# Crankcase Explosions On board the Reina Del Pacifico



## alastairrussell

*An Engine Explosion on board Reina del Pacifico, 1947* 

Leonard Septimus Brew was killed on 12 September 1947 by an engine explosion which occurred on board the ship Reina del Pacifico during her post refit sea trials, while he was Victoria Works Manager at Harland & Wolff in Belfast.

The following report of the incident was made by Harland and Wolff and is an extract from their own files. (With thanks to Gail McMaster of the Personnel Department at Harland and Wolff.)

Leonard Septimus Brew, 1887-1947 "In 1947 the Pacific Steam Navigation Company's Belfast-built motor ship Reina del Pacifico was taken in hand at Queen's Island. When the refit had been carried out the line crossed to the Clyde for speed trials which were completed satisfactorily on 11 September, though slight overheating was observed in one of the four twelve-cylinder, blast injection, trunk-piston diesel engines which had been installed when the vessel was built in 1931. During the return voyage to Belfast, while speed was being increased, all four engines exploded without warning. In an instant the engine room was a shambles, the lighting extinguished, ladders and access platforms destroyed and the atmosphere thick with smoke. 

When rescuers entered the engine room they found fires breaking out and bodies everywhere. The appalling result was that twenty-eight people died, either instantly or from their injuries, and a further twenty-three were hurt.

A public inquiry into the disaster concluded that overheating in one of the cylinders had ignited gases in the crankcase of one engine, causing an explosion which detonated her other engines. As the vessel was in the hands of the repairers, almost all those killed and injured were Queen's Island men. Among the dead was Leonard S. Brew, the Victoria Works manager in charge of the engines. He had been manager of the Londonderry repair works during the war."


The official inquiry into the accident, "Report of Court", No. 7951, adds the following details: 

The formal investigation was held at the County Courthouse in Belfast 20-23 April, 26-30 April, 1 May, 3-8 May, and 10-13 May 1848, where barristers and lawyers represented the Ministry of Transport, the builders Harland & Wolff, and the owners Pacific Steam Navigation Company, and appeared on behalf of many, but not all, of the men killed, and their families.

The Reina del Pacifico, built and engined by Harland & Wolff in Belfast in 1931, had been owned by the Pacific Steam Navigation Company for 17 years at the time of the accident. Since her delivery, she had been employed as a passenger liner between the United Kingdom and the west coast of South America except for a period during the Second World War when she was requisitioned as a troop transport by the British Government. Classified 100A1, the ship was certified to carry 886 passengers and 301 crew, and was registered at the port of Liverpool.

After completion of her refit by Harland & Wolff following her war service, sea trials commenced on 2 September 1947, before her return to the owners. Almost immediately, the sea trials were cancelled "owing to serious overheating" of various pistons and cylinders. They were restarted 8 days later when Reina del Pacifico slipped her moorings in Belfast at 07:15 on 10 September.

Steaming through the Irish Sea and the Firth of Clyde, her engines ran constantly at various speeds for over 33 hours. As she was returning to Belfast, overheating in No.2 cylinder was observed, and her engines were brought to a full stop. But about 5 minutes later the engine was restarted. 

Within a few short moments, estimated to be between immediately and 2-3 minutes, an explosion occurred, originating in the No.2 crank chamber of the port outer engine, followed by three further explosions in the crank cases of the port inner, starboard inner, and starboard outer engines.

In reply to question 25 of the inquiry, it was stated, "The primary explosion was caused by the overheating of No.2 piston of the port outer engine. The other three explosions were due to the inflammable content of the crankcases being ignited", which was explained as "a mixture of atomized [sic] or vapourised lubrica[t]ing oil, and air", which in turn began further fires within the engine room.

Using evidence at hand, it was estimated "that the piston of port outer No.2 engine had reached an average temperature of at least 500°F., with surface temperatures at certain areas of the piston well above 500°F., and in the vicinity of 1,500°F, as a maximum", although the spontaneous ignition temperature of the oil in use was approximately 720°F.

The accident occurred approximately 7 miles north east of Copeland Island in the North Channel of the Irish Sea at 16:46 on 11 September 1947.


The Belfast Weekly Telegraph reported a week after the accident, on 19 September 1947:

"Twenty-four people have died as a result of the explosion on board the crack liner Reina del Pacifico when on trials in the Irish Sea on Thursday of last week following the re-decoration at Harland and Wolff, Ltd. Some of the 22 people still detained in hospital have "improved", but most remain "critically ill"."

"The great vessel was brought back to the Victoria Wharf on Friday. Dockers stood bareheaded as the ship was nosed up the river by tugs - a sombre contrast from the manner in which she had left earlier."

"MINISTRY ENQUIRY....Preliminary investigations have been made by...[the]...senior engineer of the Ministry of Transport."

"On Monday, 23 deaths had been reported, and then on Tuesday, Robert Thompson, an engineering draughtsman,...suc***bed to his injuries in the Royal Victoria Hospital."

