grab damage in a hold is not such a bad thing as long as it is repaired before departure. I would prefer to having damage spread between 9 holds rather that concentrated in 5.


----------



## John Cassels

Bill , notwithstanding your concern , it seems the practice still goes on.
You are quite correct in saying you would refuse to load alternate holds but
it seems that many ship's Masters nowadays do not share your ( perhaps I
should say OUR) concern . There may be other "inducements ", I just don't
know.

For once I feel I must disagree with you regarding damage. In my experience,
the most damage was caused by bulldozers and not grabs. Grabs could rarely get near sounding pipes, bilge covers , hold ladders.
Perhaps we should start a new thread on bulk carrier damages during 
unloading. In fact , how did we stray so far from the original Derbyshire
subject as we now seem to have gone to alternate hold loading and damages .


----------



## Bill Davies

John,

I don't think we have drifted at all. I firmly believe the alternate/block loading may have been instrumental in weakening the hull to such a degree that it played a part in the final outcome.

Brgds

Bill


----------



## muldonaich

i would agree with you on that one bill after speaking to another two mates and retired old man they think the same kev.


----------



## Brian Locking

Bill Davies said:


> John,
> 
> I don't think we have drifted at all. I firmly believe the alternate/block loading may have been instrumental in weakening the hull to such a degree that it played a part in the final outcome.
> 
> Brgds
> 
> Bill


Bill: I would agree with this annalysis. 

JC: Rather disconcerting to hear that this loading distribution is still practiced

atb

Brian


----------



## Brian Locking

John (JC),
Speaking to a Surveyor recently who confirms all you say about alternative / block loading still being practiced. Puts it down to age/experience of Masters and commercial pressures

Brian


----------



## Bill Davies

All,

Will we ever learn?

Bill


----------



## muldonaich

sadly bill its the same as all the wars being fought we never learn anything from them why i think its mans inhumanity to man that and religion kev.


----------



## John Cassels

Brian Locking said:


> John (JC),
> Speaking to a Surveyor recently who confirms all you say about alternative / block loading still being practiced. Puts it down to age/experience of Masters and commercial pressures
> 
> Brian


With perhaps the emphisis being put on "commercial pressures".

It must be very similar to the stresses induced in container ships - as I 
pointed out in the MSC Napoli thread - where stresses can go from min
to max and back again in a short space of time.
Do these cycles say 200 times a year over 10 years ............ and we
wonder why accidents happen !.


----------



## Bill Davies

John,

Commercial pressures have always been there. Ultimately, does the Master have the experience/training? I think not.

Bill


----------



## muldonaich

how many times did you refuse dk bill brgds kev.


----------



## Bill Davies

Kev,
Dan would never get involved at that level.

However, as I have said in the past one of the pleasures of working in a company like NBC was that you had complete autonomy. You sorted operational problems out there and then. Too many telegrams to NY were tantamount to handing in ones resignation. If you did make a mistake you not not re hired and you would get wind of this half way through your vacation.
Didn't suit many but it suited me. It was dollar related.

Brgds

Bill


----------



## muldonaich

Bill Davies said:


> Kev,
> Dan would never get involved at that level.
> 
> However, as I have said in the past one of the pleasures of working in a company like NBC was that you had complete autonomy. You sorted operational problems out there and then. Too many telegrams to NY were tantamount to handing in ones resignation. If you did make a mistake you not not re hired and you would get wind of this half way through your vacation.
> Didn't suit many but it suited me. It was dollar related.
> 
> Brgds
> 
> Bill


written on the back of it in god we trust that was another old saying bill pay me of in yankee dollars do you remember how that came aboutb rgds kev


----------



## Bill Davies

muldonaich said:


> written on the back of it in god we trust that was another old saying bill pay me of in yankee dollars do you remember how that came aboutb rgds kev


Kev,

There was a time when the US Dollar was _THE_ international currency. Now I'm not too sure.

Brg

Bill


----------



## muldonaich

i think its now the rupee bill lol kev.


----------



## Me45

Brian Locking said:


> What happened to this Frame 69 people were talking about for so long?


Frame 69 is still in one piece, when they EU funded expedition returned to the wreck they looked specifically for it and it was included in the photos in the inquiry


----------



## Me45

alastairrussell said:


> Gents
> 
> Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.
> 
> David Byrne


I would really like to know how do you know that it was about midnight

thanks


----------



## Me45

jmcg said:


> The initial 'report' was prepared by the DOT in 1985 and was circulated to "interested parties" . It was not for public consumption.
> 
> Nor was it placed where curious Members of Parliament might read it - in the Commons Library! My then MP, Sir Anthony Meyer, confirmed this in written correspondence.
> 
> That same "report" was subsequently *revised* in the light of *comments *received and of *further information *which became available. It was that "revised" report that ended up in the Commons Library on 21st March 1986.
> 
> One must wonder with great suspicion what these "comments and further informations" were and who provided them. I suspect not those with first hand experience of that type of vessel i.e. seagoing staff.
> 
> Is it not an irony that information that can be made available on requests on current events and current decisions is still withheld as a matter of course for similar events and similar decisions that happened almost 28 years ago.
> 
> J.


Liverpool's Merseyside Maritime Museum have a copy of this report as I understand they have all the information that was used to form the basis of the Hasting's Shipwreck & Coastal Heritage Centre mv Derbyshire exhibition


----------



## jmcg

Yes indeed they have- but it is the 'revised' report. I would suggest that the term revised is inappropriate. It should read "doctored".

On Wednesday let us all remember all 44 who perished in that terrible event - it will be 28 years to the day since she was lost.

When we visit this site on Wednesday for our daily fix of nostalgia let us pause for a moment, reflect and remember them all. 

Lost but never forgotten. RIP to all on board Derbyshire.

Sadly

J.


----------



## Brian Locking

Me45 said:


> Frame 69 is still in one piece, when they EU funded expedition returned to the wreck they looked specifically for it and it was included in the photos in the inquiry


_*Exactly!*_ The ITF funded expedition confirmed what most Mariners knew.
I am not too sure that the ITF themselves were happy as their whole purpose was to confirm what the DFA believed at the time.

Brian


----------



## alastairrussell

*'The time was about midnight'*

_ME 45 

David Byrne was an expert witness at the re-opened inquiry and he does mention in post No 33 in this thread “the time was about midnight”. 

I like his thinking and what he has written on the subject of the catastrophic failure of the Derbyshire. If he has made a wee mistake in his post, so what, surely the time of the sinking is not important, surely his findings based on his access to all the technical data carried out by other competent specialists is what matters. 

I myself would not have used words like “ *It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open*” and “*this was again proven in the inquiry*” in any shoreside accident investigation that I have carried out in the past. I would be putting my head on the block when put under cross examination in the witness stand in court. 

Regards 

Alastair_

*Derbyshire Hatch Covers *

________________________________________
I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss. 

After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.

After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwater video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:

1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cracking that had been much talked about.

2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was again proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).

3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as forward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.

4. Damage to the focsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).

Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.

As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.

The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.

David Byrne


----------



## Brandane62

I had just joined P&O's Ardmore on the west coast of Mexico at the time of the sinking of the Derbyshire.

Keith Underhill (son of the Derbyshires Captain) was one of the 2 third mates aboard the Ardmore, and had his wife with him on that trip. I remember them leaving the ship and flying home from Mexico; very sad time indeed.

Al.


----------



## Brian Locking

alastairrussell said:


> _ME 45
> 
> 
> I myself would not have used words like “ *It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open*” and “*this was again proven in the inquiry*” in any shoreside accident investigation that I have carried out in the past. I would be putting my head on the block when put under cross examination in the witness stand in court.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Alastair_
> 
> *Derbyshire Hatch Covers *
> 
> 
> 
> I do not think I am alone in thinking the statements above helped. People who use such language are usually putting up a smoke screen.


----------



## Me45

alastairrussell said:


> _ME 45
> 
> David Byrne was an expert witness at the re-opened inquiry and he does mention in post No 33 in this thread “the time was about midnight”.
> 
> If he has made a wee mistake in his post, so what, surely the time of the sinking is not important, surely his findings based on his access to all the technical data carried out by other competent specialists is what matters.
> 
> David Byrne_


_

Sorry did not mean to appear as if i was having a dig at him, just would really like to know what time she sank. 

I was told the American Navy were listening for noises in the Pacific in the early 80s and may have recorded the sound.

Thanks_


----------



## chadburn

Me45, I don't think S.O.S.U.S. was public knowledge at that time, it may well be that the Enquiry had inside information as to the actual time of sinking but covered it with the thread of "the time was about Midnight". I like people who are prepared to put their head on the block, at least you know where they stand, fence sitter's or as they use to be known "tricky dickies" are downright dangerous when incidents happen, that is why I liked everything down in writing so they could not change their story.


----------



## Me45

chadburn said:


> Me45, I don't think S.O.S.U.S. was public knowledge at that time, it may well be that the Enquiry had inside information as to the actual time of sinking but covered it with the statement of "around" Midnight.


I didn't think it was in the inquiry. 

I've always thought it was at 05:30 GMT or 06:30 BST but would love to find out

thanks


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## chadburn

Me45, I was just refering to D.B's post No 33 as posted by Alastair.


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## gadfly

Brian Locking said:


> _*Exactly!*_ The ITF funded expedition confirmed what most Mariners knew.
> I am not too sure that the ITF themselves were happy as their whole purpose was to confirm what the DFA believed at the time.
> 
> Brian


Apologies for this, but I am not quite sure of 'what most mariners knew' 

Grateful if you could explain

best regards 

Ronda


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## Brian Locking

Gadfly,
I am surprised you asked. I recall visiting a website re the trawler Gaul and you seem to be well informed about current thinking.
Brian


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## gadfly

There is a FOI request concerning the 2000 MV Derbyshire RFI on the following site:

http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mv_derbyshire


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## Blackbob

Hi There
I was on the Furnace Bridge for three horific spells, and during this time we had a lot of cracking in the way of frame 65. The Furnace Bridge was the first of this class and was built for a fixed price of 7.3 million, and the old saying that "You get what you pay for" is really true. This ship was an accident waiting to happen! She sailed on her trials with over three hundred ship yard workers on board and never managed to pass them!!
Finally the superintendant decided that it would be better to accept the ship and hope that ships staff would be able to sort it out.
Ask Leo about the Pakistany Hilton, as he was in the catering staff he will know all about feeding the 5000!
regards Bob (one of ten engineers and two lecys at that time)


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## chadburn

The problem with taking over a ship from the Builders is that there will alway's be a bit of "snagging" to do, I had a list of them for the "Super" to consider at the morning meeting, you could however alway's tell a piece of work done by a former seagoing man amongst the Yard workers as he had an appreciation of what it would be like to have to repair it at a later time and most probably at sea. The "Super" is under pressure from both Company and Builder to get the ship accepted (Builder) and to get the ship making money (Owner) and ships put to sea with "acceptable faults" to be rectified later. Aircraft fly today with "acceptable faults" until they get repaired at their main mtce facility unfortunatly there have been a number of occasions where an "acceptable fault" has turned into a major fault which has caused an accident (like the Manchester aircraft fire). As far as large OBO's are concerned people forget that at the time when they were built the increase in size was all new thinking and an unknown area for most Designers/Builders worldwide and in most cases these ships were really built to operate in specific area's (designated by the Owner) where the wave pitch/ Port dredged depth were a major consideration in regards to supported length and method of loading which is why alternate loading was and still is an acceptable practice, if it wasn't it would be banned surely if it was a known to be the cause of ship/lives lost? Unfortunatly these "unknown area" have cost lives and ships from Builders worldwide but of course the same thing applied to the Comet aircraft. In regards 300 men on board during Trials? you must be joking those lads at the Yard were on piecework and making a fortune they could not afford to go on Trials as they might have to send their Mk1 Lotus Cortina's back!!


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## chadburn

Blackbob, Subject to my previous comments I did make further enquiries with a chap I still see now and again who once worked at the Furness yard, although he is not 100% sure he has a vague recollection that the large OBO's (being so big) could not drydock on the Tyne and had to either go to Belfast or Rotterdam for pre-handover drydocking, one vessel was behind schedule when the drydock was booked and a fair number (his words) of workers had to go there to finish it off, as to whether she was towed or ran on her own main he could not say.


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## Me45

thobshropshire said:


> The list on Merseyside Maritime Museums site is alphabetical by surname with rank stated after the surname.
> Royal Alfred Waller was the R/O on the Derbyshire at time of her loss.
> He is listed on the Maritime museums site but has not been given any rank.
> Post 249 also lists him as R/O.
> Regards


This had been an oversight by the Maritime museums which they have now amended 

http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/maritime/exhibitions/derbyshire/crewandfamilies.asp


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## gadfly

*MV Derbyshire website*

A new blog concerning the MV Derbyshire investigations can now be visited at the following link: http://mv-derbyshire.blogspot.com/


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## Bill Davies

Gadfly,
Please explain your agenda. If it is not the 'Gaul' it is the 'Derbyshire'. But nothing constructive!
I would welcome debate.


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## John Cassels

to supported length and method of loading which is why alternate loading was and still is an acceptable practice, if it wasn't it would be banned surely if it was a known to be the cause of ship/lives lost? Unfortunatly these "unknown area" have cost lives and ships from Builders worldwide but of course the same thing applied to the Comet aircraft. In regards 
Unquote"

Acceptable practice ?? .......... by who ?.


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## NoR

I believe that part of the problem with the Comet was that BOAC wanted square windows which lead to cracking at the corners a la hatch corners. The comet 1 as designed had round or oval ports.


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## chadburn

NoR, you are right it was indeed the square windows that was the cause of the Comet loss, the comparison I was making was that the design of the Comet was a "new era" in aircraft design/construction and unfortunatly it cost lives to get the design right. In my view the situation in regards to the "up"sizing of O.B.O,s in the 50's/60,s was no different, shipbuilders all over the World (not just the Furness Yard) were confronted with a set of design/construction problems which they had not come across before and unfortunatly as with a lot of developement work they have also cost and are still costing lives, now it's more to do with the age of the vessels rather than the construction methods used.

John, in regards to loading, from what I have previously read the practice of alternate loading is still going on and you have asked me the question as to who is finding it an acceptable practice? You know as well as I there are only two people who can influence the decision as to whether a ship puts to sea. One is the C/E who feels the ship is not mechanicly/elect sound and the other person is the Master who has the ultimate responsibility as to whether the ship casts off, It is his decision as to whether to accept the loading plan or not and like the C/E on another forum he can always pack his grip and walk. If the practice is as you say still going on then it is the MASTER who is finding this type of loading acceptable and is risking the ship and it's crew he is the man who shouts "let go for'ad, let go aft"


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## gadfly

Bill Davies said:


> Gadfly,
> Please explain your agenda. If it is not the 'Gaul' it is the 'Derbyshire'. But nothing constructive!
> I would welcome debate.


Dear Mr Davies

Thank you for your comments.

I am sorry if my comments about the Gaul and the Derbyshire tragedies are tiresome for you. 

You call them 'not constructive'; what would you consider to be constructive? 

I would be happy to debate truly constructive issues about these two tragedies on SN or either of these two websites:

http://mv-derbyshire.blogspot.com/
http://the-trawler-gaul.blogspot.com/

regards

Gadfly


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## Bill Davies

Gadfly,
These tragic incidents are not 'tiresome' as I was too close to the 'Derbyshire' for it not to have effected me. I have more experience of commanding this class of ship than most. However, you occasionally make a post and disappear when members discuss the issues. You have been asked by others (moderators) on the site to clarify your motives.


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## ROBERT HENDERSON

GADFLY
I have followed the comments regardinng the loss of the Derbyshire with great interest, never having had experience on that type of ship, I have refrained from making comments. Looking at the various posters profiles it is easy to see where their expertise come from until I come to yours.

Regards Robert


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## chadburn

J.C. can I ask you a question? who, where and when was it decided that alternate loading was NOT an acceptable practice and is there any legislation laid down regarding that decision.


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## Pat Hughes

chadburn said:


> You know as well as I there are *only two people *who can influence the decision as to whether a ship puts to sea. One is the C/E who feels the ship is not mechanicly/elect sound and the other person is the Master who has the ultimate responsibility as to whether the ship casts off, It is his decision as to whether to accept the loading plan or not and like the C/E on another forum he can always pack his grip and walk. If the practice is as you say still going on then it is the MASTER who is finding this type of loading acceptable and is risking the ship and it's crew he is the man who shouts "let go for'ad, let go aft"


I think you are trying to re-write history. The master's decision, and ONLY the Master's decision, prevails at all times with the Guidance advice of heads of department. I always found the C/E always wanted parity until the BIG question arrived and then they would say 'You're the Master'


----------



## chadburn

Not strictly True Pat, I have never heard of a Master make THE decision and pack his grip and do the walk because they were not happy, but I know plenty of C/E's who have (as mentioned on another forum) and there is a reason for it, an Engineer will always be an Engineer afloat or ashore where as a Master can quickly be turned into a Geography Teacher with the loss of status it brings, Like a lot of Lads who were interested in ships from a very early age I learnt to navigate and steer a ship ( stood on one of those Canadian Apple Crates where the apples were individually wrapped in blue tissue paper, do you remember?). When I broached the subject with my Father about going to sea as a D/O he said those immortal words "Get a Trade Behind You forget about the Deck there is nothing ashore for them if things get bad.


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## Pat Hughes

Chadburn,

Do I sense an Oil and water complex running through your posts.
There is a flip side to the coin when we go down this street and the obvious reply is that Deck people can change bearings and drill out cylinder head studs. You only have to be shown.
The ultimate decision on any ship rests with and only with the Master. 


Re: question to JC.....take a look at the IACS web site re Alternate Hold Loading


----------



## jimmys

The Master of a vessel can make all the decisions he likes, individual certificated officers are always in control as to whether they carry out these decisions.

A vessel I was Chief Engineer on in Liverpool was about to sail. The Master had made his decision. I then made my decision. The vessel in its condition was not sailing with me on it. The Superintendent appeared, there was some discussion. The result was, would I move the vessel into Canada dock and then leave. I did this. I then signed off and was repatriated to Glasgow.

There was absolutely no problems. Everyone makes his own decisions. The "Golden Rule" not happy don't sail.

I did not have a problem with the Master, a decent man but as well as being in the pay of the company he was in the pocket of the company. It was dangerous.

regards
jimmy


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## Pat Hughes

Jimmys,

Sounds like an amicable resolution. I doubt it was BF boat, you don't sound that old.


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## jimmys

No Pat it was not a Blue Flue boat it was an agency job, a small bulker.

The DB. fuel tanks were contaminated and we were shovelling sh*t from the purifier on a daily basis to get a clean tank of diesel for the engines. I think they were buying cheap Marine Diesel Oil (MDO). As you know it should have 10% heavy oil in the diesel, I think it had a lot more. I had sent samples ashore but no answers.

Mid 1980's some of the British flag was not very good. The Old Man was under pressure, not much changed!!!

regards
jimmy


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## Chouan

chadburn said:


> *an Engineer will always be an Engineer afloat or ashore where as a Master can quickly be turned into a Geography Teacher with the loss of status it brings,* Like a lot of Lads who were interested in ships from a very early age I learnt to navigate and steer a ship ( stood on one of those Canadian Apple Crates where the apples were individually wrapped in blue tissue paper, do you remember?). When I broached the subject with my Father about going to sea as a D/O he said those immortal words "Get a Trade Behind You forget about the Deck there is nothing ashore for them if things get bad.


How quickly? 
Four years until you've got the bit of paper, another year until you done your NQT or probationary year. That is if you're good enough to get the degree, and get a good enough degree to get accepted in a decent school of education, and then be good enough to do the PGCE and be good enough a teacher to get through the NQT year (currently there is a 40% failure rate of NQTs). Then all you've got to do is find a long-term job.


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## M29

Gentlemen
perhaps we can get back to the "Derbyshire".
When I sailed in "Atlantic Bridge" we loaded ore in Headland Australia in alternate holds (1,3,5,7,9) This was then apparantly quite normal and indeed everyone on board considered that these ships were built deliberately with the necessary strength.
Our next cargo was open mine coal from USA to Europe. This being lighter was loaded in all holds. This particular series of ships was built in Japan and they were considerably smaller than those of the "Derbyshire" class. As someone said before, there is no such thing as a "Bridge Class"
"Atlantic Bridge", "Pacific Bridge" and others were bulk carriers, whereas "Derbyshire" was an OBO and considerbly bigger. 
When I sailed on "English Bridge" which was a close relative to "Derbyshire" alternate loading was still considered as normal, I can still recall conversations on the subject in the ships bar and the absolute confidence in the ships build but bare in mind she was brand new at the time.
One episode I can remember whilst we were still in the shipyard. The small crane midway up the deck was to be tested and certified. A steel container was filled with a load of scrap metal (5 tons I think) and then the crane attempted to lift this of the dockside. The crane worked ok and picked up the load, however, the deck were it was fitted started to bend and buckle! A hurried modification had to be made!

I can confirm what was said earlier about carrying many workers away on trials. On the maidens of "English Bridge", we spent over a week at sea with a couple of hundred workers, plus all the future ships officers, shipping company supers, reps from the major companies that had supplied euipment and a number of surveyors including Lloyds.
My cabin had three technicians living in it, one each from Decca, Marconi and Redifon. I was camping on a bunk bed in the Radio room.
External caterers were feeding everyone as our own catering people were only on board as observers.
We sailed over to Rotterdam to have pipe lagging completed where the ship was finally handed over to the Owners.

Best Wishes
Alan


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## Chouan

"indeed everyone on board considered that these ships were built deliberately with the necessary strength."

Considered, or assumed? I was only a lowly 2/O on the Kona/Sir John Hunter but the faults were plain to see. Faults in design, I mean. Fortunately, we only carried oil during my time onboard.


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## Pat Hughes

M29 said:


> whereas "Derbyshire" was an OBO


I thought 'Derbyshire' was Ore/Oil as there is a difference.

Been on several as Ch.Off. Never in command. Loaded alternate holds but always uneasy. Noticed the ongoing shipboard maintainence increase whilst carrying in this mode and subsequent trips. I believe those of us of any experience knew the alternate hold loading was unsafe.


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## M29

Pat Hughes said:


> I thought 'Derbyshire' was Ore/Oil as there is a difference.
> 
> Been on several as Ch.Off. Never in command. Loaded alternate holds but always uneasy. Noticed the ongoing shipboard maintainence increase whilst carrying in this mode and subsequent trips. I believe those of us of any experience knew the alternate hold loading was unsafe.


Hi Pat
In Bibby's we called them OBO's which I believe stood for Oil/Bulk/Ore.
I assume the "Bulk" refered to bulk cargoes generally rather than Ore in particular but am ready to be corrected.

Regards
Alan


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## Pat Hughes

Alan,
There is a subtle difference.
OBOs (Ore Bulk Ore) were combination carriers built on the standard Bulk carrier template. That is Top Side Tanks (TSTks) and Double Bottom Tanks (DBTks). These tanks carried water ballast ONLY. The cargo space (the hold) was available for Ore, Grain or Oil.
Ore/Oil carriers cross section was somewhat different. Here the cargo hold had Ballast tanks either side and beneath the hold as a deep DB (raise the GM).
When employed in the carriage of Oil the ship was loaded uniformly (or homogenously as some people say). That is dry cargo hold and ballast tanks. When loaded with Ore the ballast tanks were of course empty and this is where the problem started as the ballast tanks were often sealed (hopefully) but not always gas freed. Risks were extremely high when huge grabs (Redcar) were intent on destroying the ship.


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## jmcg

M29

Re; 613 & 616

It was voyage 3 or possibly 4 that I sailed (one trip) on English Bridge. We joined her in Europort. The previous compliment had "got out" and had disappeared before we got aboard. Such was her reputation. The sequence was affirmed following our trip - we all got out and had left before the new compliment arrived. On our arrival from Ras Tanura Derek Bibby boarded and was left in no doubt about his vessel - certainly from the engineering department.

I understand that it was impossible to get a crew from Liverpool to sail her - such was the intensity of her failings in all departments. She was subsequently crewed from the International Pool in Rotterdam.

In three voyages I doubt very much that she had degenerated to a floating wreck to have created the above situation. They were cheap, nasty and unsafe ships. Nothing will convince me otherwise.


Yes they were known as OBO's - oil, bulk or ore carriers. 

Much has been wriitten on this site and elsewhere about this class of vessel, and in particular the ill fated and tragic loss of the compliment of Derbyshire. Most of the postings are from well educated, experienced and professional seafarers, who like yourself, had first hand experience of the class -whether that be in the "yard" or at sea.

Unfortunately, their contributions or offerings were not considered "pursausive" or worthy during the inquiries. I wonder why.

I await my intended visit to Kew in 2010.

BW

J


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## Chouan

But she wasn't an OBO, as has been pointed out above, I sailed on enough to know the difference. She was an Ore/Oil carrier. The difference has been explained. But, you are entirely right when you say "_In three voyages I doubt very much that she had degenerated to a floating wreck to have created the above situation. They were cheap, nasty and unsafe ships._
They were, in every sense.


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## jmcg

Chouan said:


> But she wasn't an OBO, as has been pointed out above, I sailed on enough to know the difference. She was an Ore/Oil carrier. The difference has been explained. But, you are entirely right when you say "_In three voyages I doubt very much that she had degenerated to a floating wreck to have created the above situation. They were cheap, nasty and unsafe ships._
> They were, in every sense.


English Bridge lifted coal cargo from Richards Bay - does that not make her an OBO carrier?

BW

J


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## Me45

Pat Hughes said:


> I thought 'Derbyshire' was Ore/Oil as there is a difference.


The Derbyshire carried Ore Bulk and Oil, as she carried a cargo of tapioca in 1979. Not the same refined tapioca in little packets sold in supermarket, but animal feed.


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## Bill Davies

There seems to be a lack of basic understanding in what constitutes an OBO and an O/O carrier. Pat Hughes #617 describes the difference well enough. Subsequent posts are confused.


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## chadburn

What I am trying to get to the bottom of is that there is information on this site that is saying that alternate loading is still being carried out and of course there is information saying it is dangerous practice and should not be carried out. The Question is "Why are Masters taking ships to sea with what is considered by some to be a dangerous practice? or is it that the "experts" on this Site are out of kilter with what is going on in today's shipping world. As I said in my piece the Master does have the ultimate decision, however It would be very odd for a Master to go against the C/E who declared that the ship was not in a fit state to put to sea.

"Department Heads" very similiar I suspect to "Talking Heads". Not a term I have heard on Cargo Boats so I am assuming it comes from Ferries or Liners, it was a far more relaxed approach when I was at sea it was not required for us to sit at a conference table with the Master in his best Barathea pulling rank we all understood our role's and got on with them.

Some of the Comments show a lack of understanding as to what was going on in British Shipbuilding at the time these vessels were built, British yards were struggling to obtain work because of Japanese Yards having subsidies and as I have indicated before the Japanese build quality was not better than British but because of the subsidies the ships were cheaper and Shipping companies encouraged a bidding war the outcome was no different then than it is now " You gets What You Pay For" so perhaps we are looking 
at the wrong people (Shipbuilders) and should look to the Shipowners in the blame game.


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## James_C

Geordie Chief,
You can't just dismiss the work of the Shipbuilders straight off the bat. You talk of responsibility over safety, well surely you would agree that if British Shipbuilders thought they were building a sub-standard ship for the price required then they'd refuse to do so?
Money wasn't the only issue, the fact is that as much as the design may have been poor, the build *quality* was just as bad. Poor workmanship simply because those in the yard simply can't be bothered to do a proper job is inexcuseable.
The shipbuilders MUST have known the quality of ship they were producing. Would they have really thought they could hope to gain further orders by producing tat? The fact of life is that many previously loyal British owners went to foreign yards not only due to money, but because of ships being delivered ridiculously late and built to a poor standard. 
What was going on in Japan in the 60s was lightyears ahead of what was happening in European yards, and contrary to popular belief they were producing some pretty decent ships, on time, to contract price and which worked straight out the box.
The UK had the chance to position itself as a Country which built premium ships for premium prices, i.e. Cruise ships and other specialised vessels. 
We didn't due to a combination of bad management, workforce indifference and primarily the age old British excuse - "but we've always done it this way, so we're not interested".


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## M29

Pat Hughes said:


> Alan,
> There is a subtle difference.
> OBOs (Ore Bulk Ore) were combination carriers built on the standard Bulk carrier template. That is Top Side Tanks (TSTks) and Double Bottom Tanks (DBTks). These tanks carried water ballast ONLY. The cargo space (the hold) was available for Ore, Grain or Oil.
> Ore/Oil carriers cross section was somewhat different. Here the cargo hold had Ballast tanks either side and beneath the hold as a deep DB (raise the GM).
> When employed in the carriage of Oil the ship was loaded uniformly (or homogenously as some people say). That is dry cargo hold and ballast tanks. When loaded with Ore the ballast tanks were of course empty and this is where the problem started as the ballast tanks were often sealed (hopefully) but not always gas freed. Risks were extremely high when huge grabs (Redcar) were intent on destroying the ship.


Pat
Thanks for the explanation which clarifies nicely and I'm afraid points to Derbyshire being an OBO. Her cross section fits your first description in that she had upper wing tanks with a sort of self trimming hold shape. On English Bridge maiden voyage, she came close to turning over in Rastanura when for some reason they started by loading the upper wing tanks first, causing an enormous list to occur very quickly. Fortunately, our OM realised what was happening and rushed into the cargo control room to stop the loading. 
Bibby Line being originally a cargo/liner company, had very few experienced tanker men. On English Bridge, we only had the 1st/Ch Officers, Master and pump man who were truly time served tanker men. Bibby Line literature and various websites refer to Derbyshire as an OBO but perhaps the definition is not clearly understood and "OBO" is a general term used for all these large ships.

Regards
Alan


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## gadfly

James_C said:


> Geordie Chief,
> ....................................Poor workmanship simply because those in the yard simply can't be bothered to do a proper job is inexcuseable.
> ........................... Would they have really thought they could hope to gain further orders by producing tat? The fact of life is that many previously loyal British owners went to foreign yards not only due to money, but because of ships being delivered ridiculously late and built to a poor standard.
> What was going on in Japan in the 60s was lightyears ahead of what was happening in European yards, and contrary to popular belief they were producing some pretty decent ships, on time, to contract price and which worked straight out the box.
> The UK had the chance to position itself as a Country which built premium ships for premium prices, i.e. Cruise ships and other specialised vessels.
> We didn't due to a combination of bad management, workforce indifference and primarily the age old British excuse - "but we've always done it this way, so we're not interested".


A realistic assessment of what actually happened in the late 60s and early 70s in British yards - the beginning of the end for British Shipbuilding

Best regards

Gadfly


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## John Cassels

Alan ; on yr last post , you say that on the English Bridge at RasTan they
"started loading the top wing tanks first ".

Are you sure ..........?


----------



## Pat Hughes

Amazing!!!!!


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## M29

John Cassels said:


> Alan ; on yr last post , you say that on the English Bridge at RasTan they
> "started loading the top wing tanks first ".
> 
> Are you sure ..........?


John
Absolutely. Most of us Bibby men didn't take any notice as of course cargo ships list quite a lot one way or another during loading. The old man stopped the loading and found that the tanks were being filled in the wrong order. I am not sure why it happened but the valves were all automatic controlled from the cargo control room. So could have been a misunderstanding, or a fault but we were told afterwards that we had come close to disaster. I expect that if any of my colleagues from that voyage are reading this, they could confirm the incident and maybe give more detail as to what went wrong, however, I doubt it was ever recorded officially!

regards
Alan


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## Pat Hughes

Alan,
With the greatest respect I do not think you have the difference in ships straight in your mind.


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## M29

Pat Hughes said:


> Alan,
> With the greatest respect I do not think you have the difference in ships straight in your mind.


Pat
perhaps I didn,t make myself clear. I meant that Bibby Line were originally all cargo/liner ships and so most of us were familiar with ships listing during loading, so we took not much notice when English Bridge commenced listing fairly rapidly. It was after the situation was sorted, that we learned how serious it could have been.

Regards 
Alan


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## jimmys

I am not a chartered naval architect but I am a fully trained hull surveyor. That means I can carry out the work of a Naval Architect concerning constuction , certification and repairs. I don't do design of ships.

I was under the impression OBO's were a grouping of ships with a number of different designs within this grouping. On reading some of these posting I thought I was wrong.

I obtained a reference book by the eminent Naval Architect E.A.Stokoe who was active in the 1960 designs when this grouping of ships was developed. He states the homogeneous loading ore/oil carrier where oil can be loaded in the ore space, wing tanks and DB. is an OBO. I have inspected these type of ships and they were designated OBO's.

He also states the alternative design, the version where the wing and DB tanks held ballast only is an OBO. I have seen these type of ships and they were designated OBO's.

There is a design with hoppers and a design with a restricted space in the hold for ore, they are also designated OBO,s.

The grouping OBO contains different designs.

Mr. Stokoe also states quite clearly alternate hold loading can be used to restrict the hold space when carrying ore and the vessel can be designed for this. Whether they were or not is debatable.

regards
jimmy


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## Pat Hughes

Jimmys,
I too am not a Naval Architect but am a fully trained Master Mariner. That means I am conversant with the operation of these ships under discussion.

When practical men are talking about combination carriers (which is what these ships are) it is important not to tag them all with the same name as they are quite different operationally speaking. I would consider OBOs relatively pleasurable to sail on whereas Ore/Oil carriers are I believe dangerous for the reasons outlined which I hope you picked up on.


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## Ozzie

Interested in this debate as it waxes and wains from one subject to another..including inevitably "oil and water" but after all lets not forget the poor souls that were lost on this ship....who, if truth were told, probably and thankfully did not know much about it at the end, in that I understand she suffered hatch failure at No.1 during the night and virtually went straight down...occupational hazard etc for all of us who sailed on bulkies...we've all sailed in huge seas and had confidence in the ship....but then again we had to didnt we....many bulkies have suffered similar fates
..But regarding the alternate hatch loading argument, this has been the subject of debate with many experts and my understanding of the SOLAS regulations is that there is no blanket ban on such loading..the regulation states that only ships of 10 years of age and over, and then only if the ship does not measure up to the flooding of one hold arrangements as per SOLAS, shall not sail with any hold to less than 10% of the maximum cargo weight of that hold. That to me is not a complete ban on alternate hatch loading....more a comment on the state of bulk carriers after they have been in heavy service for 10 years and maybe not getting the maintenance they should from the owners.
Rgds (Thumb)


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## Chouan

Ozzie said:


> Interested in this debate as it waxes and wains from one subject to another..including inevitably "oil and water" QUOTE]
> 
> "Gentlemen
> perhaps we can get back to the "Derbyshire"."
> 
> Quite, but there is a sense of belittling other peoples' qualifications, backgrounds and departments creeping in, whatever they may be, which the thread can well do without.


----------



## Ozzie

Chouan ..couldnt agree more
Thanks
Rgds(Thumb)


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## jimmys

Yes Pat I did notice your reasoning in the carriage of oil and ore concerning the grabs. I would not even consider allowing grabs into a centre tank when the adjacent tanks had not been cleaned and gas freed. Any crack can transmit a spark ignition.
It is a desperately unsafe practice, surely no one was operating in this manner.
These specifics are important especially as we had FO bunkers ford in the Derbyshire.

You may like to note this is nothing to do with oil and water it is operation and background debate to the Derbyshire. I have been fully trained to carry out the duties of a Nautical Surveyor as well although I do not like to state this as it upsets the Deck Officers. I did not sail ships as a deck officer as I did not design ships as a naval architect. I do not try to be either. There was reasons for this level of training for the Engineers in the old DoT, but I dont want to go into that.

The fact of problems loading crude oil in a Swan Hunter vessel is not knew. In a Swans VLCC in Ras Tanura in the early 1970's we did not know whether the valves were open or shut, the Whessoes were like bags of knitting and the only way to know what was in the tanks was to have a man at every one to ullage. Thats what we did until the Mate and the engineers got the valves in control. It was one open all open for a while. Nothing that happens in a Swans ship surprises me. I had a lot off it. It was regular.


regards
jimmy


----------



## Chouan

"You may like to note this is nothing to do with oil and water it is operation and background debate to the Derbyshire. I have been fully trained to carry out the duties of a Nautical Surveyor as well _*although I do not like to state this as it upsets the Deck Officers."*_

And you say that your comments have nothing to do with oil and water? Look at the highlighted area and reflect on your intent, your meaning and how it might be taken. Is it that you can't help trying to rub them up the wrong way? Consider how much better your statement could be received, with no loss of meaning, without that comment at the end.


----------



## Bill Davies

jimmys said:


> You may like to note this is nothing to do with oil and water it is operation and background debate to the Derbyshire. I have been fully trained to carry out the duties of a Nautical Surveyor as well although I do not like to state this as it upsets the Deck Officers. I did not sail ships as a deck officer as I did not design ships as a naval architect. I do not try to be either. There was reasons for this level of training for the Engineers in the old DoT, but I dont want to go into that.
> 
> jimmy


Jimmy,
Would you please try and focus on the debate. We are talking about the 'Derbyshire'. I say to you with the greatest of respect that nobody cares about your training or whether you are Chartered or anything else for that matter. Let us keep our eye on the ball. We have people on this site who have sailed in this class of ship and have valuable input.


----------



## jimmys

Bill,

With respect,I note the number of times you have sailed on the Derbyshire, it was a British flag vessel. You should maybe lay out you experience since you left Blue Funnel of this sort of vessel under the British flag. In fact any British Flag vessel. You just put up a few sails and its OK. Your ships seem to have no relevence to any I have seen. You dont have problems???

I do not agree with your statements alternate hold loading had any factor in the Derbyshire accident.

The facts coming out of a lack of experience among the crews may have had a serious consequence along with bunkers forward and the very serious subsequent problem of water mixing in this tank. Any experienced Master would have brought this forward.

regards
jimmy


----------



## jimmys

Chouan,

These facts upset deck officers I cant help that, they are fact. I cant change them.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Bill Davies

jimmys said:


> Bill,
> 
> With respect,I note the number of times you have sailed on the Derbyshire, it was a British flag vessel. You should maybe lay out you experience since you left Blue Funnel of this sort of vessel under the British flag. In fact any British Flag vessel. You just put up a few sails and its OK. Your ships seem to have no relevence to any I have seen. You dont have problems???
> 
> I do not agree with your statements alternate hold loading had any factor in the Derbyshire accident.
> 
> The facts coming out of a lack of experience among the crews may have had a serious consequence along with* bunkers forward and the very serious subsequent problem of water mixing in this tank. Any experienced Master would have brought this forward.*
> regards
> jimmy


I cannot believe some of your statements such as the one I have highlighted above.


----------



## muldonaich

Bill Davies said:


> I cannot believe some of your statements such as the one I have highlighted above.


hi bill this thread is becoming like an irish paliament or prime ministers question time everyone at loggerheads with each other could we try and keep oil and water out of it and get back to what caused the derbyshire to sink i think we need a few more masters and chief engineers to join this debate no disrespect to anyone but stop bickering kev.


----------



## Me45

jimmys said:


> Bill,
> I do not agree with your statements alternate hold loading had any factor in the Derbyshire accident.
> The facts coming out of a lack of experience among the crews may have had a serious consequence along with bunkers forward and the very serious subsequent problem of water mixing in this tank.
> jimmy


 I'm a little confused about the various threads to do with the loadings.

Are the various threads *similar *to Jimmy's quoted above trying to blame the mate the crew for the loss of the mv Derbyshire?? 

Or is it just because I'm not a qualified chartered person... that I've loss the context of the thread


----------



## Bill Davies

muldonaich said:


> hi bill this thread is becoming like an irish paliament or prime ministers question time everyone at loggerheads with each other could we try and keep oil and water out of it and get back to what caused the derbyshire to sink i think we need a few more masters and chief engineers to join this debate no disrespect to anyone but stop bickering kev.


Kev,
Quite agree. Very difficult to keep this thread on line. Digressions, ego's and 'red herrings' galore.


----------



## gadfly

muldonaich said:


> ..........could we try and keep oil and water out of it and get back to what caused the derbyshire to sink i think we need a few more masters and chief engineers to join this debate ...........


Hi, 

I am also a little confused as to what is going on in this thread

It appears to me that there is a general dissatisfaction with the results of the Derbyshire formal investigation and that there are a significant number of SN members who have differing views as to the cause of this vessel's loss.

Would it be possible to identify and list these points of contention - we would then be able to engage in a 'constructive' discussion on the actual causes of the loss.

regards

Gadfly


----------



## benjidog

Definitely a case of "more heat than light" in this thread of late - which is a pity. Some interesting points were raised earlier on but nothing much of value seems to have been added recently and the bickering is frankly boring. 

Like a number of other contributors, I hope we can either get back to seeing if anything new or meaningful can be added to the debate or let it drop. 

