# A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure



## alastairrussell

1995-Dec.1
Bulker MOUNT OLYMPUS, 33186gt, built 1969, abandoned by her crew after a 17 meter long crack developed in her deck. The ship was sailing on ballast in mid Atlantic from Ravenna to Norfolk.


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## alastairrussell

1996-Sep.9
Capesize bulker IOLCOS VICTORY, Cyprus, 74278grt, 132597dwt, loaded with iron ore from Tubarao to Singapore, sank one hour and twenty minutes after the crew ascertained the flooding of forward holds during bad weather off South Africa. Most crewmembers are saved by a fishing boat, but 5 died.


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## alastairrussell

1996-Oct.
A bulkhead collapses on the Malaysian capesize bulker GIGA II of 140086dwt while she was loading at Port Kembla. Two crewmembers are injured.


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## alastairrussell

1996-Dec.29
The small Greek ex-bulker converted as cement-carrier DYSTOS of 6187dwt, built 1972, classed by LR, sank during bad weather in the Aegean sea. Out of 22 persons on board (crew members, wives and one child), only one survived the capsizing.


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## alastairrussell

1998-Feb.8
The bulker LEROS STRENGTH, 27469dwt, sinks with all hands (20 persons) off the coast of Norway after structural failure in bad weather. The ships is classed by RINA and flies the Cyprus flag.


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## alastairrussell

1998-Jan.16 
Bulker FLARE, Cyprus, 29222dwt, built 1972, on ballast and bound Escoumins on St.Lawrence river, breaks in two during bad weather SE of Newfoundland. Twenty one crewmembers die.


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## alastairrussell

1998-Jan.30 
Bulker PEACE (Belize) sank off Colombo while awaiting repair after she suffered a 5 meter crack in her hull during her passage from Bremen to Korea loaded with 35000 tons iron scrap. (LLDN 9-21) [Structural]


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## alastairrussell

1998-Feb.7
Bulker FEI CUI HAI, 32300dwt, loaded with iron pellets, sinks during bad weather in China sea, 3 survivors out of 34 crewmembers.


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## alastairrussell

1998-May 18
Bulker NORTHERN ENTREPRISE (Bermuda, 37771 grt, built 1985) sustain a crack in her double bottom off Nova Scotia.


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## alastairrussell

1999-Feb.18
Barge carrier GREEN ISLAND, USA, built 1975, 47036dwt, loses 300 square meter of shell plate in bad weather near the Bermudas. Luckily this ABS classed ship remains floating on her double bottoms.


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## alastairrussell

1999-Aug. 3
Bulker VAKIS T., (Cyprus) has to come back to Dampier with 127000 tons of iron ore on board owing to severe structural problems which included a crack 2/3 meters long and a dinner plate size hole. [Structural]


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## alastairrussell

1999-Sept.6
Bulker WELL SPEEDER (St.Vincent & Grenadines, 16184 grt, built 1976) sinking in Indian ocean after flooding of hold 1 and 2. Crew abandoned vessel which sank on Sept.8 . [Structural]


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## alastairrussell

1999-Oct.4
Bulker PROVIDENCE (Panama), likely on ballast to load in Australia, suffers peeling of shell plates from the frames while sailing in the middle of the Indian ocean. Later inspection in Australia revealed a 50cm indent in hold 3 and many frames completely detached from the hull. [Structural]


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## alastairrussell

1999-Oct.11
Bulker SANAGA( Panama), on passage from Durban to China, sustained severe structural damage resulting in the flooding of hold 1 and down 2.5 meter by the head. Crew abandoned vessel.


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## alastairrussell

1999-Nov.
OBO LASSIA, (Polembros Shipping, 139800dwt) suffers severe structural failure while discharging in Italy. She has to be towed out of port. 
________________________________________


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## alastairrussell

2000-Jan. 
Bulker AIS MAMAS (Cyprus, 10273gt, built 1976) suffers water ingress in hold 1 while proceeding from West Africa to India. Crew abandoned the vessel which was later taken in tow.


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## alastairrussell

2000-Feb.22
Bulker CHINA PROGRESS (Panama, 25904 grt, built 1984) suffers structural problems.