"Names of the dead are:- James Barnes, fitter..., Leonard S. Brew, assistant manager..., James S. Collins, fitter..., Hugh Doherty, fitter..., Robert Ellis, fitter..., Harold Fay, assistant superintendent..., F. D. Glenfield, draughtsman..., William Mills, fitter..., James McAllister, fitter..., Edward McAllister, engineering draughtsman..., John McBlain, fitter..., R. McClure, fitter..., Wesley Patterson, fitter..., John Redmond, fitter..., James B. Savage, fitter..., Thomas Wilson, fitter..., Patk. J. Dunn, draughtsman..., Fred Johnston, first engineer..., Robert Thompson, engineering draughtsman..., H. C. Forbes, engineer..., A. H. Jones, senior third engineer..., J. Unsworth, engineer..., R. McKibbon, assistant manager."

"The ship bears no outward appearance of the explosion, except that one of the funnels is black from the smoke following the blast."

"HEROIC SERVICE...For three hours, Dr. Hamilton, in his first medical appointment, worked like a Trojan. He had himself lowered into the devastated engine room and with the assistance of the First Officer waded knee-deep in oil and other debris while striving to free those who were trapped. Then he organised a first aid service in the second class lounge, while stewards tore sheets and tablecloths into bandages. He is estimated to have bandaged nearly 60 men himself."

"RELATIVES' VIGIL...It was an anxious day for relatives of those on the ship last Friday. Many made a round of the hospitals and the city mortuary seeking friends. At one time five bodies were unidentified at the mortuary, but by Saturday afternoon all had been identified."

"From all parts of the United Kingdom letters of sympathy has [sic] been received. For several days the Union Jack at the City Hall was flown at half mast. Sympathy to the relatives of the bereaved was also expressed by the Prime Minister, Sir Basil Brooke...."


The Belfast Weekly Telegraph, from 10 October 1947, reported:

"Inquest on Reina del Pacifico Victims"

"The accident that happened on the Reina del Pacifico seemed - and it is no exaggeration of language - just impossible, but it happened, said the Belfast Coroner (Dr. H. P. Lowe) after evidence of identification of 27 men killed in the liner explosion on September 11 was given at an inquest in City Hall, on Friday. The form of evidence varied little. Fathers identified sons and sons-in-law; brother came forward to testify to identification of brother. Only one woman relative appeared."

"THE WITNESSES....Hugh Eardley..., a chief officer on the liner, said he was on the bridge about 4-46 p.m. when he heard an explosion in the engine-room. He went there immediately and saw a number of employes [sic] lying in the engine-room and auxiliary room. Some of the men were severely injured and others appeared to be dead. He could not account for the explosion and was unaware of its cause."

"The explosion took place aproximately [sic] seven miles off the Copeland Islands."

"Alexander W. Barr...said he was on his way to the main motor room and when near the main platform when he felt what appeared to be 'a hot blast'. On recovering his senses he found he was between No. 1 and 2 auxiliaries. He opened the door between the water room and the auxiliary water room and saw a man standing with his clothes on fire. He pulled him into the main auxiliary room and observed another man holding on to him. He repaired the lights and observed a number of men in an injured state lying in the main water room."

"Mr. Jefferson...said the lost men were key men in the industry - skilled and trusted employes [sic] maintaining the reputation of the firm and continuing to enhance the glory and honour of the city. Their places would be difficult to fill."


The News Letter, on 11 September 1997, 50 years to the day after the explosion, recalled the incident, adding:

"In the 17 years since she had been launched, she had survived two fires, the loss of some of her most luxurious furnishings to German bombers and become infamous as the liner aboard which Ramsay MacDonald had died."

"Having served throughout the Second World War, the Reina del Pacifico returned to its birthplace within Belfast's famous Harland and Wolff yards to be transformed back to her former glory. She came through her main trials without incident, and then underwent special fuel testing."

"But as she returned to Belfast on the afternoon of Thursday, September 11, 1947, disaster struck just seven miles north of the Copeland Islands. As her speed was increased, all four engines exploded, ripping the heart out of the ship."

"Tugs and the Donaghadee lifeboat, carrying doctors and medical supplies, were rushed to the scene, while Royal and Mater hospitals were put on emergency alert to take survivors, the first of whom didn't arrive until shortly before 4am the following day."

"Dr. Ted Hamilton...was the first medical man on the scene. Stripped to the waist, he was lowered into the darkness of the engine room where he waded through knee-deep oil to free the seriously injured trapped under twisted steel and debris."

"Responsibility for the incident was never fully established, with Harland and Wolff and the ship's owners, the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, sharing the compensation costs equally."

(Thanks again to Gail McMaster of Harland and Wolff for her kind help.)


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## Stephen J. Card

"Responsibility for the incident was never fully established."

Any theories of the actual cause. Whatever the cause ... each of the four engines were experience the same problem? Could have been incorrect lube oils? The ship was not new.... 16 years old and was undergoing complete postwar refit. 