However you are free to carry on bickering if you wish - there is no intention to close the debate by the Moderators.


----------



## Pat Hughes

jimmys said:


> You may like to note this is nothing to do with oil and water it is operation and background debate to the Derbyshire. I have been fully trained to carry out the duties of a Nautical Surveyor as well although I do not like to state this as it upsets the Deck Officers. I did not sail ships as a deck officer as I did not design ships as a naval architect. I do not try to be either. There was reasons for this level of training for the Engineers in the old DoT, *but I dont want to go into that.*
> jimmy


jimmy,

Where are we going with this. Concentrate!!!!! We are talking 'Derbyshire'

Pat


----------



## Bill Davies

gadfly said:


> Hi,
> 
> I am also a little confused as to what is going on in this thread
> 
> It appears to me that there is a general dissatisfaction with the results of the Derbyshire formal investigation and that there are a significant number of SN members who have differing views as to the cause of this vessel's loss.
> 
> Would it be possible to identify and list these points of contention - we would then be able to engage in a 'constructive' discussion on the actual causes of the loss.
> 
> regards
> 
> Gadfly



Gadfly,
There is nothing at all confusing going on in this thread save those who wish to confuse. I am not in any way saying you are instrumental.

Step back a little and look at the posts prior to your post #555.

There seems to be an unwillingness by some to accept certain possibilities to the Loss of the 'Derbyshire'. I have tried to give a very rational arguement for my belief in the Loss. Others have tried to introduce differential and integral calculus and similar 'smoke screens' to make up for lack of experience in these vessels rather than debate the loss in a reasonable manner.
I have said it before and I say it again. I was too close to this incident for me to take things lightly.

Regards

Bill Davies


----------



## ROBERT HENDERSON

I often wondered exactly what the truth of the Derbyshire loss actually was.
Not having sailed in those type of ships I am not qualified to enter into this debate, I was however very interested in some of the postings, especially regarding the cargo configuration. Unfortunately of late this has resolved into a slanging match with nothing constuctive being added. When somebody has to enthrall us with their superior qualifications I am always dubious as to theit actual knowledge.
As one of our greates engineers (Isamabad Kigdom Brunel) one said at an inquiry; ''A thimble full of experience, is woth a bucketfull of paper qualifications.''

Regards Robert


----------



## Bill Davies

PS: I was Master on many of this class. And yes, none were British flag. Not that that should make a difference.

_*And I thought Coronation Street was exciting tonight*_!!!!!


----------



## Chouan

jimmys said:


> Chouan,
> 
> These facts upset deck officers I cant help that, they are fact. I cant change them.
> 
> regards
> jimmy


All I'm suggesting is that you look at your comments on the Derbyshire debate. Do your remarks about Deck Officers add or detract to the debate?


----------



## peter3807

All of us serving at sea at the time of the loss of the Derbyshire were affected to some degree and our thoughts were with those lost and their families. Many of us followed with interest the subsequent enquiries and press speculation by experts with varying levels of expertise. I was under the impression that the eventual discovery of the Derbyshire and the evidence gathered had finally put the matter to rest. I don't dispute the wealth of experience from those who served on those ships and that they were a nightmare to work on and there were concerns about the quality of construction. My understanding is that the Colman judgement had put the matter to rest and negated crew negligence and the failure of the infamous frame 65. 
nds.coi.gov.uk
On 17th December 1998, Mr Prescott ordered that the Formal Investigation into the loss of the MV Derbyshire be reheard in full in the High Court. The Court sat for a total of fifty-four days starting on the 5th April 2000 and concluded its oral hearings on the 26th July 2000. 3. In the report published today, Mr Justice Colman finds that the ship sank through progressive collapse of the main hatch covers following significant flooding of some bow spaces through broken ventilators and air pipes located on the foredeck as a result of prolonged exposure to the sea states generated by Typhoon Orchid. He concludes that the officers and crew of the vessel were in no way to blame for the vessel''s loss and specifically rejects any suggestion that the bosun''s stores hatch on the foredeck was left unsecured by the crew. 4. While Mr Justice Colman is critical of the construction of the vessel at frame 65 he concludes that this did not contribute to the actual loss of the vessel and presented a very low additional safety risk to those on board. 5. Mr Justice Colman makes a total of 24 safety recommendations addressed to the Department, Lloyds Register of Shipping, the International Association of Classification Societies and the International Maritime Organisation. Following consultation with others to whom these recommendations have been addressed, the Department will submit a report to Parliament on how these recommendations are to be taken forward.

Peter


----------



## steve goldswain

i was on leave second week of four from the lincolnshire when i got a telegram to fly out to japan for the derbyshire i knocked it back talk about decisions we make in life


----------



## Bill Davies

To all contributors to this thread.

Can we leave the unpleasantness of yesterday and progress this thread in a professional manner. This thread had/has the potential of being the most interesting and informative on the site. Let's not let it degenerate into another BFR. 

Bill


----------



## muldonaich

Bill Davies said:


> To all contributors to this thread.
> 
> Can we leave the unpleasantness of yesterday and progress this thread in a professional manner. This thread had/has the potential of being the most interesting and informative on the site. Let's not let it degenerate into another BFR.
> 
> Bill


thank you for that bill it was getting out of hand it is a very interesting thread kev.


----------



## Mike S

First and foremost I have never sailed on large bulk carriers. I have sailed on small (by modern standards) bulkers such as Gerringong, Mittagong and Wollongong on the Australian coast many years ago as 2nd mate. 
Gerringong was interesting in the context of this discussion in that she was built to the new rules with a lower freeboard and higher hatch coamings. She was also built with 9 hatches and loaded iron ore in 1,3,5,7,9, and used all hatches when carrying coke. At 21000 tons dead-weight she was but a pup in comparison to the ill fated Derbyshire.
I have sailed loaded bulk carriers out of Port Hedland that were up to the size of Derbyshire.
Firstly my impressions of the bulkers I sailed on was that they were wet, stiff uncomfortable vessels and seemed to be nothing more than large ocean going barges that fought the seas rather than moving with them.
I have to say that the final report as referred to in Peter 3807's post makes the most sense and in fact answers the questions. It beggars belief that it has taken nearly 30 years to reach this stage.
Let us hope that it does not take as long to build the required scantlings into new tonnage and above all at least build the things with a decent f'csl and strong hatch covers.
I am left with the uneasy feeling that ships like the Derbyshire were an accident looking for a place to happen even allowing for the wisdom of 20/20 hindsight.


----------



## Pat Hughes

Bill Davies said:


> To all contributors to this thread.
> 
> Can we leave the unpleasantness of yesterday and progress this thread in a professional manner. This thread had/has the potential of being the most interesting and informative on the site. Let's not let it degenerate into another BFR.
> 
> Bill


Well said!


----------



## jmcg

Can anyone offer a possible explanation as to why she was finally located 52 nautical miles North East of her last reported messaged position? The last message indicated that she was "hove to". Making some way at 2 knots (my estimate) this would suggest a 24 hour passage from her last message point to her final resting. Against a typhoon!!

Was a 24 hour radio silence the norm in such conditions. 

Why did she fracture in 3 sections.

Consider the Christinaki - much later I know and not the same type.

I agree that we need more input from Masters, Deck Officers, Engineers and AB's who served on these classes (irrespective of flag) if we are ever to counter (allbeit belatedly) the perverse findings of the inquiries.

BW

J


----------



## peter3807

BW
I appreciate your point of view but the enquiry by Lord Justice Colman can not by any means be described as perverse. The evidence gathered after the discovery of the Derbyshire was put before the enquiry. Taking into account that evidence and that of those who testified at the enquiry Colman delivered a judgement which gives a clear and logical explanation for the loss. Many theories were put forward by so called experts, all of which were discredited by the enquiry. Speculation about the position and condition of the vessel after sinking are well explained in the judgement.

Peter.


----------



## K urgess

Cant remember if this link has been posted before.
http://www.nautinst.org/PDF/bulkCarrierSafety/mgn0210.pdf


----------



## steve goldswain

did the last voyage on the westminster bridge before she was sold joined her in rotterdam-pepple west africa japan port headland japan then back to rotterdam if i had relized how dangerous the bulkers were i wouldnt have touched it whith a barge pole


----------



## Bill Davies

jmcg said:


> Why did she fracture in 3 sections.
> 
> 
> BW
> 
> J


John,

My view on the initiating event and subsequent event tree are well known to those who have followed the thread.

I believe the way she was loaded (Alternate/Block) may well be a factor in the way she was weakened to such a degree that this contributed to the final loss.

Bill


----------



## jmcg

Bill Davies said:


> John,
> 
> My view on the initiating event and subsequent event tree are well known to those who have followed the thread.
> 
> I believe the way she was loaded (Alternate/Block) may well be a factor in the way she was weakened to such a degree that this contributed to the final loss.
> 
> Bill


Yes Bill - there is merit in this. She *was *weakened. The pattern of loading over her lifetime and the ***ulative effect of such loading no doubt was a contributory factor in her demise.

Had prior warnings not been heeded? Or were they hoping it would never happen?

BW

J


----------



## jmcg

Re posting # 663

It is the period following her last message coupled with the distance travelled *after* that troubles me. 

J.


----------



## K urgess

Does anyone know what method was used to fix position?
I find nothing odd in the final position being so far out even with the satellite equipment available at that time and given the conditions they were experiencing.


----------



## jimmys

I am not familiar with the system for these enquiries in England but I would assume it to be very similar to Scotland where:-

A judge will be appointed and he will not have the least idea about shipping, we call him the Beak. He will almost certainly be a political appointment.

To sit beside him will be a supposed expert, he will come from the beloved MCA. We call him the Beak's Lackey. What he lacks we do not know yet.
The lackey will in all matters of expert witnesses etc. influence the Beak.
The lackey will be observed by his boss who sits in the court body and holds the slippery pole.

We need to find out who was sitting beside Lord Colman.

It will be something like this in England. Can we have a name???

regards
jimmy


----------



## Bill Davies

jmcg said:


> Yes Bill - there is merit in this. She *was *weakened. The pattern of loading over her lifetime and the ***ulative effect of such loading no doubt was a contributory factor in her demise.
> 
> Had prior warnings not been heeded? Or were they hoping it would never happen?
> 
> BW
> 
> J


The Alternatate/Block loading had been well discussed.

Another consideration to be discussed is the enormous forces generated at these loading terminal (Sepitiba, Tubarao etc) which exceeded 15k/hr.

Putting it very simply were the dynamics (moments of inertia) of this weight being deposited on the top of a cone ever truly considered. 

What we have is a problem of POINT loading.! 

Those of you have been on these ships will have experience of ships vibrating strangely throughout loading process.

It was always with Iron Ore!


----------



## K urgess

R651400 said:


> GTZM-S... If Loran was fitted and used by GULK and assuming due to typhoon conditions sungun sightings were not possible, from my own Loran experience, there would be a high degree of accuracy in noon positions.
> JMCG... It beggar's belief that perhaps Jimmys' posting 640, if I read correctly has a point, ie the possibility Derbyshire's fuel oil became contaminated resulting in a complete breakdown and drift in 85 mph winds. I'm sure had that been the case there would have been further radio traffic to verify this.


*This* map puts her on the edge of Loran coverage for the Japan area. The position given for the wreck (25° 30′ 0″ N, 130° 30′ 0″ E) puts her roughly 270Km southeast of Okinawa. (paste the position into Google Earth)
I'd like to know if she was carrying Loran. In my experience a lot of companies only fitted it if it was going to be used a lot. Some even only fitted Loran if the ship was going to the States and did the same with Decca Navigator only on the UK coast.


----------



## Blackal

I've only skimmed through this thread I'm afraid - and got bogged down in the "qualification contest" a while back.

So - here's a kind of anecdotal story:

While at sea between October 79 and May 80, I worked with an engineer who had a brother who was a welder with Swan Hunters. This engineer told me then, that his brother related tales of filling welds in longitudinals on ships at SH. 

and Derbyshire was lost in September 1980?

Sure - there are coincidences in life............... but it convinced me.

Al


----------



## Bill Davies

Blackal said:


> So - here's a kind of anecdotal story:
> 
> While at sea between October 79 and May 80, I worked with an engineer who had a brother who was a welder with Swan Hunters. This engineer told me then, that his brother related tales of filling welds in longitudinals on ships at SH.
> 
> and Derbyshire was lost in September 1980?
> 
> Al


Stories abound regarding what went on in shipyards and I am sure all shipyards were guilty of one thing or another in the pursuit of profit. However, I think it safe to say that anything the builders of the 'Derbyshire' did was not directly linked to the loss. Lawyers would declare 'remoteness and throw up some caselaw like the 'Wagon Mound'


----------



## jasmacpm

*Higher Powers?*



Blackal said:


> I've only skimmed through this thread I'm afraid - and got bogged down in the "qualification contest" a while back.
> 
> So - here's a kind of anecdotal story:
> 
> While at sea between October 79 and May 80, I worked with an engineer who had a brother who was a welder with Swan Hunters. This engineer told me then, that his brother related tales of filling welds in longitudinals on ships at SH.
> 
> and Derbyshire was lost in September 1980?
> 
> Sure - there are coincidences in life............... but it convinced me.
> 
> Al


Here we have an interesting (possibly totally wide of the mark) anecdote, relating to a major process in the construction of a ship which sank. I believe it has been determined that broken pipes/vents may have been a causative factor. presumably welding was part of their construction, yet, how quickly it is dismissed as meaningless by another, who is able to determine 'it safe to say that anything the builders of the 'Derbyshire' did, was not directly linked to the loss' but the method of loading may well have contributed to the final loss. 

Are we in the presence of higher powers? 

In the interests of 'progress' with this thread, should we of less/mimimal/no experience and qualifications just keep our fingers off the keyboard?


----------



## muldonaich

jasmacpm said:


> Here we have an interesting (possibly totally wide of the mark) anecdote, relating to a major process in the construction of a ship which sank. I believe it has been determined that broken pipes/vents may have been a causative factor. presumably welding was part of their construction, yet, how quickly it is dismissed as meaningless by another, who is able to determine 'it safe to say that anything the builders of the 'Derbyshire' did, was not directly linked to the loss' but the method of loading may well have contributed to the final loss.
> 
> Are we in the presence of higher powers?
> 
> In the interests of 'progress' with this thread, should we of less/mimimal/no experience and qualifications just keep our fingers off the keyboard?


as ive said before in this thread only god knows what happened that night all we are doing here is trying to hopefully stop it happening again but sadly its has a few times but nobody seems to care thats the sad part of it all out of sight out of mind kev.


----------



## Blackal

Bill Davies said:


> Stories abound regarding what went on in shipyards and I am sure all shipyards were guilty of one thing or another in the pursuit of profit. However, I think it safe to say that anything the builders of the 'Derbyshire' did was not directly linked to the loss. Lawyers would declare 'remoteness and throw up some caselaw like the 'Wagon Mound'


Well, apart from pre-qualifying my post, that it was anecdotal - let's not forget that this is not a courtroom - this is an internet forum where opinions abound and are to be expected/encouraged.

I *don't* think that it is "safe" to say that the builders had nothing to do with the loss of the Derbyshire - I think it is unproven.

Al


----------



## Pat Hughes

Blackal said:


> I've only skimmed through this thread I'm afraid - and got bogged down in the "qualification contest" a while back.
> 
> So - here's a kind of anecdotal story:
> 
> While at sea between October 79 and May 80, I worked with an engineer who had a brother who was a welder with Swan Hunters. This engineer told me then, that his brother related tales of filling welds in longitudinals on ships at SH.
> 
> and Derbyshire was lost in September 1980?
> 
> Sure - there are coincidences in life............... but it convinced me.
> 
> Al


This practice of using a welding rod for the second run was not something that happened at SH alone. There were Japanese yards alleged to have been involved in this practice. As for Lawyers, you are right Bill, they are best left right out of it. Let's get back on course.

Pat


----------



## Blackal

Pat Hughes said:


> This practice of using a welding rod for the second run was not something that happened at SH alone. There were Japanese yards alleged to have been involved in this practice. As for Lawyers, you are right Bill, they are best left right out of it. Let's get back on course.
> 
> Pat


You are absolutely correct..............

But - I don't remember discussing any of the "bridge" ships at the time, but it sure sticks in my mind that I had the discussion/heard the story before the Derbyshire went down.

I'm going to have a trawl through the inquiry findings to get more aquainted with the presented facts, but if you feel that I have dragged the thread "off-course", then what is left? Let's close the thread with a print-out of the official findings? 

I'm begining to see why this thread got into the "one-upmanship" for a while.

Al


----------



## Bill Davies

Blackal,
Apart from one or two recent digressions I believe that the thread has been quite constructive. We are all discussing events around the time of the dreadful loss.


----------



## Blackal

Bill Davies said:


> Blackal,
> Apart from one or two recent digressions I believe that the thread has been quite constructive. We are all discussing events around the time of the dreadful loss.


Many apologies - It won't happen again.


----------



## gadfly

Blackal said:


> I *don't* think that it is "safe" to say that the builders had nothing to do with the loss of the Derbyshire - I think it is unproven.
> 
> Al


Blackal, I would agree with your comments. Apart from matters associated with the constructional faults at bulkhead 65, the court of inquiry did not investigate workmanship and other constructional/design issues in depth.

e.g. We know the design was deficient, but was there also a latent fault in the hatch covers of no 1 cargo hold! 

regards

Gadfly


----------



## Bill Davies

gadfly said:


> *We know *the design was deficient, but was there also *a latent fault in the hatch covers of no 1 cargo hold! *regards
> 
> Gadfly



Please expand so that we may all share this knowledge!!


----------



## jasmacpm

*Did I miss something?*



Blackal said:


> You are absolutely correct..............
> 
> But - I don't remember discussing any of the "bridge" ships at the time, but it sure sticks in my mind that I had the discussion/heard the story before the Derbyshire went down.
> 
> I'm going to have a trawl through the inquiry findings to get more aquainted with the presented facts, but if you feel that I have dragged the thread "off-course", then what is left? Let's close the thread with a print-out of the official findings?
> 
> I'm begining to see why this thread got into the "one-upmanship" for a while.
> 
> Al



Hi, where did you mention the lawyers which are best left out of it? Must have missed it.

Jimmy.


----------



## Pat Hughes

jasmacpm said:


> Hi, where did you mention the lawyers which are best left out of it? Must have missed it.
> 
> Jimmy.


He didn't! I did. Read all the posts as it does help.[=P]


----------



## chadburn

Thank You Ozzie, you have answered my question in your 634.


----------



## Me45

Bill Davies said:


> John,
> 
> I believe the way she was loaded (Alternate/Block) may well be a factor in the way she was weakened to such a degree that this contributed to the final loss.
> 
> Bill


Are you saying: 

(a) the mate and the crew responsible for the loading of the ship are responsible for the loss of the mv Derbyshire??

OR
(b) a 4 year old ship that had been laid up and not always carried iron ore had been weakened by carrying iron ore in the loading pattern

OR
(c) the knowledge gained in the last 28 years has changed the loading patterns of iron ore. As NO research had been undertaken of ships carrying Iron Ore until the second FI did this mean that the methods used in the 1970s and 1980s etc where thought to be correct at the time and it is only with hindsight that the loading patterns were found to be unsafe/unstable


----------



## chadburn

Me45 said:


> Are you saying:
> 
> (a) the mate and the crew responsible for the loading of the ship are responsible for the loss of the mv Derbyshire??
> 
> OR
> (b) a 4 year old ship that had been laid up and not always carried iron ore had been weakened by carrying iron ore in the loading pattern
> 
> OR
> (c) the knowledge gained in the last 28 years has changed the loading patterns of iron ore. As NO research had been undertaken of ships carrying Iron Ore until the second FI did this mean that the methods used in the 1970s and 1980s etc where thought to be correct at the time and it is only with hindsight that the loading patterns were found to be unsafe/unstable



Well put Me45, there does appear to be a lot of "experience comments" which are purely based on hindsight rather than the situation at the time which was that the size and construction methods of these vessels was a new experience for every body as was their loading pattern which was usually determined by the conditions/facilities at the Port of Discharge which was in my case was always the Botlek (1960's)


----------



## John Cassels

Chief , "as was the loading pattern which was usually determined by the
conditions/facilities at the port of discharge which was in my case always
the Botlek ( 1960's)............

Can you pls explain , you've lost me' !.


----------



## Pat Hughes

John Cassels said:


> Chief , "as was the loading pattern which was usually determined by the
> conditions/facilities at the port of discharge which was in my case always
> the Botlek ( 1960's)............
> 
> Can you pls explain , you've lost me' !.


John,

You are not on your own. 

Pat


----------



## Pat Hughes

There seems to be several posts above where the author's have not read the thread completely. Almost as though there is a need to offload their on thoughts at the sake of continuity. This is an important thread and needs to be treated as so. I have difficulty following the lines of random thought.


----------



## chadburn

Dredged depth of discharging Port at high tide. The building of O.B.O,s was a fine balance between strength and cargo carrying capability, there is no doubt that in certain area's of the construction they were found to be weak but that was only found out after a period of use rather than in a test tank beforehand.


----------



## Pat Hughes

chadburn said:


> Dredged depth of discharging Port


Very good Charburn! that detemines arrival draft. 
Nothing to do with *their loading pattern which was usually determined by the conditions/facilities at the Port of Discharge which was in my case was always the Botlek (1960's) loading pattern/configuration*


----------



## chadburn

As we always dropped at the Botlek our cargo package pattern never changed (from Narvik) as far as I remember which led me to believe that the discharge Port determined it for some reason, we always had two gantries offloading at the same time could that be the reason?


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## Pat Hughes

Randon thought supported by experience of the topic under consideration is OK. But some of the thoughts have no legs!


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## jmcg

We know she had laboured under the conditions she had experienced. She had been "hove to".

We know her last reported (radioed) position.

We know that her last message did not indicate voyage specific structural or other damage.

Her last message did not indicate a requirement for assistance. 

She was found 52 miles NE of her last reported messaged position. That fact indicates that she made way. We do not know what way she made - was it at 2 knots,5 knots or 12 knots. See posting #629 for my analysis.

Did she get sufficiently far ahead of the typhoon? Ans. I believe she did-her final resting position suggests that she did.

If so was she damaged as a result of passing through? 

If the answer to the above was affirmative would not the known damage be such to warrant a further message to owners. 

If so why was it not messaged? 

If we could only establish a time/distance matrix to include last messaged position to her final resting position we might then be able to establish (with a little more research of weather etc) exactly what conditions she encountered and what the conditions were at the time of her demise. 

I believe the Derbyshire was wholly consumed within seconds - not hours and minutes as some have written. Hours and minutes would have allowed time to react i.e. distress call. There was no reaction from an experienced Master and crew.

The postings on this thread have, in the main, been constructive and informative. Hopefully,we all have a positive contribution to make and I for one do not intend to patronise any Master,Chief Engineer or Sparks. 

I offer the above for further consideration and debate.

BW

J.

Clarification: wholly consumed - perhaps an unfortunate phrase. What I meant was wholly consumed in 3 sections.


----------



## chadburn

Pat Hughes said:


> Randon thought supported by experience of the topic under consideration is OK. But some of the thoughts have no legs!


Unfortunatly I have to base my recollections on trying to remember my reasons for thinking that way on memories 40yrs ago (not on hindsight as per Me45 (c)) and what I thought were those reasons, as a 4th eng and on a new ship at the time I would never dream of questioning the Skippers/Mates loading logic, my job was to ensure that the Ballast Control System (which was in the Engineroom) was working upon command.

Having been aboard the same O.B.O. when it had a major structural failure at sea I speak from experience and I have to agree with Jmcg that it all must have happened very quickly on the "Derbyshire", we were very lucky to get away with it as it also happened very quickly, given the conditions the "Derbyshire" was encountering we would not have done so. 

Has anybody else suffered a structural failure on one of these vessel's and what happened?


----------



## Pat Hughes

chadburn said:


> Unfortunatly I have to base my recollections on trying to remember my reasons for thinking that way on _*memories 40yrs ago (not on hindsight)*_ and what I thought were those reasons, as a 4th eng and on a new ship at the time I would never dream of questioning the Skippers/Mates loading logic, my job was to ensure that the Ballast Control System (which was in the Engineroom) was working upon command.
> 
> Having been aboard the same O.B.O. when it had a major structural failure at sea _*I speak from experience *_and I have to agree with Jmcg that it all must have happened very quickly on the "Derbyshire", we were very lucky to get away with it as it also happened very quickly, given the conditions the "Derbyshire" was encountering we would not have done so.
> 
> Has anybody else suffered a structural failure on one of these vessel's and what happened?


You do not seem to be able to answer a question without the 'snide' little dig.


----------



## chadburn

I am afraid it's not a "snide dig" it's just a fact, the crews on this size/ type of vessel 40yrs ago were in effect Pioneers and people like yourself learnt off their backs. Now tell me have you experienced a major failure similiar to the unfortunate "Derbyshire" or the "Har Addir" or have you just read about them.


----------



## Ian

Pat Hughes said:


> You do not seem to be able to answer a question without the 'snide' little dig.


Oh God... Do grow up!! Get over it....pleeeeaaase!!!!


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## Pat Hughes

Your post #693 speaks volumes of your own experience!


----------



## K urgess

jmcg
Having had another look at the published positions as in #663 above and the position of the wreck from two seperate sources, I have plotted them on Google earth and find that the distance measured between the last noon position and the wreck position is 167 miles almost due west using the Google Earth distance device.
25°19 N 133°11 E is the last noon position and the wreck position is given as 25°30'N 130°30'E. A "distance" of 2°41' to the west with a little northing.

It would be more interesting to know if the navigators among us consider the last two noon positions transmitted as being Dead Reckoning. The plotted positions appear as if too much wind effect has been allowed. The Daitō Islands are between the two positions but too far away for a radar fix in the appalling conditions they were experiencing.


----------



## John Cassels

Chief ; It would be nice if you would pls elaborate on your post #687.
What are you trying to say ? , you've still lost me.


----------



## gadfly

Gentlemen,

Our MV Derbyshire site: http://mv-derbyshire.blogspot.com/ was updated yesterday.

regards,

gadfly2


----------



## jasmacpm

*Good advice*



Pat Hughes said:


> He didn't! I did. Read all the posts as it does help.[=P]


Thanks for advice, Pat. Couple of points, however.
Have read most, if not all posts.
I was more than aware who mentioned 'lawyers.' Have a look back and read that series of posts, 'as it does help' ..... If it doesn't, there's no point in me explaining.




Jimmy.


----------



## non descript

*Please heed the advice...*

Whilst the thread may be interesting to some, and we are not here to either stop or censor reasonable discussion, the Moderators are becoming increasingly upset at the way the thread lurches towards personal attacks. Such activity is not only wholly contrary to the ethos of Ships Nostalgia, but extremely sad for those who have cause to remember this tragedy for reasons that they may not wish to share.

As has already been stated very eloquently in an earlier posting, but is without doubt worth repeating here - please do remember that there may be relatives or friends of the deceased belonging to this site or maybe viewing these posts as non-members, and you are sincerely asked to word your posts accordingly and with due respect and consideration.

Please think before you embark on a posting that is nothing more than a point-scoring exercise that does nothing but embarrass us all.

Mark (on behalf of the Moderating Team)


----------



## benjidog

May I add that I am in contact with a member of this site who is indeed a relative of one of those lost. This person is very interested in the discussion, but I am sure must be bemused by some of the content of posts.


----------



## Pat Hughes

*Lawyers*



jasmacpm said:


> Thanks for advice, Pat. Couple of points, however.
> Have read most, if not all posts.
> I was more than aware who mentioned 'lawyers.' Have a look back and read that series of posts, 'as it does help' ..... If it doesn't, there's no point in me explaining.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jimmy.


In response to yours with due cognizance to previous two posts. Any mention of Lawyers by anyone implied that they should be left out of our discussions. I would go along with that.


----------



## Ian

benjidog said:


> ... but I am sure must be bemused by some of the content of posts.


I think many of us are bemused too. This thread is now in its third year and many of us have followed it since John Rogers' first post, not because of any expertise we have (I certainly don't) but because as ex-seafarers we have an intense interest in the fate of the Derbyshire and all aboard her.

A bit of robust debate is to be welcomed but the failure or refusal of mature men who have held positions of great responsibility to accept that others may have a different viewpoint is "disappointing". This intolerance then leads to some of the nasty, internecine sniping that has been witnessed and causes embarrassment and, on occasion, great frustration. My posting #700 was the result of such frustration and, with hindsight, would have been better left unposted.

There has been the odd occasion on this thread (and others) that have given me a strong suspicion, no more than that, that clones live out there. Same views (nothing unusual in that in itself) but the same writing style, the same way of expressing those views etc.... different name. Perish the thought...


----------



## Ian

Pat Hughes

Be a good chap and don't bother me with PM's. Anything you may have to say about this is best said in public.


----------



## Chouan

Marconi Sahib said:


> jmcg
> Having had another look at the published positions as in #663 above and the position of the wreck from two seperate sources, I have plotted them on Google earth and find that the distance measured between the last noon position and the wreck position is 167 miles almost due west using the Google Earth distance device.
> 25°19 N 133°11 E is the last noon position and the wreck position is given as 25°30'N 130°30'E. A "distance" of 2°41' to the west with a little northing.
> 
> It would be more interesting to know if the navigators among us consider the last two noon positions transmitted as being Dead Reckoning. The plotted positions appear as if too much wind effect has been allowed. The Daitō Islands are between the two positions but too far away for a radar fix in the appalling conditions they were experiencing.


Given the lack of electronic Nav Aids at the time, it would have had to have been DR.

Having been on an OBO in in N.Pacific that didn't suffer catastrophic failure, but which was nearly overwhelmed by the height of the sea (I'm sure that if we'd been carrying a non-buoyant cargo, such as iron ore we would have been ) as I mentioned earlier in this thread. We hadn't experienced anything prior to that that would have caused us to send out a distress signal of any kind, and if we had been overwhelmed, we certainly wouldn't have had time to do so afterwards! Based on that experience, I'm sure that the end for the "Derbyshire" came very quickly indeed. My assumption is that the bows went into the big sea, the damage described above occurred, and that she never recovered, and kept on going down.

The stories of substandard (infilling with rods)welding have come from too many different sources for them to be non-contributory, as far as I'm concerned. A lad I knew before I was even out of my Cadetship told me about it, not specifying the ship, but he worked at Haverton Hill at the right time. He was pleased with himself for making so much money so easily! If, however, it was so commonplace, I can't see that it couldn't haver contributed to the weakness of the structure. We, I certainly, don't know where the substandard welding was done. I would guess it was done at night, when supervision was at its most minimal, so it could have been anywhere in the ships' structure, and I say "ships'" deliberately, as I'm sure that the substandard welding was common to all of them. This does not preclude the hatches being weak, through substandard welding, or the foc'sle fittings being badly welded or fitted, just because they are on the deck. If they were welded at night they were more likely to have been "infilled" than if they were welded during the day.


----------



## jimmys

I have never been in the Haverton yard but I did attend the Tyne yard in 1971 at a vessel, a VLCC launched that year.I personally observed the welding in that yard at various times and a lot of it was not satisfactory. Both dayshift and nightshift. I was on the same vessel in 1973 and she was failing, the cause was faulty welding. I personally observed this. The vessel had failed by January 1974, she was not loadable. I was taken off leave and sent to an advanced welding procedures, practice and inspection techniques course along with other senior engineers associated with the vessel at upper Clyde shipyards. We took her into Verholmes Drydock. We commenced to inspect, condemn and take out complete butt welds. Hundreds of metres of them, it was unbelievable. I was Second Engineer on the nightshift. All I did was welding, we had a huge shoreside squad. The cargo valves were gone as well and they were all out. The hydraulics were gone as well. Spares came by lorry load.
Anyone who says the building problems did not influence the vessels life should not be involved in shipping.
She failed completely in 1981. The building problems were still influencing her. I stood and watched them influence her as she went to scrap. I was C/Eng.

regards
jimmy


----------



## muldonaich

maybe the truth is starting to come out at long last thank you for posting that jimmy


----------



## Chouan

R651400 said:


> Chouan, without looking at any previous postings, if there was anything even remotely pointing at the truth in your speculations above and I was a member or any way involved with the DFA, I'd be looking towards turning over the RFI and going for another hearing.


Can I assume you're referring to my wondering about where in the ships' structure the substandard welding was done when you say "speculations"?


----------



## Me45

jmcg said:


> Why did she fracture in 3 sections.


She didn't fracture, but imploded and is in over 2,000 pieces. The mv Derbyshire was the first ship found that had imploded. 

It has been described like blowing up a paper bag and then hitting it, causing it to implode (Jester) see I try to do technical LOL (Jester) 

This link to the video on you tube has been posted before on post 76, but I've added it here again to save you scrolling back (it took me ages to find it (==D) )

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0


----------



## jimmys

If in any structure under water there is water filling the structure and water around the structure, irregardless of depth it will not implode.
Water is not compressible, it is a law of thermodynamics.

If a stucture does implode it will not spread. Pockets of in a air in a hatch may cause collapses. The hatch is not airtight its vented.

A nuke sub may implode due to depth its airtight.It would be squeezed flat.

Welding:-

It was not possible to completely repair the vessel I was involved in but rewelding was in the high stress areas.The good welds would arrest cracks and they did. It got a few years out of it but she was still breaking all the way through.
I think a lot of people are not coming to terms with the scale of the problem in these ships.
You do not need a dive to the bottom to break up.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Chouan

R651400 said:


> Negative, I actually meant the welding malpractice scenario you referred to. If they are actually true I would be a very unhappy person in this knowledge if I was connected in any way to Derbyshire. Perhaps I should have used the word "stories" you referred to hearing.


By using "stories" are you implying that I, and the other people on this thread who have reported them are making them up, or that the people who told us are making them up? The bloke who told me, told me because he was impressed with himself for getting one over on his employer, by making more money on overtime for his piecework. I didn't hear it from a friend of a friend who'd heard it from somebody else. It was first hand. The other "story" I heard was told to me by my brother, now a Marine Superintendant, who'd similarly heard it direct from a welder who, similarly, was impressed by how easily he was making money on piecework by infilling his welding by welding over welding rods. My brother told me. I only heard the second "story" much later, which corroborated the first. I only recalled the first recently when I was reading this thread; I was a Cadet on General Cargo ships, so didn't pay much attention to it at the time, apart from thinking how typical of British workmen of the time, at the time.


----------



## Pat Hughes

Jimmy,
I am sure you are a knowledgeable person but comments like:

_Anyone who says the building problems did not influence the vessels life should not be involved in shipping.................No. 713.

AND

I think a lot of people are not coming to terms with the scale of the problem in these ships._...............No. 718

are inflammatory and hardly likely to endear you to the many readers on this site who have vastly more practical experience than yourself.


----------



## Me45

Me45 said:


> She didn't fracture, but


sorry typo

should have read She didn't fracture *in three pieces*, but ....


----------



## jmcg

Heaven help us all.

Stop sniping.Some of you are becoming a disgrace to your profession. Can the moderators not intervene.

John


----------



## jimmys

Pat,

Any engineering candidate for any certificate of competence who does not know that build quality and build problems influence the life of a vessel would not obtain a certificate from me. I would want to put him out of shipping he is not competent.

I think it is evident a number of persons on this thread are not coming to terms with what happens when you have break up problems on ships. It is difficult. You are very often not able to see them until it is too late. Specialist training is needed.

As regards the experience part I started late fifties apprenticeship making parts for ships and have been involved ever since. Persons may have more experience than me. I dont dispute that.

I suggest you lay out your experience and qualifications and then criticise.

regards
jimmy

It is a forum if you find the posts offensive do not read them !!!


----------



## Chouan

R651400 said:


> Negative again.
> My implication was that whatever element of truth was in your posting it should be taken further.
> If you're so dumb/blind through academic nebulosity not to recognise this, I rest my case.


I don't see why you're getting so offensive. Why the accusation of "academic nebulosity"? My academic qualifications aren't in this field, an area in which I have no influence, and my only qualification in this area is experience of sailing on a sistership as Second Mate. My assumption, based on my understanding of the tone of your post, including your use of _*"stories"*_ was that you were questioning the veracity of what I was reporting. Use of language is very important; if you'd used 'reports' rather than 'stories', I'd have assumed a more positive reception to what I was saying.

Having said that, I agree that the build quality is important and should be taken further. When I was interviewed on the BBC Radio 4 programme about this I did say so, although that part wasn't broadcast; they were only interested in the Frame 65 problems.


----------



## Chouan

Or even failing to apologise for offensive comments ......


----------



## Pat Hughes

Jimmy,

Laying out my experience and qualifications is not necessary save to say I too started in the 1950s and spent the last 17 years in Ship Management. And now that I have it still does not entitle me to criticise.

What I am trying to convey to you is that the majority of your posts have a rider where you like to let us know of your superior qualifications (Chartered status/Nautical Surveyor expertise/*MCA...which incidentially I would keep quiet about*). 

What you say is in the main OK. It is just these riders (add ons) which are so unneccessary and unjustified.


----------



## Me45

Please may everyone take a deep breath, have a cup of tea, then re-start without bickering!

thank you


----------



## jmcg

When one gives evidence in a Court of Inquiry and indeed when one provides Expert Witness services (as I do) the first challenge you are faced with from the Judge and the opposing party's representatives are to lay open your qualifications and experience. It exposes potential flaws and provides an opening to discredit one. Many a lawyer and other professionals have been laid bare.

Nothing wrong with superior qualification and experience as long as they are not abused.

We need these on S/N.

J.

I have experienced this on many an occasion.


----------



## jimmys

I have no intentions of concealing my time in the MCA or of keeping quiet about it. It was a long period of training. I came in late. Mid forties. Thirty years experience when I went in. I was not a boy sailor. Up the gangway down the other side.
A ship manager, I thought it must be something like that. Give us a break Pat!!! It is most unlikely you will be able to convey anything to me. It is best you do not try. What did you do before you were a ship manager???

I did not start the thread I am only posting my opinion.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Pat Hughes

There you go again!
You simply cannot control yourself!
The purpose of this site is not for me to convey anything to you but to convey my thoughts and opinions to the site in general


----------



## jimmys

In Scotland all expert witnesses read out their qualifications from the witness box under oath in their first case. The Judge accepts you. It is perjury to make a false statement. Subsequent cases the Judge has a copy, asks if they are still current and accepts you as an expert. All the Advocates and Lawyers can question you on anything pertinent to the case including qualifications. MCA only acts for the Crown.
The ultimate disgrace is the statement " You are not an expert at all" from the legal teams. I have seen it.

regards
jimmy


----------



## jimmys

Pat , At #728 and others you were specifically addressing me. You named me, I most respectfully suggest you do not do that in the future.

What did you do before you were a ship manager, so that the members and I may know??

regards
jimmy


----------



## M29

Gentlemen
Like many on SN, I knew many of Derbyshires crew and so follow this thread with interest, in the hope of having clarification of a disaster that I still find hard to believe. Faces are imprinted on my memory of men I sailed with and respected deeply who are now gone.

Could you all please have respect for them and steer a less argumentative course, otherwise, I for one will stop following this thread as every time I log in, one or other of you is sniping or taking offence at what someone else has said.

Please remember, we are fortunate to be around to discuss the issue.

Best Wishes
Alan


----------



## jimmys

With all due respect to the members and apologies if I upset anybody I have been trying to get some answers forward. The use of the ford deep as a bunker tank worries me. It is forward of the collision bulkhead.
I have off course seen multi use tanks before ie. in Blue Flue ships bunker, ballast and domestic fresh water double bottoms. In order to use them for bunkers the dom. fresh and ballast was blanked off.
The ford deep for bunkers would need to be the same blanked off to the ballast system. A heavy oil bunker pump is different to a ballast pump and unless an up and downer would not pump water. The heavy oil bunker pump is small maybe less than 100tons/hour. No use for whats coming in forward. The ford deep would fill up.
The fore peak is connected to the ballast system maybe 12 inch line. If everything is working you should keep it dry.
The store we do not know.

In this vessel we are told she filled up. Why did this happen??

The normal procedure with bunkers ford on this type of voyage is:- around equator steam up temperature and bring as much as possible aft, round the Cape and at equator again bring all aft. Blank off ford bunker suction to empty tank and put tank back to ballast but do not fill. In force majeure with ingress of water you pump using your large pumps. Thats what engineers do pump out water.

I would expect with the scale of damage to the forecastle in this vessel I would keep it dry. Why did it not happen??? The pumps in this ship in good condition could suck the backside up.

regards
jimmy


----------



## K urgess

I suggest you watch the simulation posted previously and reposted by Me45 earlier.
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0
I also suggest that the last words should be noted that the time lapse of the events depicted is *TWO* minutes.
Can we at least accept that the people involved in the enquiries were experts in their fields and that their conclusions are to be accepted as a valid interpretation of the events that led to this tragic loss.
The number of bulk carriers lost during this period is a direct indication that the whole class was flawed in a basic way.
Some more general consideration of the class as a whole rather than on this particluar ship may avoid upsetting anyone who is closely connected to the tragedy.