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## alastairrussell

2000-Mar.23
Bulker LEADER L (38975gt, built 1977), sinks in the Atlantic after structural failure and the collapse of a hatch cover. Out of 31 crewmembers only 13 could be saved.. The ship was flying the Panama flag, and was classed by the Polish Register. After this tragedy the PR was ejected from IACS. It had been bought in 1996 for $=3.5m but its H&M insurance value at the time of sinking was $=6m. (ship)


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## alastairrussell

2000-June 5
Bulk carrier ALGOWOOD (22558gt, built 1981) suffers severe structural failure and sinks while loading gravel/stones at Bruce Mine, Ontario.


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## alastairrussell

2000-July 14
Capesize TREASURE (Panama, 76705grt, built 1983, Class BV), suffers structural damage about 1000 miles West of Port Noloth. With the hold 4 flooding the air pressure lifted the hatch covers but the ship kept proceeding at 9 knots to seek refuge in Cape Town. Later she was denied refuge, told to proceed 50 miles back at sea but sank while 6 miles offshore with her 1300 tons bunkers causing a disastrous pollution killing thousands of penguins on Robben island. She had then a 160 square meter hole in the shell plate. The ship is owned by Good Faith Shipping, owner of several lost bulkers: the CORAZON, the NAGOS. 


Although nobody died as a result of the TREASURE sinking, the incident got a main coverage in the world-wide media due to oil pollution and the subsequent death of seabirds. This says a lot about the value of a seafarer's life!


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## alastairrussell

2000-July 22 
Bulker LOK PRAGATI, (India, 16040 grt, built 1984) sent distress message owing to forecastle damage and water ingress shortly after sailing Port Elisabeth RSA. She had to call Cape Town for repair.[Structural]


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## alastairrussell

2000-Sep.5
Bulker EUROBULKER X, Flag Cambodia, built 1974, 19473 grt, breaks in two while loading cement at the port of Lefkandi in central Greece. 

From a subsequent press report: "The ill-fated 26-year-old bulk Eurobulker X as "unseaworthy" at the time of her loss in September 2000, and opines that the vessel should never have been allowed to sail. Excerpts from the report, compiled after a 15-month investigation into why the vessel broke her back and sank while loading cement at a terminal in the Bay of Lefkandi, were published by the Athens daily Ethnos shortly before the new year. A Ukranian seafarer among the 16-man crew was killed in the accident, which caused one of the worst-ever environmental disasters along the north Attica coastline. As quoted by the newspaper, the report describes the general condition of the Stavros Ilias-owned vessel as ranging from average to poor, while parts of her steel structure are said to have been almost totally wasted away. The report contends that "the management and operation of Eurobulker X was most careless, possibly motivated by the desire to make the greatest possible profit". Steel plating in the lower decks is said to have been 30-40% wasted away and in need of replacement, while the vessel's upper ballast tanks had deteriorated by 50% to as much as 100%. The vessel's Ukranian master is described as lacking formal qualifications, and the inquiry report is critical of the Halkis Cement company's loading procedures which had led in this case to the cargo being loaded amidships, with outlying holds left empty. The owner and the master of Eurobulker X were in February 2001 fined Drs 128m ($346,000) by a Halkis court in connection with the sinking of the cement carrier and subsequent pollution. Five others have been charged over the incident, including the vessel's second mate and the person held responsible for authorising the vessel to sail after she underwent repairs at Avlis Shipyard, near Halkis, which is itself run by Stavros Ilias group interests." (Ships) . It is one of rare case of a fine for the structural failure of bulker, this thanks to the pollution. The death of seafarers apparently is not worth such a concern by any court in the world.


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## alastairrussell

2000-Sep.16
Bulker MADONA ( Liberia, built 1982, class NKK, 20122grt,33037dwt), founders near the Cocos islands during a moderate gale. The ship was loaded with cement and for an unknown reason she began to take water in one hold, listing heavily and forcing the safe evacuation of all 25 crew to the livestock carrier DANNY FII.


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## alastairrussell

2000-Oct.17
Bulker HAYDAR, 35336 grt, built 1981, has to make an emergency call in Honolulu after a crack in hold 1 caused an ingress of water.[Structural]


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## alastairrussell

2000-Dec.15
O/O HIGHLAND FAITH found with crack in main deck after inspection by NY USCG.