Saw her on the rocks off Bermuda 1957. Have heard the story but never heard and causes the disaster on trials.

Stephen


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## Duncan112

When I was a Cadet we had an Engineering Lecturer ( the late J R Williams) who spoke of this as he was in the yard at the time - he placed the blame on some overhaul work that had been done on the fuel system by subcontractors as H&W quoted too high a price. Anyone else heard this?


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## uisdean mor

I noted - "and then underwent special fuel testing." Blast injection on "special fuel"?? 8 days previously she had ceased trials because of multiple overheating incidents. It would be perhaps worth trying to ascertain the work carried out in those 8 days prior to the final trial runs where only 1 local overheating incidence is recorded. Was the injection kit the source of the problem?? Incorrect or incomplete combustion causing the local overheating?? Just a couple of thoughts. This must have been investigated by the inquiry - is there any mention of it? Slainte


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## Varley

I have to say that I think Stephen is on the right lines. Fuel dilution was my first thought too.

The crankcase atmoshere is only explosive if some overheating has caused the luboil to reach its flashpoint. Of necessity such is not reached in normal operation unless the flash point has been lowered as with the leakage of fuel into it.

For the other crankcases to 'detonate' means either they had also been overheating or that the flash point had been lowered (a pointer in favour of this amateur opinion would be if the LO system was commoned up somewhere. We should be looking for a single failure).

A horrible accident whatever.


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## David Campbell

Please read this from the family of the H&W Riena Del Pacifico Ship Manager at the time. Google this.

I was at H&W at the time and the general concensus was overheating of the 4 engines trunk pistons all reconditioned but had been placed in all different cylinders, after spending years in their own particular cylinders. All the 4 crankcase gas escape lines were common.


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## howardws

Varley said:


> (a pointer in favour of this amateru opinion would be if the LO system was commoned up somewhere. We should be looking for a single failure).


Possibly a common crankcase breather system?


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## OilJiver

A horrific accident indeed. Whilst events in Reina del Pacifico were very different to those in Capetown Castle, the names of both vessels are perhaps amongst the most notable amongst marine engineers.

It’s probably about 30 years since I looked at the former incident in any detail and I no longer have any information relating to it. However, a crankcase explosion in one of four engines resulted in explosions in the other three.

I’m pretty sure that fuel dilution had nothing at all to do with it. (Fuel dilution is not a prerequisite for a CC explosion). I think that the vessel had recently undergone lengthy repairs, (inclusive of major engine overhauls) immediately prior to the event. The vessel was undertaking sea trials after repairs and the machinery was under control and operation of the ship repairer.

A unit in one engine became overheated during trials - probably on account of insufficient piston liner clearance. The engine was stopped for investigation and then restarted with the tragic consequences that followed.

The crankcase explosion (hot spot & oil mist) subsequent to re-starting that engine, caused a secondary explosion which carried over to the other three engines because (I think, and as indicated by others) of common venting arrangements of crankcases in all engines.

I think that the investigation found the ship-repairer’s on board team had limited experience of operation of ship’s machinery at sea. A major contributory factor was therefore lack of adequate charge/supervision/competence of the machinery during trials.

Many recommendations followed, including re-design of crankcase relief mechanisms, use of cc inerting systems etc, and several others.


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## Jim S

The official "Wreck Report" is worth reading - It can be found at www.plimsoll.org
Although a recommendation was to separate crankcase vents, common venting was not considered a source of the spread of the explosion to the other three engines.
The explosion pressure from the port outer engine being considered sufficient to distort the crankcase doors of the other three engines.
In earlier service hot pistons were not unknown.

John Lamb the well known Shell Tanker Engineer Supt and diesel engine text book author was one of the investigating panel


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## OilJiver

Thanks Jim. As I say, long time since I’ve looked at it in any detail so will read the report with much interest.


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## Varley

OJ. All explosions require both 'fuel' and a source of ignition not just ignition. I'd swallow one CC explosion from local overheating, that would be the usual failure mode but for the others to go to requires the lubricating medium (or some of it anyway) to have been above its flash point otherwise it would not have been 'fuel'. In you scenario (which does have the advantage of being in line with contemporaneous reports) requires three separate failures. Lowering of the flashpoint may only require one (depending on whether the systems were commoned up somewhere) and a bit of blowby to ignite it.

Surely even in 1947 the flashpoints would have been measured as part of the most obvious 'first aid' evidence gathering?


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## OilJiver

V, have just scanned through the report as referenced in # 9 (Thanks Jim). 
Seems there was a small amount of fuel dilution of the lub oil. Nothing too unusual about that. (Other than that the engines had probably not run for many hours since charged with presumably new oil). 
Certainly the report indicates that the amount of fuel dilution wasn’t a contributory factor to any of the explosions. 
The report goes on to describe the initial occurrence as following the standard pattern of events for a crankcase explosion, all of which are well understood.
The report concludes (as noted by Jim) that the explosions in the other three engines were something quite different. 
Pressure in the ER resulting from event 1 causing CC doors on those engines to deform inwards allowing flame & hot gas to enter and ignite the lub oil vapour (not mist) within those engines. 
A shocking incident. Thanks again for the location of the report Jim.