----------



## jimmys

With all due respect to the members and apologies if I upset anybody.
What this simulation is basically saying is that a vessel steams into weather and has problems, nobody does anything about. It breaks up. The simulation is saying the Master of the vessel steamed into that weather till the vessel broke up and did nothing.

It is a disgrace to the memory of the crew of the vessel. I am looking for reasons why they could not save themselves.

In bad weather the most important thing on that ship is the bunkers, without them you die. Was the vessel short of usable bunkers??? She seemed to be going straight for Japan. Did a bunker problem force him into the typhoon???

The second most important thing is to keep spaces dry. Keep the head up. Everything fills up you do not pump it out, just rubbish. This vessel has huge powerful pumps aboard. Even with that hatch gone there is a good chance of control forward. You cannot do anything about cargo.


regards
jimmy


----------



## non descript

jimmys said:


> With all due respect to the members and apologies if I upset anybody.
> What this simulation is basically saying is that a vessel steams into weather and has problems, nobody does anything about. It breaks up. The Master of the vessel steamed into that weather till the vessel broke up and did nothing.
> 
> ....
> 
> regards
> jimmy



Jimmy,

We live in a democracy and as such people are entitled to their opinion no matter how unpopular it may be; to this end we are here to Moderate the site as the Owners would want it, and we are not here to delete or remove comment, unless of course it crosses the boundaries of normal politeness and good manners.

You have expressed a view, and frankly I am not here to discuss whether it is a good or a bad concept, but I do feel that you owe it to yourself and others to edit it to read: _*“In my opinion, the Master of the vessel steamed into…”*_ – Put like that, it is clear that it a personal opinion expressed as all free people are able to, and not an actual fact.

Kind regards
(Thumb) 
Mark


----------



## muldonaich

my own view is she was consumed by one massive wave not the way it showed you on the video otherwise they would have sent out a mayday she just buried her bow in a massive sea and kept on going kev.


----------



## jmcg

I do not believe a YOU TUBE simulation would be acceptable in any inquiry. I would venture to say that all self respecting mariners would be very sceptical of such a simulation.

JimmyS is persistant and indeed consitstent with his belief - this must be commended.

Likewise, I would like to know the reasons why she fractured or broke away in 3 main sections - not 3 *pieces *as has been erroneously stated by another. The distance from her last reported message to her final resting place troubles me. What was going on during that period and in what conditions was she experiencing at the end.

Re#739. Yes huge p/ps on these vessels. Had she been taken seas and had her bunkers contaminated? Main engine out?

Remember the Braer. 

But the Braer had time to request assistance. Not so for Derbyshire.

As Muldunaic opined - the truth may one day emerge. Jimmys contributions are most welcome if we are to achieve that end.

Bw

J.


----------



## jimmys

Thank you. That is far from my opinion, I have changed it to "the simulation is saying".

I am looking for reasons for what happened. No blame. I have no intentions of attacking the Master or anyone else on the ship. There are reasons for this happening.

regards
jimmy


----------



## K urgess

The simulation is from the UK/EC Surveyor's Report after the inquiry and not a You Tube fabrication.
The whole sequence is described in graphic detail on page 9 of the report.
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/shippingp...shire/mvderbyshiresurveysukecasses5012?page=9
This press release in 2002 just goes to show that even 26 years after she was launched it was still happening.
https://mcanet.mcga.gov.uk/public/news/printer.asp?mcga_news_id=2011
The reasons for this happening are well do***ented.


----------



## jmcg

Fortunately, other vessels of the class did not deliver too many fatalities. The Derbyshire delivered 44 souls. That is why it remains an emotive subject.

J


----------



## K urgess

As shown in the link between 1980 and 1994 the total losses of bulk and combination carriers was 149, with 1,144 lives lost. 
http://www.zetnet.co.uk/oigs/derbyshire/


----------



## jmcg

Marconi Sahib said:


> As shown in the link between 1980 and 1994 the total losses of bulk and combination carriers was 149, with 1,144 lives lost.
> http://www.zetnet.co.uk/oigs/derbyshire/


Accepted - but they were not all of the same class (or build) as Derbyshire

J.


----------



## peter3807

Marconi Sahib said:


> The simulation is from the UK/EC Surveyor's Report after the inquiry and not a You Tube fabrication.
> The whole sequence is described in graphic detail on page 9 of the report.
> http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/shippingp...shire/mvderbyshiresurveysukecasses5012?page=9
> This press release in 2002 just goes to show that even 26 years after she was launched it was still happening.
> https://mcanet.mcga.gov.uk/public/news/printer.asp?mcga_news_id=2011
> The reasons for this happening are well do***ented.


Just to say that I appreciate the reasoned argument you bring to this forum. However the UK/EC surveyors report while indicating that the loss was due to flooding of the forward compartments, they indicate the initial cause was an unsecured bosuns store hatch, thus indicating crew negligence. Wasn't this negated by the Colman enquiry which found that the initial cause of forward compartment flooding was due to failure of of ventilator heads.

Peter


----------



## jimmys

With all due respect to the members and apologies if I upset anybody.

This vessel did not seem to be in control of the Master. There was a superior being sending messages to it telling it the route to take. It had already been routed into bad weather, there was some equipment losses. 

Was this financial ie. to save bunkers. 

Was this normal at the time, did Masters take cognizance from this sort of system. It is not believable to me I have never heard of it. I realise I am inexperienced.

regards
jimmy


----------



## gadfly

Good evening all

In previous posts there have been a number of suggestions that welding rods were possibly used as an infilling material on some structural welds that were carried out by the shipyard (to save time).

For those unfamiliar with welding terminology I think it would be useful here if we mentioned a number of basic elements in welding technology:

There are two principal types of welded joint:

i)	butt welded joint
ii)	fillet welded joint 

Additionally, there are a number of variations on these two main types of welded joint (lap joints, deep penetration fillet and butt welds etc).

Infilling with electrodes would only save time on welded joints where thick steel plates or sections were being butted together and these type of joints would, typically, only be found in the main structural welds in the hull (e.g. main butt joints in upper deck plating) 

In the loss scenario that was put forward by Justice Colman, it was a failure in fillet welding that was assumed to have initiated the loss.

As a further clarification:

i) Infilling with electrodes and similar material is not a welding defect, it is *malpractice*.
ii) Cracks, inclusions, porosity, undercut, lack of penetration etc are frequent and typical welding defects that are found in the works of most shipyards
iii) Undersized leg length, throat thickness or inadequate edge preparation are non-compliances with the design/drawings and required construction standards

Collectively, i) to iii) may colloquially be called ‘bad workmanship’

Regards

Gadfly


----------



## peter3807

jimmys said:


> With all due respect to the members and apologies if I upset anybody.
> 
> This vessel did not seem to be in control of the Master. There was a superior being sending messages to it telling it the route to take. It had already been routed into bad weather, there was some equipment losses.
> 
> Was this financial ie. to save bunkers.
> 
> Was this normal at the time, did Masters take cognizance from this sort of system. It is not believable to me I have never heard of it. I realise I am inexperienced.
> 
> regards
> jimmy


Jimmy

The Judge exonerated the captain for navigating into the heart of Typhoon Orchid because his weather information had led him to believe that he would be able to keep ahead of the storm.

The weather reports provided by the vessel's routing agency were "seriously deficient". 

Peter


----------



## peter3807

To clarify the point on weather routing. In the early days of weather routing I was serving on bulk carriers in the N Atlantic. On our first voyage weather routed we ended up in some appalling weather. We stood on the bridge wondering how bad it must be on our original track. I assume that weather routing was adopted as a way of saving time and fuel costs. I can not comment on whether or not this was successful. Perhaps masters who sailed under that system in the 70's could comment. Did you trust the system or rely on your own experience. Colman found no fault in the Derbyshires Masters decision to follow the recommended track

Peter


----------



## gdynia

Peter are you talking about the Photinia on the Grand Banks when she actually went backwards in a 2 day period


----------



## peter3807

Quotes from the "Report of the Re-Opened formal investigation (RFI) into the loss of the mv DERBYSHIRE" The Honourable Mr.Justice COLMAN.: ( HMSO 2000 ISBN 0 11 702530 3)

* Shipping green water
RFI 10.2: The frequency and amount of green water which boards the vessel in heavy weather depends on a combination of factors inter-acting with the freeboard. These include the height and frequency of the waves, the length of the vessel's hull and its shape. These factors affect the way in which the vessel moves in the sea, in particular the extent to which it sustains leave, pitch and roll and whether its hull rises with the waves or the bow pitches into the waves. The height of a wave crest above the deck at the bow is likely to be greater than amidships. Vessels are navigated in very heavy seas with the sea on the starboard bow rather than abeam. Hence, in such conditions, greater freeboard is required forward than amidships. This additional forward freeboard may be permanently provided by a forecastle or a deck not parallel to the water line.
* Seaworthiness
RFI 16.10: When the "DERBYSHIRE" sailed on her last voyage from Sept-Isle was she in all respects seaworthy for her contemplated voyage to Japan in so far as material to her loss?
In the sense that she was not fit to withstand an encounter with a North West Pacific Typhoon of not unusual intensity because of the insufficient strength of the air pipes and ventilators on the foredeck and of the forward hatch covers, she was not objectively seaworthy. She was, however, reasonably believed to be seaworthy by her owners, classification society and officers and crew, given the current state of knowledge in the shipping industry in relation to the possible incidence and effects of green water loading on air pipes and ventilators and forward hatch covers.
* Weather routeing
RFI 34: This Report accepts that the message sent to the vessel by Oceanroutes at 0113z on 8 th September was seriously deficient in information. However, this Report does not accept that it has been established that Oceanroutes were negligent or otherwise at fault in failing to advise the master to alter course. In as much as it has not been shown to be negligent for a typhoon forecasting service to have failed to anticipate the unusual forward projection of the wind field of Typhoon Orchid, it was not unreasonable for a routeing agency to continue to endorse the vessel's present course up to 1000z on 8 th September. Failure to anticipate the extent of the wind field and the unusually distant spread of heavy swell running before the storm centre is not shown to have been professionally negligent. Even if the message sent at 0113z on 8 th September had contained adequate information then available, that information would not have caused the master to change course. It can therefore be concluded that the vessel's encounter with the most severe sea conditions of the typhoon arose without the fault either of those on board or of Oceanroutes.
RFI 35: However, the brochure issued to masters by Oceanroutes in which it set out what routeing services it would provide in respect of typhoons was obscurely worded. If Oceanroutes intended to suspend positive routeing advice in such conditions, that should have been much more clearly expressed. 

The above extracts from the report may clarify points raised in this forum. Or, as I believe raise further points for discussion. The last paragraph is particularly interesting. Did Oceanroutes suspend advice as they could no longer predict the track of Orchid after routing the Derbyshire into the dangerous sector of the cyclone.

Peter


----------



## peter3807

gdynia said:


> Peter are you talking about the Photinia on the Grand Banks when she actually went backwards in a 2 day period


No Nev.

That was bad enough. A few trips later.

The Photinia light ship to Philadelphia. 21 days from Manchester. Heavy pounding all the way. Starboard lifeboat lost, Top masts loosened, spare anchor broke loose on foredeck, pipework fractured in dry stores. I had Flu. First trip third mate. That was a Christmas and New Year I will always remember.

Peter


----------



## jmcg

Re post #750

Would shipyard welding at critical points not be subject to NDT and or other penetrative or Xray testing. Who would "sign it off".

J.


----------



## James_C

jmcg said:


> Re post #750
> 
> Would shipyard welding at critical points not be subject to NDT and or other penetrative or Xray testing. Who would "sign it off".
> 
> J.


Did NDT and X-Ray testing exist in the 70s? I would doubt it.


----------



## muldonaich

weather reports i was on naess lousianna in 1966 we went through hurricane arlene of the yankee coast and despite all forcasting captain warman altered course every time he did so did the hurricane we could not dodge it no matter what so we just went through itneedless to say it was not a good trip


----------



## gadfly

jmcg said:


> Re post #750
> 
> Would shipyard welding at critical points not be subject to NDT and or other penetrative or Xray testing. Who would "sign it off".
> 
> J.


NDT (non-destructive testing) is applied on a sampling basis to butt and seam welds in the hull, not all critical welds are subjected to NDT tests, otherwise all welds are subjected to visual inspection. 
Neither of these inspection processes offers 100% assurance of hull structural integrity. The principal assurance of hull integrity is the shipyard's quality contol process. 

Fillet welds generally are only subject to visual inspection.

As far as 'signing off' is concerned, the shipyard, the owners representative and the Class Society all have to sign these things off. However, the over-arching statutory responsibility for certifying the structural integrity of the vessel lies with the Class Society as they will normally issue the Safety Construction Certificate.

regards

Gadfly


----------



## jmcg

Thanks for the explanation on welding - posts #757 & 759

J.


----------



## Derek Roger

Re Welding ;
The rules for weldment sizes take into account the fact that all welds will not be perfect ie Ship construction is over welded to allow for this .

This does not however negate the possibility of defective welds to cause stress raisers and perhaps by means of creeping cracks ( sometimes called fatigue cracks ) to move into the main steel structure causing failure .

I do not suggest that this was the cause of the loss . It seems clear that the vessel endured severe weather and foundered ( as have many others )

Marconi Sahibs post 744 gives a report of an expert of the findings and I think that should suffice .

I am deeply disappointed in some of remarks and counterpoints of some of our members .

Regards Derek


----------



## jimmys

*derbyshire*

In a tanker/bulker we would be looking at as low as 1metre to 5 metres per hundred metres of butt welds for NDT. i.e. 1% to 5%. A passenger ship a lot higher. The welders weld test pieces for destructive testing to obtain their codes.
The yard can supply NDT and quality control at a cost if asked. In 1971 it was not a requirement for a SafCon Cert. It was not taken on the vessel I sailed on. Derbyshire I do not know. Could be not taken!!!

I am wondering if this vessel was short of bunkers, the routes taken seem very minimum to me. He was heading up 130 deg approx. straight for Japan.

Any ideas what he took in New York, consumption per day, how many days.
I would be looking at five days reserve here. It is what we would call a stretcher of a voyage this, stretches your reserves. A long stretch to get where he was???
Could he have had some forward not usable. Would this routing company have influence on the bunker supply, a lot of questions??

I feel the vessel is under pressure before the typhoon.

at post #744 a 12 hour period no pumps mentioned, nobody does anything she just fills up?? Its nonsense.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Chouan

Marconi Sahib said:


> I suggest you watch the simulation posted previously and reposted by Me45 earlier.
> http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0
> I also suggest that the last words should be noted that the time lapse of the events depicted is *TWO* minutes.
> Can we at least accept that the people involved in the enquiries were experts in their fields and that their conclusions are to be accepted as a valid interpretation of the events that led to this tragic loss.
> The number of bulk carriers lost during this period is a direct indication that the whole class was flawed in a basic way.
> Some more general consideration of the class as a whole rather than on this particluar ship may avoid upsetting anyone who is closely connected to the tragedy.


I watched the youtube film last night and found it very moving. 
If the foc'sle hatch was beginning to move, and if the bridge had been able to see it, given its position and the distance, the severe weather would have precluded them from being able to do anything about it, I would have thought, at least at that stage. If the ventilators and other foc'sle fittings were carried away by heavy green seas, again as is suggested, I would suggest that even if pumps were ordered to be put on line immediately, there would have sufficient time lag for the subsequent green sea/seas to do sufficient damage forrard for pumping to be to be unavailling. I doubt whether the pumps mentioned, even those of the capacity to pump through a 12" line could shift sufficient water to prevent the disaster in the 2 minutes given, from the initial order to start pumping. How long to set the line? How long for the pump to start running?

Jimmys, I agree that the foc'sle head tanks etc. could have been pumped out if they'd flooded earlier, but if we're talking about a sudden ingress of water caused by failure of deck fittings, then, I think, my argument stands.


----------



## jimmys

At Marconi Sahib reports at #744 it states:-

The fore peak ballast tank is filled over a 12 hour period, that is fully what I would expect in a vessel of this size in this type of sea. It is coming through vents.

The engineer when asked by the Mate will line up his ballast system to the tank take a quick pump to clear the lines. Stop the pump and read from the combination gauge the static head in the tank,. If the head pressure is 10psi one psi is 28inches of water. Approx. 24 foot in the tank. The ballast pump is on the bottom. Within a few minutes a report of the tank loading is with the Master.
The Master gives the order pump out, if the order is pump like f**k, everything goes on. The ballast pump and everything else the engineer can get on the line. He has plenty of them. Any tank with a head is easy to pump.

Within five minutes I would expect to have at least two pumps on it and another two standing by.

Not much in a twelve hour period. The Mate would be looking at what he has in the pumproom. I dont know.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Pat Hughes

Why do you not withdraw from making any more posts on this thread.
Most of your posts seem to be a cut and paste devoid of any real practical knowledge. You have upset a lot of people with your 'wild' speculation regarding the Master (who I knew albeit briefly) and rightly corrected by Tonga amongst others. Call it a day. If not for the sake of the readers sanity try compassion for the readers who may be related to the poor souls who were lost.

Pat


----------



## jmcg

Pat.

If you dont like what Jimmys has to offer you can always place him on the ignore list. 

You must understand that Jimmys has, like almost all on S/N, valuable contributions to make. They may conflict with your reasoning and substance and indeed that of others - but this is an open forum where opinions are advanced for the benefit of all. 

This thread has captured the imagination of a large number of members and has provided a searing insght in to many possible contributory factors that may have resulted in the loss of Derbyshire. A lot of what has been discussed on this forum was never advanced or discussed at the inquiries. 

I suspect that there are reasons for that.

In conclusion, I welcome postings from all - just refrain from launching personal attacks.

BW

J.


----------



## jimmys

On this vessel I think the ballast main is fractured in the cofferdam. That is where I am leading. When engineers dont do what is laid out previously something is wrong. If they could they would do it. They could not. I am just stopping to let people come in with sensible comment. I had hoped we would not get Mr. Hughes post. Where did I cut and post that from??

regards
jimmy


----------



## Ian

jmcg said:


> Pat.
> 
> If you dont like what Jimmys has to offer you can always place him on the ignore list.
> 
> You must understand that Jimmys has, like almost all on S/N, valuable contributions to make. They may conflict with your reasoning and substance and indeed that of others - but this is an open forum where opinions are advanced for the benefit of all.
> 
> This thread has captured the imagination of a large number of members and has provided a searing insght in to many possible contributory factors that may have resulted in the loss of Derbyshire. A lot of what has been discussed on this forum was never advanced or discussed at the inquiries.
> 
> I suspect that there are reasons for that.
> 
> In conclusion, I welcome postings from all - just refrain from launching personal attacks.
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


In total agreement with what you say jmcg. Unfortunately trolls can't abide the fact that some people may have a different point of view. I don't know if jimmys is right or wrong but I do respect his right to post. He puts forward his views with feeling and I am in no doubt of his sincerity. IMHO his posts are far more welcome than the mindless sniping we see every time he does post.


----------



## jimmys

Thank you Gentlemen I will be coming back to the matter of bunkers, as you know I am trying to get reasoned explanations for every thing that happened, it is slow. People can assess them later. Some of the things I am going over have been mentioned before but we did not have much information, as info comes we go over it again.

I must ask Marconi Sahib, what was the situation with that vessel concerning direct telephone. I recall in the Atlantic in a vessel around 1985 without RO we had a set about Two foot by 18 inches by 18 inches, Marconi make, and the Master and I could talk to the Americas and UK from mid Atlantic. The old man set it up.

Was it available in the Derbyshire position and would it be fitted. Could the senior people talk direct to management without the key from there.

regards
jimmy


----------



## K urgess

Sorry gentlemen, but I absolutely refuse to get drawn into your further speculation.
My posts so far have been aimed at drawing your attention to the *facts*.
If you choose to ignore them I cannot help.


----------



## jimmys

*derbyshire*

Marconi Sahib,

At your post #744 the information you posted said there was contaminated bunkers forward. Why did you post it if you wished not to be involved in it???
I read it in your post.

The Chief Engineer in this case would want to discuss the situation with his superintendent in person confidentially. With contaminated bunkers the vessel would not be allowed into Japan.

regards
jimmy


----------



## jasmacpm

Marconi Sahib,
does the information you posted (# 744) actually say there was contaminated fuel forward? Perhaps, I have overlooked it?

It also, looks to me like this report makes clear, we will never know exactly what happened and only postulates a likely scenario for consideration?

Jimmy.


----------



## K urgess

Simply one of the points in the likely scenario shown in the official report of the inquiry. The complete report is here -
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/shippingp...mvderbyshire/mvderbyshiresurveysukecasses5012

"Before the stern goes below the seas implosion/explosions are already taking place at the bow. 
The fuel tank, already containing fuel oil and sea water, implodes internally and relieves the increasing pressure on its Bulkhead 339 boundary, the air in the ullage space exploding this bulkhead outwards at the top. 
No.1 hold tanks begin to implode and the whole process dominoes along the length of the vessel in rapid fashion with shock waves traversing the structures weakening them and making them more susceptible to collapse towards the aft end. With each implosion the loss of buoyancy causes the vessel to sink even more rapidly taken down by its heavy cargo and rotating forward by the bow."

I merely linked to the relevent page explaining the *likely* scenario of the break up and sinking that was accepted by the inquiry. The red portion above I take to mean that the tank contained seawater because the bow had been breaking up not that it was always contaminated.


----------



## chadburn

Jimmy, like yourself I have wondered as to whether they were having problems with the Ballast system, the failure on the Addir and the "Dominoe effect" which resulted in the flooding of the Duct Keel left us without an "automatic" functional system because the coils on the Martonair command valves were rain/damp proof rather than waterproof. The speed of the failure of the structure and the resultant damage seem to happen in less than a minute and as with the unfortunate "Derbyshire" ripped open the Cofferdam and the Duct Keel which resulted in it's flooding. The Addir was the first and biggest vessel built at the Furness Yard at that time and was one of four "Super O.B.O'S" In their day until the "Derbyshire" type were built. As I have indicated before the failure and subsequent problems we encountered were taken into account and improvements were made on the following ships as she was effectively a running prototype which is how it was in the early days

In regards to Pat Hughes post and my inexperience on this type of vessel, we were ALL INEXPERIENCED in the 1960's (a point which seems to have gone over his head), Designers, Builders, Owners and Crew but hopefully the problems we experienced may have saved the lives of both myself and other Crew on her Sister Ships, in my case the "Har Saggi" which I later joined for a couple of trips.

Hydraulic Systems could also be a nightmare and I read that the "Derbyshire" had been laid up for a Year, as the Canadians have found out to their cost with the 2nd hand Submarines getting a vessel back to fully function after a period of lay-up takes a long time, the main problem being "sticky" Valves.


----------



## jasmacpm

*Report*

Hello, Sahib,
Nae problemo.
That's how I read it, too. I found the link useful and interesting and just wanted to check if I had missed the report saying that contaminated fuel was a contributory factor.

Regards,

Jimmy.


----------



## Derek Roger

Some years ago I was responsible for a salvage operation on the MT Erati in the Bay of Fundy . The vessel was 160,000 tonne VLCC . She experienced very heavy weather from Shetland to Canada . A forward hatch to the rope locker and a vent carried away in severe seas causing down flooding of the forward stores ; rope locker ; chain lockers and forward pump room . This caused a total loss of electrical power ford and all hydraulic power packs were submerged with piping damaged . 
The first the crew / Captain knew that something was amiss was the vessel was going down by the head and the foredeck was awash with heavy seas . 
As the Captain pointed out irrespective of the damaged and flooding forward it was impossible to put crew on deck for 3 or 4 days due to the weather . That is even if the electrical power and hydraulics been available the pumping systems could not have been used in this instance.

I wont go into detail of the salvage but only put forward the idea that Derbyshire was probably in a similar situation and could not put crew forward to pump or investigate damage .

David's post # 33 and subsequent posts seem to make it clear what happened based on visual proof of the wreck components . 

It fails me that there is still contentious debate looking for some other reason . 

The vessel foundered due to inadequate design strength of the hatches with catastrophic down flooding .

What part of hatch cover failure do some of our members not understand ???

Regards Derek


----------



## Blackal

Derek Roger said:


> The vessel foundered due to inadequate design strength of the hatches with catastrophic down flooding .
> 
> What part of hatch cover failure do some of our members not understand ???
> 
> Regards Derek


 
As a newcomer to the thread, it appears to me that there are some egos here, who think they should have been invited to that inquiry...............  

Al (Thumb)


----------



## gadfly

Re: Marconi Sahib; "Simply one of the points in the likely scenario shown in the official report of the inquiry. The complete report is here -
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/shippingports/shipping/safety/mvderbyshire/mvderbyshiresurveysukecasses5012"

Gentlemen

Unfortunately the above link only takes us to the assessors report, which was neither the final nor official report of the formal inquiry.

The findings within this report were not accepted in the 2000 official RFI

Regards,

Gadfly


----------



## K urgess

Would you mind posting that in plain English without the technobabble and with links to the do***ents you mention.


----------



## gadfly

Marconi sahib

Are you talking to me?

regards

Gadfly


----------



## K urgess

Well, Yes.
Since I put the links up and quoted from them I only expect you to do the same with what you say is the 2000 official RFI, whatever that is.


----------



## gadfly

Marconi Sahib said:


> Well, Yes.
> Since I put the links up and quoted from them I only expect you to do the same with what you say is the 2000 official RFI, whatever that is.


Link to a site that is selling a copy of the report of the 2000 RFI

http://www.amazon.com/Report-Re-ope...=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1224967822&sr=1-2


This publication (unlike the Assessors report) is not freely available from the DfT

Hope this helps

Best regards 

Gadfly


----------



## K urgess

Have you read this?
If you have, in what way does it differ to the report I quoted?
I'm sure we would all like to know.


----------



## gadfly

Have you read this?

Regards

Gadfly


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## jmcg

Marconi

RFI= Re-opened Formal Inquiry.

J.


----------



## K urgess

I wouldn't be asking if I had. Now would I.
I would know the differences and be able to quote from it.
So, since you say the ones that I quoted were not the official version, I am asking what the differences were, if any.
If you don't know then that's fair enough but I would expect someone who posts a statement such as that to have the answers at his fingertips.
I'm sure one of our members in the Ship Management field will be able to tell us if you can't.


----------



## K urgess

Thank you, jmcg. (Thumb)


----------



## Derek Roger

Blackal said:


> As a newcomer to the thread, it appears to me that there are some egos here, who think they should have been invited to that inquiry...............
> 
> Al (Thumb)


To understand the whole picture you would have to read all the threads . I agree with your proposition that some here imagine themselves better versed in matters Marine than the persons selected for the case .
The persons who gave opinions were given all the facts available where as the opinions given by some on this thread are by the most part only conjecture .

By the way I have read all the threads and have come to my own conclusion that the " root cause " was the under design of the Hatch Covers .

However I remain open to correction if anybody is able to convince me otherwise .




Regards Derek


----------



## billyboy

I watched the do***entary/investigation on the Derbyshire on TV and have to go with Derek on this one. The forward hatch covers were not up to the job in such freak wave conditions. The sea got in and she went down by the head.


----------



## Pat Hughes

Derek Roger said:


> To understand the whole picture you would have to read all the threads . I agree with your proposition that some here imagine themselves better versed in matters Marine than the persons selected for the case .
> The persons who gave opinions were given all the facts available where as the opinions given by some on this thread are by the most part only conjecture .
> 
> By the way I have read all the threads and have come to my own conclusion that the " root cause " was the under design of the Hatch Covers .
> 
> However I remain open to correction if anybody is able to convince me otherwise .
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Regards Derek



Derek,

I too have read all the posts and before saying more there is a need to separate those wanting to hear a certain outcome (for their own emotional reasons) and of course the experts. Nothing more to be said there. 
It is my belief and I would say the contention of Shipmanagers of my vintage (who were seagoing in a Senior capacity at the time) that the root cause was 
1. For'd water ingress (for'd access hatch or vents...take your pick)
2. This ingress would, over time, alter the trim exposing the hatch covers to unprecedented 'green water' effect on securing arrangements.

The change in trim by the head *would not have been noticed *by those on the Bridge although it may have taken little as an hour or so.

My own view is that it was over in minutes once the first hatch cover was breached with perhaps only the Bridge team and the usual enquiring mind from the E/R who knew anything about it.


----------



## jmcg

Re post 789

Pleased to note the word "Selected".

We might have had a more satisfactory conclusion if competent seafarers were appointed to assist .

Competence is not (and never has been) determined by qualifications or experience alone.

From my experience of this site I can see that we have a lot of very competent ex and current seagoing members from all departments.

I seem to recall that at least one person on the inquiry or perhaps an expert had never been to sea in his life. Will have to visit my records again !

Bw

J.


----------



## jimmys

*derbyshire*

Thank you Chadburn I too joined Texaco from Blue Funnel in the late sixties. I was on the German built VLCC's the Mboats and they were blowing up all over the place. It was bad news. We did not know what was happening.
With regards to the Derbyshire there is definite problems in the ballast system. No professional enquiry would miss it. Water comes in we pump it out. We do it all the time.
There seems to be a doubt on this thread that a "fact" is something in law that is not challengable. I consider there is not much fact in this RFI.

regards
jimmy


----------



## Derek Roger

Pat Hughes said:


> Derek,
> 
> I too have read all the posts and before saying more there is a need to separate those wanting to hear a certain outcome (for their own emotional reasons) and of course the experts. Nothing more to be said there.
> It is my belief and I would say the contention of Shipmanagers of my vintage (who were seagoing in a Senior capacity at the time) that the root cause was
> 1. For'd water ingress (for'd access hatch or vents...take your pick)
> 2. This ingress would, over time, alter the trim exposing the hatch covers to unprecedented 'green water' effect on securing arrangements.
> 
> The change in trim by the head *would not have been noticed *by those on the Bridge although it may have taken little as an hour or so.
> 
> My own view is that it was over in minutes once the first hatch cover was breached with perhaps only the Bridge team and the usual enquiring mind from the E/R who knew anything about it.


Exactly Pat ; That is why I posted # 777 giving a similar event on MT Erati where the forward end was flooded and the crew were not aware until the event had taken place due to the weather conditions . Also even if their equipment was not damaged ( which it was ) they could do nothing as it was impossible to go forward again due to the extreme weather .

David Byrne's post # 33 where he gave expert evidence based on the visual evidence of the wreck says it all .
One would have thought that we would all be proud to have such first hand evidence posted by one of our members .

Not so apparently ? 

Regards Derek


----------



## muldonaich

thats what i said in my last post she buired her bow into a massive sea and did not recover it was all over in a few minutes i was on a timber carrier in 69 we went through the worst weather seen in the pacific for god knows how many years she was thirty thousand tons and we were running down into the troughs it was like we were never going to climb back outso if the derbyshire was in weather like and down by the head she did not have a snowballs chance in hell of surviving the ship i was on was connon forest the scotspark was caught in the same weather she had a lot more damage than we had a few wre not so lucky kev


----------



## jimmys

I have been reading over Mr David Byrne's post at #33. In my opinion the board of enquiry may not have had visual evidence I would therefore assume it was possibly an underwater survey. I have carried out lots of them and they are not good especially at depth.
I note no1 hatch did not implode it was clearly punched in. If you look at no1 hatch forward bulkhead in Lemschout's sketch @ #507 It is still in good shape. No sign of any great downward loads. A few bends.
As far as implosions are concerned it is well nigh impossibe to create one in a sinking ship. It is physically impossible to have an implosion and have wreckage spread. It crushes. I understand it was in three pieces and aft broken in lots of pieces. Therefore no implosion. Perhaps it broke up then imploded or we can invent a few more.
Any sketch of spread of pieces???

With the state of these vents forward and the presence of bunkers, I do not think there is any doubt of bunker contamination certainly in the typhoon and maybe earlier in the voyage. Any person with a knowledge of bunkers knows that when you get Sea Water in, it is difficult to get it out and you even have a problem getting it out in the engine room.

I am not at all sure and I think jmcg analysis of perverse finding are correct.

regards
jimmy


----------



## non descript

The posting at *# 797* gives, by implication, a rather unfortunate assessment and to be reasonably fair to Mr Byrne, I do think it would be correct to acknowledge these actual words from his posting at *# 33* and not take them out of context or even misquote them; the words he used were:

*“I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss.” *
and
*“After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwater video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:…”*

On that basis, for anyone to post _-“I have been reading over Mr David Byrne's post at #33. He had no visual evidence I would assume it was underwater survey. I have carried out lots of them and they are not good….” _is maybe a little unfair, and certainly unwise, as it implies a certain degree of criticism, which in the cir***stances is wholly wrong. i.e. Mr Byrne made a factual statement that he gave evidence, and that the board of enquiry found as follows… 

It should also be noted that apart from the two postings on this thread, Mr Byrne has very wisely chosen to stand aside and not add anything more to this discussion and we should respect him for this and we must not be tempted to claw over his text and pick holes in it by implication, when he has clearly left the stage and gives every indication of not wishing to take part and therefore defend himself from possibly misguided claims.

Please do not be tempted to make personal attacks, either real or implied - it is contrary to the ethos of Ships Nostaligia and it is also contray to the rules that the Owners of the Site have laid down.
(Thumb) 
Mark

ps. If you still have an unrestrained need to say something, then I guess this text:

*-“I have been reading over Mr David Byrne's post at #33 and in my opinion the Board of Enquiry may not have visual evidence and I therefore would assume it was possibly an underwater survey. I have carried out lots of them and they are not good….”* 

... would just maybe reflect an accurate comment. - It certainly would avoid any accidentally implied criticism.


----------



## non descript

Thanks Jimmys (Thumb)


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## gdynia

Jimmys In the past several years I have been involved in quite a few salvage operations as a team. One was in over 900 metres of water where the only way we could achieve this was with underwater video. There is alot of state of the art equipment on the market these days which has proved invaluable on these salvages.


----------



## jimmys

You are indeed correct, but in order to look at how material fractures we need to look at individual "beach marks" on the material thickness,. These beach marks determine the passage through the material of any fatigue or creeping cracks. We need magnification and accurate measurement of the lengths of the beach marks. Through this we can determine the conditions of loading and the cycles of stress to failure which gives us a time scale of loading of the vessel. When we get them we can tell how long she was in the typhoon.
I suggest you look at a sketch of the whole fore end sent by jmcg and have a look at the path of cracking along the deck. We need to look at that fracture. It is a fatigue fracture right along the deck.
Cameras are not yet at that stage. It is after Lemschouts post #357 somewhere. I have to go.

regards
jimmy

regards


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## Me45

The National Archives have released the digital records of the Re-Opened Formal Investigation into the loss of the mv Derbyshire, they may be found online at:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/205/3/index.htm

and the Assessors reports

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/204/2/


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## R58484956

Right ho lads you have now all studied the text and photos, so now can we have your comments on what you have seen and learnt.


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## steve goldswain

never ever sail on bulkers(Cloud)


----------



## gadfly

Me45 said:


> The National Archives have released the digital records of the Re-Opened Formal Investigation into the loss of the mv Derbyshire, they may be found online at:
> 
> http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/205/3/index.htm
> 
> and the Assessors reports
> 
> http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/204/2/


Good evening,

The above links provide public access to sources of factual data on the Derbyshire tragedy plus the assessors' report, which contains a few controversial opinions.

Additionally, the outcome from the UK's judicial process into the loss of this vessel (the report of the re-opened formal investigation) may also be accessed via the National Archives on:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/205/2/

For those with an interest in possible 'scenario 14' theories, the following link may be worth a visit:

http://mv-derbyshire.blogspot.com/2008/11/mv-derbyshire-theories-and-factual.html

Best regards,

Gadfly


----------



## Me45

gadfly said:


> For those with an interest in possible 'scenario 14' theories, the following link may be worth a visit:
> 
> <link to blog>
> 
> Gadfly


Why start a separate blog when this thread has some very interesting, informative and entertaining posts?

Me


----------



## peter3807

Me45 said:


> The National Archives have released the digital records of the Re-Opened Formal Investigation into the loss of the mv Derbyshire, they may be found online at:
> 
> http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/205/3/index.htm
> 
> and the Assessors reports
> 
> http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/204/2/


Thank you for finding the link to the RFI. The assessors findings of crew negligence were discredited in the RFI which I, and many others, believe finally arrived at the reasons for this tragic loss. Some posts on this site have raised legitimate concerns concerning the construction of combination carriers. The tone of some posts leave a lot to be desired and show a lack of respect to those who were lost. I would like to suggest that such issues are raised in a new forum. I would further suggest, as a mark of respect to those lost and their families that this forum is closed and a forum of remembrance is opened for all those lost at sea.

Peter


----------



## Steve

Sorry disagree, thread will remain open.


----------



## Lemschout

Just received news from Captain RAMWELL that a few days ago there was at the headquarter of the British DfT a presentation on the Derbyshire to the DFA members. 
Among the persons who were present and say a few words were Sir Anthony COLMAN (Knighted Judge & who oversaw the RFI) and Lady Mountbatten who is supporting the DFA since a long time.

Judge COLMAN made a reference to the cleverness of Professor TAWN of LANCASTER University who, with another scientist who is living in California, performed the complicated mathematical equations vital to Colman's conclusions.

Meanhwile I keep checking, often several times a week one of the recommendations of Sir Colman integrated in SOLAS, the remote controlled pumping system of the forward compartments, just to sadly ascertain than on about two third of the ships inspected it is not ready for use.


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## Bill Davies

Only sailed in a few of this type and I did not like the experience. Allways thought they were dangerous.


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## steve goldswain

leave it open but still startanother thread


----------



## John Petches

This is worth getting up early for 
Deep Sea Detectives - The Hunt for the Derbyshire
Next On:
Saturday 20th December 6:00 am - History (Ch 234)
Synopsis:
Forensic engineers sift through evidence in a bid to reveal why British freighter the Derbyshire sank in 1980 during a typhoon in the South China Sea, killing all 44 people aboard


----------



## M29

John Petches said:


> This is worth getting up early for
> Deep Sea Detectives - The Hunt for the Derbyshire
> Next On:
> Saturday 20th December 6:00 am - History (Ch 234)
> Synopsis:
> Forensic engineers sift through evidence in a bid to reveal why British freighter the Derbyshire sank in 1980 during a typhoon in the South China Sea, killing all 44 people aboard


John
Could you repeat this message on the "Derbyshire" thread under "Bulk Carriers". There are plenty of members on the thread and I am sure they would be interested in this programme.
Best wishes

Alan


----------



## K urgess

Simce multiple postings of the same information are discouraged I've moved the post by John Petches to the appropriate thread along with Alan's reasonable request for a posting in this thread.
The title sounds very much like a program aired on the BBC last year.
More details are available at
http://www.history.com/minisite.do?...ent_type_id=1411&display_order=4&mini_id=1069
There is also one on the Edmund Fitzgerald.
Both emotive subjects.


----------



## R58484956

Thread 813 History channel *234* thats for those on cable, for those on Sky it is *529*


----------



## gadfly

Dear all

Happy New Year and season's greetings!

For those interested in the hatch covers on the Derbyshire, and whether they were adequate and conformed with the standards of the day, an article has just been published on the following website: 

http://mv-derbyshire.blogspot.com/

Best regards,

Gadfly


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## Lemschout

Gadfly,

Just read your very interesting blog about the Derbyshire which shows that the hatchcovers were even below the weak standards of the time. Also I fully agree that the RFI mainly succeeded te exonerate the builders and the class from all responsibility. It pushed also the legislation somewhat in the right direction, but as a PSC inspector I can ascertain that the new rules are poorly implemented, with about one bulker out of who where the new safety measures are not ready for use. On some old bulkers the required changes to the pumping system of the foreward compartments are even totally ineffective, while on other new bulkers they are insufficients.

In the summary of the "Recommendations towards improved ship safety" of the Admiralty court, the point 14.7 suggest that "Masters of bulk carriers should be made fully aware of the possible dangerous consequences of water entry into forward spaces and consequent reduction of freeboard", but practically it is seldom the case.

On some capesize bulkers, the forward boatswain store is extending far below the main deck, probably to reduce the capacity of the fore peak tank and the allowable stresses on ballast. The result is that, in case of flooding of that store, up to 3000 tons water are added to the extreme fore ship. With some bulker having very large and very weak ventilation heads on the extreme fore part of their nearly flush deck (no raised fore castle), this flooding is highly probable if these ships meet an Orchid like typhoon while fully loaded. 

It is here that, also based on my experience with bulker in bad weather, I disagree with the statement in your blog "Therefore, the small trim by the bow could not realistically and satisfactorily explain the cycle of floodings and the resulting sinking that were suggested by the inquiry." 
It does not take into account, just like the RFI and apparently the Marin tests, the drastic increase of the possibly already high longitudinal inertia of the Derbyshire. 