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## alastairrussell

2001-Jan.11
Bulker SG PROSPERITY, 103083gt, built 1997, suffers cracks in bow steel plate.Repaired at sea.


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## alastairrussell

2001-Apr.10 
Bulker HONGHAE SANYO, 39722dwt, built 1976, 28 crew; disappears with all hands b off Japan in bad weather.


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## alastairrussell

2001-Sep.-13
Capesize bulker KAMIKAWA Maru, 149000dwt, built in 1986, loaded with iron ore, sinks during bad weather in the South Atlantic Ocean after structural problems. Thirteen crewmembers could be saved by the bulker ALDEBARAN, but 10 crew are missing including the master. (ship)


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## alastairrussell

2001-Dec.-22
Capesize bulker CHRISTOPHER (83784grt, built in 1983 ) loaded with coal, sank with all hands after reporting damage on fore ship and broken hatchcovers. This during an Easterly near gale 7 with a 7 meter swell. 
________________________________________


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## alastairrussell

2002-March
Bulker LAKE CARLING, 17464gt, sustain fracture in bad weather while still sailing in the Gulf of St.Laurent.


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## alastairrussell

2002-Aug.
Bulker ARCHANGELOS SEA, 64926dwt, built in 1977, found with 90 deficiencies by the PSC of Amsterdam. Subsequently detained in Belfast,


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## alastairrussell

Panamax bulker ARCHANGELO SEA, built in 1977, class ABS, detained in Belfast for numerous structural deficiencies. Allowed to sail for scrap yard in India.
________________________________________


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## alastairrussell

2004-Mar.-9	
Capesize bulker CSK TRIBUTE (ex-MINERAL BURGUNDY), 79920grt, built in 1991 at Sasebo, class=ABS, loaded with iron ore, develops a large splits in hold 1 port side. The vessel must be repaired before proceeding with the trip.


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## alastairrussell

2004-April 26	
Bulker CAPE AFRICA (149535dwt), suffers the loss of a part of the shell plating in way of hold 3 while about 150 miles from Cape Town. The crew is evacuated, the fuel pumped out, and the ship is towed to False Bay for repair. More damage is discovered in the adjacent hold 3.


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## alastairrussell

2005-Feb.-26 
Bulker SHEN NON FENG ( 39984grt, built in 2002, class=China classification Society), suffers damage on forecastle during bad weather off Norway.
________________________________________


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## alastairrussell

2006-May-4 
Capesize bulker ALEXANDROS T. (St.Vincent & Grenadines 91164grt, built in 1989, class=LR), loaded with iron ore, sank off South Africa after reporting a severe list. 26 crew members are missing. Unless a cargo shift took place, a never reported event with iron ore, on the basis of the story of the few survivor it is quite obvious that the casualty is again due to a side shell failure that a double hull could easily have avoided.
________________________________________


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## surfaceblow

alastairrussell said:


> 1999-Feb.18
> Barge carrier GREEN ISLAND, USA, built 1975, 47036dwt, loses 300 square meter of shell plate in bad weather near the Bermudas. Luckily this ABS classed ship remains floating on her double bottoms.


The Green Island is a LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) vessel. A LASH vessel carries barges and containers some also carry their own tugs to push the barges around when the ship is chartered by MSC. These vessels are useful to the military due because they can be unloaded with their own equipment.

"SS GREEN ISLAND is a LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) vessel owned by Central Gulf Lines of New Orleans, LA and operated by Waterman Steamship Corp. Chief Engineer Charles W. Brown helped bring his severely damaged vessel to safety after a violent Atlantic storm, for which he received the 2000 American Merchant Marine Seamanship Trophy during ceremonies at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy on 16 December 2000. When a storm opened a gaping hole in the ship's hull, GREEN ISLAND reached safe harbor in Bermuda. On the night of February 16, 1999, GREEN ISLAND was battling its way through 40-foot waves and 50-knot winds while 150 miles northeast of Bermuda. Pounding from the heavy seas eventually caused the ship's interior web frames to carry away and break through its outer plating, opening a 30- by 90-foot hole in GREEN ISLAND's hull. Seawater quickly poured through the gaping hole, flooding the ship's starboard wing tank and causing a 20-degree list. Water also poured into the engine room through the ventilator shafts."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/green-island.htm


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## JoK

Kurdistan. Broke in two in the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1978


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## JoK

Gold Bond Conveyor, New Years Day '93?