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## Philthechill

*Whilst finding-----*

-----the description of this terrible accident both fascinating and informative I'm surprised there is no real mention of Dr. Hamilton and his heroics.

I "Googled" his name but got no definitive info.

Reading-about his "being lowered into the chaos that was in the engine room" makes you realise how much times have changed!

In this day-and-age, when a load of firemen and Police refused to wade into a 3' deep lake to rescue a drowning man because of fears for their "safety", those terribly injured men in that engine room would probably have died whilst a "Method Statement" etc. would have to worked-out first! Salaams, Phil(Hippy)


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## OilJiver

Philthechill said:


> ----- I'm surprised there is no real mention of Dr. Hamilton and his heroics.
> 
> I "Googled" his name but got no definitive info.
> 
> Reading-about his "being lowered into the chaos that was in the engine room" makes you realise how much times have changed!
> 
> ........., Phil(Hippy)


Absolutely right Phil. 
This incident (along with a few others), has remained subject to study amongst those preparing for tickets, many years after the event. (And rightly so).
That said, until the last couple of days, I’d never heard of the guy who did so much to help those injured after the event.
Perhaps a change for better in today’s world is that people such as Dr Hamilton might be more likely to be recognised for their actions. 
OJ


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## Varley

OJ. I'll agree that seems definitive. The energy in the initial explosion must have been phenomenal. (I do not agree that there would have been a flammable atmosphere anyway in the other machines - we would be having CC explosions every day if that were the case. The energy from the first must have vapourised the LO in at least one of the others).


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## OilJiver

V, my recollections from study of the event, a long time ago, were incorrect in regard to one area at least. That being the mechanism by which the detonation was transferred. (As said, I thought that this had been by common connection of the crankcases).
The energy required to bring about the secondary events must have been colossal, as you say. Reading the report, it’s indicated that such was the power of the initial explosion; the temperature of oil vapour within the (breached) crankcases of the other engines was raised almost immediately to self-ignition point. The kind of thing that you’d be more likely to associate with an ordnance explosion I guess.
OJ

A point not forgotten, was that the ER was under the control of the ship-repairer at the time. Something that I've never understood and an issue about which I made robust comment in an earlier (but unconnected) thread.


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## Chillytoes

I recall our EK's teacher at Sydney Tech highlighting this incident when talking about crankcase explosions. It was said that because the crankcase breather pipes from each engine joined into a common pipe, the initial explosion was propagated back through each of the other individual breather pipes. 
Our teacher, Len Bateman, also recounted the story of John Lamb's testing arrangements and how Lamb was said to be sort of locked away in a shed by himself happily causing crankcase explosions and showing that the initial blast was followed by an even more violent secondary explosion as more oxygen rushed in resulting in an even more explosive atmosphere. The outcome of all this was the invention of the BICERA explosion doors.


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## berbex

An interesting thread, which somehow I keep connecting mentally with an incident I had --with a very small engine, just 190cc 2st.

Freshly re-bored and all mounted for the first start. Went off on second pull, totally out of control. Pulled off the spark plug but it kept on spinning, dieseling. I had filled the oil bath air cleaner with clean oil but in which I had rinsed two ball bearings after cleaning them with nitro thinner to remove the encrusted lacquer. Only when the last hint of the thinner from the filter had been burnt did the demon stop.

What is the possibility of residual cleaning agent of very low flash point remaining in the cc and lube system? In spite of the health hazard some are still in such use to this day.


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## alastairrussell

I agree with what Chillytoes says. The great engineer John Lamb was one of the investigators in the Renal Del Pacifico accident inquiry.

If I remember correctly there are always two explosions (a primary and secondary) during a diesel engine crankcase explosion. 

The primary one is just a wee bang which would blow the crankcase doors off the old type of engine . This primary bang would then create a vacuum which would suck large amounts of fresh turbulent and oxygenated air into the crankcase. The secondary explosion would create a much larger bang that would then do major damage to the engine room and personnel!

As result of the tragic Renal Del Pacifico accident inquiry, major improvements were introduced to all new diesel engine propelled ships. This was in the way of fitting crankcase explosion door relief devices and also a crankcase oil mist alarm detectors. The cross crankcase ventilation in all multi engined ships was also banned.

The spring loaded non return explosion door relief devices were fitted to the crankcase doors to re-direct the primary explosion upwards and then close to stop the introduction of any outside air to create the heavy secondary explosion.


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## berbex

alastairrussell said:


> The spring loaded non return explosion door relief devices were fitted to the crankcase doors to re-direct the primary explosion upwards and then close to stop the introduction of any outside air to create the heavy secondary explosion.