Almost always I check the arrangement on the fore ship, and even on the small vessels I can observe that a good buoyancy fore is essential to prevent water ingress through the spurling pipes of the anchor chains and the subsequent flooding of the chain lockers, with eventually leaks to the fore compartments including the fore peak.

You can find more detail at "http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sdbyxsto.htm".

Best regards


----------



## Bill Davies

Lemschout,

The points you raise have been well debated throughout this thread and in the main seem to have broad agreement of the membership here. However, I too having much experience of this class of vessel I am interested to hear about Bulk Carrier Malpractice' which is still evident and I think the ultimate respect we can extend to those who lost their life in this incident is to ensure it does not happen again.
Very little is mentioned re the accelerated moments of inertia, which is a product of high loading rates. I often observed unnatural behaviour (flexing) of ships whilst loading at these ports. The inevitable cracking at Hatch corners on the loaded passage seemed to be the norm.


----------



## Lemschout

If the efficient implementation of the new safety measures is the best way to show respect for those who died on the Derbyshire, and many other bulkers, then there is very little of it from the shipyards and those who approve the cape size bulkers built during the last 15 years. 

Within two weeks I have observed quite awful disposition on the bow: no raised forecastle, weak vent heads exposed to green seas (see picture) and access hatches that have no additional securing system. 

Furthermore the staffs which are manning these vessels are often totally unaware of the risks of flooding of their large forward boastwain store. With the recent shortage of officers, a lot of less experienced and poorly paid seafarers have been enlisted on these unsophisticated vessels. This is in full contradiction with Colman's recommendation 14.7 of the RFI.

Finally their ISM procedures for heavy weather do not contain any special precautions regarding the fore compartments, like ensuring that the valves of the pumping system are in the right position, that the system has been tested recently, that the fore access hatch is efficiently secured. And of course none of these new staffs dare to use the ISM code as it should: reporting the observed weaknesses on the bow and suggesting some improvement. 

Some managements are also raising hell with their flag state and their class when the PSCo dare to cast some doubt on the arrangements fore by writing a deficiency about them.


----------



## Bill Davies

Lemschout said:


> If the efficient implementation of the new safety measures is the best way to show respect for those who died on the Derbyshire, and many other bulkers, then there is very little of it from the shipyards and those who approve the cape size bulkers built during the last 15 years.
> 
> Within two weeks I have observed quite awful disposition on the bow: no raised forecastle, weak vent heads exposed to green seas (see picture) and *access hatches that have no additional securing system.*
> 
> Furthermore the staffs which are manning these vessels are often totally unaware of the risks of flooding of their large forward boastwain store. With the recent shortage of officers, a lot of less experienced and poorly paid seafarers have been enlisted on these unsophisticated vessels. This is in full contradiction with Colman's recommendation 14.7 of the RFI.
> 
> Finally their ISM procedures for heavy weather do not contain any special precautions regarding the fore compartments, like ensuring that the valves of the pumping system are in the right position, that the system has been tested recently, that the fore access hatch is efficiently secured. And of course none of these new staffs dare to use the ISM code as it should: reporting the observed weaknesses on the bow and suggesting some improvement.
> 
> Some managements are also raising hell with their flag state and their class when the PSCo dare to cast some doubt on the arrangements fore by writing a deficiency about them.


Now this is an interesting post and I would say in line with my thinking on todays operation of these vessels. I would like to think I (and my vintage) had something to do with what I have highlighted in red.


----------



## Lemschout

The crews who realize the danger of a poorly secured boatswain store access hatch, are quite good at fastening them. See the picture herewith with the wire, but it is only possible if there is another access, and that was not the case on the Derbyshire.

But on some ships, even with an additional entrance, there is nothing at all to prevent an openning during a bad storm. With such crews with little experience, their first storm on a capesize bulker could be their last.

It shows, that in spite of all the litterature produced on the Derbyshire tragedy, the right information still fail to make its way to the people who need it.


----------



## jmcg

This months' edition (February 2009) of "Shipping Today and Yesterday" carries an informative article on Bibby Line and in particular to loss of the M.V. Derbyshire. 

The commentary touches on the "official" findings of the two inquiries but more importantly, now introduces a time of 17:00 hours as to when green seas loading of No 1 hatch cover commenced. The commentary indicates that from her last reported position (230 miles S.E. of Okinawa) she had travelled a distance of 170 miles to her final resting place of 400 miles east of Okinawa.

Had she got underway again? 

The inquiry constitution and "findings" continue to sit uneasily with me !

BW

J


----------



## chadburn

There is NO EVIDENCE that the suspect access hatch was left open or the failure of the clamping/sealing arrangements on this type of hatch were the "ROOT" cause of the demise of the unfortunate "Derbyshire". there is however photographic evidence that both the Starboard Windlass and the mast have been torn from their mounting's along with photogaphic evidence of impact damage to this particlar hatch's coaming along with evidence that the hatch cover is missing. Unfortunatly they were unable to find the hatch cover which may have shown how this hatch cover came adrift (which way the clamping fork's were bent for instance). There are numerous photograph's of Vessel's in the photographic section of this Site were it show's that this type of hatch/clamping arrangement is still being fitted as standard fixture to vessel's without a raised forecastle and without any evidence of any so called Safety Clamp attachment. Now I would have thought that if someone had "Designed" a Safety clamp then they would have made sure they photographed it fitted from all the angles under the Sun to make sure they had EVIDENCE of their "invention" and to promote it instead of submitting a drawing which looks like it came from a "Spot the missing Bits Competition". As far as the main hatch cover's not complying, that is a worry for us all, unless there was an agreement with Lloyds to bring them up to spec at a later date(to allow the ship to sail) which was unfortunatly not carried out.


----------



## Bill Davies

jmcg said:


> The inquiry constitution and "findings" continue to sit uneasily with me !
> 
> BW
> 
> J


Your not alone.


----------



## jmcg

chadburn said:


> There is NO EVIDENCE that the suspect access hatch was left open or the failure of the clamping/sealing arrangements on this type of hatch were the "ROOT" cause of the demise of the unfortunate "Derbyshire".
> 
> Chad - you are quite correct in your posting. No evidence -just fanciful "findings". There is, however,an abundance of tragic history and compulsive evidence of retro repairs to the type and class.
> 
> BW
> 
> J


----------



## Bill Davies

jmcg said:


> There is said:
> 
> 
> 
> Interesting! Please expand!!
> 
> Bill
Click to expand...


----------



## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> chadburn said:
> 
> 
> 
> There is NO EVIDENCE that the suspect access hatch was left open or the failure of the clamping/sealing arrangements on this type of hatch were the "ROOT" cause of the demise of the unfortunate "Derbyshire".
> 
> Chad - you are quite correct in your posting. No evidence -just fanciful "findings". There is, however,an abundance of tragic history and compulsive evidence of retro repairs to the type and class.
> 
> BW
> 
> J
> 
> 
> 
> Would you care to elaborate ?, Are you confining your comments to structure
> welding repairs in way of fore and aft brackets at hatch ends , or is there
> something else that we don't know about ( except of course the well known
> discontinuation of longitidinal strength in way of the pumproom cofferdam ?.
Click to expand...


----------



## Bill Davies

Thanks John. I forgot to include the previous poster in my request for further explanation.


----------



## chadburn

Although I hate to say it about the Furness/Swan's Yard there does appear to have been a problem with the welding "Quality Control", not only did our vessel "Har Addir" suffer from welding problems( which led in our case to a major structural failure whilst on Trials) but I now read on the Furness Bridge ( built some years later )from posting's on that site that she also suffered welding failure's whilst on Trials and it appear's that a team of Welders had to go with her and re-weld the Ballast Tank's, although unlike a Japanese new build the Bow's did not fall off thankfully.

Re message sender will reply later.


----------



## jmcg

Frame 65 damage/repairs in all of the type - even the strongest "as built" Furness Bridge. See Department of Trade Report dated 3rd March 1986.

Explosion on Tyne Bridge 8th September 1974 at sea approx 10.00 hrs when hatch cover cover at no 8 hold was pulped following explosion. Serious p/p
problems recorded previous day whereby Teledep showed 75 tons of ballast when in fact is should have read 400. I recall similar on English Bridge en passage Europoort - Ras Tanura.

Dodgy mimic boards in the cargo control room -all vessels. Engineers/p/p man would ignore them as utterly defective.

Loss of rudder on Ocean Mandarin ex Sir Alexander Glen. She was forbidden re-entry to any port in South Africa.

Starboard Slop tank fracture Tyne Bridge.

Break up and tcl of Kowloon Brige ex English Bridge off Stag Rock. She had two high tensile steel beams retro welded to her deck over frame 65 region in order to compensate for strength loss confirmed by evidence of cracking. Just before the time of her loss she had put into Bantry for futher emergency repairs to her previous retro repairs. Because of the weather the scheduled repairs could not be effected.

Continuous oil leakages on English Bridge that necessiated all available "hands" to be in engine room equiped with 40 galls oil drums to gather up the lub oil before it ignited and blew us all to kingdom come. We had serious fire on board fully loaded MEC off Las Palmas.

Sir John Glen trading as Nafiska ? (will look it up) was in later years restricted by class to bulk only (not obo) . As Cast Kittiwake she had to be repaired and restored otherwise she would have been declared unseaworthy and fit only for the scrapper. 100 tons of new steel fitted to forepeak.

I could go on - but it troubles me at a time when I'm enjoying a 38 year old Highland Malt. Hope the above whets your appetite and satisfies your consumtion of a little elaboration.

;


----------



## Bill Davies

jmcg said:


> Frame 65 damage/repairs in all of the type - even the strongest "as built" Furness Bridge. See Department of Trade Report March dated 3rd March 1986.
> 
> Explosion on Tyne Bridge 8th September 1974 at sea approx 10.00 hrs when hatch cover cover at no 8 hold was pulped following explosion. Serious p/p
> problems recorded previous day whereby Teledep showed 75 tons of ballast when in fact is should have read 400. I recall similar on English Bridge en passage Europoort - Ras Tanura.
> 
> Dodgy mimic boards in the cargo control room -all vessels. Engineers/p/p man would ignore them as utterly defective.
> 
> Loss of rudder on Ocean Mandarin ex Sir Alexander Glen. She was forbidden re-entry to any port in South Africa.
> 
> Starboard Slop tank fracture Tyne Bridge.
> 
> Continuous oil leakages on English Bridge that necessiated all available "hands" to be in engine room equiped with 40 galls oil drums to gather up the lub oil before it ignited and blew us all to kingdom come. We had serious fire on board fully loaded MEC off Las Palmas.
> 
> Sir John Glen trading as Nafiska ? (will look it up) was in later years restricted by class to bulk only (not obo) . As Cast Kittwake she had to be repaired and restored otherwise she would have been declared unseaworthy and fit only for the scrapper. 100 tons of new steel fitted to forepeak.
> 
> I could go on - but it troubles me at a time when I'm enjoying a 38 year old Highland Malt. Hope the above whets your appetite and satisfies your consumtion of a little elaboration.
> 
> ;


Thanks for your prompt reply. Can you remind me. Did you ever sail in any of these ships and in what capacity??


----------



## jmcg

Yes Bill - I cherish the memories of my seagoing days and am haunted by the one trip I did on English Bridge (as posted much earlier in this thread). I was one of only 3 fully UK certificated ABs (including Bosun) although I signed on as GPS1.

One trip was quite sufficient for me and indeed all others. We all "got out" in Europoort as indeed had the compliment on previous voyage. I understand that nobody on the "Pool" in Liverpool would sail in her. Crew was to be sourced from the "International" Pool" in Rotterdam.

An old colleague from Fyffes confirmed this quite recently when he said that the Southampton "Pool" had also been so disposed when EB or Bibby was posted.

There was, however, a tremendous sense of mutual comraderie between the UK ABs with the entire ER department from the Chief down to the wiper. 

I was only tasked with ABs deck duties when absolutely necessary - all other times I was "down below". The OM and CO did not like it but the CE had the day to day control of the GP crew. The OM & CO accepted that the engine room /ancillaries situation required all available resourses at the expense of deck crowd. We had 2 or 3 others from Portugal/Spain purporting to be "seamen" . They were used for other purposes on deck like sugieng and cleaning brushes etc. They are another story.

BW

J


----------



## John Cassels

jmcg ; you say , and I quote , "As Cast kittiwake she had to be repaired and
restored otherwise she would have been declared unseaworthy .........".

Now , would you be kind enough to let us know ; is this your own conclusion - and if so , on what basis , or is this something you have read somewhere , and if so , where.


----------



## jmcg

John Cassels said:


> jmcg ; you say , and I quote , "As Cast kittiwake she had to be repaired and
> restored otherwise she would have been declared unseaworthy .........".
> 
> Now , would you be kind enough to let us know ; is this your own conclusion - and if so , on what basis , or is this something you have read somewhere , and if so , where.


Certainly not MY conclusion. A much respected Master who served as Master with Bibby on the OBO vessels could confirm what I wrote. Cast Kittiwake was restored to intended design in 1982.

BW

J.


----------



## jmcg

I would welcome any input from of the navigation members who could study /concentrate on last reported position and the final resting position. 

This equates to approx 180 miles plus or minus 10. Would it not be possible to chart out distance/speed ratio from these two positions,with full recognition of prevailing conditions and contents of her last message. 

J.


----------



## K urgess

This has been discussed before from post #663 and including your post at #665. Up to post around the 700 + mark


----------



## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> Certainly not MY conclusion. A much respected Master who served as Master with Bibby on the OBO vessels could confirm what I wrote. Cast Kittiwake was restored to intended design in 1982.
> 
> BW
> 
> J.


Your comments re Cast Kittiwake I still find troubling.

How would a Master with Bibby's be aware of defects on a Cast OBO ??.


----------



## jmcg

Presumably from Lloyd's Register. Lloyds concurred with the diagnosis and treatment of Tyne Bridge and recommended that owners of Cast Kittiwake & Sir A.Glen effect similar repairs. The recommendation was actioned with the two vessels receiving the same retro repair as Tyne Bridge.

I would imagine most Bibby Masters would have more than a passing interest in such matters at the time and that relevant data would be available to them.

BW

J


----------



## Chouan

jmcg said:


> Frame 65 damage/repairs in all of the type - even the strongest "as built" Furness Bridge. See Department of Trade Report dated 3rd March 1986.
> 
> Explosion on Tyne Bridge 8th September 1974 at sea approx 10.00 hrs when hatch cover cover at no 8 hold was pulped following explosion. Serious p/p
> problems recorded previous day whereby Teledep showed 75 tons of ballast when in fact is should have read 400. I recall similar on English Bridge en passage Europoort - Ras Tanura.
> 
> Dodgy mimic boards in the cargo control room -all vessels. Engineers/p/p man would ignore them as utterly defective.
> 
> Loss of rudder on Ocean Mandarin ex Sir Alexander Glen. She was forbidden re-entry to any port in South Africa.
> 
> Starboard Slop tank fracture Tyne Bridge.
> 
> Break up and tcl of Kowloon Brige ex English Bridge off Stag Rock. She had two high tensile steel beams retro welded to her deck over frame 65 region in order to compensate for strength loss confirmed by evidence of cracking. Just before the time of her loss she had put into Bantry for futher emergency repairs to her previous retro repairs. Because of the weather the scheduled repairs could not be effected.
> 
> Continuous oil leakages on English Bridge that necessiated all available "hands" to be in engine room equiped with 40 galls oil drums to gather up the lub oil before it ignited and blew us all to kingdom come. We had serious fire on board fully loaded MEC off Las Palmas.
> 
> Sir John Glen trading as Nafiska ? (will look it up) was in later years restricted by class to bulk only (not obo) . As Cast Kittiwake she had to be repaired and restored otherwise she would have been declared unseaworthy and fit only for the scrapper. 100 tons of new steel fitted to forepeak.
> 
> I could go on - but it troubles me at a time when I'm enjoying a 38 year old Highland Malt. Hope the above whets your appetite and satisfies your consumtion of a little elaboration.
> 
> ;


See my post No.52 for details of repairs, etc to the Sir John Hunter/Cast Kittiwake/Kona. I was 2/O on her when she was the "Kona" and because of the inspection routine, according to standing orders, I was intimately aquainted with them.


----------



## jmcg

A disturbing return to as it was from one who saw and noticed. I have made a mistake in naming Sir John Glen. It should of course read Sir John Hunter.

Thank you for referring me back to post #52.

BW

J .


----------



## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> Presumably from Lloyd's Register. Lloyds concurred with the diagnosis and treatment of Tyne Bridge and recommended that owners of Cast Kittiwake & Sir A.Glen effect similar repairs. The recommendation was actioned with the two vessels receiving the same retro repair as Tyne Bridge.
> 
> I would imagine most Bibby Masters would have more than a passing interest in such matters at the time and that relevant data would be available to them.
> 
> BW
> 
> J


Fine , now we get to the crux of the matter.

So now you say the information came "presumably "from Lloyds register ?.

You talk about steel replacement in the fore peak but chouan's post # 52
has repairs to deck fractures and pumproom and these in 1986 long after
the 1982 period you talk about.

I know that in September 1981 , the Cast Kittiwake was trading in oil and
at no time under Cast ownership was the vessel threatened with being
placed out of class or having her oil carrying capability withdrawn. She was
NOT restored to "intended design "in 1982 as you state but was trading normaly.

I contend that you have heard , overheard , read or otherwise wrongly
interpreted something which you have now accepted as gospel.

But please be very careful in what you say on open forum with regards to
ships which you seem not to know too much about regarding the 
operation and running of these type of vessels. 

You touch a rather tender spot with those who have been activly involved.


----------



## jmcg

I stand by what I say and have written. I have made my position quite clear from an early date in relation to my one trip on English Bridge. You may or may not have served for longer periods and in another capacity (operating or running) than I have and I am not interested in that element. 

A particular discusion rounding the Cape in ballast involving 2O and 3 ER + Junior + myself was rekindled following the loss of Derbyshire.

Lloyds Register was and still is a much respected source of genuine information . The Register could possibly be one of many other sources of genuine information that a Bibby Master (or any other for that matter) would read and gain current information. I never said that Lloyds Register WAS the definitive source of information available to a Bibby Master. Lloyds Reports may have been another reliable source as could Bibby's in house journal.

I stand by my comments regarding the former Cast Kitiwake. As Nafiska M she was detained in Rotterdam and was only allowed to sail to Poland for further repair. Likewise, I stand by my comment that she was restored back to her intended design in 1982.

I have been extremely careful in my sources of information and post as I believe to be true and accurate. I have built up my own notes of reference of English Bridge and Derbyshire since 1980 and will continue to refer to them as an accurate penning from my own hand.

If I "hear" of something and cannot confirm its accuracy or authenticity I treat it as such - just hearsay. 

Of course I could (like most mortals) misinterpret statements or other utterings. Regarding this subject matter (Derbyshire and Class), I do not believe I have misinterpeted anything. I have not accepted "something",as you contend, as Gospel. 

Of course I will continue to exercise great care in what I say and post in relation to my knowledge of the vessels in question. You are at liberty to post as you wish in matters of operating and running of the vessels. It is unlikely that I would join issue with you in that regard but others might.

Perhaps you might wish to elaborate on being "actively involved". I'm sure I am not the only one who would welcome further debate on subject matter. 


J.


----------



## jmcg

Referring back to my notes and previous post I made no inference to Cast Kittiwake being "placed out of class." 

The words I used were "remained unseaworthy". The repairs carried out in 1982 and 1986 are included in the long litany of historical retro attention to these vessels.
J.


----------



## Chouan

I thought, on reflection, that she was unseaworthy, when I left her. I told my father, a retired Superintendant Engineer, of her condition and he was horrified that such a vessel should be still sailing. Her bulkheads between ballast and cargo tanks were unsound and passed oil, her main deck handrails had corroded away in places and had been replaced by rope, as well as the buckling of the strengthening brackets in way of frame 65. Only a misplaced faith in her flag, a sort of misplaced belief in duty, my own lack of imagination, and, I suppose, a subconscious fear of unemployment made me stay once I'd joined.


----------



## jmcg

jmcg said:


> chadburn said:
> 
> 
> 
> There is NO EVIDENCE that the suspect access hatch was left open or the failure of the clamping/sealing arrangements on this type of hatch were the "ROOT" cause of the demise of the unfortunate "Derbyshire".
> 
> Chad - you are quite correct in your posting. No evidence -just fanciful "findings". There is, however,an abundance of tragic history and compulsive evidence of retro repairs to the type and class.BW
> 
> J
> 
> 
> 
> Sums it up
Click to expand...


----------



## John Cassels

I am still awaiting a reply to my post # 827 regarding Chadburn's comments.

With regards to the Cast Kittiwake - and not the other names she was known
as , we seem agree to disagree. My recollection ( and I operated her for
the owners along with the other Cast OBOs ) , she was never out of class
nor did she need 100 tonnes of steel repairs in the forepeak to remain in class.
As I said , I know she was trading in oil during the summer of 1981.

Technical and crew management were done by a well known management
company but I was certainly "in the know " as owners rep.

Somewhere in the loft , I still have a file from years ago with copies of 
telexes concerning abnormal incidents at the time. Will look this up .


----------



## Chouan

When I was on her she was called the "Kona"; she was managed and manned by Denholms, along with the Sir Alexander Glen, then called "Helm", which was in equally poor condition, I was told by those who sailed on her. I, fortunately, was never called upon to do so.


----------



## Bill Davies

jmcg said:


> jmcg said:
> 
> 
> 
> Sums it up
> 
> 
> 
> John,
> 
> You think so! Based on what??
> 
> Bill
Click to expand...


----------



## jmcg

The comment outlined in red at post#845 re retro repairs. Retro repairs only.

J.


----------



## Bill Davies

Ongoing repairs were necessary on these ships and I am still around to talk about them. I would suggest that the comment outlined in read is itself fanciful. Anyone of any experience in this type of ship will know what was needed. There are many members here will know exactly what I mean.


----------



## bulkcarrier

Believe it or not..I had never heard of the "Derbyshire" until I joined this forum..I find this all very interesting.. It is like the "Edmund Fitzgerald of England".. Is there any books, DVD's or photos of the incident?

Thanks,

Galen


----------



## K urgess

If your read through the posts, Galen, you should find links to some of the inquiry and simulation results.


----------



## chadburn

Although I agree with jmcg, I personally would not have called them "fanciful" I would have called them scurrilous allegation's of a Crew not here to defend themselves and until there is positive proof of the allegation's then they (the Crew) have the right to be given the benefit of the doubt.
In all of the picture's of Vessel's in the photographic section of this Site I cannot find a picture of this type of access hatch on a Bulk or O.B.O. (of which there are many) with the dog's tied up with a bit of heaving line or a lashing or some sort of alleged safety device . Fortunatly for most self respecting Crew's their idea of good seamanship/maintenance is of a far higher standard than other's.


----------



## Bill Davies

As usual, your response is pure theatre and playing to the gallery.
Your posts some time back re discharging Botlek sums up your knowledge of Bulk Carriers and JC is still awaiting a lucid response on that account.
Have respect for the crew by addressing the issues we are discussing and hopefully this type if incident will not happen again.

Bill Davies


----------



## Chouan

"There is, however,an abundance of tragic history and compulsive evidence of retro repairs to the type and class.BW"

I can't see how this statement can be classed as fanciful. Unfortunately, I'm one of Bill's invisible 7 (or 8) so he won't be able to see my response. 
I saw the repairs and inspected the area that they were supposed to reinforce on a regular basis. How can they be described as fanciful? By which I assume he means exagerrated, or made up?


----------



## John Cassels

Chouan ; I have asked many moons ago from Chadburn to tell us what he
means by his statement , but it seems worse than waiting for the 2nd. coming
of Christ. Until he does , then I also must class them as fanciful until he feels 
fit to describe to us these retro repairs.

What do you mean - one of Bill's invisibles ?.


----------



## randcmackenzie

Post 847:
'Sir Alexander Glen, then called "Helm" '....

Sir Alexander Glen was never called Helm. Helm was previously named Cast Heron and before that Nordic Chieftain.

Similar hulls but very different internally to the Swan Hunter ships.

She continued to trade oil and bulk until she left Denholm management, though as Bill says, it took ongoing repairs to keep her that way.


----------



## jmcg

Can anyone venture to comment on why "As Built" drawings were never lodged /receipted at Lloyds and "were not available" at Swan Hunters for consideration at the Inquiry(s) . Always understood that Drawings and Plans had to lodged before Classification certification was approved and or issued. Correct me if I'm wrong - in a dignified way please.

Have noted more than a few pops at Engineering and other department subscribers on this thread simply because they hold and offer a different perspective. Totally unnecessary. 

J


----------



## Chouan

randcmackenzie said:


> Post 847:
> 'Sir Alexander Glen, then called "Helm" '....
> 
> Sir Alexander Glen was never called Helm. Helm was previously named Cast Heron and before that Nordic Chieftain.
> 
> Similar hulls but very different internally to the Swan Hunter ships.
> 
> She continued to trade oil and bulk until she left Denholm management, though as Bill says, it took ongoing repairs to keep her that way.


Sorry, my mistake, I'd always thought, clearly erroneously, that the 'Glen and the 'Hunter became the Kona and the Helm.

_"What do you mean - one of Bill's invisibles ?."_

I am one of 7 or 8 members who have disagreed with Bill, and consequently put on an "ignore" facility, open to all members, which means that he can't see my posts. As far as the repairs are concerned, I've described them, so how are they fanciful?


----------



## Macphail

This thread should close, what one must remember that seafarers life's where lost and respect must prevail. The thread has degenerated into petty bickering.


----------



## John Callon

I agree with the post by macphail that it is time this thread should be closed. It seems to me that the whole episode has degenerated into an argument between experts (?) on ship construction as to who is right and who is wrong, with no thought or compassion being given to those poor souls who lost their lives on this vessel. Having sailed with Bibbys for a good number of years, I personally knew six of the crew members including the Captain having sailed with them on various ships within the Bibby Line fleet, who perished on that fateful voyage. It would be appreciated if some dignity and rememberance could be observed regarding this disaster, instead of all the petty bickering.
Many thanks,
John Callon.


----------



## R904444

Chouan said:


> When I was on her she was called the "Kona"; she was managed and manned by Denholms, along with the Sir Alexander Glen, then called "Helm", which was in equally poor condition, I was told by those who sailed on her. I, fortunately, was never called upon to do so.


I joined the the Cast Kittiwake in Rotterdam on 21/07/82 as 4/E and at this time she had just had major repairs done in the frame 65 area, I was shown one of the frames that had been removed which was very badly cracked. I don't know if the repairs were to builder's specs but on that trip we carried iron ore from Brazil to Japan and then oil from the Gulf to Augusta, Sicily via the Suez canal. There were no major structural problems during this trip.

I was also on the Cast Heron (Ex Nordic Chieftan) when it changed its name to 'Helm' in End June early July 1983 when Cast allegedly went bust (rumour on board at the time), maybe John Cassels can shine some light on this. She was at built in Sunderland to a different design to the Kittiwake. We carried one oil cargo on that trip. 

Her Sister was the Nordic Crusader which could probably start a new thread wth the Loch Striven lay up and problems she had in the engine room - crankshaft moved on main shrinks after Main Engine cylinder(s) filled with water!

Andy McArthur


----------



## Bill Davies

John Callon said:


> I agree with the post by macphail that it is time this thread should be closed. It seems to me that the whole episode has degenerated into an argument between experts (?) on ship construction as to who is right and who is wrong, with no thought or compassion being given to those poor souls who lost their lives on this vessel. Having sailed with Bibbys for a good number of years, I personally knew six of the crew members including the Captain having sailed with them on various ships within the Bibby Line fleet, who perished on that fateful voyage. It would be appreciated if some dignity and rememberance could be observed regarding this disaster, instead of all the petty bickering.
> Many thanks,
> John Callon.


John,
I do not think the thread should be closed down and conversely would say that by doing so would show disrespect to those who lost their lives in this tragedy. Every so often, the request you make is made for the same reason but I believe it is nothing more than people playing the 'emotional card'.
I have commanded many of this type of vessel, some slightly larger and a few slightly smaller than 'Derbyshire' but nonetheless have many years ***ulative sea time in this class alone to bring to the table. I have a genuine interest in the operation of these vessels and I believe the Final Enquiry bought a 'sort of' peace to the incident without addressing the real issues. Why? Because the FI was also confronted with 'no go ' areas similar to what you are suggesting here.

Bickering? I leave that for those who have 'heard about it' or 'read about it' 

Brgds

Bill


----------



## John Cassels

Chouan said:


> Sorry, my mistake, I'd always thought, clearly erroneously, that the 'Glen and the 'Hunter became the Kona and the Helm.
> 
> _"What do you mean - one of Bill's invisibles ?."_
> 
> I am one of 7 or 8 members who have disagreed with Bill, and consequently put on an "ignore" facility, open to all members, which means that he can't see my posts. As far as the repairs are concerned, I've described them, so how are they fanciful?



If you are referring to your post # 52 , then you havn't described anything.

Anyway , for the benefit of yourself and jmcg regarding his assertion that
the Cast Kittiwake needed extensive work to restore her to class in 1982 ;

Found my old files and spend yesterday afternoon strolling down OBO
memory lane. Did not find much of importance regarding the Kittiwake but
found quite a few horror stories about the other Cast OBOs which I had
long forgotten. Heating coils frozen in the stowage position under the
hatch lids and could not be freed to lower to TT and laycan only days away
( can't remember how we got out of that one); Oil ingress into void spaces
cofferdams, pipe tunnels ; deck scrubbers that couldn't get O2 content
down , couldn't keep positive IG pressure after deck seal and a host of
other normal little OBO nightmares . I can see tears of nostalgia from
Bill and Roddy !!.
Regards the Kittiwake , only found the following ;

24 June 1982 ; telex from me to Master ( via Rotterdam agents ) telling him
I wanted hold #9 discharged and emptied first ( probably for outstanding
repair work).
21 July 1982 ; telex from me to Cast head office in Fribourg reporting that 
items #16 and 19 cleared from defect list.
20 Sept 1982 ; telex from me to head office saying I had recieved heavy
weather and log abstracts voyage Sepetiba - Singapore from Master.

That's all I found , just routine stuff and nothing about class dramas.
As I said before , she was trading in oil in the Summer of 1981 and I was
on board ( as owners rep ) at the time of frame #65 as indicated by
R 904444. Think it about time you told us EXACTLY where your info
comes from.


----------



## John Cassels

R904444 said:


> I joined the the Cast Kittiwake in Rotterdam on 21/07/82 as 4/E and at this time she had just had major repairs done in the frame 65 area, I was shown one of the frames that had been removed which was very badly cracked. I don't know if the repairs were to builder's specs but on that trip we carried iron ore from Brazil to Japan and then oil from the Gulf to Augusta, Sicily via the Suez canal. There were no major structural problems during this trip.
> 
> I was also on the Cast Heron (Ex Nordic Chieftan) when it changed its name to 'Helm' in End June early July 1983 when Cast allegedly went bust (rumour on board at the time), maybe John Cassels can shine some light on this. She was at built in Sunderland to a different design to the Kittiwake. We carried one oil cargo on that trip.
> 
> Her Sister was the Nordic Crusader which could probably start a new thread wth the Loch Striven lay up and problems she had in the engine room - crankshaft moved on main shrinks after Main Engine cylinder(s) filled with water!
> 
> Andy McArthur


Morning Andy,

Cast didn't go exactly bust but had the rug pulled away from underneath by
A Canadian consortium who had been funding the two new building OBOs.
Most of the existing OBO fleet had then to be sold off.

Ah , the Nordic Chieftain and Crusader , sailed on both of them ............
and the nightmares return .


----------



## Chouan

"If you are referring to your post # 52 , then you haven't described anything."

I'm sorry, I thought I did. I'll refresh your memory.

_*“"Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired."
Whilst not criticising the above, the repair work on the above vessel was far more extensive. 
Certainly by 1986-7 when I sailed on her she also had extensive doubling plates, extra repair work, extensive large brackets etc etc in pump room along bulkhead. Much, MUCH, more than deck cracks repaired. The repairs, especially the cracks, were inspected every three days, according to the ship's standing orders, in case of the cracks re-appearing, or new ones making an appearance.”*_
Now, I may only have been a lowly Second Mate on her, and may not have had extensive experience of the operational and management side of OBOs, but, to me, that is a description. 
It is a description based on what I saw, on a ship that I sailed on. Not what I heard, not what I read about, not what I was told, but what I saw. I didn't measure the size of the brackets, I didn't see the paperwork; when one is doing cargo watches on sixes and preparing the charts and courses for the next voyage one has other concerns. However, they were big brackets, I would guess, from memory, about 15' by 8' and 11/2" thick, and were clearly retro fitted. They were substantially buckled. The doubling plates along the deck were also substantial, there were substantial patches inside the pump room as well as on the bulkhead the other side of the bulkhead from the pumproom. 
To me, this is merely elaborating on my earlier description. Because I don't have notes, drawings and technical information to draw from does not make my description "fanciful", nor does it make it invalid. It certainly doesn't mean that I haven't described anything. Perhaps I haven't described anything in a way that you wish it to be described. Perhaps you can tell me, or the membership, how you would like me to describe what I saw if the above is insufficient?

As far as seaworthyness is concerned, I have already indicated that some of her bulkheads weren't sound. Her deck was paper thin in places and "bounced" as one walked across it. 
We loaded oil at Sullom Voe and were only passed as "safe"(!) because of our flag; there was no inspection! Again, I haven't been told any of this, I was on watch with the Mate when the "safety inspection" took place. It helped in that the inspector was ex-Denholms and was sympathetic.


----------



## chadburn

John.c I suggest you read your 827 CAREFULLY again you will see that it is in two parts the first part IS MINE which begin's "There is No Evidence etc" the second part was added by jmcg regarding retro repairs, although it is in the same font, You will have a long time waiting for me to come on Watch especially when It's not my turn.

Bill Davies. you are the very chap who introduced the theory on this Forum that the Crew left this hatch open/unsecured WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE AT ALL, not myself, I and other's find this distasteful which is why you blocked them out, unfortunatly you appeared to have based this theory on your own experience which speaks volume's for your style of seamanship, Both jmcg, myself and other's have sailed and experienced Furness built O.B.O's. Tell me which one did you serve on? 
As far as your comment about the Botlek, that's what the O.B.O's I served on were built for, the contract was to supply Krupp's (the Botlek being the offloading Port) and we sailed under their houseflag. Once the Contract finished the ships were sold off. Not rocket science is it.


----------



## John Cassels

Chadburn , you are indeed correct.

Chouan , I'm not going to get into a dispute with you as this thread is not
the appropriate place but you quote several statements "abundance of tragic
history ............"; ëxtensive doubling plates, extra repair work ,extensive large brackets etc etc ......" 

But this is not the point , you may well be correct but can hardly be called 
a desciption ( you do a little better in the middle part of yr #866 ).

The point is , these are repairs you saw in 1986-1987 my whereas sticking
point is jmcg's annoying inference that 4-5 years earlier under Cast 
ownership in 1982 she was nearly out of class.
This I would like clarified from his side.


----------



## Steve Woodward

Gentlemen,
The Derbyshire and the loss of all 44 people on board is a tragedy that few of us will forget, but the interests and memory of those lost is not best served by petty personal bickering.
Remember relatives of those who were lost may read this forum, so please treat this thread with the respect it deserves


----------



## Chouan

Bill Davies said:


> Incorrect like most of your over emotional posts. I have always believed that the initiating event for the ingress was through the access hatch. That is far from saying the crew left the hatch open. _*I do not have the facility to edit/block posts.*_ My seamanship in question from a RN/MN Chief Engineer ....please!
> 
> Try constructive responses rather than playing to the gallery. As for rocket science I do not believe you could comprehend it or seamanship for that matter.


Members do, however have the ability to block posts for themselves, ie. so that _*they*_ can't see posts from members whose posts they don't wish to see. Posts #97 and #109 in this thread both refer to Bill’s “ignore” list, which he here seems to know nothing about, in post #110 he agrees to an inclusion to that list. 

John, you've made some good points in some good posts in this thread, but your tone is increasingly patronising, I'm afraid.

_*"But this is not the point , you may well be correct but can hardly be called a desciption ( you do a little better in the middle part of yr #866 )."*_

D- could do better, take a hundred lines: I must pay more attention to detail, especially when engaged in conversations with my elders and betters.

Clearly this thread is now reserved for senior people only, people with only 2 stripes who merely sailed on the ships are obviously commenting under suffrance. It would be funny if the background wasn't so tragic.
I'll get my coat.


----------



## John Cassels

Steve Woodward said:


> Gentlemen,
> The Derbyshire and the loss of all 44 people on board is a tragedy that few of us will forget, but the interests and memory of those lost is not best served by petty personal bickering.
> Remember relatives of those who were lost may read this forum, so please treat this thread with the respect it deserves


Steve , you are indeed correct. The main subject started to slip away
early on and it shouldn't have.

We should actually start another thread - (S)crappy obos - for example.
If I do , I may refer to various posts on the Derbyshire thread but not to
the ship herself. Would that be acceptable ?.


----------



## chadburn

jcmg, in answer to your query regarding drawings for the Derbyshire. The only drawing's showing her ""as built" will have been aboard her, there is a reason for this, let me know if you want to know the reason why this is, it is not unusual.


----------



## Steve Woodward

John Cassels said:


> Steve , you are indeed correct. The main subject started to slip away
> early on and it shouldn't have.
> 
> We should actually start another thread - (S)crappy obos - for example.
> If I do , I may refer to various posts on the Derbyshire thread but not to
> the ship herself. Would that be acceptable ?.


I see no problem with that
Steve


----------



## jmcg

Chadburn

Many thanks for your offer. 

BW

J


----------



## non descript

That post was deleted – If you cannot get a grip and recognise the earlier excellent text from Steve Woodward, viz:

_*“The Derbyshire and the loss of all 44 people on board is a tragedy that few of us will forget, but the interests and memory of those lost is not best served by petty personal bickering.
Remember relatives of those who were lost may read this forum, so please treat this thread with the respect it deserves*_. 

– then please do not post at all.

So, get real – take notice and DO NOT indulge in personal bickering… It is not a lot to ask.

(Thumb) 
Mark


----------



## rfajim

*Hello John*



John Rogers said:


> Where were the ships built Pat?
> John


Hi John how's it going, seem to remember you!.
Was Cdt / Snr from 1966-1976...
Just went back on 2002 Sept. Ferries-MM and now RFA-3OE.
Would like to track down final resting or ashes scattering of Bob (RD) Prescott, killed in boiler explosion whilst off Ushant awaiting orders-Liverpool Bridge, but not sure of year.
As often past near crem, at St Helens, as daughters live out that way.
Will have to try HMSO i think.
How's life in civvy street?.
Catch you later Regards Jim O'Donnell Liverpool.


----------



## rfajim

rfajim said:


> Hi John how's it going, seem to remember you!.
> Was Cdt / Snr from 1966-1976...
> Just went back on 2002 Sept. Ferries-MM and now RFA-3OE.
> Would like to track down final resting or ashes scattering of Bob (RD) Prescott, killed in boiler explosion whilst off Ushant awaiting orders-Liverpool Bridge, but not sure of year.
> As often past near crem, at St Helens, as daughters live out that way.
> Will have to try HMSO i think.
> How's life in civvy street?.
> Catch you later Regards Jim O'Donnell Liverpool.


.

If talking about build of ships-then we took English Bridge from the TEES at Haverton Hill under the transporter,,,and once out could never return,,,1973-bit mucky and quite a workhorse-intensive tlc i guess.
Made by swan Hunter to the usual type of design and a low grade of tensile steel to save weight-hence fatigue i guess.
Cheers Jim


----------



## chadburn

rfajim, did you have any problems with welds/leaking Ballast Tanks when you took the English Bridge on Trials or had they got the problem sorted by the 3rd Ship in the series? Cheers.


----------



## Franktheboat

i was on the shropshire thank christ she was not a tanker
i also watched the derbyshire on tv this morning i wander why she broke into so many pieces 


franktheboat


----------



## jmcg

Frank Pulford

A good introduction may be found by reviewing "A Ship Too Far - The Mystery of The Derbyshire" written by Capt. Dave Ramwell & Tim Madge. Published by Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN No. 0-340 56997-2. Compulsive reading. 

BW

J


----------



## Bill Davies

I think this book is what you say, an introduction, and should be supplemented with Bulk Carrier Practice which is about to be released in its second edition (new format).


----------



## Tmac1720

Can also recommend " Return of the Coffin Ships, the Derbyshire Enigma" by Bernard Edwards.