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## JoK

Another bulker loses all the vents on deck in weather off of NS. Ship is evacuated and ship lost-sorry don't know name.
Another bulker is detained in NS with cracking on the deck. Repairs are made ship sails-another one I don't know the name.


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## djw1

alastair,

good start. check out Pierre Woinin's list at
http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sbchron+.htm.
This stuff should be in a formal database
so it can be queried and analysed.
Proprietary ship casualty data bases exist
but since they are not reviewable by third parties
any conclusions based on this data are little more than advertorial.
The CTX Tanker Casualty data base http://www.c4tx.org/job/cdb/search.html
is an exception.
See http://www.c4tx.org/pub/cdb_man.pdf for the make up
of this database.
I've been thinking for some time about expanding the CTX CDB
to bulkers (OBO's are in theory already included.).
Your post has pushed me to do this.
I don't want all these losses to be conveniently forgotten.
Any suggestions, help gratefully accepted.

KTF

Jack


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## djw1

Correction the links to the CTX database and its manual are
http://www/c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/serach.html and
http://www/c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_man.pdf.

Mea culpa.

Jack


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## djw1

Try again.
http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/search.html and
http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_man.pdf.

Mea maxima culpa.

Jack


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## Derek Roger

JoK said:


> Kurdistan. Broke in two in the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1978


We had the forward section of her in Saint John Drydock when I was there . Pumped out all the oil and cleaned her . Then I think she was taken off shore and sunk if my memory serves me right .

You probably saw her when she was in dock ??? I don't remember what year it was ??



Kind Regards Derek


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## JoK

Yes, I saw it on dock but I thought it was the stern? The stern was taken back to Europe somewhere and a new bow put on?
Didn't the Navy sink the forward section?
I was 16 or 17 so it is fuzzy.


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## alastairrussell

Jack

Thanks for your kind words of encouragement and I agree with everything you say and want to do. I will assist you in any way I can. Lord Donaldson apparently reported in one of his Inquires that *1225 bulk carrier seamen died in 153 ships lost during a 16 year period.* Like you I believe all these ships and seamen should not be forgotten. 

It upsets me to think that one of my favourite ships and its engine room along with 17 poor souls is on Lord Donaldson’s list and is now lying on the bottom of the ocean off South Africa. 

On the Iron Endeavour we used to have problems with the hydraulic hatch jacks jamming up when we were preparing for departure. This meant that the hatch cleats could not be engaged and secured before we had freed the jack. I often wonder if this is why the hatch floated off ? We used to have problems with a horrible multi bolted engine room access hatch to the duct keel. Did someone leave this door off? Did the new owners load alternate holds?

*Iron Endeavour - O/N 305467 , IMO 6900239 *

The Panamax bulk carrier was completed in February 1969 by Thompson and Sons of Sunderland for the Nile Steamship Comp[any, (part of the Furness Withy Group), . Registered at Newcastle, U.K. 74,596 DWT, 40,316 GRT, 798' 5" LOA, 120' 3" Breadth, 39' 3" Summer Draught. 8 cylinder 20,000 bhp J type Doxford oil engine giving her a 15 knot service speed and burning 57 tons of H.O. per day. She had 8 cargo holds with a crew of 41. We produced all electric power at sea from the main engine waste heat boiler. She was strengthened for ore cargoes and No 3, 5 and 7 could be left empty. 

On delivery, she was placed on a 10 year bareboat charter to BHP of Australia. Vessel re-registered Australian and she became the largest Australian flagged merchant ship. Her main function was the transportation of iron ore pellets from Whyalla to Japan. A typical run was Port Kembla to Whyalla in ballast, load iron ore pellets for Japan and then in ballast to Port Hedland to load iron ore fines for Port Kembla. 

In 1970 she ran aground in Port Hedland and received bottom damage which was repaired in Singapore. 1972, Galley burnt out at sea. 1983 the charter ended and the ship reverted to her owners. 