But in spite of all the developments CC explosions are still taking place, at times causing deaths.

Only weeks before retiring I was explaining the need of serious explosion door design to juniors whose idea of a large diesel engine was that it is same as a motor car's but bigger. A few months later deaths occurred from a cc explosion from just that same type of machine, in spite of the explosion doors.

here's one example
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBpdM5O2XsY

The gremlins in the engine are always finding new ways of causing dangerous entertainment, and one cannot safely put down his guard.


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## Philthechill

*THIS is not------*

-----about c/c explosions but a scavenger-belt death.

It may well have been on SN before.

I you input "Ships engineer killed in scavenger-belt"-----(or similar wording) you can read about the horrific way this poor bloke was killed.

A prime example of NEVER entering a closed space without someone standing by!

I well-recall crawling inside a Scotch boiler, through one of the access-doors, when the clown "standing-by" thought how funny it would be to "refit" the door. 

He was only f*****g-about, but it was an awful feeling hearing that door being fitted!

It was only in place for a very short time but I felt quite a surge of panic when I heard the door being inserted!

Of course this idiot fell about when he removed the door and heard the stream of invective I lobbed his way! 

He wasn't so flippant, however, when I got out of the boiler and threatened to knuckle him! Salaams, Phil(Hippy)


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## JohnBP

More info on the ship is here..... John

http://www.liverpoolships.org/


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## Jim S

*Scotch Boiler "Prank"*



Philthechill said:


> -----about c/c explosions but a scavenger-belt death.
> 
> It may well have been on SN before.
> 
> I you input "Ships engineer killed in scavenger-belt"-----(or similar wording) you can read about the horrific way this poor bloke was killed.
> 
> A prime example of NEVER entering a closed space without someone standing by!
> 
> I well-recall crawling inside a Scotch boiler, through one of the access-doors, when the clown "standing-by" thought how funny it would be to "refit" the door.
> 
> He was only f*****g-about, but it was an awful feeling hearing that door being fitted!
> 
> It was only in place for a very short time but I felt quite a surge of panic when I heard the door being inserted!
> 
> Of course this idiot fell about when he removed the door and heard the stream of invective I lobbed his way!
> 
> He wasn't so flippant, however, when I got out of the boiler and threatened to knuckle him! Salaams, Phil(Hippy)


Phil -what a terrible experience you had with the idiot closing the manhole door on you. There has been at least one story of an engineer being accidentally shut inside a boiler in the manner you describe and when released the shock had turned his hair white - True or Anecdotal - who knows.
The idiot was lucky you did not hit him. I am guessing you did not report the incident - dismissal would have been too good for him.

Jim S


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## Stephen J. Card

A couple of years ago a 2/E crawled into a scavenge space when alone. The door closed and a clip fell over and he could not get out. After the first starting he was gone and was later found.


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## Philthechill

*Isn't that the------*



Stephen J. Card said:


> A couple of years ago a 2/E crawled into a scavenge space when alone. The door closed and a clip fell over and he could not get out. After the first starting he was gone and was later found.


-----one I put-in? Post#21. Salaams, Phil(Hippy)


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## Philthechill

*No I didn't-----*



Jim S said:


> Phil -what a terrible experience you had with the idiot closing the manhole door on you. There has been at least one story of an engineer being accidentally shut inside a boiler in the manner you describe and when released the shock had turned his hair white - True or Anecdotal - who knows.
> The idiot was lucky you did not hit him. I am guessing you did not report the incident - dismissal would have been too good for him.
> 
> Jim S


-----report him Jim, it never crossed my mind actually.

He was an ex-Army bloke who thought he "knew-it-all" and was as popular as a dose of c***s.

He did 11 voyages-------1 Out, 1 Home. Salaams, Phil(Hippy)


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## Duncan112

Here is a link to the scavenge space tragedy - although I suspect it's not the first time it has happened.

http://maritimeaccident.org/library2/the-case-of-the-one-way-assassin-2/

I commend Bob's Maritime Accident Casebook to you all - he is currently trying to improve safety on Philippine inter-island ferries as well as promoting general marine safety.


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## Bill Morrison

Hi, Can anyone recall a case where I think it was two persons whither shipyard or ships personnel I can't remember. An inspection of a stabiliser was being carried out. Access was through a hatch which required the stabiliser to be fully retracted. For some reason while they were in the space, the stabiliser was operated and in doing so cut off access to the hatch and any means of escape.
I am almost certain it resulted in fatalities. I read it in either the Motorship Magazine or Shipbuilding and Engineering which used to circulate round the smoke room this was in the mid 1960's
Bill


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## ben27

good day duncan112.sm.30th march.2015.21:27.#27.have read your link.it must have been hell for that yong officer.nobody paying attention to the telltale rag,and nobody would say if they had seen him.i wonder how there lives went on board after that.may the young officer rest in peace.regards ben27