----------



## K urgess

The posts following this are more concerned with the apparently continuing problems with bulk carriers so they have been moved out to a new thread here
http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/showthread.php?t=26109


----------



## Budgie

I remember it well,i'd just done 2 x three month stints in a row on Dart Atlantic (Bibby bros)as a junior rating and ac***ulated 2 months leave, resigned and company asked me if i wanted to fly to canada to join the Derbshire in a months time, i was tempted but got carried away on leave and changed my mind went back to the pool 2 months later and ended up back on Dart Atlantic where most of the crew had thought i had joined it, and then told me of her demise, found out a couple of years ago that the poor bloke who took the position was a first tripper.it often pondered through my mind what they went through.


----------



## calway

hi john rodgers or jim o'donnell this is rob prescotts sister cal would like to here from you, and how much you new about our brother


----------



## R58484956

*MV Derbyshire*

On Saturday night 6th JUNE (TONIGHT) at 22.00 hrs local, there is a tv programme called
"Deep Sea Detectives" which is dealing with the sinking of the Derbyshire in 1980. The programme is on for one hour.
It is on the History channel, Sky529, Virgin 234


----------



## Bill Davies

R58484956 said:


> On Saturday night 6th JUNE (TONIGHT) at 22.00 hrs local, there is a tv programme called
> "Deep Sea Detectives" which is dealing with the sinking of the Derbyshire in 1980. The programme is on for one hour.
> It is on the History channel, Sky529, Virgin 234


Well,
What did you think.? I did not see this programme but always keen to hear new angles, if there are any, on this dreadful incident.

Bill


----------



## whitterd

Dick S said:


> I sailed on the Eden Bridge, built in Japan to same plan I remember seeing a picture of Eden Bridge broke in halfe alongside a quay somewhere in South America when the loading arm would not shut down. (new name by then)
> Dick


I sailed on the Eden Bridge for 9 months; we were at sea in the Pacific at the time of the Derbyshire loss. I remember thinking there but by the grace of god go I. The Eden Bridge was a total wreck top to bottom. I don’t recall one saving grace on this ship save the sauna room. There is not the space on this site to cover all the defects. I wonder what the elf n safety brigade nowadays would make of some of the things that we took to sea masquerading as ships. 
Regards
David Whitter


----------



## Abbeywood.

whitterd said:


> I sailed on the Eden Bridge for 9 months; we were at sea in the Pacific at the time of the Derbyshire loss. I remember thinking there but by the grace of god go I. The Eden Bridge was a total wreck top to bottom. I don’t recall one saving grace on this ship save the sauna room. There is not the space on this site to cover all the defects. I wonder what the elf n safety brigade nowadays would make of some of the things that we took to sea masquerading as ships.
> Regards
> David Whitter


I spent five years in both Dart Atlantic and Dart America, (!975-80) but prior to that I served two trips in the Atlantic Bridge and one trip in the Australian Bridge where my Junior watchkeeper was Graham Hutchinson who sadly ended up as 2nd Eng in the Derbyshire.
I had also sailed with Chief Eng' the Chief Steward and had made the aquaintance of the Master G.V.Underhill. 
Having left Bibby's for the UK coast trade, I was surprised to read that I had been included in the Derbyshire crew list, only to find out that there was a person with the same name serving in the Deck Dept, (i.e. Peter Lambert)


----------



## Bill Davies

No doubt the relative of Paul Lambert, to man who organised the Derbyshire Family Association.


----------



## thobshropshire

Correct Bill, Peter Lambert was Paul Lambert's brother


----------



## Bill Davies

Is the Derbyshire Family Association still active?


----------



## thobshropshire

*Derbyshire Families Association*

I am not sure one way or the other re the DFA, they obviously provided info for the exhibition at Liverpool Maritime museum in 2005

http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/maritime/exhibitions/derbyshire/crew_families.aspx

Not seen anything more recent


----------



## Bill Davies

Yes ,they seem to have gone very quiet. We have them to thank for the pressure resulting in the SOLAS Bulk Carrier amendment.


----------



## jmcg

It is difficult to imagine the frustration that these people have experienced.

As we near the 29th anniversary of the tragic loss of fellow seafarers let us pause for a moment to remember them.

I can thank my God that I was given the wisdom to sail but one trip on her sister. She broke her back some time later.

We will remember them.

J.


----------



## bones140

There is a lot of information available on the National Archives website including the second hearing transcript and the photographs taken of the Derbyshire on the sea bed:
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ero/browse.aspx?id=4004&level=5&entrypoint=MT/204/2/APPENDIX 6.htm


----------



## luzy

*Tyne Bridge*

Hello!

Was it the Tyne Bridge?
I sailed on her in the 80.


----------



## non descript

luzy said:


> Hello!
> 
> Was it the Tyne Bridge?
> I sailed on her in the 80.


I am not sure what your question is asking, but as you will see from the thread if you go back through it, the _Derbyshire_ was the _Liverpool Bridge_, before she was renamed Derbyshire. Built in 1976, she was lost in September 1980, so that leaves you with what seems like a very lucky escape.


----------



## Neil Mant

Hi all just found this on UTube.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0
UK/EC Assessors report.
Neil


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## K urgess

Already posted a long time ago, Neil. (Sad)


----------



## luzy

Thank you so much.
I sailed a few times on the sistership from the Derbyshire, the Tyne Bridge. 
Even at the time the Derbyshire was lost.
I sailed for an Italian Company.
Any crewmembers reading this? I remember Tony the R.O.


----------



## janemary

*Bill Hunt*

I have set up a Forever By The Sea Fund with the RNLI in memory of my twin brother, Bill Hunt, who was 4th Engineer on the Derbyshire. Anyone who remembers him and who would like to add any memories (or donations!) can find the link on the RNLI webpage.
It will be 30 years in September.
Thanks


----------



## Gulpers

*Welcome*

janemary,

On behalf of the Moderating Team, a warm welcome to SN from the Isle of Anglesey.
What a wonderful way of raising funds for the RNLI in memory of Bill's untimely death.
Good luck and I am sure many SN members will visit the RNLI website to contribute either memories or indeed cash. (Thumb)


----------



## jmcg

Another year rolls away and as posted by janemary @ #902 it will be 30 years ago on September 9th that the last call was made by those on Derbyshire.

I hope all S/N members reading this will pause for a moment or two in rememberance of all 44 that were lost to the deep on that voyage. I can still imagine and indeed remember her sister - English Bridge - creaking and groaning and the comments of the 2nd Mate as we rounded the Horm in ballast. It was but a few years later that those words haunted me and will continue to do so.

Let us remember them all on Thursday.

J


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## michael charters

They are never forgotten. *MV Derbyshire*


----------



## dominic

MV Derbyshire - 09/09/1980 - 09/09/2010 - To all the crew and family members who passed on that fateful day 30 years ago. You will always remain in our memories. R.I.P.


----------



## jmcg

dominic said:


> MV Derbyshire - 09/09/1980 - 09/09/2010 - To all the crew and family members who passed on that fateful day 30 years ago. You will always remain in our memories. R.I.P.


A nice simple tribute Dom that rings true with me.

There will be a 30th anniversary memorial service for those lost at the Liverpool Parish Church of St Nicholas, Pier Head, Liverpool on Saturday 11th September at 13.00 hours.



BW

J


----------



## tonymorcom

*Astounded*

I have just come acros this thread and naturally opened it out of interest as I was a serving officer at that time. I simply cannot believe that the subject has been treated in such a disrespectful way as it has by certain members over the years. Derbyshire will go down in history as one of the most widely known shipping disasters since Titanic whatever the reason was for her sinking. Surely we should all just pay our respects and spare a thought for those that lost their lives doing a job that we all LOVED so much. R.I.P. Officers and crew of the M.V.Derbyshire.


----------



## B.Nicholson

tonymorcom said:


> I have just come acros this thread and naturally opened it out of interest as I was a serving officer at that time. I simply cannot believe that the subject has been treated in such a disrespectful way as it has by certain members over the years. Derbyshire will go down in history as one of the most widely known shipping disasters since Titanic whatever the reason was for her sinking. Surely we should all just pay our respects and spare a thought for those that lost their lives doing a job that we all LOVED so much. R.I.P. Officers and crew of the M.V.Derbyshire.


Tony you are so correct. I think anyone showing disrespect should be booted off this site. Not only are they disrespectful, but also disgusting and a disgrace to the Merchant Navy.


----------



## chadburn

One of the problems with this sorry episode was the use by one man of numerous "glove puppet's", as he was found out during the course of the contribution's his "glove puppet" contribution's (which caused a lot of upset at the time) have now been expunged. He was not man enough to make adverse comment's under his own well known name/title but used other's (glove puppet's) which at the time looked genuine as they were "proper" names as in Brian Locking for just one. He also claimed to have designed a so called security device for a hatch similiar to the one fitted to the Derbyshire which was at first thought to be the reason for the loss and submitted what could be described as an etch-a-sketch drawing of his device, he also claimed that he had this device fitted to vessel(s) which he served on. Clearly he used this sorry episode to promote something that was a figment of his imagination as it does not exist otherwise I am sure he would have photographed it from every angle and produced them as evidence to back his claim. Nothing has been forthcoming. Why he should use such a tragic event to gain "kudos" has a lot of us puzzled and in my view is despicable and I have no time for him no matter what he now call's himself.


----------



## John Farrell

Are there any of these combination carriers still in operation?


----------



## randcmackenzie

Yes, quite a number.


----------



## Billieboy

John Farrell said:


> Are there any of these combination carriers still in operation?


Lots of them John, all with much reduced scantlings and f.o.c. crew. They get lots of attention when in North Europe, from the Port State Control, so owners tend to send them to other ports.


----------



## John Cassels

randcmackenzie said:


> Yes, quite a number.


Roddy , you missed out the word "unfortunatly ".


----------



## John Farrell

John Cassels said:


> Roddy , you missed out the word "unfortunatly ".


John Cassels,
I think we would all agree with you on that one .


----------



## randcmackenzie

Well no, funnily enough, hard core crazy or not, I quite liked OBOs, and the last one I sailed on was an easy ship to work, though somewhat cheaply built.

Of course, there were many things requiring attention all the time, but if the owners were competent OBO managers, they could be quite well kept up.

The latter day OBOs I boarded as mooring master were fitted with many workload reducing advances.

It was always a giggle to get cargo surveyors to stop wriggling and admit that there was indeed a zero ROB after an oil discharge.


----------



## John Cassels

Except surveyors that kept moaning about "clingage " , and that was 30 years
ago.
But you're right , did manage to get a zero ROB once - Cast Puffin.


----------



## Jacko123

loss of the Derbyshire explanation video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0


----------



## reefrat

chadburn said:


> One of the problems with this sorry episode was the use by one man of numerous "glove puppet's", as he was found out during the course of the contribution's his "glove puppet" contribution's (which caused a lot of upset at the time) have now been expunged. He was not man enough to make adverse comment's under his own well known name/title but used other's (glove puppet's) which at the time looked genuine as they were "proper" names as in Brian Locking for just one. He also claimed to have designed a so called security device for a hatch similiar to the one fitted to the Derbyshire which was at first thought to be the reason for the loss and submitted what could be described as an etch-a-sketch drawing of his device, he also claimed that he had this device fitted to vessel(s) which he served on. Clearly he used this sorry episode to promote something that was a figment of his imagination as it does not exist otherwise I am sure he would have photographed it from every angle and produced them as evidence to back his claim. Nothing has been forthcoming. Why he should use such a tragic event to gain "kudos" has a lot of us puzzled and in my view is despicable and I have no time for him no matter what he now call's himself.


Some one suspected the "glove puppetry" a long time ago on the thread. I for one was disgusted at the flapping of qualifications and virulent personal abuse, some times thinly veiled but still abuse that got into what is a sombre thread.

I heve have always be curious as to the volume of the bosun's store. Was it of such size that it could put the ship dangerously down by the head. 
R.I.P.


----------



## Billieboy

reefrat said:


> Some one suspected the "glove puppetry" a long time ago on the thread. I for one was disgusted at the flapping of qualifications and virulent personal abuse, some times thinly veiled but still abuse that got into what is a sombre thread.
> 
> I heve have always be curious as to the volume of the bosun's store. Was it of such size that it could put the ship dangerously down by the head.
> R.I.P.


Reefrat, with due respect, the official, final report, shows that the bosun's store hatch, was fully secured until the hull was already sinking. The video/computer description, a few posts up at #918, is incorrect.


----------



## Mike S

Interesting BB......so essentially it was the severing of the air pipes fwd that caused the ship to go by the head?

Like many others I ceased to follow the thread during the era of the "Glove Puppets" as I found the whole thing very distastefull in view of the tragic sinking.

I still feel that she was essentially a ship caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. She is not and will not will be the last large vessel to suc***b to the sea at its worst.

RIP to all on her.


----------



## reefrat

Billieboy said:


> Reefrat, with due respect, the official, final report, shows that the bosun's store hatch, was fully secured until the hull was already sinking. The video/computer description, a few posts up at #918, is incorrect.


Dear BB no respect required, please mark me down severely for not paying attention, the thread has become so convoluted that I, along with some other members, seem to have lost the plot


----------



## Blackal

tonymorcom said:


> I have just come acros this thread and naturally opened it out of interest as I was a serving officer at that time. I simply cannot believe that the subject has been treated in such a disrespectful way as it has by certain members over the years. Derbyshire will go down in history as one of the most widely known shipping disasters since Titanic whatever the reason was for her sinking. Surely we should all just pay our respects and spare a thought for those that lost their lives doing a job that we all LOVED so much. R.I.P. Officers and crew of the M.V.Derbyshire.


Mmm.......... not sure that I would agree - entirely.



The thread was not started (I believe) to be a tribute or eulogy to the deceased, but merely a topic for technical (or human behaviour - if appropriate) discussion. As the thread developed however, anything deemed contentious by some contributors - was censured by them because 'relatives of the deceased were following the thread' ?

As I mentioned in the thread - it's a 'forum'. It is all 'opinion' - if you don't want opinion......... stay away from the thread and limit your reading to the official enquiry.

A thread to pay respect - is a different matter completely, and should be moderated accordingly. 

(I wasn't aware of the 'glove-puppetry' going on - that's an interesting aspect. There were certainly lots of egos prevailing, though)

Al


----------



## John Farrell

I would agree with Blackal in entirety.

it's a 'forum'. It is all 'opinion' - if you don't want opinion......... stay away from the thread and limit your reading to the official enquiry.

Post mortems to any degree held on this site will achieve nothing except upset those close to those who were lost. 

Generic discussions on this class of ship is healthier!


----------



## Billieboy

Mike S said:


> Interesting BB......so essentially it was the severing of the air pipes fwd that caused the ship to go by the head?
> 
> RIP to all on her.



Yes Mike, then she went slowly deeper and deeper. The severing of the air pipes was ably assisted by corrosion above the deck weld. This was borne out by inspection of air pipes on other vessels of the same class.


----------



## jmcg

I have never ruled out the possibility that she was not under way or just underway when her back severed and consumed immediately. She was found some considerable distance from her last reported position.

I was on her sister for one trip and can still recall her groans. For many years thereafter it was difficult to crew her from Liverpool.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## John Cassels

In my humble opinion , OBO's were the biggest abortion ever to have been
bestowed on the shipping fraternity.

I am talking about the 1st. generation - late '70's early '80's.


----------



## chadburn

A bit earlier than that John, more like the late 1960's certainly with the 75,000 tonner's


----------



## John Cassels

chadburn said:


> A bit earlier than that John, more like the late 1960's certainly with the 75,000 tonner's


I stand corrected ............. Was always on the cape size ones.


----------



## randcmackenzie

I think you are painting the picture too black John, they were not all bad ships, though some of the Denholm capesizes were truly awful.

Best ones I came across were the Swedish built 100,000 tonners. The older sisters of the Team boats which became Friendly Ranger, Friendly Carrier, Pacific Express and so on were basically good ships. Friendly Carrier was originally AK? Fernstrom, then Silverland. Vianna was another whose picture has featured recently.

They had midships pumprooms with the pumps driven by either steam turbines or dedicated diesels, which worked surprisingly well.

The Team boats themselves were not bad either, though the system of having the generator engine drive a pump did put a lot of eggs in one basket.

The Swedish buily Nor-Obo class were not bad either, hydraulic deepwell pumps in each hold, and NO pumproom.

The problem with all of them was maintenance, which depending on the owner's fortunes in the seventies and eighties could be quite minimal.

But there were many horror stories .......

B/R


----------



## John Cassels

Maybe I am at that Roddy but it was the Denholm capesize I was talking about.

My last one ( before coming ashore ) was the worst and shall remain nameless
less the nightmares return. Don't have to tell you the things we had to do to
clean for oil after a sticky Richards Bay coal discharge.
Even apart from the cleaning op., the system itself was a disaster.
For example , none of the permajets would drop properly due to years of
coal dust and we once had to drop the portable heating coils from under
the hatch covers ;

Enough said.


----------



## richy

I went on board the derbyshire in japan before she went down, we were in the same storm as her after but we were lucky.


----------



## muldonaich

richy said:


> I went on board the derbyshire in japan before she went down, we were in the same storm as her after but we were lucky.


 i thought she was heading for japan with a full cargo of ore kev.


----------



## John Callon

muldonaich said:


> i thought she was heading for japan with a full cargo of ore kev.


You are quite correct Kev, she was heading for Japan to discharge her cargo of ore. As I remember, some of the crew were due to be relieved in Japan and their reliefs were actually waiting for them in the Hotel at the Japanese port that the handover was to take place.
John.C


----------



## richy

such a long time ago it must have been the port before. I always thought it was in japan i boarded, we used to swap films with every british or maersk ships in dock. 
I can remember the typhoon we were in, been in a few storms but that time i was quite nervous


----------



## gadfly

Hi all

Some comments regarding the Load Line Convention and the hatch covers on the Derbyshire have recently been added to the following website:

http://mv-derbyshire.blogspot.com/

Regards


----------



## jmcg

Gone but never forgotten on this 31st anniversary of her demise.

Sad indeed for all families who will never forget.

J


----------



## billwoodwardart

When I got married in June 1980 I had asked to take my wife with me for a "honeymoon trip". I was offered a J/Eng position on the Derbyshire but 
I asked to go back on the Wiltshire as I'd never sailed in the same ship twice and thought it would make it easier on the bride if I knew the ship.
We were in drydock in Malta when the Old Man and the Cheng came into the bar and broke the bad news.
The other wife on the ship (2/mate's) had just come off the Derbyshire and had ridiculed us for not taking her over the stinky Wiltshire. Her face was so white.
I lost a lot of mates that day. We could so easily been with them, my wife and I.
I only drink on one day of the year these days...it falls in September.


----------



## New Haven Neil

*Almost...*

I have a similar tale, but I was even closer. I was due to join her offshore at Cape Town as a j/eng on her last voyage - she was late and I went to the Staffordshire up the gulf. So the poor sod that went in my stead (Lambert?) was lost. We were actually going to the same port in Japan, some of the folk waiting came on board of course - we knew then she was gone.

I lost friends on her of course, Arthur Bayliss was a real gent, and Graham & Anne-Marie Hutchinson were neighbours of ours too, that really hit us hard. Honeymoon trip too. Still hurts to think about it.


----------



## jmcg

Although the thread appears to be fading somewhat let us remember all her complement on Saturday next - 9th Sept '12

It will be 32 years since she was consumed.

Let us pause and remember them all.

Lost but never forgotten.

J


----------



## The Buccaneer

*RN ops September 1980.*

Hi all,
In post #396 of this thread R651400 wrote:
'I was working in Japan when "Derbyshire" disappeared. 
At the same time there was a Royal Navy courtesy visit, HMS Antrim to Tokyo, HMS Naiede and RFA oiler Tide**** in Yokohama. 
I have it on good authority HMS Antrim was joyriding local dignitaries around Tokyo Bay when the message was passed that "Derbyshire" had disappeared. 
To the best of my knowledge not one of the above mentioned vessels left port to take part in the search.'

As far as I can see from following the thread through nobody made any comment about this occurence. This refers to the RN Far East Flotilla of 1980 consisting of :Submarine HMS 'Dreadnought' (S101),HMS 'Antrim', HMS 'Coventry',HMS 'Alacrity'(beset with engineering probs,so didn't complete whole deployment) HMS 'Galatea' and HMS 'Naiad' plus 3 RFA vessels that visited various Far East ports during July to September 1980. It seems that some or all of the deployment departed Taiwan on 6/9/80 bound for ports in Japan. It therefore appears that the vessels were AT SEA during typhoon 'Orchid' with ETA at Tokyo for 'Coventry' and 'Antrim' for 11/9/80. History reveals this to us via the photo-albums of crew members of 'Coventry' see this link here:
http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/albums.php
If you click on Steve 'Moffs' Moffatt's album, it will reveal that the deployment left after 5/9/80 from Taiwan and confirms arrival and duration of stay in Tokyo via complimentary bus pass: Click on 'Tokyo, Japan, September 1980 '.
The album of Jack Russell shows us an image of 'Typhoon South China Sea.,1980'. From available info this could of been typhoon's Lex,Marge or Norris, but is more likely Orchid, on the afternoon of 9/9/80.
All this puts these RN ships (or some of them) potentially within 100 miles of Derbyshire's last known position as of 9th September 1980; and as R651400 points out, it appears that none of these vessel's assisted in the search for Derbyshire; neither were any of the officers of these vessels called to the Derbyshire Inquiry or RFI to give evidence of sea state etc. 
Has anybody ,now, any comment about these RN ops of Sept 1980?
Regards,
Uncle Buc.


----------



## Andy Duncan

If I remember correctly we were fairly close to the Derbyshire when we were asked if we could assist in a search ,we couldnt as we were hoved to , the ship was the Kollie D, fully loaded heading for Japan.

Andy


----------



## oldman 80

The Buccaneer said:


> Hi all,
> In post #396 of this thread R651400 wrote:
> 'I was working in Japan when "Derbyshire" disappeared.
> At the same time there was a Royal Navy courtesy visit, HMS Antrim to Tokyo, HMS Naiede and RFA oiler Tide**** in Yokohama.
> I have it on good authority HMS Antrim was joyriding local dignitaries around Tokyo Bay when the message was passed that "Derbyshire" had disappeared.
> To the best of my knowledge not one of the above mentioned vessels left port to take part in the search.'
> 
> As far as I can see from following the thread through nobody made any comment about this occurence. This refers to the RN Far East Flotilla of 1980 consisting of :Submarine HMS 'Dreadnought' (S101),HMS 'Antrim', HMS 'Coventry',HMS 'Alacrity'(beset with engineering probs,so didn't complete whole deployment) HMS 'Galatea' and HMS 'Naiad' plus 3 RFA vessels that visited various Far East ports during July to September 1980. It seems that some or all of the deployment departed Taiwan on 6/9/80 bound for ports in Japan. It therefore appears that the vessels were AT SEA during typhoon 'Orchid' with ETA at Tokyo for 'Coventry' and 'Antrim' for 11/9/80. History reveals this to us via the photo-albums of crew members of 'Coventry' see this link here:
> http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/albums.php
> If you click on Steve 'Moffs' Moffatt's album, it will reveal that the deployment left after 5/9/80 from Taiwan and confirms arrival and duration of stay in Tokyo via complimentary bus pass: Click on 'Tokyo, Japan, September 1980 '.
> The album of Jack Russell shows us an image of 'Typhoon South China Sea.,1980'. From available info this could of been typhoon's Lex,Marge or Norris, but is more likely Orchid, on the afternoon of 9/9/80.
> All this puts these RN ships (or some of them) potentially within 100 miles of Derbyshire's last known position as of 9th September 1980; and as R651400 points out, it appears that none of these vessel's assisted in the search for Derbyshire; neither were any of the officers of these vessels called to the Derbyshire Inquiry or RFI to give evidence of sea state etc.
> Has anybody ,now, any comment about these RN ops of Sept 1980?
> Regards,
> Uncle Buc.



Well like yourself, I do not recall any RN ships being despatched to search for signs of the Derbyshire after her disappearance. However that does not suprise me, and in that respect, I do not hesitate to remind those who may need to be reminded, that Margaret Thatcher had been in power for a little over a year, (or thereabouts) at the time of the Derbyshire's loss. Yes the very same Margaret Thatcher who moved hell and high water in her efforts to prevent any public enquiry into the matter.
She was no friend of mercantile seafarers, as most, I think, would agree, nor indeed of the Shipping Industry itself. Whether that had anything to do withthe gist of your post, is probably best left for readers themselves to decide. 
*So far as the Red Ensign is concerned*, I am of the view that she alone succeeded where Hitler and Doenitz had failed. That of course, is a damning indictment of a Prime Minister and the then Government, of what was previously, withou doubt, the finest Maritime Nation in the world, and a nation whose Merchant Seafarers must, and indeed are at least now recognised as the most courageous of them all, as indeed will any survivor of the Atlantic and Russian Convoys confirm.
I do not hesitate to commend your reference to the website http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/albums.php, and in particular to the photograph in the album of Jack Russell depicting a photograph of a Typhoon in the South China Sea in 1980.
The photograph says a lot, but what some readers may not appreciate is that when such extreme weather conditions persist for extended periods of time then "_out there_", unseen, indeed _undetectable_, is likely to lie one of those bloody great holes in the ocean which despite being somewhat mythical, quite definately, do in fact exist. When a vessel stumbles across one of them (through bad luck or extreme misfortune),and literally falls into it, the outlook is exceedingly bleak.
As she wallows in the depths of that hole, (and that is really all she can do), there will come a time when the hole begins to fill, at which point it's sides can come crashing down on top of that vessel, and there are no cargo hatch covers in this world which are designed to withstand the enormous head of water which may/ can be experienced in such a case.
*If that* happened to the Derbyshire, (and it may have), then her potential for survival would have been limited, particularly as I believe her cargo hold hatches were of the early Macgregor Side Rolling type - which makes me suggest that if such incident occured she would be likely to founder very quickly. ( It's just another likely scenario which may have resulted in her loss).
Unfortunately I have not sufficient memory of that particular typhoon, how fast it was moving, and therefore how long it remained within a particular geopgraphical area and perhaps in consequence, how likely such a hole was formed. Make no mistake, those *holes* do exist, and they can be exceedingly large and deep, - quite enormous in fact.
Those on board are unlikely to have any knowledge of its existence, (the photo makes that quite clear) until, that is, they are unlucky enough to suddenly fall into it, - at which time there is suddenly absolutely no doubt at all.
Under those cir***stances *Survival is possible*, but with *Divine Intervention *alone._Such intervention can_, and I believe may take a variety of different forms. Deadfreight is one of them - of that, you may be assured, but it is likely more will be needed, - *BUT* at least, deadfreight is a bloody good start.


----------



## The Buccaneer

Oldman 80 wrote:I do not hesitate to commend your reference to the website http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/albums.php, and in particular to the photograph in the album of Jack Russell depicting a photograph of a Typhoon in the South China Sea in 1980.
The photograph says a lot, but what some readers may not appreciate is that when such extreme weather conditions persist for extended periods of time then "out there", unseen, indeed undetectable, is likely to lie one of those bloody great holes in the ocean which despite being somewhat mythical, quite definately, do in fact exist. When a vessel stumbles across one of them (through bad luck or extreme misfortune),and literally falls into it, the outlook is exceedingly bleak.

I totally concur with your comments about NNW (Non Negotiable Waves); I myself faced my first one at an estimated 30 metres in 1986 and indeed believed doom awaited us and immediatly I clawed my way to the control console and sounded the general alarm; just as the vessel rode up the face of it and crashed through the the bubbling white foaming top. Crew, fresh out of their bunks (either by being thrown or by virtue of the general alarm) were aware that something strange had been encountered: But seemingly not so with Derbyshire.No hint of urgency or distress communications, and I for one remain very suspicious of this fact. This then leaves the question of why in the period of 6th-10th September 1980 RN ships had put to sea into the teeth of a predicted tropical storm /typhoon. Is it not the desire of most Masters/Commanders to avoid these things, especially when well predicted, as with Typhoon Orchid? Then we have to ask as to why (as the crew photo albums show) that having been shadowed by Russia's capital surface ship (Kiev) just one week before, wouldn't they be interested in a large radar target within their vicinity, (This is cold war RN from 1980 remember), that Derbyshire would have provided. I suspect that surface surveillance from RN ships (even then) would have been far superior to any ability Derbyshire would have had, and would the RN not be at all suspicious if a large target held on their radar suddenly disappeared from the trackers during a raging typhoon, prompting them to raise their concerns with appropriate Authorities ashore?
...and didn't the Derbyshire on 31/7/80 receive 'charterers' orders to 'slow steam' to add 2 weeks to their journey? If allowed to steam at normal service speed Derbyshire would not have been in this area of sea, in Typhoon Orchid, at the time of her loss. It would be great here at SN if some RN crew from this flotilla could let us know what activities they got up to whilst on passage Taiwan to Japan. Looks to me like under normal sailing conditions for RN ships, that such a voyage would only take a couple of days. Did they carry out any exercises or trials en-route?
Best Regards,
Uncle Buc.


----------



## jmcg

It still puzzles (and indeed troubles) me that Derbyshire had appeared to be under way (not hove to) for some time and had travelled inxo 110 miles from her last reported position.

If there were active Naval vessels nearby could it be the case that her radio gear was "knocked out" or otherwise silenced by the Naval vessels.

I am not familiar with Radio - perhaps a more informed radio chap could comment. 


BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## jmcg

If she in was_ known or suspected peril _i.e. the OM and bridge + Engine room persons in full knowledge of her increasingly perilous situation resulting from an intake of water over her bow causing flooding (as reported) could it be argued that there was sufficient time to send a positional or other non SOS message.

Sorry to ask what might appear a silly question - unfortunately I know little or nothing of radio communication or Radio Officers work loadings of the era.

R 651400
Can you explain what "coverage of a 500 kc/s distress watch by this alongside flotilla would have been stood down" means . I understand the flotilla alongside bit but no more.


BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## jmcg

Thanks for the further explanation- it makes sense to me now.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## Boatman25

Seems to me these posts are just an excuse to make a scapegoat out of someone especially Margaret Thatcher, you will all be saying next she was responsible for the weather, having been in two typhoons I can tell you that if the ship gets in trouble in one nobody stands a chance


----------



## jmcg

Boatman

I've been in a few as indeed were many other S/N members who are /were active on this thread. On Autolycus during one horrendous passage through a "big wind" we tripped our engine (prop out of water leading to engine overspeed), lost Jumbo from Mainmast (aft), lost timber boards loaded on deck in Otaru and we all stood and took our chances.

I do not believe MT is being made a scapegoat on such an emotive and sensitive thread such as this at all - she has enough form with shore side issues. I do not believe she figures in this at all.

I concur with R651400 - and go further to suggest that she was consumed without any cogent advance warning to her OM and his crew. 

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## 5036

From all the survey evidence, the forward hatches gave way causing the bow to go down exposing more hatches to fail. The cargo was found in very closely spaced discrete piles indicating swift structural failure. there was a strong feeling that the frames around frame 65 area were substandard but this was dismissed by the detailed analysis of Professor Douglas Faulkener of Glasgow University who concluded, under new analytical evidence, that the waves encountered by the Derbyshire would have been what was considered at the time and now proven to be "rogue waves" . In any event, the sinking was so fast that it is unlikely that the poor souls had any opportunity to send out a distress signal. If this is the case, it is an affront to lay blame for any failure to search by the Royal Navy who would, in my experience, have been first to put to sea to aid Brits in distress. To blame any politician for this disaster is way below human decency.


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## jmcg

Anyone know what she hauled on her penultimate voyage?

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## Boatman25

Thank you NAV that is what I was trying to say, why must there always be a need to blame someone


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## oldman 80

The Buccaneer said:


> Oldman 80 wrote:I do not hesitate to commend your reference to the website http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/albums.php, and in particular to the photograph in the album of Jack Russell depicting a photograph of a Typhoon in the South China Sea in 1980.
> The photograph says a lot, but what some readers may not appreciate is that when such extreme weather conditions persist for extended periods of time then "out there", unseen, indeed undetectable, is likely to lie one of those bloody great holes in the ocean which despite being somewhat mythical, quite definately, do in fact exist. When a vessel stumbles across one of them (through bad luck or extreme misfortune),and literally falls into it, the outlook is exceedingly bleak.
> 
> I totally concur with your comments about NNW (Non Negotiable Waves); I myself faced my first one at an estimated 30 metres in 1986 and indeed believed doom awaited us and immediatly I clawed my way to the control console and sounded the general alarm; just as the vessel rode up the face of it and crashed through the the bubbling white foaming top. Crew, fresh out of their bunks (either by being thrown or by virtue of the general alarm) were aware that something strange had been encountered: But seemingly not so with Derbyshire.No hint of urgency or distress communications, and I for one remain very suspicious of this fact. This then leaves the question of why in the period of 6th-10th September 1980 RN ships had put to sea into the teeth of a predicted tropical storm /typhoon.
> 
> 
> 
> Is it not the desire of most Masters/Commanders to avoid these things, especially when well predicted, as with Typhoon Orchid?
> 
> 
> 
> Then we have to ask as to why (as the crew photo albums show) that having been shadowed by Russia's capital surface ship (Kiev) just one week before, wouldn't they be interested in a large radar target within their vicinity, (This is cold war RN from 1980 remember), that Derbyshire would have provided. I suspect that surface surveillance from RN ships (even then) would have been far superior to any ability Derbyshire would have had, and would the RN not be at all suspicious if a large target held on their radar suddenly disappeared from the trackers during a raging typhoon, prompting them to raise their concerns with appropriate Authorities ashore?
> ...and didn't the Derbyshire on 31/7/80 receive 'charterers' orders to 'slow steam' to add 2 weeks to their journey? If allowed to steam at normal service speed Derbyshire would not have been in this area of sea, in Typhoon Orchid, at the time of her loss. It would be great here at SN if some RN crew from this flotilla could let us know what activities they got up to whilst on passage Taiwan to Japan. Looks to me like under normal sailing conditions for RN ships, that such a voyage would only take a couple of days. Did they carry out any exercises or trials en-route?
> Best Regards,
> Uncle Buc.
Click to expand...

Well sorry to butt in once again, I am not RN nor RN Retired. However I cannot resist responding to the section quoted or "wrapped" in your posting - as shown above.
"Is it not the desire of Most Masters etc etc. to avoid these things (Cyclones/Typhoons/ Hurricanes)" ?
Well of course it is, but in the case of most bulk carriers it is frequently not possible to avoid them completely. They have not the speed required to ensure that is possible. What we do / did do is position the vessel clear of the dangerous quadrant, ie the one which would, in the event of crippling result in the vessel being carried into the path of the Storm. Sometimes, indeed often, that is the best that can be achieved.
In addition I should point out that the fact that nothing was heard from the Derbyshire in the period immediately before her loss, is really not suprising at all. Her foundering would have been very rapid - so rapid in fact, it is unlikely that any transmittion could have been (a) formulated/compiled & (b) transmitted - even assuming her aeriels remained intact/serviceable in those conditions -and it is quite likely, indeed very likely, they did not.
A brief VHF msg may have been possible for sure - but even then it may not have occured, or simply was not clearly heard, if it did.
Of further consideration - in those conditions any form of rescue is virtually out of the question - I suggest. After it has passed - well that's a different matter of course.
The other points you raise - I have no idea about, but have a feeling you may be on the wrong track entirely - but there again, who knows ?


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## oldman 80

One final point/question.
Has anybody at all been able to determine whether it was daylight or darkness when she went to the bottom ?
If the latter, then I suggest they wouldn't have had a clue they were foundering, at least until they were well on their way !!!


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## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> Anyone know what she hauled on her penultimate voyage?
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


If you mean what cargo she was carrying - Iron ore ex PoCa.


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## chadburn

In regards to the RN Warship's the sea state is even more important bearing in mind that as they use fuel they become top heavy especially those that are GT powered, anything less than half tank's/bunker's make's them unstable.


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## jmcg

J C

Do you by any chance or (anyone else) know where she discharged her cargo ex PoCa? 

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## 5036

R651400 said:


> Who perchance is laying blame?
> Since you've openly stated above you have experience in such matters perhaps you would like to give us the benefit of this by answering the question I put in my #396?


The wreck of the Derbyshire was discovered 700nm ssw of Tokyo Bay and the first reports of a problem were not reported until 13th September, 4 days after she sank. The following is an extract from the official report:

3 Search and Rescue

3.25 On 13th September 1980, due to the absence of any radio communication from the vessel since the 9th September, Bibby Bros. And Co (Management) Limited instructed their local agents in Japan to request the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency to mount a search for the vessel. The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency indicated, however, that a full-scale search could not be mounted until the vessel’s arrival was at least 24 hours overdue. Various Japanese radio stations and ships agents were nevertheless requested to maintain a watch for the vessel. The DERBYSHIRE failed to arrive at Kawasaki on the 14th September 1980.
3.26 On the 15th September 1980 the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency organized an air and surface search for the DERBYSHIRE. The major part of the search was conducted by the Japanese patrol vessels OSUMI and MOTOBU assisted by two reconnaissance aircraft Nos. 791 and 811.
3.27 At 1503 hours (local time) on the 15th September 1980 one of the reconnaissance aircraft spotted an oil slick in a position approximately 25° 50’ North 133° 30’ East. The patrol vessel OSUBMI was instructed to proceed to this position. At 0545 hours (local time) on the 16th September 1980 OSUMI discovered oil rising to the surface of the sea in a position approximately 25° 48’ North 133° 37’ East.
3.28 Samples of one of the oil slicks were analysed and found to have had ‘a degree of similarity’ to that of the DERBYSHIRE, although positive identification was not possible.
3.29 On the 17th September 1980 the search was suspended due to the presence of tropical revolving storm SPERRY in the vicinity of the search area.
3.30 On the morning of the 18th September 1980 the search was resumed. At about 1810 hours on the 20th September 1980 the search was terminated, no sign of the vessel, her crew, or of any further material which might have come from the vessel having been found.

I hope this answers some of your questions. It would have been very much akin to a needle in a haystack and the Japanese are to be commended for finding the "possible" location of the wreck.The chances of survival were assessed as non existent.

There was a huge upswell of emotion about the first inquiry and its findings that blamed the crew for not properly securing the bosuns locker hatch forward and a demand for a survey of the wreck to find answers. Incidents with sisterships experiencing damage to the famous "frame 65" added to this. The lack of a survey was blamed on politicians but the truth of the matter was the problem of finding the wreck and then getting enough detail to allow the inquiry to be reopened. I was heavily involved in manned and unmanned submersible work in the late 70's and through the 80's and had some informal conversations with some of those involved in making decisions about surveys of the wreck. The wreck was initially thought to be in a location with a depth of 3300 feet but it very quickly turned out to be an estimated 4000 metres and an actual depth of 4200 metres (6000 feet) We had limited side scan sonar and ROV capability at that time and it was not until major advances in multi ray wide beam designs became available to research institutes and then to external organisations that the ITF survey was the first available in 1994 and pulled off a very lucky finding of the wreck, there were few of us thought that it would ever be found and all credit to Woods Hole and Oceaneering for their sterling work. Rapid progress in technology allowed the Department of Transport to sanction a definitive survey in 1997. (This is better explained in Section 15 of the report)

The inquiry was reopened and found that the vents on the fo'c'sle had been damaged by the force of the waves encountered by the Derbyshire and a winch had been ripped off it's mountings and had damaged the bosun's locker hatch which had caused the bow to fill, the vessel to go down by the head and the hatches to sequentially fail by the weight and force of green water acting upon them. The officers and crew were vindicated.

The entire report is now available from the National Archives online at:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/MT/205/2/P2/Report/report.pdf


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## oldman 80

NAV:-
Thank you for the above posting (#962) - it's good for all to be reminded of those now far distant events. (Lest they be forgotten)
3.28 is of enormous importance. I recall DNV being the first to initiate major fuel policy reforms in 1981 / 1982 in response to what I can now see as being indirectly Derbyshire related, as well as directly related to another vessel of similar type, under their jurisdiction, which came uncomfortably close to foundering in horrific weather conditions Trans Pacific some 10 - 12 weeks after Derbyshire was lost.


Edit:- on this notable 28th Day of February 2013 it is perhaps appropriate to remember those of the Derbyshire whose remains shall not be returned to their families or loved ones - 
_They that go down to the sea in ships, that do business in great waters; 
These see the works of the LORD, and his wonders in the deep. 
_
Edit 2:- for notable read noteable


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## Hamish Mackintosh

jmcg said:


> J C
> 
> Do you by any chance or (anyone else) know where she discharged her cargo ex PoCa?
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


She was in drydock in Japan for routine maintenance work in April 1980, she then sailed for Australia and picked up a cargo of Coal for Fos-Sur-Mer, after departing Fos, she sailed for New York in Ballast, here she took on Bunkers,then sailed for Seven Islands or Sept lles as it is called in this French part of Canada where she Arrived on 10th July 1980,it is interesting to note that on the passage north from Australia ,she ran into heavy weather and sustained damage forrad, with the forcastle space being flooded, the damage was repaired at sea, and she arrived at Fos on the 20th June , where Capt Geoffrey Underhill assumed command. hope this helps


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## alastairrussell

I agree with R651400 and I quote: *'my personal sentiments are I think it about time this thread was locked'.*

Regards 

Alastair


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## jmcg

Hamish

Thank you for the additional information- very helpful.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> There was only one question and frankly no it doesn't but no matter.
> If anyone cares to read through this originally well-intentioned thread in it's entirety they can see it was the victim of a lot of inter-member abuse plus trolling on a grand scale resulting in SN expulsion.
> I returned solely to answer jmcg's query on radio matters and the fact I was in Tokyo at the time of the disaster.
> 
> 
> .....
> 
> 
> 
> and my personal sentiments are I think it about time this thread was locked.
Click to expand...