Sold straight away to Greek interests, managers Theodore and Angelos Efstathiou, Piraeus, renamed *Andromachi*, registered Piraeus.

1987, 27th April, the vessel loaded with iron ore ran aground in Venezuela's Orinoco river near mile 149. Initial attempts to re-float her using tugs were unsuccessful and she had to be lightened before being pulled into deeper water. Sustained hull damage and following temporary repairs had to be dry docked in Hong Kong.

1990, Sold to the Turkish Kýran Group and renamed *Kaptan Ziya Sonmez*, registered Istanbul. On 23rd February 1990 her collision bulkhead cracked while loading coal. Cargo had to be removed and major ship yard repair carried out.

1992 Sold to Good Faith Shipping Company of Panama and renamed *Ocean Blue*. Bought at an Admiralty auction in Gibraltar in 1992 by Ostene Shipping Company of Turkey. Sold on almost immediately to Nagos Shipping Ltd., Valetta, Malta and renamed *Nagos*, registered Valetta.

1993, 26th May, while on passage from Richards Bay to Antwerp with a full cargo of coal the *Nagos *encountered very heavy weather off the South African coast. A hatch cover was washed away, believed to be from No.1 hold, and the ship began taking on water into the hold. She sank approximately 70 miles off Port Elizabeth, in lat.35 15S, long.24 01E. 16 crew members were rescued by helicopter and 17 were missing believed drowned.

Regards

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

Jok

Is Foundation Maritime still going? I remember reading a book about one of their salvage tugs. I was real pleased when dry docking in Halifax in the 60's to see that the tug had an F on the funnel !

Alastair


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## dom

*dom*

Alexandre P. left Dampier a week befor us,no survivors three dead in a liferaft


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## Derek Roger

JoK said:


> Yes, I saw it on dock but I thought it was the stern? The stern was taken back to Europe somewhere and a new bow put on?
> Didn't the Navy sink the forward section?
> I was 16 or 17 so it is fuzzy.


 I think you are correct .. Derek


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## McCloggie

*1225 bulk carrier seamen died in 153 ships lost during a 16 year period*

The statistics speak for themselves. Very, very tragic.

I do not realy know enough about this but do know that in the offshore game these figures are simply unacceptable. 

Local rules and Class Societies inspecting to these rules (eg UK HSE, USA Coast Guard, etc.) would simply not accept this.

Why is it allowed?

Are the vessels originally sound and then badly managed/crewed or is their a fundamental design flaw here?

McC


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## djw1

McCloggie,

The Donaldson number is low. A Japanese analysis ended up with
2067 dead between 1978 and 2000
of which 1126 were attributed to structural falilure.
See http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/maritime/bcfsa/msc75/annex3.pdf.

The core reason is our system of "self-regulation" in which owners (and yards)
shop for the Class and FOC that supposed to regulate them.
The nearest equivalent is auditing. See Enron et al.
The difference is that auditors are playing with people's money.
Class is playing with people's lives.

In any event, the result is that almost all tankers and bulk carriers
built in the last 30 years are fragile and unreliable.
And an owner who doesn't feel like doing proper maintenance
does not have to.

Not a lot of nostalgia in this thread.

Jack devanney


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## Ian

Forgive me i,me wrong but the Bulk Carrier "DERBYSHIRE" seems to have been missed,
She according to all known investigations was a structrural loss.
I.E. failure of a main structural bearing /member,
just a thought .as she bore My Name.....my thoughts are ever with her crew and their families, "for those in peril "
Derbyroy


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## Lemschout

Jack Devanney wrote:

"In any event, the result is that almost all tankers and bulk carriers built in the last 30 years are fragile and unreliable."

My last inspections of these last weeks appear to confirm that.

One of the last ship was more than 50 years old, not a bulker but a good coaster. I went some ballast tanks and found no wastage. But on some recent bulkers severe corrosion appears after about ten years.

An other aspect is that some new shipyards are making strange mistakes: escapes that cannot be opened from inside, spurling pipes that cannot be accessed, cofferdams 20cm wide that cannot be sounded, ventilated, inspected but in which water and cargo can finds its way in with no chance to ever get out...