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## BERRIET

*MV Reina Del Pacifico*

MV Reina del pacifico 

Good morning gentlemen, 

I went through all messages and the court report.(Smoke)
This case is very interesting, sorry for its horrible issue .Just to discuss a bit further more about it , 
I have some concerns – interrogations about ‘’how it happened ‘’, and ‘’ why ‘’.Sourcing the root of the failure is always delicate, and many interrogations arise from there or there.
So , one day the shipowner ask for repairs , overhauls , and many works .A list is received by the yard ;then , at ship arrival generally you go on board , and have a technical meeting with superintendant and chief engineer. It’s always good to know how the engines are, if they are suffuring of abnormal temps , if the ship has been drydocked recently or not , if one of th engine is to be kept at no more than 70% load , because otherwise , they expect to size up pistons.
Then , works start ,and after a while , you have 48 pistons , 48 liners , in the workshop.
1)	I suppose, pistons were fully inspected for cracks , 
Then , fully measured to see if they were still recondition able ;one critical thing is the material height remaining between piston grooves , as engine manufactueurs , especially with such large bores , give you maximal material that can machined out , the game is to let enough material in between rings grooves so that no cracks occurs later , within the engine; of course , you have to fit the pistons then with new rings of new height , that give the original ; this gives you a bit more friction , a bit heavier ring that will , after many running hours , slap harder and deteriorate again the groove ; today , machining piston grooves is not so common, it depends of the owner ;

2)	Then , this is time of decision ,and to take responsabilities , for the yard and for the shipowner 
For quite and almost new pistons : ok , check , clean up , and pull back in engine .
For pistons that are easely controlled , checked , with enough material for milling , machining , OK , recondition and pull back in engine .
For the discarded pistons….troubles are coming; ‘’why to discard this one ? it’s nothing , this one will last some more thousand hours ; it will be replaced later ; it’ expensive to fit new pistons ; delivery time is too long ; I don’t have other spares pistons , so this one , this one , and this one , are the best among the discarded ones , and are to be pull in the engine’’ ;these are words that can be heard in many repair yards .
3)	for the liners ;checks are : cracked or not , worn out or not ,oversized or not ;honing process to be conducted with skilled and experienced people ;in the 30s , I suppose cast iron flakes were possible ,and when reconditioning liners , material flakes could leave the inner walls of the liners , during running in of engines ;
as it’s a trunk engine , piston play the role of a crosshead , so 0,6 mm clearance is OK , with a diameter of 630 mm ; normally , such big low speed , trunk , direct drive engines had also 
so sort of ‘’rubbing belt , or rubbing ring ‘’ , below and above piston pin axis , to guide the piston , to center it ; as for more recent RND M engines from Sulzer , they were fitted also with these kind of rubbing rings , this to avoid contact of the pistons upper parts with the liner ; Sulzer considered that with running hours , due to normal wear of piston , liners ,,a contact could happen , and then lead to piston size up .
Normally , the position of the piston in its liner is crtical for RND M engine it is mor ‘’confrtable ‘’ as it is a crooshead engine , but for a trunk engine , this is critical ; positioning of the piston is made by the quality of the liner itself ; straight wall , perfect circle ,and landing of the liner in the frame ;the piston will have to face the lateral reaction , the torque given by the propeller , so the liner where it push on , laterally , has to be neat ; also , it’s a reversible engine , both sides are concerned . 

4)one thing about engines having years of service:: landing , seatings faces between liner in water jacket , and water jacket in the frame ; this is to be checked , as fretting marks , fretting surfaces leads to misalignment of liner axis with frame axis ,and with cranckshaft axis .till it’s a matter of misalignment on starboard or portside , OK , it will only create few failures ;but , the most dangerous is misalignment on fore or aft , then it’s critical ; piston will follow the liner , and for sure , major failure will occur ; you can see the contact pattern on the conrod shell , only landing on a side , and engine room staff saying ‘’ we’ve got to change the sheel severy 500 hrs , but why?’’; the shell contact pattern then looks like a half moon and risks of major disaster is there .By the way , on this case , they were also cracking brand new liners too.Every 1000 hrs then.
Landings can be a mess , and all units mixed on a same engine , and between engines .They can be machined in a workshop ashore to keep landing faces clean , but , with the time , less and less material is kept on waterjackets ……
It’s perpetual discussions in the office with the yard and superintendant : who take the responsibility of pulling back the discarded pistons , liners , because it’s too expensive to pull in new ones ? or, ‘’ok , these ones will last a few more thousand running hours , they will be replaced at first opportunity , we will care to not go over 70 % load on this engine ‘’