Hmm - I can't argue with that sentiment, but on the other hand I'm not sure I agree with it either. There are many, I suspect, who would wish it were locked - for a multitude of different reasons.
One thing for sure, the thread does contain some highly relevant observations and comments from technical experts in different jurisdictions. Therefore "Locking" might be acceptable, whereas "Deletion" would be totally unacceptable, as there is so much of immense relevance, for viewers able to sort the "wheat from the chaff".
In amongst it all are some exceptionally high quality "technical" posts - quite amazing, in many cases.
Surely, from that perspective alone, the thread in itself, must be a major contribution toward minimising the likelyhood of such a tragedy being repeated. It is indeed a gold mine of significant information, some applicable, some perhaps not so - but always worthy of consideration, irrespective of all other matters.
We will never know with certainty what really happened, but one thing for sure, we have a much better idea of what might have happened, indeed most likely happened. In that respect the thread has enormous educational value, is a credit to the website, and in my view, to the moderators and administrators who have let it run, and must clearly have resisted an inevitable temptation to close it down.
For that alone, we should applaud them. The thread indeed reveals and/or suggests much, about many significant things, across a varied broad spectrum of matters.


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## jmcg

I have not re-read the Report in its entirety as yet. However, there appears (so far) to be little substantive "evidence" to support her inability to transmit immediately after she hove to. Very much can happen in a test tube scenario that is not replicated in real time events.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> I have not re-read the Report in its entirety as yet. However, there appears (so far) to be little substantive "evidence" to support her inability to transmit immediately after she hove to. Very much can happen in a test tube scenario that is not replicated in real time events.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


 Oh my God - what next ?
What kind of substantive evidence would you like ?
Some consideration of aerials, (_as they were in those times_), in conjunction with the certainty that she was "typhoon exposed" is all the evidence required to suggest it is at least highly likely she was rendered temporarily "unable to transmit". 

Correction to my posts/edits of yesterday 28th February 2013.
Disregard "Notable" and "Noteable"; *HISTORIC* is clearly a more appropriate word.


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## jmcg

Oldman

I have read and digested the Report up to Chapter 4.

I did qualify (so far) in my post #969. Transmitters and arials are mentioned in Chapter 3 as *possibly* out of commission. This could be as a matter of convenience. 

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> Oldman
> 
> I have read and digested the Report up to Chapter 4.
> 
> I did qualify (so far) in my post #969. Transmitters and arials are mentioned in Chapter 3 as *possibly* out of commission. This could be as a matter of convenience.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


Well I thought (clearly erroneously) that common sense should have sufficed. However, not to worry, "_carry on reading_", - as they say. It's still important that people do that - despite the passage of time.


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## Hamish Mackintosh

jmcg said:


> Oldman
> 
> I have read and digested the Report up to Chapter 4.
> 
> I did qualify (so far) in my post #969. Transmitters and arials are mentioned in Chapter 3 as *possibly* out of commission. This could be as a matter of convenience.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


As the wreck was found in seven main parts, the bow and stern section were seven hundred yards apart, the bridge and accomodation could NOT be located and were thougt to be lying behind the bow section, so I doubt that ANY arials could have been reported on,( on the assumption that the said arials were located on top of the bridge)


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## oldman 80

Hamish Mackintosh said:


> As the wreck was found in seven main parts, the bow and stern section were seven hundred yards apart, the bridge and accomodation could NOT be located and were thougt to be lying behind the bow section, so I doubt that ANY arials could have been reported on,( on the assumption that the said arials were located on top of the bridge)


Absolutely.
I still find it "strange" they did not locate the aft section of the vessel, but lets face it, the fact they located any part of her is really quite remarkable, and would probably not have come about had it not been for "people power." Remember, it took them 60 odd years to locate HMAS Sydney - but they did do it eventually - thanks to people power winning over in the end.
By comparison, the location of Derbyshire was determined quite rapidly, thanks to public outcry as much as anything else.
It's disappointing that the aft accommodation / bridge was not discovered.
Had it been so, then no doubt aerials would have been one of the first things they would have looked at.
One should remember they (the aerials) had quite likely not been lowered for close inspection since she was last in port back in Canada.
You can be reasonably sure they (the aerials) would have been scheduled to be lowered and inspected after arrival at Kashima (Disport) a couple of days or so after she encountered the Typhoon - had she survived it - that is.
At the end of a long ocean passage aerial shackles and the like inevitabley show signs of wear and tear, - add to that the effects of the typhoon so close to the end of the voyage, then it is quite likely they (the aerials) had, in fact, come down (or even just one of them, effectively shorting out another) approaching the height of the storm. Unfortunately that sort of thing tends to happen at those sort of times.
What is it they call the "governing law" in relation to such matters ?
Is it Murphies Law or something ?
However be the aerials up or down - it makes little difference - she'd still have gone to the bottom , so it's purely "academic" in a sense.
Even if she had the time to transmit (rather unlikely) it would not have saved her, nor those on board. She foundered very quickly, - you can bet your last dollar on that - so quickly in fact, that they probably did not even realise it was occurring until the sea had, or was about to devour them. 
One can also reasonably assume that her cargo / fuel distribution was likely arranged for even keel arrival in Japan.
Under way, that would result with her trimmed by the head - before any ingress of water occurred up for'd, - and she was a flush decker. Not a pretty picture at all, in those weather conditions.
A Flush Decker, with Cargo Holds and old style Macgregor Side Rolling Hatch Covers, on that size of Deadweight - was bordering on insanity - I believe.
It sends a shiver down my spine - for sure.
I doubt DNV would have allowed it, - indeed, - I'd be utterly amazed if they did.


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## jmcg

Are you suggesting (as I do) that the arial issue was speculative?. 

Red herrings comes to my mind - but we will never really know.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## 5036

oldman 80 said:


> Absolutely.
> 
> By comparison, the location of Derbyshire was determined quite rapidly, thanks to public outcry as much as anything else.


The problem was not the will to do it but the ability to do it. The wreck is in 4200 metres (14000 feet) and the technology was not available to the ITF and DoT until the '90's. The survey that located her struck incredibly lucky for the time but even so, a detailed survey could not have been carried out as the technology was very basic producing very low quality images. Again the technology progressed rapidly in a couple of years allowing a reasonable standard of photomosaic to be achieved.

I also wonderif air pockets in the aft section could have given buoancy that would have allowed it to drift as she sank more slowly than the cargo and rapidly flooded cargo spaces. This phenomenon also caused a wreck to travel several hundred miles along the seabed in the Gulf Stream.


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## The Buccaneer

nav said:


> I also wonderif air pockets in the aft section could have given buoancy that would have allowed it to drift as she sank more slowly than the cargo and rapidly flooded cargo spaces. This phenomenon also caused a wreck to travel several hundred miles along the seabed in the Gulf Stream.


Your thinking here would lead me to ask as to how then, if the implosion/explosion theory of the RFI is correct; How could the stern/transom of Derbyshire exist as a relative complete entity as it does? Surely this part of the vessel with steering flat etc. was heavily compartmentalised and more liable for implosion/explosion than the cargo holds that are austensibly 'vented' spaces. It would follow that the hull stern section also should have been totally destroyed; that it's not allows us to see the rudder heavily compressed through pressure of depth and that it is set at hard to Port: possibly indicating a desperate avoidance manoeuvre whilst on the surface: but no distress alert or prior indication of trouble.


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## The Buccaneer

oldman 80 said:


> Is it not the desire of Most Masters etc etc. to avoid these things (Cyclones/Typhoons/ Hurricanes)" ?


Well of course it is, but in the case of most bulk carriers it is frequently not possible to avoid them completely. They have not the speed required to ensure that is possible.'' 

I'm just wondering here why the RN felt that they had to lunge into the teeth of 'Orchid' with ships a lot smaller than Derbyshire. Not having to be in Tokyo for 11th September, HMS Coventry and HMS Antrim didn't need to leave Taiwan til late on 9th September (not such a problem for HMS Dreadnought of course...)

''In addition I should point out that the fact that nothing was heard from the Derbyshire in the period immediately before her loss, is really not suprising at all. Her foundering would have been very rapid - so rapid in fact, it is unlikely that any transmittion could have been (a) formulated/compiled & (b) transmitted - even assuming her aeriels remained intact/serviceable in those conditions -and it is quite likely, indeed very likely, they did not.''

The ship had a bow flooding problem previous trip Port hedland to Fos, France with coal, as has been mentioned; class were not informed of this; After departing Seven Islands she ships green sea's and loses a for'd liferaft overboard: with holds 1 and 9 empty. Surely with aforeknowledge about the previous flooding, and entering a Typhoon, the Master must have suspected a possible re-occurence of this problem.

''The other points you raise - I have no idea about, but have a feeling you may be on the wrong track entirely - but there again, who knows ?''

It appears to me that in modern accident investigation, sometimes being able to think the unthinkable provides access to the truth.
BR
Uncle Buc.


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## 5036

The Buccaneer said:


> I also wonderif air pockets in the aft section could have given buoancy that would have allowed it to drift as she sank more slowly than the cargo and rapidly flooded cargo spaces. This phenomenon also caused a wreck to travel several hundred miles along the seabed in the Gulf Stream.


Your thinking here would lead me to ask as to how then, if the implosion/explosion theory of the RFI is correct; How could the stern/transom of Derbyshire exist as a relative complete entity as it does? Surely this part of the vessel with steering flat etc. was heavily compartmentalised and more liable for implosion/explosion than the cargo holds that are austensibly 'vented' spaces. It would follow that the hull stern section also should have been totally destroyed; that it's not allows us to see the rudder heavily compressed through pressure of depth and that it is set at hard to Port: possibly indicating a desperate avoidance manoeuvre whilst on the surface: but no distress alert or prior indication of trouble.[/QUOTE]

As I understand it the cargo compartment bulkheads failed in rapid succession once the initial failure started and hence the rapidity of sinking. The after compartmentalised section would have smaller and perhaps stronger cells that would implode but at a later stage of sinking. It is a not unusual phenomenen.

Just a thought.


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> Are you suggesting (as I do) that the arial issue was speculative?.
> 
> Red herrings comes to my mind - but we will never really know.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


Can't see how you interpret my comments on aerials the way you appear to have done. I was responding to some guy who stated he was "suspicious" because nothing was heard from her in the period immediately before she foundered. I see nothing "suspicious" in that, - for the reasons outlined.
On the other hand if you are refering to the report you are now reading with respect to your comment re:- " speculative ", well lets face it, there were no survivors so it's all rather speculative in a sense. Most likely scenario is the best they can hope to come up with, and considering the cir***stances I don't think they did too bad a job. (from memory) 
Better than no enquiry at all - which could so easily have been the case - had Thatcher had her way.
Anyhow I have said all I am going to say on the Derbyshire in another thread, (it's a highly sensitive issue, and has been since the day she was lost). It was only when "Buccaneer" recently mentioned someones photograph of a typhoon in the area taken back in 1980 that I took the opportunity in this thread to draw peoples attention to it - it tells far more than mere words, when it comes to such weather conditions - out there.
To the best of my knowledge there is no other photo like it - anywhere in the thread.
I hope you find your continued reading of _the report_ informative, and deeply saddening - despite the inevitable "somewhat speculative aspect".


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## 5036

oldman 80 said:


> ......
> Better than no enquiry at all - which could so easily have been the case - had Thatcher had her way.......


Oldman80, sir, with espect, it was the DoT who consulted with the Hydrographer of the Royal Navy and many private organisations and whilst they were very kean to do a survey they were unable to do so because the capability did not exist outside of the US security and research organisations until 1994 and even them decent photographic mosaicing was not available until 1997 at which time the DoT put in motion the definitive survey.

Thatcher was Prime Minister until 1990 when the technology to undertake a survey at the 4200 metre depth was just not available. She left the whole authority regarding a survey to those that she regarded as the responsible experts, the DoT, who did not do a survey because they could not do a survey. She could not have sanctioned a survey even if she had wanted to do one.

Read Section 15 of the report at:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/E...ort/report.pdf

it is a very accurate description of the available technology from 1980 onwards.


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## oldman 80

QUOTE=nav;659491]Oldman80, sir, with espect, it was the DoT who consulted with the Hydrographer of the Royal Navy and many private organisations and whilst they were very kean to do a survey they were unable to do so because the capability did not exist outside of the US security and research organisations until 1994 and even them decent photographic mosaicing was not available until 1997 at which time the DoT put in motion the definitive survey.

Thatcher was Prime Minister until 1990 when the technology to undertake a survey at the 4200 metre depth was just not available. She left the whole authority regarding a survey to those that she regarded as the responsible experts, the DoT, who did not do a survey because they could not do a survey. She could not have sanctioned a survey even if she had wanted to do one.

Read Section 15 of the report at:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/E...ort/report.pdf

it is a very accurate description of the available technology from 1980 onwards.[/QUOTE]

********************************************************************************************************

* Nav:-
Heavens above - here we go again.
Some of you guys really do know how to twist and distort - do you not ?
Point 1. YOU now talk about a survey - I have never mentioned the word survey. My comments have consistently refered to ENQUIRY - not survey. 
The two are entirely different entities.
Thatcher robustly resisted any form of public enquiry into the loss of the vessel, right from the start, at which point the focus was very much, if not completely, on the shipbuilders who built her, her design, and the construction methods adopted. Accordingly, that enquiry/Inquiry, had it proceeded, (and it certainly should have) would have inevitably spotlighted the Classification Society involved. 
That is a fact.

Point 2. You cannot, in my view, pick and choose, at your convenience, to separate the DoT from Margaret Thatcher and her Government - They (DoT) were in effect the administrative arm of a thoroughly rotten regime throughout her time in office.

Point 3. So far as those who suffered immense loss as a result of the Derbyshire Tragedy, and of course, those lost with her, THEY FULLY DESERVED that public enquiry, and they deserved it at the time. Thatcher resisted it.

I have never disputed or even refered to the availability of sub sea survey technologies in the 1980's - they have no bearing whatsoever on decisions in relation to Public Enquiries. Of course any enquiry would have been enhanced with modern technology had it been available to facilitate a sub sea survey for subsequent submission to an official Public Enquiry. YOUR point relating to the lack of such technology at the time was not/is not, in my view, a valid reason to block an enquiry in line with Point 1 above. That is what was required at the time. It is what should have occurred.

Thank you for including the link to information regarding modern sub sea technology. I hope those that follow us in the future, make full use of it, and of this website, of course. 
In relation to that matter, wouldn't it have been great to have had the internet back in those days - perhaps that's another reason for blocking the initial public enquiry. It is not one that sticks though - if it was.*

Rgds,
_Oldman 80_


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## oldman 80

The Buccaneer said:


> Oldman 80 wrote:I do not hesitate to commend your reference to the website http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/albums.php, and in particular to the photograph in the album of Jack Russell depicting a photograph of a Typhoon in the South China Sea in 1980.
> The photograph says a lot, but what some readers may not appreciate is that when such extreme weather conditions persist for extended periods of time then "out there", unseen, indeed undetectable, is likely to lie one of those bloody great holes in the ocean which despite being somewhat mythical, quite definately, do in fact exist. When a vessel stumbles across one of them (through bad luck or extreme misfortune),and literally falls into it, the outlook is exceedingly bleak.
> 
> I totally concur with your comments about NNW (Non Negotiable Waves); I myself faced my first one at an estimated 30 metres in 1986 and indeed believed doom awaited us and immediatly I clawed my way to the control console and sounded the general alarm; just as the vessel rode up the face of it and crashed through the the bubbling white foaming top. Crew, fresh out of their bunks (either by being thrown or by virtue of the general alarm) were aware that something strange had been encountered: But seemingly not so with Derbyshire.No hint of urgency or distress communications, and I for one remain very suspicious of this fact. This then leaves the question of why in the period of 6th-10th September 1980 RN ships had put to sea into the teeth of a predicted tropical storm /typhoon. Is it not the desire of most Masters/Commanders to avoid these things, especially when well predicted, as with Typhoon Orchid? Then we have to ask as to why (as the crew photo albums show) that having been shadowed by Russia's capital surface ship (Kiev) just one week before, wouldn't they be interested in a large radar target within their vicinity, (This is cold war RN from 1980 remember), that Derbyshire would have provided. I suspect that surface surveillance from RN ships (even then) would have been far superior to any ability Derbyshire would have had, and would the RN not be at all suspicious if a large target held on their radar suddenly disappeared from the trackers during a raging typhoon, prompting them to raise their concerns with appropriate Authorities ashore?
> ...and didn't the Derbyshire on 31/7/80 receive 'charterers' orders to 'slow steam' to add 2 weeks to their journey? If allowed to steam at normal service speed Derbyshire would not have been in this area of sea, in Typhoon Orchid, at the time of her loss. It would be great here at SN if some RN crew from this flotilla could let us know what activities they got up to whilst on passage Taiwan to Japan. Looks to me like under normal sailing conditions for RN ships, that such a voyage would only take a couple of days. Did they carry out any exercises or trials en-route?
> Best Regards,
> Uncle Buc.


**********************************************
Buccaneer:-
In my previous post this morning - directed to NAV - I made mention to some persons appearing to distort and /or twist what has been posted by others, - perhaps for reasons suited to their own particular agenda. 
I had intended to let this 2nd example just go, but having tackled the NAV affair, it would be inconsistent were I to now ignore it.

Accordingly I have the following comment to make:-

In my posting #943 I made particular and specific mention of the existance of " DIRTY GREAT HOLES " in the ocean.
I chose the word "HOLES" quite deliberately, for the very simple reason, that "HOLES" is precisely what I meant .
I did not at any stage refer to Non Negotiable Waves, nor did I refer to any waves whatsoever. (Had I been refering to waves, I would probably have chosen the terminology "Rogue Waves" as the terminology Non Negotiable Wave is a terminology I have never used before, although it is a good terminology for such a wave. In addition, had I been refering to waves, then *wave* is the word I'd have used.
Somehow, my reference to *HOLES*, was changed to NNW (or Non Negotiable Wave.)
There is an enormous difference (in fact no comparison at all) between a Wave, be it a NNW or a Rougue Wave, and a HOLE in the ocean. 
A HOLE is A Hole - not a wave, and I would appreciate it ( if you choose to quote me), if you would at least quote me correctly, rather than reverting to your personal interpretation of my post. 
The effects of a NNW or Rogue Wave crashing down on a vessel positioned at the bottom of a deep trough is entirely different from the effects of a hole collapsing in on a vessel captured (or imprisoned) at the bottom of a deep hole in the ocean.
A NNW or Rogue wave will crash down on a vessel in the trough, with significant and perhaps severely damaging force, but it will do so perhaps from the starboard side, perhaps from the Port side, perhaps from ahead or even from astern.
A Dirty Great Hole in the ocean (_and they do exist, all be it very few and far between - ie they are not in fact completely "Mythical in nature"_) behaves very differently - the sides collapse at some point, and the ocean CRASHES DOWN ON THE VICTIM VESSEL with equally, if not more, devastating force, but it does so *simultaneously* from port, from starboard, from ahead and astern. It is for that reason it is a hole, not a wave.
Should anyone be unfortunate enough to experience the phenomena (and the chances of that, I suspect, are quite minimal) they will recognise it immediately, and they will be left in no doubt whatsoever that it is a hole they have experienced - NOT A WAVE of any description at all.
Who knows ? - they may even survive it, and live to tell the tale - but they will have to be exceptionally lucky for that to happen, - _*I believe. 
*_[/I][/I]


----------



## oldman 80

Continuing the theme in my 2 most recent postings above - I now take issue with Buccaneers posting #978.
It appears that when he posted it the "Quote" function was not operating correctly.
In consequence, it appears that the following comment has been attributed to me:-
Quote:-
_ "The ship had a bow flooding problem previous trip Port hedland to Fos, France with coal, as has been mentioned; class were not informed of this; After departing Seven Islands she ships green sea's and loses a for'd liferaft overboard: with holds 1 and 9 empty. Surely with aforeknowledge about the previous flooding, and entering a Typhoon, the Master must have suspected a possible re-occurence of this problem."
Unquote:-

The quoted section is not in any way associated with me, - how it has appears like that - I do not know. 

SOME OF THE INFORMATION quoted may be accurate, alternatively IT MAY NOT BE , - but one thing for sure, it is highly unlikely she carried coal from Port Headland to Fos at any time in her life. Port Headland is an iron ore port - not a coal port. 

I DO KNOW the quoted information appears as having been posted by myself, - which is totally incorrect. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ME AT ALL.


Would some moderator/administrator kindly rectify the situation forthwith.
Thank You.

Oldman 80


_


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## WilliamH

Oldman, I have read Buccaneers post 978 and as I read it he is not attributing the quote you mention to yourself, it is not within the quotation marks he uses.


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## Boatman25

This thread should be closed there is far to many teddy bears being thrown out of prams by one person and far to much red ink, its very disrespectful to those poor people who died


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## oldman 80

Further to posting 984 above - on further detailed scrutiny The Buccaneers posting #978 is completely misleading from start to finish. It appears * malicious in intent*. It is not only the quoted section refered to in my #984 which is a wrong representation, it is the whole of his posting from start to finish.

For the benefit of members, the entire posting is copied and pasted herewith :-

Copy and Paste:-

''


oldman 80;"Is it not the desire of Most Masters etc etc. to avoid these things (Cyclones/Typhoons/ Hurricanes)" ?
Well of course it is said:


> Unquote.
> 
> End of Copy and Paste
> 
> Please note:-
> Para 2. commencing:- _ "I'm just wondering here why the RN" _" and ending "Not such a problem for HMS Dreadnought" ---
> appears as having been written by me - YET IT WAS NOT .
> 
> Para 3. commencing :- "_''In addition I should point out that the fact that nothing was heard " _and ending " _and it is quite likely, indeed very likely, they did not.'' _------------ this paragraph is a true quote of a previous posting made by myself.
> 
> Para 4. commencing " _The ship had a bow flooding problem_" and ending "_must have suspected a possible re-occurence of this problem."_
> Those words are not my words - they have never been posted by me.
> 
> Para 5. commencing:- "_the other points you raise_" and ending "_but there again - who knows ?_
> Those word are a true quote of words I previously posted.
> 
> Para 6. commencing :- "_It appears to me_" and ending " _BR Uncle Buc" _------- are not my words - and yet the whole posting appears as a Quote of a posting by me.
> 
> Would the moderators/administrators kindly investigate the foregoing apparently maliscious posting by The Buccaneer, and if they determine it as truly maliscious (and not a result of the Forum "quote" function malfunctioning) - take the appropriate action forthwith.


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## alastairrussell

R651400

I am with you 100%. Please please moderator please lock down this thread. 

Please think about the poor relatives of those that were lost. To everyone else who does not agree please please please google 'MV Derbyshire' in Youtube and look at the animation of the sinking of the MV Derbyshire !!!

The problem with OM 8008 is that he never did any courses at Leith Nautical College!


Alastair


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## jmcg

Alaistair

With the greatest respect to you and in full recognition of the sensitivity & indeed importance of this thread I do not believe that it should be locked down. 

You may wish to consider not posting on the thread if you feel aggrieved or otherwise uncomfortable with other's views - but please don't invoke the moderator's lock when so many of us are posting with our own heart felt thoughts, queries and opinions. 

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> Alaistair
> 
> With the greatest respect to you and in full recognition of the sensitivity & indeed importance of this thread I do not believe that it should be locked down.
> 
> You may wish to consider not posting on the thread if you feel aggrieved or otherwise uncomfortable with other's views - but please don't invoke the moderator's lock when so many of us are posting with our own heart felt thoughts, queries and opinions.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


********************************************
jmcg or steamroller - which I sort of rather prefer.

It is a difficult one is it not ?
I have often thought the forum should be locked down, but in every case, I have eventually come to the conclusion that " locking it" would be counter productive, and would serve no usefull purpose at all.
There are so many excellent postings in amongst some of the garbage, and I am fearfull that if locked down, those postings might be lost.
That would be another tragedy in my view. Their are many casualties from the Derbyshire incident - they extend further than many might think - much much further in my view.
Sometimes I even feel the thread may have become the most significant public enquiry of them all - there are some guys who have submitted excellent contributions. Especially those who have made truly remarkable observations/comments on the wreck survey video's. Without this forum, they may never have had the opportunity to do that. The forum gives them a voice, and they clearly deserve it, - no doubt about that at all.
Therefore, *I second your call to have the forum kept open.*
Perhaps it might be possible to have some kind of delay applied to it, so that postings may first be vetted by moderators before being viewed - as it is obviously a sensitive forum. I do not know if that would be possible or not - I have seen some websites where it is, but I also recognise that such an option might very well inhibit future postings to the general detriment of all.
It's really not an easy call - at all. 
I agree also with your suggestion directed toward Alistair Russell, re:- "posting" - somewhere else.


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## Boatman25

OM 80 you really have a high opinion of yourself dont you, the garbage posts you refer to can only be your own, have some respect for those that died and their memories and the same applies to you, if you dont like whats going on then dont post or post elsewhere


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## 40907

It would be sad if this thread were closed. I'm not and, sadly, never have been a seaman but I love reading what you guys (well, most of you!) have to say on the many subjects around ships and the sea. The opinions are diverse to say the least and, dear Mr A Hole, I have a news flash for you - yours is not the only valid opinion.

Losing a ship at sea is bad enough but losing a ship and not knowing the FACTS behind its disappearance is quite horrendous.

Surely you are adult enough to be able to accept an oposite point of view without throwing a hissy fit? If you can't respond to a post in a civil manner, it can't be that difficult to refrain from responding at all - can it?

And, Sir, please accept the limitations of a system like this. Quotations are ruined by the accidental removal of even ONE of the marks put there by the system. The guy quoting your wise contribution was probably not even aware of removing that ONE silly little square bracket!!


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## 5036

Oldman80, I cannot see how an enquiry would have solved anything in 1980 as the facts were not known. The only knowns were the Frame 65 issues which came up many years later and although they were valid reasoning, they had absolutely no bearing on the calamitous failure that befell Derbyshire. Had an enquiry sat and found for any results they would have been way wide of the mark. The facts are that vents and deck openings failed and a winch broke free breaking open the bosun's locker hatch etc, etc etc. Frame 65 was completely dismissed and no-one could have come up with the failure scenario. To bring politicians into what were civil service decisions taken on advice from Royal Navy Hydrographers is taking personal political views which are totally invalid. Any Prime Minister of any political persuasion would have been advised of exactly the same .


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## stevesherratt

Gentlmen,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tN4xROtMjI

Steve
R770014


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## oldman 80

Boatman25 said:


> OM 80 you really have a high opinion of yourself dont you, the garbage posts you refer to can only be your own, have some respect for those that died and their memories and the same applies to you, if you dont like whats going on then dont post or post elsewhere


You are entitled to your opinion.
Perhaps it's an excellent example of "How you see yourself and how others see you"
The two can be completely different.
I have different views entirely - pretty much ensactly the opposite to yours, on this issue.


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## oldman 80

nav said:


> Oldman80, I cannot see how an enquiry would have solved anything in 1980 as the facts were not known. The only knowns were the Frame 65 issues which came up many years later and although they were valid reasoning, they had absolutely no bearing on the calamitous failure that befell Derbyshire. Had an enquiry sat and found for any results they would have been way wide of the mark. The facts are that vents and deck openings failed and a winch broke free breaking open the bosun's locker hatch etc, etc etc. Frame 65 was completely dismissed and no-one could have come up with the failure scenario. To bring politicians into what were civil service decisions taken on advice from Royal Navy Hydrographers is taking personal political views which are totally invalid.
> 
> 
> 
> Any Prime Minister of any political persuasion would have been advised of exactly the same
> 
> 
> 
> .
Click to expand...

 That of course is an excellent point (your last sentence) in actual fact it does say it all, does it not ? (Bad judgement by the PM)
However in a Democracy (if it is that) it is the voice of the public that has to be considered in depth.
I do not believe the uk public were anywhere near being of the same view as the civil servants you refer to - they wanted that enquiry (Royal Commission type) into the shipbuilders, Class, and the others involved at the time of her building - They didn't get it, and they should have, at least within a couple of years.
So far as the relatives of the victims are concerned - I believe it was *not only their right but their absolute entitlement.*
Had it occurred (the Inquiry) when it should have , and not been blocked, then the *most likely* cause of her eventual foundering would have been *most likely* clearly identified much much earlier than it was.
Everything about the fore end of that vessel was deplorable.
The Frame 65 buisness was well known throughout the industry by those involved with such vessels - it had long before been clearly identified, discussed, deliberated on, and almost certainly rectified, - but even on that one we cannot be 100% certain, in the Derbyshire's case. 
We can be pretty certain that it was (rectified) in the case of at least two other vessels of that class, so presumably Derbyshire had been the subject of the same rectification processes around Frame 65. 
The trouble is - no one could inspect her - to confirm that. A more timely Public Inquiry would have laid that matter (of ongoing doubt) - completely to rest, at a far more appropriate time.


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## oldman 80

Reef Knot said:


> It would be sad if this thread were closed. I'm not and, sadly, never have been a seaman but I love reading what you guys (well, most of you!) have to say on the many subjects around ships and the sea. The opinions are diverse to say the least and, dear Mr A Hole, I have a news flash for you - yours is not the only valid opinion.
> 
> Losing a ship at sea is bad enough but losing a ship and not knowing the FACTS behind its disappearance is quite horrendous.
> 
> Surely you are adult enough to be able to accept an oposite point of view without throwing a hissy fit? If you can't respond to a post in a civil manner, it can't be that difficult to refrain from responding at all - can it?
> 
> And, Sir, please accept the limitations of a system like this. Quotations are ruined by the accidental removal of even ONE of the marks put there by the system. The guy quoting your wise contribution was probably not even aware of removing that ONE silly little square bracket!!



Not so - Refer #944 & # 956 then follow through.
Dangerous territory !!
If it were SA it might be viewed as treason - certainly back in those days.
And don't be rude.


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## Boatman25

oldman 80 said:


> And don't be rude.


Pot and Kettle comes to mind


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## Mike S

I was about to post some sensible and erudite comments, (as always) however in respect to the memory of the crew lost all those years ago and the grief of relatives I will refrain. ..........
Perhaps others could too....?


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## oldman 80

Mike S:-
The thread remains open, but I agree, - It's probably best that you do, unless of course, you have actual significant sea going experience of those types of vessel (OBO) .
In November /December 1980 about 10 weeks after the loss of the Derbyshire, another British Flagged OBO came very close to foundering in atrocious weather conditions. Had that occurred then it would have been *another loss of a UK vessel, with all hands* within a span of 10 weeks. I was the Master.
*She fell into a hole* in the ocean. *That hole* collapsed inward from all directions, completely overwhelming her.
She was not overcome by some Freak Wave, "Non Negotiable Wave" or or any series of them.
It happened at dusk - and was the preliminary to the longest night of my life.

This is what I have previously posted elsewhere on this site in other discussion/debate. 

Copy and Paste:- from December 2012.

" I am intrigued by your mention of the 1966 Load Line Rules and that reference to a defective formulae for the purpose of the determination of hatch cover strengths. 
I am sure I have heard mention of that before, not in text, not on a website, but on reflection, I believe it was during verbal conversations in my office on board, - between hatch cover manufacturers, dock yard officials, and Classification Surveyors engaged in overseeing a very costly refurbishment of hatch covers Nos. 1 to 9, in dry dock - mid to late 1982 (approximately). The details of the discussions I cannot remember, only the gist of them, but those formulae were definately a part of them.

My crippled vessel found *a hole* in a fuming ocean, - she fell into it, and the hole collapsed inward, overwhelming her completely – only the upper two decks of the accommodation block and the wheelhouse, initially remained above water. Late November, early December 1980 - trans North North Pacific. (east to west)
She struggled terribly, she shook and she screamed and she moaned, and that abominable noise (like a railway train tearing itself apart) of that extended “mortal conflict” between forces *W* and *B,* (either could have prevailed ) - and the sensation of an “earthquake” on board, will remain with me for ever. That is the best description I can give.
Structural failure, NO, - that did not occur, just bending and buckling – that’s all. BUT SHE HELD. (The hatch covers)
Hatch No 1. Slewed and displaced, but essentially still on the rails. (Some hydraulics “ juggling” required.)
I never saw weather like it before, or again afterwards. Just horrific, unbelievable stuff, and for so long, - without let up. Hurricane Force winds/ white out conditions day after day after day – no let up. It was a bad winter for sure. (I never left the wheelhouse/chart room for 11 long days and 12 nights, apart from one terrifying trip forward after dawn to secure that displaced Hatch cover)
But she survived, all be it wounded, as it later became apparent, and that’s all that matters in the end. 
Had the Derbyshire been built elsewhere, and been with a different classification society - Well we can but speculate, Can we not ?
It won’t do much good though, I feel.
“Being prepared”, on the other hand, - that is different – it should result in survival, at least.
Let’s Keep that message alive, for it is incredibly good advice.

*End of copy and paste.*

*********************************

When that *hole* in the ocean collapsed inward, from all directions , the force of water on top of those hatch covers was enormous, as the vessel fought desperately to break surface again.
Every hatch cover (1-9) was at least imploded/distorted to some degree, but fortunately that "implosion" did not complete. It was not even readily discernable by naked eye, only by subsequent measurements.
They (all 9 hatches) were subsequently removed, faired, rebuilt as required, and completely refurbished - at enormous cost. They were vastly superior hatch covers to those with which Derbyshire was equipped - they were much stronger, and had far superior securing arrangements.
They were Navire Hatch covers – a huge improvement on the old Macgregor type which I believe were fitted to Derbyshire. 
That is why they did not fail significantly, – but I think they likely would have, - *had all the intended cargo been on board.*
My vessel was under a far superior classification society compared to the Derbyshire, and had been built by superior ship builders (she was much improved on any OBO design before her). She was also in the hands of highly competent ship managers and owners - the most experienced around at the time, - when it came to that type of vessel.
*Yet she was very nearly lost* - and had she not been subjected to that "deadfreight" at the load port - I doubt she would have survived . Those hatch covers would likely have suc***bed despite their superior construction.
The damage details were duly recorded (accurate measurements of the degree of hatch cover distortions as determined by the hatch manufacturers, classification surveyors and dockyard personnel) and were, so I was advised, immediately sent to the initial Derbyshire DoT "investigators" as evidence of the effects of around a 10ft head of water on top of the cargo hatch covers ( equating to around 19ft over the deck – approx.) on that type of vessel. I assume therefore they, were subsequently used in the final determination that the Derbyshires hatches had collapsed /imploded under the weight of water they were subjected to.

My ship survived - and ships personnel went home. 
Derbyshire did not ? 
The incidents , I remember them * (and I live with them) today*, as if it occurred yesterday.
The fact that the damages to my ship as a result of what happened to her hatch covers in similar conditions were used by the DoT’s Derbyshire Investigators for their initial considerations deliberations has always rendered her loss of unique, and even close significance, so far as I am concerned. 
It is for that reason I take great umbrage at the likes of *Buccaneer *distorting my words, (*and even more outrageous matters)*) and to having crude/ vulgar individuals like *Reef Knot*, and *Boatman*, commenting in the manner they have.
*Large/Freak Waves* behave one way, - they will likely flow across and off the vessel.
*Holes in the ocean*, are not myths as some would suggest, they do occur, - I encountered one *once only *in my life at sea. They are completely different to freak or Rouge waves, they collapse inwards from all directions simultaneously, totally overwhelming a vessel unfortunate enough to "seek out" and "fall into" one.
*Why* my vessel's propulsion was "crippled" and at one time in imminent danger of being rendered totally and even irrecoverably powerless, in that horrific weather, is another matter entirely.
The real cause of that was not revealed / determined until many months later. However, the classification society made major changes to heavy fuel specifications and the global monitoring of subsequent supplies to vessels under their jurisdiction, as a result of those findings. 
*The foregoing are also the reasons I have clearly stated elsewhere on this site that the final findings in relation to the Derbyshire were probably quite correct. 
*Buccaneers belated suspicious theories about Cold Wars, Russian Battleships (or whatever they call them) and The Royal Navy - we can all do without.

Finally I await a response from the moderators and/or administrators of this site in relation to what appears to have been a deliberate and maliciously fabricated post by The Buccaneer.


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## jmcg

This is interesting Old Man 80. You resurrect important points - many of these points have been advanced and discussed at earlier junctures on this thread and in other places.

I am somewhat attracted by your mention of superior classification. Surely LR was / is a top classification society. You also mention "superior ship builders"

Again this item has been debated with two schools of thought. My view (and I sailed in her sister) is that the build quality was much below what one would expect in the late mid/late 70s.

Can you let us have the name of your vessel (so nearly consumed) so that we may compare and contrast the very many issues.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> This is interesting Old Man 80. You resurrect important points - many of these points have been advanced and discussed at earlier junctures on this thread and in other places.
> 
> I am somewhat attracted by your mention of superior classification. Surely LR was / is a top classification society. You also mention "superior ship builders"
> 
> Again this item has been debated with two schools of thought. My view (and I sailed in her sister) is that the build quality was much below what one would expect in the late mid/late 70s.
> 
> Can you let us have the name of your vessel (so nearly consumed) so that we may compare and contrast the very many issues.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


Good question - your last sentence - I also would be very interested 
to know which ship he is talking about .


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## WilliamH

You are wasting your time John, I have already asked and was told the name of the ship was not important.


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## John Cassels

WilliamH said:


> You are wasting your time John, I have already asked and was told the name of the ship was not important.


Yea , I know but thought maybe third time lucky.

If he again refuses then guess we can draw our own conclusions .


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## Boatman25

A bit like the book being advertised on here The Long Silence


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## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> You are wasting your time John, I have already asked and was told the name of the ship was not important.


Indeed you did, and Indeed you were.
I confirm it again.
The name of the ship is not important, 
It could have been any ship,
and it is *that fact* which is the most important of all,
(Particularly looking forward)
As any real mariner will tell you.

However if you are still really interested then that information will be available through the appropriate authorities, to whom the information was provided.

Edit:- And so far as the weather conditions are concerned, you may like to approach AMVER - the vessel was a participant and I suspect the crossing will have been archived. In fact they may even have an acoustic signature of those moments when the vessel was overwhelmed. I understand that is one of the things that they did They might even be able to pinpoint the position of that hole. I can't remember that detail.


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## John Cassels

Have it on pretty good authority ( two sources ) that once again this
mystery ship is another of his flights of fancy,

In other words , he lies like a Takoradi flat fish.


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## oldman 80

Well I do not know about takoradi flat fish John,
But this much I am sure,
You have a serious problem, and I think you should seek councelling for it.


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## jmcg

In the absence of details of any comparator I suggest we move to more meaningful debate.


"Holes" in the sea is a new concept to me. Is this Ben Line speak? If she "fell into a hole" as a whole (entity) as suggested I would ask how would the hole be capped?

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## Boatman25

With an old man hole cover


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> In the absence of details of any comparator I suggest we move to more meaningful debate.
> 
> 
> "Holes" in the sea is a new concept to me. Is this Ben Line speak? If she "fell into a hole" as a whole (entity) as suggested I would ask how would the hole be capped?
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


"Ben Line Speak" - you ask ?
Well, - Sort of, - maybe, - in a sense, - somewhat indirectly, - I suppose.

"Moving on to more meaningfull debate" ?
Yes, good idea,
Just you do that.
Goodbye.


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## joebuckham

shades of bd perhaps


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## 40907

oldman 80 said:


> "Ben Line Speak" - you ask ?
> Well, - Sort of, - maybe, - in a sense, - somewhat indirectly, - I suppose.
> 
> "Moving on to more meaningfull debate" ?
> Yes, good idea,
> Just you do that.
> Goodbye.


Ah c'mon oldfeller 80! OK, so I'm just a vulgar person who annoys you. But, please, give us something sensible to discuss. What ship? Are you afraid of being identified as some person who got his ship into trouble? You wouldn't be the first and you won't be the last. I'm pretty sure there'll be sympathetic listeners around here.


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## 40907

joebuckham said:


> shades of bd perhaps


Shades of BD?


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## chadburn

It would appear that I am not the only one who thinks it very odd that some member's will not name any of the ship's they were on.


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## 5036

chadburn said:


> It would appear that I am not the only one who thinks it very odd that some member's will not name any of the ship's they were on.


It's said you were on the Flying Dutchman?


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## chadburn

nav said:


> It's said you were on the Flying Dutchman?


Was it was steam driven?


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## joebuckham

Reef Knot said:


> Shades of BD?


a one time member infamous for his comprehensive knowledge[=P]


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## oldman 80

joebuckham said:


> shades of bd perhaps


BD ?
Please clarify.

Confused ? - well not about any hole in the ocean - that's for sure.

nor indeed, in respect of anything else about that North Pacific crossing, the couple of weeks before it, and the aftermath of it - to this day.


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## alastairrussell

_Gents 

The loss of this USA registered ship appears to be pretty well identical to that of the MV Derbyshire tragety. I have highlighted the investigators finding at the end! Maybe the first Derbyshire inquiry report should have been similar instead of blaming the crew! 

If you google the ships name you will see she gets a mention as being lost in the Bermuda Triangle and she is also on a rougue/freak wave list! 

Regards

Alastair
_
*The Loss of the SS Poet in 1980
*

The recent death of Capt. Paul J. Esbensen, 76, of Stevensville, who was a highly respected wreck investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board and a well-known port figure, recalled his role investigating the loss of the SS Poet more than two decades ago. He had spent 15 years as senior marine investigator for the NTSB before retiring in 1996. During his tenure with the NTSB, he investigated 25 major maritime accidents, including the Poet and the loss of the Pride of Baltimore.

Almost 26 years after the Poet mysteriously disappeared, what happened to it is still the subject of much speculation. Originally built as the General Omar Bundy at the Kaiser Shipbuilding Corp. yard in Richmond, Calif., in 1944, the ship transported troops until 1949, when it was laid up in the James River Reserve Fleet. There it languished until 1964, when it was delivered to Bethlehem Steel Corp. in Baltimore, which undertook its conversion into a bulk carrier at its Sparrows Point shipyard. Renamed the SS Portmar, the ship was operated by the steel company's Calmar Steamship Corp. subsidiary transporting steel products between the East and West. Later renamed the Port, it finally became the Poet after being acquired by Hawaiian Eugenia Corp. in 1979.

The 522-foot U.S. flag vessel was loaded with 13,500 tons of bulk corn at Girard Point Terminal in South Philadelphia, and it prepared to leave on what was to have been a routine voyage to Port Said, Egypt, on Oct. 24, 1980.

"Before she left Philadelphia, a Coast Guard petty officer conducted an inspection and found three violations. At two points, oil drums and acetylene tanks were lashed to rails without proper `dunnage,' or padding underneath, to prevent sparks. The ship was also found to lack a required piece of navigational equipment, called a loran, an acronym for long-range navigation," The New York Times reported at the time.

Early on the morning of Oct. 24, the Poet began slowly making its way down the Delaware River toward the Atlantic. Capt. LeRoy A. Warren, a Bel Air resident with 41 years of experience at sea, was on the bridge, and the ship held a crew of 34, including two from Baltimore -- Frank E. Holland, a deck engineer, and Walter M. Mitchell, an oiler.

Capt. Gary Harper, the pilot who was taking the Poet down the Delaware River, noted that the ship was "heavy at the bow and sluggish in responding to the wheel," the Times reported. "It took a little longer for the ship to respond because the ship was by-head," Harper told the newspaper, "meaning the bow rode low in the water." At 8:30 a.m., the ship reported its last position as it sailed past Cape Henlopen, Del. It was the last time that anyone would hear from the ill-fated Poet.

The Poet also gave its Oct. 24 position to the Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue System, an international center that tracks ship movements in the Atlantic and Pacific.

The next day, as the ship steamed east, it encountered a severe storm with 30-foot seas and winds gusting to 60 knots. The storm lashed the Atlantic Coast for the next two days. Experts said that the storm was nothing unusual, and the Poet had encountered and survived far worse storms in its 36-year career. The owners of the vessel reported Nov. 3 -- nine days after receiving their last message from the Poet -- that they had not heard from the ship, which was due to dock in Port Said on Nov. 9.

The Poet had vanished into the lonely Atlantic depths without so much as an SOS.

A 200,000-square-mile Coast Guard search of the ocean, from the Straits of Gibraltar to Cape Henlopen, failed to find any trace whatsoever of the ship or its crew. "Although planes have crisscrossed the ocean, they have spotted neither the Poet nor any lifeboats. And no ships crossing the Poet's intended route have seen any sign of the ship," The Sun reported at the time.

In its marine casualty report, the Coast Guard reported that the "precise time and location of the vessel's loss are unknown and cannot be determined. The Board concludes that the Poet was most likely lost during the period when it encountered the most severe weather conditions between the morning of 25 October and the evening of 26 October." Regarding no radio signals, the report said, "The Board concludes that it is likely that the lack of any radio distress message was due to the loss of the ship being so sudden that there was no time to send a distress message on 500 kHz using the main or emergency radio transmitters or the lifeboat radio." The report also stressed the lack of any wreckage, lifeboats or oil slicks, and said it "appears quite possible that if the vessel was lost very rapidly, the lifeboats may well have been secured in their cradles by the gripes and would have gone down with the vessel."

Page 3 of the report gives the most likely explanation for the loss of the Poet: *"The commandant has concurred with the Marine Board that the proximate cause of the casualty cannot be determined."........*


----------



## ben27

good day oldman80. 5march,2013,04:32.i have read your account of what can only be discribed as a nightmare of a voyage.first let me congratulate you and your crew for getting back to a safe haven.i am not a navigator but i know a courageous story when i read one,whatever the conflict is with your fellow decky's i do not know.but they cannot deny your report in your log.if they doubt that.they must look at there own reports and wonder if they are perfect,good luck oldman80.and all your crew of that horrific voyage.ben27


----------



## Hamish Mackintosh

Alastair, Sir, the final report also was deemed "Human Error"


----------



## Mike S

On her second voyage heading home in the Bay of Biscay the NSZ cadet ship Otaio was hit by three enormous waves. Water entered the engine room through the sylights, the windlass was set back and the bulkhead at the aft end of no 2 hatch was badly buckled. Two small sail boats stowed on the docking bridge aft were turned to matchwood. The accommodation was flooded.
It was around 1959 I believe.
Capt A Hocken in command. A fine seaman and ship master.
She was in dock for three months under repair. New, well found ship, built to LR's highest standards and hove to at the time. I was not on board but know some who were and yes the impression from her bridge as the third wave approached could have been described as a "hole"......it was higher than her foremast.
Mentioned only to show that these incidents do happen.
RIP Derbyshire.


----------



## alastairrussell

Hamish

Re your post 1023, I agree with you but I am thinking that any kind of catastrophic failure has to end up as a result of human error. In this case the port pilot says the ship was down by the head when she left the loading port. Just like the Derbyshire was with the flooding up forward.

I am thinking now 'that times are a changing' , I remember some of the directors of the P&O ended up on manslaughter charges when their ferry rolled over leaving Antwerp (was it the Spirit of Free Enterprise)?

Alastair


----------



## jmcg

Alastair

It was the Herald of Free Enterprise. The company P&O was charged with Manslaughter but not convicted. The prosecution against P&O Ferries (Dover)Ltd was terminated when the Judge (Turner) directed the jury that, as a matter of law,there was no evidence upon which they could properly convict six of the eight defendants including the company, of manslaughter.

It was notoriously difficult to succeed with a charge of CM particularly when those in the dock were "remote" or of higher standing. They had to be "identified" as the controlling minds of the company before a conviction could be secured.

In an attempt to overcome this difficulty the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 entered the Statute books law some 11 years after the Law Commission propduced a Report [I"]Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter". Have a read of this if you can get a copy. 

Since then only four companies have been prosecuted under the CM law- 3 of which have succeeded .

Hope this helps.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## John Cassels

chadburn said:


> It would appear that I am not the only one who thinks it very odd that some member's will not name any of the ship's they were on.


Can't do that if they are floating around on the sea of imagination .


----------



## oldman 80

chadburn said:


> It would appear that I am not the only one who thinks it very odd that some member's will not name any of the ship's they were on.


Geordie Chief
It was clear from postings elsewhere that you are aware of what a windlass is, and where it should be, even when it is no longer there.
At least I think it was you who 'demonstrated" that fact, somewhere on this web site some time ago, but I've too much else to do and am prevented from going back to confirm it.
(My computer is slow, (or maybe its just me), or it could even be the website itself.)
I'm pretty sure it was you though, as I recognise the "Geordie Chief" bit, and identify it with that recollection from some time ago.
What is it that is "odd" about some members not mentioning the names of some of the ships they've been on ?
That doesn't register with me as being " odd " so why does it so appear so to you ?. (Unless they are compelled to of course) 
Could it be as simple as this:- It was any large/largeish combination ship which is, or was, L.R. 
Other possibilities:-
Maybe she was * just very special* reaching old age, and being finally laid appropriately to rest. (That would be the best reason I think.)
Equally, it could simply be some "mixed up" cocktail of both.


----------



## oldman 80

ben27 said:


> good day oldman80. 5march,2013,04:32.i have read your account of what can only be discribed as a nightmare of a voyage.first let me congratulate you and your crew for getting back to a safe haven.i am not a navigator but i know a courageous story when i read one,whatever the conflict is with your fellow decky's i do not know.but they cannot deny your report in your log.if they doubt that.they must look at there own reports and wonder if they are perfect,good luck oldman80.and all your crew of that horrific voyage.ben27


Thanks for that old timer.
It's the almighty that should get the praise - no doubt about it, plus the hull itself, the builders and the classification society (DNV) - they got it right that's for sure - a very superior bunch.


----------



## alastairrussell

BW/JMCG

Thanks for your post it was all A1. My memory is failing a wee bit but I do remember the reason that the Head Shirangs of the P&O were cleared from prosecution was because the new law had not been tested properly in court . It was apparent that a mere legal technicality got them off and after their case the particular law was changed. Am I right in saying this ? 

Apparently the masters of the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' had been sending letters to the P&O management complaining about the loading procedures in Antwerp as being sub standard. Back then the thing by all the ministers in the government was to their underlings was 'not to put anything that they did not want to see on their desk'.

We must all realise that in these days of the mighty WWW, things have changed. The truth only has to be told and do***ented. 

Regards 

Alastair


----------



## Duncan112

alastairrussell said:


> BW/JMCG
> 
> Thanks for all the info in your post 1026. My memory is failing a wee bit but I do remember the reason the Head Shirangs of the P&O were cleared from prosecution was because the new law had not been tested properly in court . It was apparent that a mere legal technicality got them off and after this a case the particular law was changed.
> 
> Apparently the masters of the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' had been sending letters to the P&O management complaining about the loading procedures in Antwerp as being sub standard. Back then the thing by all the ministers in the government was to their underlings was 'not to put anything that they did not want to see on their desk'.
> 
> We must all realise now that in thse ays of the mighty WWW days things have changed. The truth only has to told and do***ented on the WWW.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Alastair


Alistair,

One minor correction to your account above - it was not the P&O management that had been sent the letters which had, shall we say, sarcastic comments scrawled on them by the management but the Townsend Thorensen management, the disaster occurred a few days after the P&O take over had been finalised but the errors were made by TT (This is not saying that P&O may have reacted differently - it would be interesting to see if P&O had different procedures or if similar concerns had been raised).

A similar situation occurred with P&O and the grounding of "Kowloon Bay" on Poo Rondo where the DoT pronounced themselves satisfied with P&O's internal inquiry into that and declined to hold one of their own.


----------



## alastairrussell

Sorry Duncan 

I apologise, but I decided to change my post after you replied to my first input!

Its 10 PM here in AU and I have had a few glsses of good quality AU chardanney

Sorry Duncan

Alastair


----------



## Duncan112

No Problem Alistair - wish I was at the end of the working day rather than near the start - still I've got this evening to look forward to (Pint)


----------



## jmcg

alastairrussell said:


> BW/JMCG
> 
> Am I right in saying this ?
> 
> Alastair
> 
> The principal ground for the decision against P&O in relation to the case against the company,was that, in order to convict it (the company) of manslaughter, one of the individual defendants who could be "identified" with the company would have himself to be guilty of manslaughter . As there was insufficient evidence on which to convict any of the individual defendants the case against P&O had to fail.
> 
> The conclusion meant that the adoption of the" principle of aggregation" into English criminal law was not to be.
> 
> Hope this helps.
> 
> BW
> 
> J (Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## iwben

sorry to butt into the conversation but people keep mentioning antwerp with regards to the herald of free enterprise but she actually left zeebrugge when she rolled over.

regards
ben


----------



## chadburn

oldman 80 said:


> Geordie Chief
> It was clear from postings elsewhere that you are aware of what a windlass is, and where it should be, even when it is no longer there.
> At least I think it was you who 'demonstrated" that fact, somewhere on this web site some time ago, but I've too much else to do and am prevented from going back to confirm it.
> (My computer is slow, (or maybe its just me), or it could even be the website itself.)
> I'm pretty sure it was you though, as I recognise the "Geordie Chief" bit, and identify it with that recollection from some time ago.
> What is it that is "odd" about some members not mentioning the names of some of the ships they've been on ?
> That doesn't register with me as being " odd " so why does it so appear so to you ?. (Unless they are compelled to of course)
> Could it be as simple as this:- It was any large/largeish combination ship which is, or was, L.R.
> Other possibilities:-
> Maybe she was * just very special* reaching old age, and being finally laid appropriately to rest. (That would be the best reason I think.)
> Equally, it could simply be some "mixed up" cocktail of both.


The Deck Machinery was sat on pad's or chock's (like the main engine) which meant that the complete Windlass baseplate was not sat directly on to the bedplate which was welded to the Deck, there was a gap of around 3/4 of an inch. The Pads were positioned where the holding down bolt's were and the holding down bolts passed through the pads to keep them in place. I can fully understand that in weather condition's that the Derbyshire met with that this set up could cause a shearing effect on the holding down bolt's which allow the Windlass to come adrift. As far as not naming vessel's it still seems a bit odd to me that you tell an interesting story but do not mention the name of the vessel which is a bit of a spoiler to the story and makes people doubt that the incident actually happened.


----------



## Peter Titman

Very sad memories. Kevin a good friend from Southampton cadet days was on his 1st trip as jnr eng. If I remember right his dad was a naval architect and spent years on the case.


----------



## 5036

chadburn said:


> The Deck Machinery was sat on pad's or chock's (like the main engine) which meant that the complete Windlass baseplate was not sat directly on to the bedplate which was welded to the Deck, there was a gap of around 3/4 of an inch. The Pads were positioned where the holding down bolt's were and the holding down bolts passed through the pads to keep them in place. I can fully understand that in weather condition's that the Derbyshire met with that this set up could cause a shearing effect on the holding down bolt's which allow the Windlass to come adrift. As far as not naming vessel's it still seems a bit odd to me that you tell an interesting story but do not mention the name of the vessel which is a bit of a spoiler to the story and makes people doubt that the incident actually happened.


The holding down bolts are there only to secure and locate the windlass, the thrust forces are taken by thrust bearing surfaces. A jumbo jet engine is held in place. in the same manner, by four half inch bolts which sounds frightening and might even put you off flying.


----------



## chadburn

Given the set up as it was with Pad-space-Pad-space etc with the bolt's going through the Pad's a sudden and very powerful wave from the right/wrong direction hitting the Windlass could shear the holding down bolts like carrot's. In "normal" use it is fit for purpose but given the condition's that the Derbyshire found herself in with waves strong enough to stove a Hatchcover in is a different matter. Boeing 707's had problem's with their engine's mount's due to unusual cir***stances.


----------



## Frank P

nav said:


> T A jumbo jet engine is held in place. in the same manner, by four half inch bolts which sounds frightening and might even put you off flying.


Nav, 

I think that you find that the bolts holding a 747 engine to the wing are about 2.25 inches in diameter and 4 inches long, still not very big....

Cheers Frank.....(Thumb)


----------



## 5036

Frank P said:


> Nav,
> 
> I think that you find that the bolts holding a 747 engine to the wing are about 2.25 inches in diameter and 4 inches long, still not very big....
> 
> Cheers Frank.....(Thumb)


Are they not for the pylon? I seem to recall being told by Cathay Pacific's chief engineer, a long time ago, that the engine itself is held in place by four half inch bolts and the forces were taken by thrust plates. I may be wrong and would be delighted to be corrected.

I also remember flying to the middle east with five engines on a jumbo jet, the fifth was a replacement unit being flown out as standby to replace a changed out unit. There was apparently a special pad mounted under the wing to allow this before servicing facilities are as widespread as they are now.


----------



## Rocket_Ron

nav said:


> I also remember flying to the middle east with five engines on a jumbo jet, the fifth was a replacement unit being flown out as standby to replace a changed out unit. There was apparently a special pad mounted under the wing to allow this before servicing facilities are as widespread as they are now.


Puts a lot of drag on, thats why its as close to the centreline as possible.


----------



## 5036

Rocket_Ron said:


> Puts a lot of drag on, thats why its as close to the centreline as possible.
> 
> View attachment 33754


Wow! Thanks R-R! Lots of people have said that it was impossible and there's the proof!Thanks!


----------



## oldman 80

chadburn said:


> The Deck Machinery was sat on pad's or chock's (like the main engine) which meant that the complete Windlass baseplate was not sat directly on to the bedplate which was welded to the Deck, there was a gap of around 3/4 of an inch. The Pads were positioned where the holding down bolt's were and the holding down bolts passed through the pads to keep them in place. I can fully understand that in weather condition's that the Derbyshire met with that this set up could cause a shearing effect on the holding down bolt's which allow the Windlass to come adrift. As far as not naming vessel's it still seems a bit odd to me that you tell an interesting story but do not mention the name of the vessel which is a bit of a spoiler to the story and makes people doubt that the incident actually happened.


*For the most urgent attention* of Geordie Chief/Chiefs.
Thank you for the above information.
The following is submitted for your detailed scrutiny & professional consideration/deliberations.
*For comparison purposes only*:-
*My Swedish Built Raised Foc’sle and DNV Classified OBO.*
Sailed Vancouver November 1980 bound for Pohang via Juan de Fuca and Tsugura Straits.
Weather en route during protracted passage as follows:- 
Severe Storm Force Winds experienced for approx. 75% of Trans Pacific Passage which includes approximately 12 days of intense severe hurricane force winds without let up ( and the sea conditions associated therewith).
Vessel arrived disport (Pohang) much delayed, but nevertheless with the following essential items remaining on board. 
2 anchors – (1 each Port and Stbd).
1 spare anchor (on deck - forward)
2 windlass ‘s Complete and essentially intact ( On Raised Foc’sle) Port and Stbd.
I suggest, by comparison,
*Your Flush Decked UK designed, constructed, and classified O.B.O*. was clearly designed, constructed, and Classified by none other than the “ *Lunatic Fringe*”.

Are you aware of any formal public Inquiry to date, which has exonerated the designers, builders and classifiers of your OBO from blame for its loss with all hands.
Thanks again for your communication as captioned above.

Rgds
Capt. (Retired) 
Master Mariner Fgn (Class 1)
p.p. Swedish built, DNV classified OBO’s.


----------



## Boatman25

What was the ships name and which company did it sail for


----------



## Frank P

nav said:


> Are they not for the pylon? I seem to recall being told by Cathay Pacific's chief engineer, a long time ago, that the engine itself is held in place by four half inch bolts and the forces were taken by thrust plates. I may be wrong and would be delighted to be corrected.
> 
> I also remember flying to the middle east with five engines on a jumbo jet, the fifth was a replacement unit being flown out as standby to replace a changed out unit. There was apparently a special pad mounted under the wing to allow this before servicing facilities are as widespread as they are now.


Hello Nav, I worked (maintenance) on Jeddah airport for over 3 years and I had a few friends who worked for Rolls Royce and I used to visit their maintenance shop regularly, and one time one of them showed me a bolt (approx 2x4) and he said that 4 of these is what is holding the engine on to the wing, I was surprised to say the least. 

During my time at Jeddah the replacement/spare engines came in crates on cargo planes.

Cheers Frank......(Thumb)


----------



## jmcg

It would be highly unlikely that designers,constructors or classifiers would be subjects of an inquiry since the Government of the day had promised indemnity to Swan Hunters and others against claims arising from her loss (estimated at £60 million). This was part of the privatisation deal for shipbuilders.

In March 1982 Tyne Bridge ( a sister of Derbyshire) started to crack in an area for'ard of her superstructure. When she was returned to Hamburg her classification society (Italian) diagnosed the damage as been caused by the method employed at her builders to effect construction in the region of frame 65.

She was then restored to the specifications of her original design. 

Is it not curious as to why the "as built" plans for five of the six of these sisters mysteriously vanished.

Sorry OM80 unless we have specific details i.e name of ship and her owner at the time we can draw no positives from your last posting


BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## 5036

Frank P said:


> Hello Nav, I worked (maintenance) on Jeddah airport for over 3 years and I had a few friends who worked for Rolls Royce and I used to visit their maintenance shop regularly, and one time one of them showed me a bolt (approx 2x4) and he said that 4 of these is what is holding the engine on to the wing, I was surprised to say the least.
> 
> During my time at Jeddah the replacement/spare engines came in crates on cargo planes.
> 
> Cheers Frank......(Thumb)


Thanks for that Frank.


----------



## Stephen J. Card

Boatman25 said:


> What was the ships name and which company did it sail for


Most likely one of the Denholm managed SeaTeam OBOs. approx 100,000 dwt.

NORVEGIA TEAM
SCANDIA TEAM
SEVONIA TEAM
etc etc

I sailed in SEVONIA TEAM as 2/M... 1975. Nice ship... better than most.. possibly because of the three month spent at anchor in Eleusis Bay followed by one cargo of crude fromTripoli to Bilbao and then three weeks anchored Falmouth Roads for tank cleaning prior to layup in Norway.


----------



## jmcg

Can you confirm OM80? Thank you.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## jmcg

A little research revealed that on 20th May 2012 you posted under a thread header *"One Very Fine OBO Indeed*" details of SCANDIA TEAM  http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/showthread.php?t=44898.

We must, in the absence of any confirmation from you deduce that this is the vessel that you hitherto refused to identify on the Derbyshire thread.

Thank you Stephen J. Card for the lead.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> It would be highly unlikely that designers,constructors or classifiers would be subjects of an inquiry since the Government of the day had promised indemnity to Swan Hunters and others against claims arising from her loss (estimated at £60 million). This was part of the privatisation deal for shipbuilders.
> 
> In March 1982 Tyne Bridge ( a sister of Derbyshire) started to crack in an area for'ard of her superstructure. When she was returned to Hamburg her classification society (Italian) diagnosed the damage as been caused by the method employed at her builders to effect construction in the region of frame 65.
> 
> She was then restored to the specifications of her original design.
> 
> Is it not curious as to why the "as built" plans for five of the six of these sisters mysteriously vanished.
> 
> Sorry OM80 unless we have specific details i.e name of ship and her owner at the time we can draw no positives from your last posting
> 
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


Noted. You have all the info you require so if you really want to know
Go back to all the authorities Concerned.
As for what conclusions you care to draw, thats up to you.
I really couldn't give a toss anymore.
As for the rest of you *guys, you can go do the "impossible"*


----------



## Boatman25

I am convinced even more now OM80 that you are in a land of your own, what is so difficult to name a ship, I think it is because no ship or incident took place or if it did you had no part in it and cant name the ship because everyone who was on it will then know you did not sail on it


----------



## randcmackenzie

Hello Stephen,

Or the 120,000 tonners Anglia Team, Brittania Team etc

But the odds are on Scandia.

I finished my time in Denholm Glasgow on Scandia and London, both of which were a bit long in the tooth by then, but were still reasonable ships.

B/R



Stephen J. Card said:


> Most likely one of the Denholm managed SeaTeam OBOs. approx 100,000 dwt.
> 
> NORVEGIA TEAM
> SCANDIA TEAM
> SEVONIA TEAM
> etc etc
> 
> I sailed in SEVONIA TEAM as 2/M... 1975. Nice ship... better than most.. possibly because of the three month spent at anchor in Eleusis Bay followed by one cargo of crude fromTripoli to Bilbao and then three weeks anchored Falmouth Roads for tank cleaning prior to layup in Norway.


----------



## Stephen J. Card

randcmackenzie said:


> Hello Stephen,
> 
> Or the 120,000 tonners Anglia Team, Brittania Team etc
> 
> But the odds are on Scandia.
> 
> I finished my time in Denholm Glasgow on Scandia and London, both of which were a bit long in the tooth by then, but were still reasonable ships.
> 
> B/R



Those are the names I was trying to remember!

My time in SEVONIA was cushy indeed. Anchor watches... 12 on, 12 off, 12 on.... 24 off... for three months. Plenty of time running a lifeboat back and forth to shore, weekend cruises round the small fishing ports near Eleusis Bay, parties on board, evening at the British Residents Club in Athens. All good times. Derek Fuller was master, Colin Rowden mate, Sloan Kelly as 3rd Mate. I took over from Peter Hewitt as 2nd. Certainly better than WARWICK FORT, NORDIC CLANSMAN or AVON BRIDGE!


----------



## Boatman25

I think that this thread should be left alone with reverence to those that passed away and that a new thread be started about these type of ships and their problems, it is not nice that people should be arguing, slanging each other and making silly mysteries on a thread about a ship which took its crew to the bottom of the sea, call the thread OBO or Bulk carriers and their problems or something like that


----------



## chadburn

oldman 80 said:


> *For the most urgent attention* of Geordie Chief/Chiefs.
> Thank you for the above information.
> The following is submitted for your detailed scrutiny & professional consideration/deliberations.
> *For comparison purposes only*:-
> *My Swedish Built Raised Foc’sle and DNV Classified OBO.*
> Sailed Vancouver November 1980 bound for Pohang via Juan de Fuca and Tsugura Straits.
> Weather en route during protracted passage as follows:-
> Severe Storm Force Winds experienced for approx. 75% of Trans Pacific Passage which includes approximately 12 days of intense severe hurricane force winds without let up ( and the sea conditions associated therewith).
> Vessel arrived disport (Pohang) much delayed, but nevertheless with the following essential items remaining on board.
> 2 anchors – (1 each Port and Stbd).
> 1 spare anchor (on deck - forward)
> 2 windlass ‘s Complete and essentially intact ( On Raised Foc’sle) Port and Stbd.
> I suggest, by comparison,
> *Your Flush Decked UK designed, constructed, and classified O.B.O*. was clearly designed, constructed, and Classified by none other than the “ *Lunatic Fringe*”.
> 
> Are you aware of any formal public Inquiry to date, which has exonerated the designers, builders and classifiers of your OBO from blame for its loss with all hands.
> Thanks again for your communication as captioned above.
> 
> Rgds
> Capt. (Retired)
> Master Mariner Fgn (Class 1)
> p.p. Swedish built, DNV classified OBO’s.


I have to agree with you in regard's to Flush Deck's I did not like them either, as far as I am aware the Designer's at the Furness Yard when it was owned by Sears Holdings did not design their Bulk vessel's with flush deck's including the two I was on "Har Addir" and "Har Saggi" for El Yam (M.O.) which were two of a group of four and the last Sears Holdings built (you will see the rather obvious connection). It was only when Swans took the Yard over that Flush Deck's appeared.


----------



## oldman 80

chadburn said:


> I have to agree with you in regard's to Flush Deck's I did not like them either, as far as I am aware the Designer's at the Furness Yard when it was owned by Sears Holdings did not design their Bulk vessel's with flush deck's including the two I was on "Har Addir" and "Har Saggi" for El Yam (M.O.) which were two of a group of four and the last Sears Holdings built (you will see the rather obvious connection). It was only when Swans took the Yard over that Flush Deck's appeared.


Thanks for that Geordie Chief ?
The historical facts in relation to the Builders Yard at that time are now just too hazy for me, so far down the track.
I had a feeling that somewhere out there would be some guys from the Senior Marine Engineer fraternity and more importantly with sea service experience of OBO's or Ore / Oilers in those days.
If I recall correctly, they were very turbulent times so far as Shipbuilding and the Yards were concerned.
When takeovers, mergers etc. occur, then that is most likely the time at which major blunders will occur .
It is at such times also, that the somewhat turbulent environment of mergers/takeovers (call it what you like) may be used as a convenient smoke screen for cost and corner cutting practices. 
It is the area, which in my view deserves much more focus, and it always has been in my opinion.
Flush deckers may be just, ( and I repeat just ), acceptable for straight tankers, but never in a million years for an ocean going combination carrier.
If you and I were discussing this matter at an on board ship management meeting, over a cup of coffee perhaps,the I would be saying to you, well look at it this way chief - look at it from an imaginary ship conversion project. I would then say, it might be acceptable to convert a combination carrier to a straight tanker but not the other way round. (I hope you "get the gist" of what such an " imaginary " scenario would entail).
I wonder sometimes, whether Derbyshires basic hull design was in fact a basic tanker design, then someone approached the yard and demanded a combination carrier be built.
O.K. then, yes we can do that, says management, we'll just cut much bigger holes in the decks, much much bigger in fact, and we'll weld some larger coamings around them and stick inferior style side rolling hatches on top. 
Of course, that is probably not how she, the Derbyshire was born , I use the scenario as a simple demonstration in words, as an approximation of what may have occurred as she evolved from the desks of the naval architects until her final completion.
Although the foregoing text is just a very "general concept" of that sort of evolution process, (design through to completion), the end result would be the same - *and that is*, a "beast" of a ship, that really should never have been born.
No wonder OBO's got such a bad name - some were far superior in every respect - and with time, I feel they would have, or should have evolved into a very usefull ship within the concept of the climate change considerations.
We all know they require special skills and expertise to operate them correctly and much hard work - but if that's what is required to save the planet - so be it.
The hard work factor of course, is another reason they were not popular with some officers and crew, unless they were in semi - lay up - as sometimes they could be.
As for me, I always prefered the OBO to a straight "round the cape tanker". I was also extremely lucky to stand by the building of two of the superior class of OBO, then sail on them and others for several years as both C/O and Master.
Had I been required to serve in the Derbyshire or one of her class, I think I'd just have turned around and gone home, or at least given it serious consideration.
I'll leave it there chief, and hope we may bump into each other again some time, in another world, or forum perhaps.


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## chadburn

Amazing, but I have to agree with you again as I believe Swan's who were building "Supertanker's" in the 1960's with Flush Deck's at their Yard on the Tyne carried that design through to vessel's like the unfortunate "Derbyshire". I think it was you that thought the "Derbyshire" may have lost her M/E and I agree she was then left at the mercy of wind and sea. As far as Tanker's were concerned I did in the 1960's consider them but as they were blowing up I gave them a miss.


----------



## oldman 80

chadburn said:


> Amazing, but I have to agree with you again as I believe Swan's who were building "Supertanker's" in the 1960's with Flush Deck's at their Yard on the Tyne carried that design through to vessel's like the unfortunate "Derbyshire". I think it was you that thought the "Derbyshire" may have lost her M/E and I agree she was then left at the mercy of wind and sea. As far as Tanker's were concerned I did in the 1960's consider them but as they were blowing up I gave them a miss.





chadburn said:


> Amazing, but I have to agree with you again as I believe Swan's who were building "Supertanker's" in the 1960's with Flush Deck's at their Yard on the Tyne carried that design through to vessel's like the unfortunate "Derbyshire". I think it was you that thought the "Derbyshire" may have lost her M/E and I agree she was then left at the mercy of wind and sea. As far as Tanker's were concerned I did in the 1960's consider them but as they were blowing up I gave them a miss.


That is Noted Chief and thanks. 
It is indeed very interesting.
I can't remember with clarity what was going on in the shipyards in those days - my priority was of course the BoT requirements for Masters and Mates. Someone engaged in Marine Engineering, I reckoned, would have a better recollection than I.
I have no idea if M.E. failure or near failure contributed to Derbyshires loss, I rather suspect not, but one never knows for sure.
My company knew about the fuel problem very early in the drama with my OBO, and also knew we were in trouble because of it. My company, a good ship manager at the time liaised closely with Amver to try and monitor our progress with whatever means was available to them, (AMVER) although just what technology that was, I don't know. US Military stuff I believe. However it was reassuring to believe that they were doing the best that they could, even if it was not actually occurring. 
The R/O (Tom) I think, and Portishead bent over backwards, trying as best they could to keep communications open throughout, as the drama developed, sometimes with success, sometimes not so. (We got fitted with Satcom quite quickly after that, next time back in Long Beach I think. One positive out of it all).

In the case of My OBO on that North Pacific crossing in late 1980, near engine failure prevented the vessel being turned, as was required, she had lost steerage way and just sat there, helm hard over at a maximum achievable RPM of around 30 (roughly DSA), which gradually further reduced to the point where she was in extreme danger of broaching completely, and also the very real possibility of the HFO dropping to its Pour Point - that would really have put the cat amongst the pigeons had it occurred, and it came very close on too many occasions for my likening. (It was Winter and the sea temp not on our side). We did have D.O. of course, but nothing like enough to change over to it full time, so some other solution had to be found. I can't go into that on here though. One thing for sure Amver would have been a bit "perplexed" in respect of the vessels progress - if they were actually "acoustically" following us as I have reason to believe that they were. The normal plot will show it though, irrespective, provided it was archived.
The reason for that (FUEL Issue), or so it was believed at the time, was that the HFO fell far below specification. There followed the inevitable big time battle between owners and the Long Beach (USWC) fuel suppliers. It was heading for the courts in big style, but to this day I am not sure what finally happened there, ( there was “something” else about it – I recall,) in fact the case might still be going on for all I know, although that’s probably unlikely. There comes a time when you become no longer privy to such matters. 
On finally reaching Pohang, detailed inspection of the M.E. was carried out, and the findings were “grim”. On top of that we still had something in the order of 4000 tonnes of the crap HO on board, and you just can't just get rid of it like that. Even the boilers didn't like it, let alone the M.E. but they only consumed 20 tpd (about) when going flat out in port discharging oil cargoes, or when being utilised for inert gas generation. It would have taken years to get rid of it that way.
The total fuel issue itself is a long story but after discharge of coal in Pohang, we limped down to Singapore for docking and a major M.E rebuild. The Crankshaft was ok, but everything else was “changed out”. There were sufficient reconditioned pistons, fuel pumps, liners, valves and cylinder covers etc. lying in our fleet stock warehouse in Singapore, to provide for about 6 units but the remainder we had to wait for whilst they were reconditioned locally. That figure of 6 is just a rough one; it may have been 5 or 7 that were available from fleet stock immediately. Not that it matters much, as all 9 units were “stuffed”, and had to be rebuilt/ reconditioned.
There were big problems with the T.C.'s also, as you would expect, but we were fully aware of that all the way across, - and they had to be landed and refurbished also. Another costly exercise, but it took top priority at the time. The full extent of the hatch cover damage, had not even been recognised yet, it was only after we had oil in her again, and hit some heavy weather, that it began to dawn that something was “disturbingly wrong” with the cargo hold hatch covers.
It was no longer just a case of them being “something less than gas tight”; they were no longer “anything” tight. A bit "messy" at times and damned right depressing, I can tell you – she was generally a beautiful looking ship – all orange and grey, with some cream. Anyhow the necessity for total hatch cover refurbishment #1 to #9 was now recognised, and the appropriate planning put in place. That job was done late the following year 1982 or maybe early 1983, - Singapore D.D. also. 
Had we been able to get more power on that crossing, then it might have been possible to have been able to avoid the worst of the weather, but I doubt it - the whole North Pacific was angry, very angry, indeed. 
I never saw anything like it (weather wise), for such continuous extended period before, nor again afterwards.
The fuel problem was, in the main, Vanadium content related, but there was a bit more to it, than just that - but I'm damned if I can remember the details.


----------



## oldman 80

John Cassels said:


> Have it on pretty good authority ( two sources ) that once again this
> mystery ship is another of his flights of fancy,
> 
> In other words , he lies like a Takoradi flat fish.



Revelation 20
[1] And I saw an angel come down from heaven, having the key of the bottomless pit and a great chain in his hand.
[2] And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years,
[3] And cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, that he should deceive the nations no more, till the thousand years should be fulfilled: and after that he must be loosed a little season.
[4] And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them: and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.
[5] But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished. This is the first resurrection.
[6] Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power, but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years.
[7] And when the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison,
[8] And shall go out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth, Gog and Magog, to gather them together to battle: the number of whom is as the sand of the sea.
[9] And they went up on the breadth of the earth, and compassed the camp of the saints about, and the beloved city: and fire came down from God out of heaven, and devoured them.
[10] And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.
[11] And I saw a great white throne, and him that sat on it, from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away; and there was found no place for them.
[12] And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works.
[13] *And the sea gave up the dead which were in it*; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them: and they were judged every man according to their works.
[14] And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death.
[15] And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire.


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## 5036

When one starts quoting the bible it is usually a sign that the poster has lost the argument. The hypocrisy gene is a major part of all of our make up but there is always a magnification attached to these type of posts.

The Good Lord tells us to forgive and forget but you seem hell bent on revenge against 1980's politicians even when you acknowledge that there was no evidence available at the time to base anything on and that a fuel problem you may or may not have experienced on a ship that we don't know whether you were or weren't on might or might not have had an effect on the Derbyshire incident. 

As the Good Book says, "let he that is without sin...."

Oh Lord! I'm getting as bad as you now!


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## alastairrussell

*THE MV DERBYSHIRE PROLOGUE*

We know much of this paper will find agreement with the Derbyshire Family Association: we hope
all of it will. But it is the sole work and responsibility of Paul Lambert (Chairman of the Derbyshire
Family Association) and Dave Ramwell (Captain), and it must not be taken as necessarily reflecting
the views of any other party.

*SAFETY FIRST - COMMERCE SECOND
*

*INTRODUCTION
*
The "Derbyshire", an oil/bulk/ore (OBO) ship, loaded with 150,000 tons of iron ore and carrying 44
persons, disap peared in a typhoon she should have shrugged off with ease - and so quickly that not
even a distress signal escaped.

*BACKGROUND

*"Derbyshire" was supposedly well found, classed to highest standard and barely four years old. (In
terms of working life, three, as she had been laid up at Stavanger for a year). Her crew consisted of
competent, qualified men, she was fined with the latest navigational equipment and all her papers
were in order.

News other loss in September 1980 prompted an instinctive reaction from seafarers : "She's too big
to disappear ......."

Indeed, when nine year old "Mineral Diamond" disappeared in uncannily similar cir***stances 11
years on, the subsequent inquiry, instituted by the Hong Kong Director of Marine, concluded: "...... it
seems most likely that a major structural failure of her hull, which resulted in her breaking in two, is
the cause of her sinking ....."

Events following the severe cracking of sistership, "Tyne Bridge", in 1982 were to prove "Derbyshire"
and all her sisters were weak just forward of the accommodation superstructure, and in all but the
first of the six ship series extemporaneous construction methods in the region of frame 65 introduced
a potentially fatal flaw.

The UK Department of Transport recognised this in its first report after preliminary investigation of
the loss of the "Derbyshire" conducted in 1985. The report was changed in 1986 to blame the
weather. Parties who perceived possible compromise of their position in the 1985 version, were
happier with the second - not surprising when it is known their input led to the change.
The only ill built and un-restored "Derbyshire" sister, in a collapsing and abandoned state, collided
with Southern Ireland and, in doing so, precipitated the Formal Investigation of the loss of
"Derbyshire" over six years earlier.


*FORMAL INVESTIGATION

*Hopes, by those who lost loved ones in "Derbyshire", that the Formal Investigation would deliver the
truth at last, were dashed when, by ignoring or trivialising the history of the damage throughout the
fleet, and by failing to call crucial witnesses, the Court nursed ''Lost in Bad Weather" over the
finishing line well ahead of all other runners.

But the whitewash was at least blatant enough to excite the anger of others who, like most of the
families^ knew they had just witnessed a cover-up. A formidable team, formed almost
spontaneously by a shared burning desire for justice, joined forces with the Derbyshire Family
Association. Together they forced a review of the Formal Investigation, captured the interest of the
media (investigative programmes were broadcast on national stations, both TV and radio), wrote a
book on the case, published articles, initiated questions and debates in both Houses of Parliament,
and, most crucially, stemming from the initiative of Shaun Kent, working with John Jubb, located the
wreck of the "Derbyshire" 2.8 miles deep.

The DFA and its helpers provided the wherewithal to find "Derbyshire" when others said it could not
be done.