It’s a ship with 48 units, all alike, and why not mixing? 
Preparing some 4 or 6 units to face a failure at sea , or to replace one unit when TBO is achieved ;
But , if some water jackets were machined ( to remove the fretting maks ) , and so was the frame landing for this particular landing , then as added a shim of a calibrated thickness ,this , all in all , to get the correct bumping clearance ; but , as the time pass , knowing these details can be lost , mix up can be done , wrongly , by misknowledge ; then later , you tight the cylinder head on it , you squeeze liner in water jacket , in turn in he frame ; then you have a certain position of the cylinder axis .And troubles arises ‘’ combustion pressures to hight , too low “”; then people put their hand on fuel racks , for MM3 per stroke , then want to check injection timing ; where is the TDC , and so .Engine is out of balance , firing pressures hard to egalize . Maybe this happened , as the ship was sailing for 17 years .If the engine is not design with ‘’powerpacks’’ , for easy maintenance , you don’t play with that ;each unit is to be kept in its place .
Another thing : major overhaul leads to tension release within the structure of the engines , as you pull out a huge mass from the engine; then frame stresses are released , deformations occurs ;before overhaul , measurements of crankshaft deflections are to be done , and one thing to know is that these engines were certainly over 8 meters long , so deformations are inevitable; this affect highly landings of liners ; typically , when cold , engine bedplate are seated to get a concave seating of about 0,12 to 0,15 mm ; when at running temp , you are normally at zero ;
5 ) governors : were they of the all speed type ( aspinal ? ) ;as these are low speed direct drive engines , they have to be tested on a bench , to see fuel rack mms according to the speed ; springs inside can be smashed ,worn , and could lead to engine overrunning ( the engine achieves its maximum power before achieving its corresponding rpm ) ;this I sa big factor of having engine over heating ;as the ship had 4 engines , I suppose some people were dedicated to keep an eye on the governors index , as well as on tachometers , to make sure that the load ( ship displacement ) was taken by the 4 engines , equally ;if not , some engines will achieve higher temperatures ;factor not to be forgotten , as I foresee that a lack of comprehension and management happened at sea trials ; as well as fuel injection pumps ; one fuel pump was faulty , ok it happens , regarding the 47 others pumps .
6) engine tuning : timing chain set I proper position, valve overlap hecked ( as it was a turbo charged engine , valve overlap is of high importance , it allows to cool down inlet exhaust valve , as well as piston crown , and upperpart of liner walls ;incorrect timing creates overheats ; also , it decreases volumetric efficiency , so , less air is trapped , less air scavenge the combustion chamber , consequence : all temps rises , oil film on liner walls is cooked , piston crown temp rise , it deforms , clearance decreses dramatically , piston size up is about to come …..
For injection pumps :timing was it measured before overhaul ? recorded? Then, nozzles were new ones ? or the same ones ‘’reconditionned ‘’, were the spray patterns ok on the pistons crown? No marks of bad injection? References of the nozzles to be checked , number of holes , diameter , spray angle ; otherwise , you spray fuel oil on inner liner walls , so by by lub oil , you burn he piston crown , and again , temps rises , dilatation, piston sizes up.
Smoke : what was the aspect of the smoke : chef engineers always keep an eye on it , light grey , no colored ; if thick black , problem.


7 )heat balance , thermal efficiency : all auxiliaries were overhauled ? sea water pump, fresh water pump , oil pumps, separate oil pmp for piston cooling ? were all diaphragms , nozzles , by pass valves , cheked ? as piston were oil cooled ( BW engine ) , were these temps and pressure cheked ? 
Were All 48 pistons receiveing proper flow of oil ? if not , of course you get major failure .
Heat exhangers ( for oil , for fresh water ) were checked ? efficiencies measured by recording the temps before the arrival at the yard ? any comments from the chief engineer ? 
Turbo charger , linked with the engine valves timing overlap : was it ‘’upgraded ‘ by BBC , or not ; was air and gas nozzles checked ? 
Fuel consumption of engines: were these values known before overhaul, and abnormal
Indicators cards ; a full set of 48 cards to look at at arrival of the ship.

8 ) when overhaul works are coming to the end , and trials concerns arise s, a meeting is again organized .
First , if the yard proposed it in its financial and technical offer, you stated that one or two days will be spent for preludes , heats up , deflection , turning gears engaging to check that all oil flows through the engine , that no air pockets remains in piston crow ( risks of failure )or in water chambers ( liners cracks ) 
Then you proceed to starts without fuel , all cyl heads vents open ,to see if no water jerk out 
If electrical turning gear, note the intensity: as the engine was overhauled, you have a higher value, than before in the same condition , and also if stern tubes packing glands were overhauled , and new material putted in .
All values before starting are noted, with temps and manometers indicators in good order .

Next day , as exemple , you proceed to double , triple the mooring lines.one by one , or two by two , with enough people , you proceed to starts up , for 2 minutes ,carefull listening of the noises , then stop, turning gear engaged , open all doors , check inside , touch inside for abnormal heat there and there ( piston skirt at bdc , main beaings , conrod , rockers arms )
Then close down , start again , for 5 mns , same checks 
Then 10 mns, for 20 mns and stop.
At the same time , you checked and noted also temp of thrust bearing , oil water , exhaust , noted values and behavior ( slow ? jiggling ? )of governor , and speed ; the only load then is the one corresponding to the idle speed ( this engine , probably 30 rpm ) , with pistons , liners ,Babbitt in bearings , and stern tube material not runned in .