In searching the wider bulk carrier scene for any corroborative general evidence it was inevitable that
this team would stumble on "the bulker problem"; it was too big to miss. Put simply the problem is:
most bulk carriers are not strong enough to do the job for which they were built over the lifetime that
was originally projected for them. Hundreds of seafarers have lost their lives as a result.
It is being argued by some that, regrettable as the losses are, the problem cannot be cured quickly.
We, the two authors of this paper present the wherewithal to show that it can.
The "Derbyshire" is a separate case covered by separate argument; she was a new ship and only
carried the ageing bulker problem in embryo. But our knowledge of the unacceptable toll of life, and
our awareness that, through a profile raised by the "Derbyshire", we can make an impression,
emboldens us - indeed, we feel, leaves us no alternative other than - to open this wider front in the
battle for justice, in the interests of all who still sail in these coffin ships. If we complicate matters for
ourselves, so be it..... we cannot just walk away.

*LOSSES IN BULK*

How could the late Doug Foy, retired seafarer turned marine journalist, pre-empt the classification
societies, with their vast data banks, in warning of the inadequacy of bulk carrier design? It was
November 1990 before Lloyd's Register conceded that the then current spate of losses signaled a
need for investigation into the type. At the beginning of that same year one spokesman claimed
those losses were "atypical", another told a BBC Interviewer, Lloyd's Register "don't believe the
vessels have a fundamental design fault; they believe the ships' sides simply wear out because of
corrosion and punishment they receive as cargo is loaded and unloaded".

Which prompts the question, if it was not the job of the classification society to foresee and cater or
such corrosion wastage and natural punishment, then whose job was it? Perhaps the authors of "A


Ship Too Far; The Mystery of the Derbyshire" (one of them Dave Ramwell) touched on the truth:
“The classification society system no longer works in today's fiercely competitive environment. It
should be ended."

We think ail the classification societies have fallen short of those standards which could reasonably
be expected of them; that measures could have been taken much earlier and that, even now, their
diagnosis does not properly disclose the severity of the malady.

During the. five years before the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) reviewed
the safety and structural integrity of bulk carriers, losses averaged 10-per year and 700 seafarers
died in the type. In 1990 the total bulk carrier fleet represented 7% of the world's fleet -and
accounted for 57% of its casualties.

In the period 1980 to 1996 43 'standard' bulk carriers of over 20.000 dwt were lost in
cir***stances where structural failure could well have played a part. (Taking a 'standard' bulk
carrier to be a vessel with a configuration where there is a single skin, transversely framed side,
double bottom, with topside and hopper tanks running through the cargo holds). Other bulk
carriers failed structurally but were fortunate enough not to be lost as a result.
The age of the ships varied - from only eight years to thirty nine years old. The average age was18,
with 78% of them fifteen years or over.

At the time of writing statistics (source: MARINE ENGINEERS' REVIEW, April '97) give 4,200
bulk carriers (of all configurations) of 150 m or more, 1,900 of these are fifteen years old or
more.

As the MER points out, "...... the ships were built to class and international regulations that applied at
the time of their construction."

But the plain fact is many of these ships were built when the classification societies knew, or ought to
have known, those regulations were inadequate.

Track records spell out the only sure way of eradicating the danger posed by the fifteen year old bulk
carrier – scrap it.

Recently IACS has claimed its Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP), started in 1993, has reduced
bulker losses. We believe such reduction could have more to do with the raised level of awareness
of the mortal dangers attaching to old bulkers. It is not a case any more of clapped out rustbuckets
slipping quietly below the waves, with a "can't lose" owner recovering his "total loss" from the
underwriters. Now the public increasingly demands an answer, and it harbours a sympathy for the
seafarer that would countenance the spending of £ millions to investigate one "classic case" lying 2.8
miles down. This awareness, together with recent moves to update the marine insurance industry
towards better actuarial practice, is the real medicine to start the cure.

To what extent, we wonder, was the "raised awareness factor" instrumental in dictating the fate of
the "Nafsika M", last of the "'Derbyshire" sisters? Despite her owners having spent thousands of
dollars to (one would suppose) extend her life just two and a half years ago, she is now destined for
breaking up in Bangladesh. Paul Lambert warned the major classification societies of the difficulties

in making such an old bulk carrier safe. He was rewarded with threats from the Greek lawyers of her
owners with action against him in the civil and criminal court. That legal action may still be pending,
but, in the meantime, given "Nafsika M's" implications for the "Derbyshire" case swivelling the
spotlight on her, would any classification society now dare to put her in class unless she was
absolutely seaworthy? Conversely, without such spotlight, would she have been granted a few more
years to justify all that expenditure in the Gdansk shipyard?

Whatever the case with "Nafsika M", we believe the IACS' ESP is ineffective.
Early February 1997 the bulk carrier, "Leros Strength" sank off Norway, killing her 20 man Polish
crew and sending 15 tons of oil ashore to foul the coast.

•"Leros Strength" had been through the ESP.

• "Leros Strength" had been classed by RINA, the Italian classification society and an
accredited member of IACS

• Transfer of "Leros Strength" from the American Bureau of Shipping had conformed to all
reporting requirements laid down by IACS.

Just a few weeks later the bulker "Albion Two" was discovered broken in two on the seabed some 70
miles west of the tip of Brittany. She is now the grave of 25 men. She had been through the ESP.
When the sinking of a deliberately scuttled, loaded bulk carrier ("Gallant Dragon") takes six seconds,
when a 22 year old bulker ("Trade Daring") simply snaps in two alongside whilst loading, when plates
peel away from ships' sides, and when, over a period of only eighteen I months, the deaths number
nearly 300, with thousands over two decades .... then we think we are justified in demanding of
IACS, and all who help keep these old bulker carriers in circulation; take more positive action,
because the measures you have taken so far are clearly not enough.

*NEW CRITERIA

*In December 1996 IACS ratified its decision requiring the corrugated bulkhead between holds No. 1
and No. 2 and the double bottom structure in way of No. 1 hold, to meet new criteria for single skin
bulk carriers of 150 m in length or over, being, at the same time, fifteen years or more in age, and
likely to carry cargo that includes material of bulk density lt/m3 or more. 

This requirement was shaped by statistical indication that tonnage over fifteen years old was most at
risk, and hold No. 1 was most likely to flood - making the corrugated transverse bulkhead between
holds 1 and 2 the most structurally vulnerable. (Some 40% of the bulker losses involved water
ingress to No. 1 hold). But, again, given the vast data banks of the classification societies, why did
it appear to us that John Jubb, Welding Consultant, beat the whole maritime regulatory system to the
draw on this one, when he was promoting awareness of the relative fragility of these connections
during talks he gave (and still gives) on "Derbyshire"' and bulk carriers, generally?

We believe most fifteen year old bulkers cannot be made safe without spending more than the ship
is worth. Tinkering about with bulkheads could even prolong the sickness by creating the impression
that something positive is being done. You cannot make a silk purse out of an old sow's ear.

We believe all bulk carriers should be scrapped on their fifteenth 'birthday', unless the owner makes
specific appeal on the grounds that his ship is well above average condition for her age. If the owner
does so appeal there should be an initial and relatively cursory inspection by an independent suitably
qualified professional to check whether the ship in fac t tallies with her owner's optimistic assessment.
If it does there should be a further inspection, this time of a thorough and rigorous nature, using the
most sophisticated crack detecting and weardown measuring instruments available. The ship would
be taken out of service for as long as the inspectors 'considered necessary. It would be for the owner
to ensure his ship was brought to such condition as would best facilitate such survey.

This second survey would be carried out by an International Maritime Organisation (IMO), or IMO
appointed, team. (It is envisaged the IMO would be "empowered" as in point 10 of the 30 point
presentation attached). And we would suggest an owner be assisted with his survey costs should
such IMO team agree to extending the life of his 15+ bulker, monies being taken from an IMO
centrally administered fund created with levied contributions from the shipping industry and the
marine insurance industry - both of which stand to gain from this policy in the long term.

The policy puts the onus on the shipowner and, if he believes his ship warrants it, encourages him
to avail himself of such option. Conversely the rust bucket, cowboy will have little choice but to cut
his losses (and, as a happy incidental, the seafarers' death rate in bulk carriers) by sending his ship
to the scrapyard where he can at least get the price other metal.

IACS may be making moves in the right direction, but the loss of "Leros Strength" and "Albion Two"
do not inspire confidence in the effectiveness of those moves. More, much more, needs to be done.
Old bulk carriers - rundown ships generally - are a global problem requiring a global strategy. Self
regulation has failed; a radical, new approach is needed.

We believe safety at sea can be enhanced, and enhanced quickly, but it would require the
implementation of '"people orientated" policies, and these days such a bias is out of fashion. It
would require safety first, commerce second.

We are certain that once such policies have been established, such commerce as grows out of the
new regime will be on sounder and more profitable footing. And not in spite of, but because safety is
the first consideration.

Some may think us arrogant for taking upon ourselves to advise the maritime establishment.
Indeed we know we have entered territory that should rightly be occupied by others - but now
we’re here, we've looked around, and we seem to be on our own.

*PROPOSALS - 30 POINT PLAN*

So - here is our 30 point plan to make things better ...

1. Damage arising from possible design flaws in a ship should be promulgated by M.

Notice, or other means, to alert others in similar ship type to their potential danger.

2. Should any party not so broadcast such possible danger, it shall count as having
recklessly endangered life and attract meet penalty

3. An International Ship Data Base (ISDB) should be established to record the salient
details of every ship. It should be managed by the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO).

4. There should be a basic "core record" for each ship, and this core would reflect those
conditions against which a good maritime insurance company would set its judgment as
to what constitutes a "good risk". For example, criteria would include: ship's age;
condition at last survey; history of insurance claims/accidents; number and nationality of
crew; qualifications.

5. Anyone should have access to ISDB information provided they can prove good intent to
the IMO. For example, parties engaged in safety exercises should have unimpeded
access, but where suspicion of seeking knowledge to secure, say, commercial
advantage over rivals exists, the IMO would have to be cir***spect to greater degree.
(Charges for information should be only that necessary to cover costs. There is
philosophy behind the ISDB such that seeking to profit by it would compromise it as a
"lifesaver").

6. Anyone having knowledge of what he/she considers to be a dangerous defect in a ship
should have the right to cause such defect to be appropriately recorded with the ISDB.
Should the IMO refuse to so record such alleged defect then the IMO should give to the
complainant its written reasons. Such response would then, potentially, have the force
of a legal do***ent and a copy would be retained by the IMO.

7. Similarly, if an applicant is refused details he/she has requested from the ISDB, and
same applicant is not satisfied with the IMO verbal explanation for refusal, then same
applicant should be given a written letter detailing the reason(s) for such refusal.

8. The criteria as to what constitutes a seaworthy ship must be agreed between: the IMO.
the marine insurance industry, maritime regulators, seafarers, seafarers' unions and
professional bodies (e.g. Nautical Institute), ship-builders, shipowners and naval
architects. In the event of disagreement the final arbiters would be the IMO in
collaboration with the marine insurance industry.

9. There should be global standardisation of rules and regulations governing the building
and operation of ships in order to stop the downward spiral of safety standards caused
by solely profit relat ed flag of convenience 'standards'.

10. The IMO, presently responsible for formulating and bringing to ratification, rules and
regulations, should also be responsible for the implementation, and then policing, of
such rules and regulations.

11. Where safety is concerned (e.g. reserves of stability in a damaged roro, or the current
unacceptable rate of bulk carrier losses and associated deaths) there should be an
agreed "fast track" towards implementation of necessary measures.

12. The classification society system is failing to protect life at sea to satisfactory level; it
should be ended - along with the shipping industry's over reliance generally on self
regulation. No replacement system should be profit orientated, inter-classification
society competition having helped to drive standards down to present state.

13. Respective governments should 'take charge of issuing all licences and certificates
through different shipping levels - from certifying the seafarer's qualifications to granting
licence for a shipping company's formation.

14. Governments should ensure that the responsibility for both promoting and regulating
the shipping industry does not reside with the same Government (or Government
appointed) Department. (This has been done in the off shore UK oil industry. After the
Piper Alpha explosion safety matters were removed from the Department of Energy
and given to the Health and Safety Executive).

15. The current UK ship accident investigation body is the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch of the Department of Transport. It cannot be seen as truly independent; there
should be a Civil Maritime Authority (analogous to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA))
recognised by all parties as being professionally impartial, and the CMA alone would
make official investigation post accident.

16. Such CMA would count as "any party" within the context of point 2 of this presentation.

17. An individual, or a board of directors, should be named as being solely responsible for
the efficient running of the ship(s) within their company, and an address should be
given. Such address being the place where the responsible party can be accessed at
all times by anybody having legitimate cause for enquiry. This should be a condition of
their licence to operate as a shipping company.

18. Every ship must be appropriately insured and carry proof of insurance.

19. Underwriters should accelerate moves to update actuarial practice (still rooted in the
days of Samual Plimsoll) and simplify procedures after an accident. In associated legal
proceedings, lawyers unnecessarily complicating or drawing out cases would be named
and fined.

20. If, during insurance related, legal, or any other proceedings, there emerges information
with the capacity to enhance safety elsewhere, that information shall be promulgated as
per points 1 and 2 of this presentation.
Confidentiality or other judicious precaution shall, as far as possible protect the
interests of parties specific to the case, but, whatever, the promulgation of such
information must take precedence.

21. When standards have been internationally agreed they must be treated as minimum;
enhancement above the benchmark should be encouraged.
For example, the UK DOT cites roros as meeting the highest standards - and they do. But
presently agreed standards, where they address matters of reserve buoyancy and
stability in the event of accident, are themselves too low.
Again, the US has decreed above minimum standards for the construction of tankers
sailing in US waters, in deference to environmental safety. This has pushed up general
standards as owners anticipating trade with the US have to meet those US standards.
Also, a ship not complying with these enhanced standards would lose resale value vis a
vis one that did.

22. Anyone having legitimate cause for concern over matters relating to safety should
never be discouraged from expressing such concern for fear of adverse consequences.
Any party threatening such adverse consequence in order to protect their own position,
or for any other reason, should be severely penalised.

23. A system for the confidential reporting of "near misses" (akin to that run by the CAA)
should be established internationally. (The Nautical Institute runs such a scheme
voluntarily; it could serve as a model).

24. The location of ''Derbyshire" 2.8 miles down demonstrates that a sh»p need never bi?
"lost" again - only "missing pending location".
Where a foundering has similar controversial connotations to "Derbyshire's" case, or
where forensic examination of the wreckage could usefully add to the store of scientific
maritime knowledge, then such wreckage investigation should proceed under the
authority of the CMA proposed in point 15 of this presentation. Findings should be made
public in every case, or, if there is compelling reason for secrecy, such reason should be
given as fully as possible. The usual''.... It will not serve the public interest..." will no
longer be acceptable.

25. Following such wreck examination by the CMA there should first be published the CMA
findings; but these should be regarded in the first instance as 'draft' only; responses
from various and acknowledged expert individuals and organisations shall be fully
considered and the draft, if appropriate, amended and published in 'final' version.
Where there is disagreement between parties this should be noted with, as appropriate,
explanations to support opposing views to those published in the body of the final version,
and such views shall be published as an annex to and integral part of same final CMA
publication. (In event of similar accident this will alert parties involved to all likelihood.
Such a mechanism, had it been in place, would have long ago accelerated moves to
improve bulk carrier safety and saved many hundreds of lives).

26. The proposed CMA should undertake the monitoring of quality control at shipyards,
mainly by un-announced spot checks. Regular reports on the different yards should be
sent to the IMO by the CMA (and its equivalent in other countries, using the same
criteria by which to make judgment).
The IMO should publish the names of any shipbuilders who fall so short of good practice
as to compromise safety.

27. If inspection of a ship reveals evidence of bad practices at her builders (for example,
welding rods, found during repairs, which were used in the building as ‘fillers’ in a weld),
then it should be investigated by the CMA and the builders brought to account.
In each such event the CMA would report to the IMO, and as soon as possible where the
CMA judges other contemporaneously built ships from the same yard could have been
similarly the subject of bad practice.

28. Records of all shipyard related reports should be retained by the IMO, and yards should
be aware that bad practices could adversely affect future cases involving ships built at
their yards, especially in legal context.

29. If statistics alone indicate patterns giving cause for concern (e.g. excessive losses in
the older sections of the bulk carrier fleet, and in the fishing fleet) then this should be
sufficient reason for the IMO to mount appropriate investigations. Any protests resulting
from such initiative should be made in writing, and protesters should be aware that
attempts to compromise safety, by seeking excessive accommodation of factors
conducive to profit for example, would meet with severe penalties.
(Again, had such facility been in place 10 years ago hundreds of lives would have been
saved).

30. The IMO alone, using its ISDB and established ground rules, shall' -decide what
constitutes "fair treatment", and then it will ensure global implementation of same.


Paul Lambert Captain Dave Ramwell
Chairperson Cheshire, UK

MV Derbyshire Families Association
Liverpool, United Kingdom.


----------



## ECKER365

*derbyshire*



John Rogers said:


> Watch a a TV show today about the sinking and the finding the wreck of the Derbyshire,great to watch,the program is on the History Channel. Anyone remember the loss of the ship.?
> John.


 we were in the same storm typhoon orchid i think heading in the opposite direction. on a kuwait shipping co ship iwas a naive cadet but i remember sitting on the bar floorwith back to bulkhead trying to stop you sliding across rthe deck 35 degree rolls our captain offered to help but other ships were closer ,beliieve only traces of oil found.worked subsequenly on bulk carriers but never slept easy thinking what horror the last minute of the derbyshire must have been rgds mike eckerley 2nd mate kwt shipping


----------



## jmcg

Monday next will be the 33rd anniversary of the loss of Derbyshire and her 42 crew +2 wives.

Remember that these souls have no grave but the sea.

I will remember them.

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## luzy

John Rogers said:


> Watch a a TV show today about the sinking and the finding the wreck of the Derbyshire,great to watch,the program is on the History Channel. Anyone remember the loss of the ship.?
> John.


I remerber the sinking of the Derbyshire. During that time I sailed on a sistersip M/V Tyne Bridge.
I can recommand the books: A bridge too far and Return of the 
Coffin Ships. Very interesting.

Luzy


----------



## Hamish Mackintosh

luzy said:


> I remerber the sinking of the Derbyshire. During that time I sailed on a sistersip M/V Tyne Bridge.
> I can recommand the books: A bridge too far and Return of the
> Coffin Ships. Very interesting.
> 
> Luzy


Yes "return of the coffin ships" opens ones eyes to a lot of disasters, not only the Derbyshire, and it gives a far different theory, as to its unfortunate demise


----------



## howardws

luzy said:


> I can recommand the books: A bridge too far and Return of the
> Coffin Ships. Very interesting.
> Luzy


Please note the first book is 'A Ship Too Far'. They are both available on Amazon.


----------



## alastairrussell

Let us all remember that today, 25 June 2014 is the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Day of the Seafarer.


----------



## jmcg

Tomorrow 9th /10th September will be the 34th anniversary of the loss of Derbyshire and her 42 crew +2 wives.

Remember that these souls have no grave but the sea.

I will remember them.

John


----------



## SAGcadet

I thought I would make a small contribution here, it was 35 years ago but the events of the period made it all quite memorable

I was on the Sir Alexander Glen from feb 82 for 6 months

The pumproom plates were around an inch and a quarter thick and had a number of random cracks within the plates themselves, but not the welds, the welds were fine. We would drill these plates out periodically and keep an eye on them. The cracks were focussed around the centre section of the plate, spreading outwards
To me this suggests that the metal was prone to stress fracturing within it's own structure because of stress fatigue, (perhaps the grade of metal was too hard/brittle)

After one drop off in japan we went to a huge dry dock in a tiny place called Aioi to get checked out. We all expected to see most work being done around the pumproom but it was discovered that the rudder was about to drop off kinda thing and they had to do a huge amount of work to sort it out so us cadets got a two week holiday
(The Kowloon Bridge has it's rudder drop off)

I was never in those huge seas which the pacific can produce on SAG, seas which are far bigger than anything I ever saw in any north atlantic storm
She didn't ride well on the waves and seemed to "punch" her way through a sea. There was no foc'sle and her freeboard was the lowest I ever sailed in, you could almost hang off the bottom rung of the deck railing and touch the water with your feet so the sea was never far away when sailing loaded, and not far away from those hatch covers in heavy seas

Definitely not a good ship design for sailing into a Typhoon, and the class had do***ented structural issues as well, related either to the metal being not up to the job or the design
Since both the rudder AND the pumproom had serious cracking issues my own guess would be the grade of metal used in the construction


----------



## SAGcadet

If you want a sobering read concerning our industry then use wiki and search from

List of shipwrecks in 1960

Just add a year for each search 1961, 62 etc

It's a dangerous industry


----------



## tiachapman

coffn ships


----------



## deanthornton1962

I Joined the Tyne Bridge in 1978 Rust bucket (understatement) in November in Piraeus Greece.
Sailed to Livorno Spent six weeks watching the cracks being welded up flown back home to Newcastle as no heating impure water so they gave us beer instead.
Hunting and Son knew of the problems with the design.
We crossed to Newport news Virginia took forever as we were down to 3 knots and wish I had the I phone as to see that ship bend as we were crossing WHOA.


----------



## jmcg

Just a reminder that to-morrow 9th September will be the 36th anniversary of the loss of the Bibby Line (Liverpool) OBO, M.V. Derbyshire taking with her 44 souls.

No doubt, many of us here on S/N will have known or sailed with some of those lost, who I'm sure, had it not been for their fate, would be subscribing to S/N.

We will remember them all to-day, to-morrow and thereafter - those who have no grave but the sea.

Remembered as always.

John


----------



## tiachapman

Coffin Class


----------



## sidsal

Indeed a tragic event.
God rest their souls !


----------



## BOB.WHITTAKER

*Coffin Class*

Fortunately I have only good memorys of this class of ship, being with Houlders / Furness I sailed on two of them as Second Engineer . These were the Sir John Hunter ( With my wife Hazel ) and the Sir Alexander Glen . We had the usual upsets to routine but no disasters . I never 
sailed on the first of the class the Furness Bridge , which Houlders
Engineering Superintendent , Hartley Reid , told me was a " Character
building experience ". This when he visited the Ocean Transport in 
Liverpool . Now there was a steady job , a four legged Doxford with a DC shaft generator , two Allen diesel generators , once you got " Full
away " leaving Liverpool on with the shaft geny. off with the Allens and
next stop Santos or Montevideo . If you were lucky ! ! !


----------



## Les Gibson

Bob,
Remember the Ocean Transport well. I was in the last year of my apprenticeship in Leslie's Hebburn yard where she was built. Wired up most of the winches and installed tween deck lighting with a couple of other apprentices.


----------



## Peter Cheseldine

thobshropshire said:


> This class of vessel had a cargo control room all the ballast pumping was controlled from there.
> Remotely operated valves were hydraulic I seem to recall.
> Regards


Tyne Bridge
Dobie McKinnes valves and controls. Valve actuators on deck regularly jammed due in ingress of iron ore dust "Weather sealed and require no maintenance" according to the manufacturer. 
An hydraulic oil back flow also caused a slop valve to open during emergency ballasting off Wakyama. Resulting in oily water in number 8 hold (if I remember correctly). It was assumed that a spark created by movement of the hatch cover which resulted in both hatch covers disappearing overboard. Luckily no serious injuries.
Somehow I managed to survive six terms of service on this vessel.


----------



## Peter Cheseldine

Peter Cheseldine said:


> Tyne Bridge
> Dobie McKinnes valves and controls. Valve actuators on deck regularly jammed due in ingress of iron ore dust "Weather sealed and require no maintenance" according to the manufacturer.
> An hydraulic oil back flow also caused a slop valve to open during emergency ballasting off Wakyama. Resulting in oily water in number 8 hold (if I remember correctly). It was assumed that a spark created by movement of the hatch cover which resulted in both hatch covers disappearing overboard. Luckily no serious injuries.
> Somehow I managed to survive six terms of service on this vessel.


Apologies. No 9 hold not 8 as stared


----------



## tiachapman

YES DEAD RIGHT COFFIN CLASS, worked on them as a shipwright in the Furness yard threw together.


----------



## jmcg

Tiachapman

Was there no quality control or effective management policies/procedures in those days/yards?

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


----------



## Peter Cheseldine

I have posted a couple of thumbnails of Tyne Bridge, on the tanker thread under "whatever happened to Huntings."


----------



## jmcg

As the years roll on and at times memory fades let us all remember this day in 1980 when 44 of our seafaring colleagues perished to the deep with the loss of Bibby's M.V. Derbyshire.

They have no graves but the sea.

Let us always remember them.

Never forgotten.

J


----------



## Frank P

R.i.p.


----------



## Erimus

Good grief....that far back?? Seems more recent than that but like Piper Alpha images stay with us in the business..

Indeed RIP those 44 lost souls.

geoff


----------



## slick

All,
Alittle help please, somewhere a while agoI read through the Crew List.
I see the name of the Chief Officer was given as Bayliss.
I sailed with a chap called "Curly" Bayliss in the RFA is he the one?
My apologies in advance if I am being a bit clumsy.

Yours aye,

slick


----------



## trotterdotpom

A sad day. You could see her taking shape (as Liverpool Bridge) at Haverton Hill from the top floor of Binns department store in Middlesbrough. A curiosity then with no idea of her future.

John T


----------



## trotterdotpom

slick said:


> All,
> Alittle help please, somewhere a while agoI read through the Crew List.
> I see the name of the Chief Officer was given as Bayliss.
> I sailed with a chap called "Curly" Bayliss in the RFA is he the one?
> My apologies in advance if I am being a bit clumsy.
> 
> Yours aye,
> 
> slick


Slick, According to http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?202709 "Culry Bayliss" was the master.

John T


----------



## jmcg

Curly was indeed Chief Officer

Captain was Geoff Underhill - he was our C/O on her sister English Bridge. A fine seaman.

Sailed with 5 others who perished on Derbyshire.

Full crew list below:-
The 44 people lost on board MV Derbyshire, including 42 crew and 2 of their wives, were:
Kevin Allis (junior engineer)
Francis Arthur Bayliss (chief officer)
Philip Joseph Best (steward)
Paul John Bindon (extra 2nd officer)
Thomas Victor Blease (PO)
Richard Bond (PO)
Terence Brown (GP1)
William Buckley (purser CO)
Ali Bin Bujang (GP1)
Timothy Burke (GP1)
Nigel Coates (GP1)
Leo Thomas Mackenzie Coltman (3rd engineer)
Frederick James Chedotal (electrician)
John James Crone (2nd steward)
Mark Freeman (junior catering rating)
Andrew Gordon (steward)
Alexander Turner Gordon (steward)
Joseph Henry Graham (2nd cook)
John James Greenland (steward)
Barry James Hardman (chief cook)
Anthony Jack Hodges (CPO)
William Leonard Hunt (4th engineer)
Graham Hutchinson (extra 3rd engineer)
Annemarie Hutchinson (wife of Graham Hutchinson)
David Hugh Jones (2nd engineer)
Mary Jones (wife of David H Jones)
Norman Gibson Aiken Kane (GP1)
Paul Desmond King (junior engineer)
Peter Lambert (GP1)
Bernard Langton (GP2)
Norman Marsh (chief engineer)
Ali Bin Haji Musa (GP1)
Ronnie Musa (GP1)
James Noblett (GP1)
Clive William Rapley (extra CO)
David Michael Ridyard (extra 4th engineer)
Badarun Bin Sekah (GP1)
Adrian Keith Stott (junior seaman)
Peter John Taylor (PO)
Raymond William Taylor (2nd officer)
Geoffrey Victor Underhill (master)
Royal Alfred Waller (radio officer)
Griffith Wyn Williams (GP1)
Edward Frank Williamson (junior engineer)


J


----------



## New Haven Neil

Always a hard day - Paul King went instead of me....the ship was late and I went to another, I was supposed to be on her then. :-(


----------



## twin

greeting from canada
i was on the dock when the Derbyshire left sept iles for japan 
i was working for iron ore company of canada at that time and i was use to go several time on the loading berth to Watch the loading


----------



## NJR

NJR. 
Just finished reading "the Shipwreck Hunter" by David Means.
A fascinating book which features much detail of the "Derbyshire" incident.
Caught my attention as I sailed on the old "Derbyshire" in the sixties.
Life was much more interesting in those days!


----------



## Winmar

Titanic and the Herald of Free Enterprise gets talked about frequently but this was equally as grim and sad as either of those! 42 seamen and two lasses wanting to spend some time with their men taken in the blink of an eye. I think about this one a lot. May they all rest in peace.


----------



## 5036

Apologies if this has been referred to before, but it is chilling.
RIP.


----------



## jmcg

I remain somewhat ill at ease with the final reports, particularly so when there is have been no reasons advanced as to why she remained silent for so long under these worsening conditions.

j


----------



## DrHannibalLedford

I remember when this happened. I was just a kid at the time but I remember being shocked since Derbyshire was such a huge ship. I remember her discovery as well. So sad. RIP Derbyshire crew and wives!


----------



## tsell

nav said:


> Apologies if this has been referred to before, but it is chilling.
> RIP.
> 
> 
> https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=9tN4xROtMjI


Nav, thank you for posting the video. Two things I learned that I was previously unaware of: The diving suit technology (as a former recreational diver, I can appreciate the risks that occupant took); and for the first time, I was made aware that there are six thousand wrecks below the cold waters of the Great Lakes. I am staggered at that revelation as I think about the hundreds of lives that were lost.

Taff


----------



## Barrie Youde

#1005 

A most dramatic video.

I have not read the reports in their entirety. In my ignorance, I wonder when it was first realised that they had water ingress below deck?

Only when it was too late to attempt to turn and run before the sea, by the look of the reconstruction.

A tragedy indeed.


----------



## KEITHMAR

Barrie, She apparently sank very quickly ,to turn such a large vessel , once The Master realised what was happening , (Even if He did ? ) would, in My opinion, have been impossible! Entirely Agree A tragedy indeed.


----------



## Barrie Youde

Thank you, Keith.

I quite agree. To turn in those conditions, even in the best of trim, would not have been easy; so there cannot have been much time available to take any action.


----------



## john nichols

I too served one voyage on the Glen in 1985 as Chief Officer. By that time Bulkhead 65 beam knees had been strengthened but one of my weekly jobs was to crawl through the space to check for signs of further cracks developing. My first inspection revealed some additional slight cracking. I marked the extremity of the cracks with a felt tip pen but the cracks did not develop further during my time there.
However, one day in the focsle head store area I found a huge split in one of the two hawse pipes. Worryingly, this split had not occurred at a welded seam but was in fact a split down the centre of one of the plates, it was about 4 feet long and approx 1/2 wide. This defect was reported to the owners and I believe note was made of the problem for the Derbyshire inquiry. Who knows, perhaps Derbyshire had a similar defect which contributed to the focsle filling with sea water
JN


----------



## uncle Ray

quietman said:


> I sailed on the Tyne Bridge before the Derbyshire disaster happened,even then the class of ship had various problems.On the tyne bridge you couldnt even stand on theplatforms to operate the winches as one crew member fell through and injured his leg badly due to rust


I was on the Tynebridge from 1975 to 76, I joined her in Finland and was butterworthing the tanks / hatches to change over to dry cargo we were just off the top of Scotland on our way to the US when a fire broke out in the pump room , all the Co2 on the ship ( 162 bottles ) was set off into the pump room and dowsed the fire, we sailed on to Newport News with no fire fighting system. a couple of trips before I joined her she had an explosion in Tokyo Bay and lost no 9 hatch lids and the trip before that she hit an Iceberg and holed the bulbous bow, this was filled with concrete in Canada. She did have cracks we used to monitor them weekly and when in port a team of welders were brought in to weld them up. Happy days


----------



## steviej

uncle Ray said:


> I was on the Tynebridge from 1975 to 76, I joined her in Finland and was butterworthing the tanks / hatches to change over to dry cargo we were just off the top of Scotland on our way to the US when a fire broke out in the pump room , all the Co2 on the ship ( 162 bottles ) was set off into the pump room and dowsed the fire, we sailed on to Newport News with no fire fighting system. a couple of trips before I joined her she had an explosion in Tokyo Bay and lost no 9 hatch lids and the trip before that she hit an Iceberg and holed the bulbous bow, this was filled with concrete in Canada. She did have cracks we used to monitor them weekly and when in port a team of welders were brought in to weld them up. Happy days


I was on the Furness Bridge in 1973 and we experienced the similar storms and the the forward deck hatch dogs came loose filling the forecastle with sea water. I was really upset as I had to rebuild the generator in the forecastle. Missed many a meal walking up and down the deck. Could have been worse.


----------



## uncle Ray

steviej said:


> I was on the Furness Bridge in 1973 and we experienced the similar storms and the the forward deck hatch dogs came loose filling the forecastle with sea water. I was really upset as I had to rebuild the generator in the forecastle. Missed many a meal walking up and down the deck. Could have been worse.


The Focsle hatch was always dogged down and lashed when we were at sea, lessons must have been learnt from other sister ships. 
If I had to work up fwd I'd always carry a flask of coffee and a sarnie for smokko to save the long trek aft. 

The Hydraulic pipes to the hatch winches were rotten and always failing, it was a nightmare to keep up with Hydro oil and new sections of pipe, there was no such thing as a spill kit those days the spillage was washed down with Gamlin and rags. 

Also weekly inspections down the tween tank bulkheads and pump room bulkheads for cracking


----------



## Harry Grainger

Gamlin - now there's a brand for yesteryear.


----------



## uncle Ray

Harry Grainger said:


> Gamlin - now there's a brand for yesteryear.



It is Harry, it was a good grease / oil cleaning agent worse and if you got a splash of it in the eye's jeez it stings for a long time.


----------



## BOB.WHITTAKER

GENTLEMEN
I hate to be pedantic but it is GAMLEN not GAMLIN , I
checked on Wikipedia !
Regards the Derbyshire the Furness Bridge and sister ships , I was 2eng
on both the Sir John Hunter and the Sir Alexander Glen , with my wife doing
a trip with me on the Sir John Hunter . It was early days in the life of both
vessels and fortunately we had no incidents similar to those that the ships
became well known for .
Cheers , Bob Whittaker


----------



## uncle Ray

BOB.WHITTAKER said:


> GENTLEMEN
> I hate to be pedantic but it is GAMLEN not GAMLIN , I
> checked on Wikipedia !
> Regards the Derbyshire the Furness Bridge and sister ships , I was 2eng
> on both the Sir John Hunter and the Sir Alexander Glen , with my wife doing
> a trip with me on the Sir John Hunter . It was early days in the life of both
> vessels and fortunately we had no incidents similar to those that the ships
> became well known for .
> Cheers , Bob Whittaker


Our Gamlin must have been bought in " CHINA"


----------



## davidrwarwick

MV Derbyshire lost with all hands today 9th September 1980, RIP the 42 crew and two wives who perished.


----------



## jmcg

Our thoughts and prayers are for those who perished and for their families,relatives and friends on this sad memorial day.

I had previously sailed with a number of those lost..

It still troubles me why,reasonably assuming those on the Bridge who would be aware of her troubles in the hours and minutes before she was consumed, could not send out a distress message.

RIP all. Never forgotten.

J


----------



## Erimus

davidrwarwick said:


> MV Derbyshire lost with all hands today 9th September 1980, RIP the 42 crew and two wives who perished.


Thanks for the reminder David....RIP

geoff


----------



## MakemBill

uncle Ray said:


> I was on the Tynebridge from 1975 to 76, I joined her in Finland and was butterworthing the tanks / hatches to change over to dry cargo we were just off the top of Scotland on our way to the US when a fire broke out in the pump room , all the Co2 on the ship ( 162 bottles ) was set off into the pump room and dowsed the fire, we sailed on to Newport News with no fire fighting system. a couple of trips before I joined her she had an explosion in Tokyo Bay and lost no 9 hatch lids and the trip before that she hit an Iceberg and holed the bulbous bow, this was filled with concrete in Canada. She did have cracks we used to monitor them weekly and when in port a team of welders were brought in to weld them up. Happy days


I joined Tyne Bridge in Japan in about May 1976 as a first tripper Galley Boy. Left her, in Japan again, around December 1976. Loved the trip and the experiences but what happened to Derbyshire was a shock to the system.


----------



## uncle Ray

MakemBill said:


> I joined Tyne Bridge in Japan in about May 1976 as a first tripper Galley Boy. Left her, in Japan again, around December 1976. Loved the trip and the experiences but what happened to Derbyshire was a shock to the system.


Makem, 
I signed off the Tynebridge in May but the relief crew came onboard a couple of days early I do remember a young Galley rat, do you have ginger hair by any chance


----------



## MakemBill

Hell no. That may have been the deck hand from a Sunderland who joined then. I was the runt wearing NHS glasses. I think I joined with the renowned Tommy Nelson


----------



## uncle Ray

aye I remember you, I was the eeejit that swapped his ****e guitar for my beautiful 12 string, was Whisky the Japanese dog and the Boxer dog still onboard when you left


----------



## callpor

*Canadian Premiere – Trapped in Typhoon Alley, the Mystery of MV Derbyshire*

Thanks to GCaptain and Rick Spelman's Old Salt Blog for the following information:-
"Discovery Channel (Canada)’s new do***entary series, “Disasters at Sea,” premieres on April 16th at 10 PM ET. The first episode, “Trapped in Typhoon Alley,” looks at the mysterious sinking of the Capesize Ore/Bulk/Oiler MV Derbyshire, with the loss of 42 aboard, in Typhoon Orchid in 1980. "


----------



## davidrwarwick

MV Derbyshire lost with all hands today 9th September 1980, RIP the 42 crew and two wives who perished.


----------



## jmcg

Yes, just about to post a reminder David.

I sailed with a number of those lost on her sister English Bridge. Always remembered ! 

A commentary /do***entary below. 







Still so many unanswered questions remain.

RIP all and comfort to all family /friends still struggling with their loss.

J.


----------



## jmcg

*We remember today the loss of 44 souls on the Bibby Line OBO M.V. Derbyshire.* 

Forty years ago she suc***bed to the deep taking all on board with her.

Prayers are for all those lost and the family members who no doubt will be grieving today.. 

I sailed with 3 of those lost lost including Captain Underhill (when he was Chief Officer) and 2 deck crew. A sad remembrance for me today as always.

So many unanswered questions remain.

May their god be with them.

J


----------



## jmcg

*Tomorrow.*
A gentle reminder to remember in your prayers all 44 souls that perished when Derbyshire was consumed 41 years ago - 9th September 1980.

RIP to Capt, Underhill and his crew. So many questions remain unanswered.

Never forgotten.


J.


----------



## taffe65

jmcg said:


> *Tomorrow.*
> A gentle reminder to remember in your prayers all 44 souls that perished when Derbyshire was consumed 41 years ago - 9th September 1980.
> 
> RIP to Capt, Underhill and his crew. So many questions remain unanswered.
> 
> Never forgotten.
> 
> 
> J.


RIP poor buggers


----------



## Ssmdaviid

Paul Liu said:


> Steve,
> 
> The disaster of Derbyshire was also partly blamed on rogue waves, since you were nearby, do you remember the wave conditions at the time?
> 
> Paul


 think Typhoon close by


----------



## Mike Kemble

I have just watched this on Discovery. The same programme was on the Arctic Explorer which was Capt's fault. He ordered the ship to force its way though thick ice. But thats the subject of another thread somewhere I imagine.


----------



## keithabrenda1

John Rogers said:


> Watch a a TV show today about the sinking and the finding the wreck of the Derbyshire,great to watch,the program is on the History Channel. Anyone remember the loss of the ship.?
> John.


I was down to join the Derbyshire as Mate. Do not know what it was but but had a bad feeling about OBOs. After a long fight with Bibs they shifted me over to the Gas Ships. Live to tell the tale. Lost more than a few pals on the Derby. I still question why was the ship in the position she was. No rush for a load of iron rocks? But


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## jmcg

The so called "Second Official Report" suggest that the Master was following orders from Company obtained by Ocean Routes. There were three conflicting Typhoon Weather Reports.

What continues to trouble me is why she travelled almost 120 miles from her last reported communicated position when she was "hove to".

Many years ago an old man sent me details of a collision in the English Channel when the fishing vessel MFV HOSANNA was run down and sunk by a bulk carrier en route to Sept Isles. It was an illuminating and disturbing account. I still have it . One or two other S/N members have it as well. One in particular, (a former RN Officer) who has not posted for a very long time suggested that the contents could very well be accurate. However, he opined that the detailed account should not be for public consumption. Certainly, the author of the account has long since died and possibly the few who hare no longer posting.

Consider:-

*HM Coastguard /MFV Hosanna

The Cold War- Russian / British /American warships in the area (South China Sea)

Capt. Underhill and his Officers on Bridge throughout the ordeal of typhoon but unaware of her increasing draught without sending Mayday/SOS?*

I am willing to forward what was sent to me by the now deceased author. If interested contact me by PM only.

BTW. I sailed on her sister ship English Bridge and also with Capt. Underhill when he was C/O.

BW

J


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## jmcg

At this desperately sad time please let us also remember and mourn the loss of the 44 souls that perished on the OBO carrier MV Derbyshire on this day in 1980 - 42 years ago.

They have no grave but the sea. May their God be with them

J


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