Next day , you leave for sea , with objective to run in all 4 engines at the same time , with normally dedicated people at certain places , in the engine room , to record and check teps and press .Typically , this kind of engine will need to have , 5 rpm of load increase every half an hour , and then , for example , after going over 6O% load ( around 70 rpm ? ) you will increase speed by steps of 5 rpm every hour .at each point , full records of datas are tobe done , then , values are to be immediately compared in between engines , the load must be shared on 4 engines ; this to lead to a neat run in .Indicator cards to be taken after 50 %load , before , peak pressure can be measured with a ‘’ kiene ‘’ device . 48 units running at the same time require a lot of people around to care of the engine , so , preparation of the trials is to be done days before .
It is to say that when you do the complete overhaul , it is your responsibility to lead the run in then .
If something wrong happen , ok , you reduce the load , look if things cool down , then , after 20 mn , you reload , step by step .If any doubt , ok , stop this engine , and no one touch it till we go back to the yard for examination .


As a conclusion, reconditioned pistons , mixed with new liners , parts no fitted at the good place , lack of management during the sea trials ( one people stop an engine , after a few minutes , someone else start it up …this is non sense .) For the disastrous explosion and its 
horrible issue , may be the engine was certainly having a non-well conducted run in ( as ship staff and yard staff were not talking to each other , apparently, no common discussion , too much people touching to this and this….. ) , in conjunction with pistons , liners ,reconditioned , suffering of non-detectable cracks , and with poor margin to support extra heat and stress ;with these defects , heavy 630 mm pistons pushing , with lateral reaction , started to created huge heat due to friction , oil heats up , cooling oil for piston heats up , piston heats up , clearance reduces , size up begins ; someone stop this engine , so no fuel oil is injected , but for sure , this engine still turns , by its own inertia , and by its trailing propeller ; in the engine , bits of material , hot spots exists , in a mist of oil , at hight temperature ; when someone else starts up the engine , of course , huge amounts of air is injected in these big cylinders ( 630 mm by 1200 mm stroke ) ;this air probably went through scratches and sizing up marks , and even , by possibly cracked piston ring grooves , and this air then , arrives within the crankcase, then, mix with hot oil mist , and detonates , ignited by hot spots .


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## YM-Mundrabilla

Thank you Berriet. You have obviously put a great deal of work into your summary and whilst I have no marine experience I know that your summation applies in so many areas of mechanical maintenance where money may well override good engineering practice. (Ouch)


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## BERRIET

YM-Mundrabilla said:


> Thank you Berriet. You have obviously put a great deal of work into your summary and whilst I have no marine experience I know that your summation applies in so many areas of mechanical maintenance where money may well override good engineering practice. (Ouch)


good morning Mundrabilla ; yes , thank for your message .It's a kind of situations i had to deal with ,formerly i was in charge of repairs in a yard, and i was the engineer in charge ( financial , technical , on board for trials , ..... and as the time was passing , i get bored of it , and resign.I get really concerned about this dramatic event , as i really lived same ''almost like '' accidents or ''incidents'' ; my father is now retire from he merchant navy , now he tells me his stories , and at 3 oppotunities , in 36 years of service at sea , he admitted that the ship could have been lost with all hands ( 1 container ship , known in the early 80's as ''steel tombs container ships '' , as their stability , when built , was ''no so confident'' , 1 LNG carrier , in the mid 80's , with a storm , a huricane on the harbor ,while loading LNG , all mooring lines snapped , pilot shouting '' leave the ship , it will explode '', no tugs wanted to rescue , finally , the captain ,a 200 % responsible and corageous captain , order t leave , as for full ahead , monouvered , and the ship , lukily , found its way to the high seas , and all ended well ; lng splashed on main deck , safety automatic valves closed , it was a well maintained ship , not new , but with serious people on board ;1 steam leak on a VLCC , steam went throuht my father 's coverall , hopefully ''only '' burnt a piece of skin at rear of his let shoulder ; You all people on this site , thanks for discussing , it's really great moments to share all these events .

Thank , best regards .(Thumb)


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## Hugh Ferguson

Had a crank-case explosion in a generator aboard Glenroy in the Gulf of Aden in July c.1951. It spread and set the port main engine on fire.
A very anxious afternoon: Captain Simmonds sent me down to see how they were getting on. Couldn't recognise any of the engineers, they were in a hell of a mess.
Came up and out of the engine room and all the crowd were there filling extinguishers as fast as they could: bosun Foh Art Tze told me all refills been used up!
No casualties, continued into Aden on one engine: glad not to have been an engineer, as if they hadn't had enough they now had the mess to clear up in Aden in July!


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