Faced with so many weaknesses, I have the feeling that the classes' inspectors cannot cope any more and that their bosses start to fear for their liabilities.

Almost every week I find a Do***ent of Compliance for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods certificate, issued by a main IACS class, allowing the organic peroxydes (5.2) to be loaded in the cargo holds! (Since yesterday 2 of them). This while his product must be always loaded on deck and preferably in a location where it could be easily jetissoned in case of fire. 

If some day a major fire is caused by this kind of product loaded under deck as mentioned on such a stupid certificate, I wonder how the related Class will defend its case!

Must say that this is exceptional with GL, as they have a special service to check these difficult certificates. Many more errors can be found if these papers are scutinized, for sure when they are drafted by a surveyor in a remote location who thinks he can do everything, or simply copy the date from a similar paper.


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## alastairrussell

Derbyroy

I plucked the above list out of the internet by googling and I failed to record the person or organisation responsible!! I would take a punt and say the incidents look like they have come from the casualty lists in the Lloyds List Newspaper. 

I feel we have to go with Jack and let him modify his operating database on problem tankers to include failed bulk carriers. I would personally like to see his database placed in a web site alongside any relevant, technical papers, Court of inquiry and Admiralty Court findings on the operation of structurally unsound ships. I am sure that as the Derbyshire was an OBO she will already be in Jack’s database 

I think the web site should be kept away from any form of influence from the international shipping establishment. The site should push for IMO and the other relevant organisations to legislate for more protection for the Master and others on board who go against commercial pressures and report defective repairs or serious fault in their ships. 

Jack 

Seeing that I am not too good at English, I typed the word ’Nostalgia’ into the Microsoft word dictionary and it came up with the words ‘sentimental recollection’ so I then typed the word ‘sentimental’ and up came ‘Mawkish in feeling’ so I decided then to give the exercise away as I thought that the word ‘mawkish’ just had to be Scottish and not an English word? 

I read the Japanese report on bulk carrier safety which you recommended and also Captain Pierre Woinin’s website and I found them both good, I was surprised to read that a few ships I knew in the eighties had problems. I wonder if Donaldson’s 16 year list that he was referring to might have ended in the middle eighties before some of the suspect ships got a bit older and run down?

I feel, after reading the Japanese report that all their structural failure incidents could be broken down into three groups,

A.	Catastrophic failure ending up with loss of life and/or major environmental damage.

B.	Catastrophic failure with no loss of life with the ship being saved from sinking and to be either broken up or repaired.

C.	Structure cracks and local failures that required detention, modifications or repairs. 

Failure caused by corrosion should definitely be recorded as a structural failure. The designer has to declare a corrosion allowance in the structure!

Jack and Lemschout 

You both have achieved success in your quest to change the wrongs of the past. I feel we have to keep the pressure on the international shipping establishment, to get them to work to one international standard and this means penalising any ship owner or classification society heavily if they step out of line. 

I think all the classification societies are back peddling at the moment and running to their PR organisations to get them to improve their image. How about this full page LR advert in the October 2007 Shipping World and Ship builder. I quote: *“LIFE is about getting to the top. Our teams can help bulk carrier owners and operators beat fatigue, assisting in the design, build and maintenance of safer, more robust ships. We’ll help pull you through regulatory and market change. You can rely on our strength, because in business, trust MATTERS”.

- LIFE MATTERS-*


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## alastairrussell

I will probably get into trouble again with this post as the MSC Napoli was a container ship and not a bulk carrier but I think the report is related to our bulk carrier problem and should be read . The full investigation report can be read in the MAIB web site.

*Synopsis of the MAIB MSC Napoli Investigation Report*

During the morning of 18 January 2007, when on passage in the English Channel, the 4419 TEU container ship MSC Napoli encountered heavy seas, causing the ship to pitch heavily. The ship was making good a speed of 11 knots and the height of the waves was up to 9m. At about 1105, the vessel suffered a catastrophic failure of her hull in way of her engine room. The master quickly assessed the seriousness of the situation and decided to abandon ship. 

Following the broadcast of a distress call at 1125, the 26 crew abandoned the vessel in an enclosed lifeboat. They were later recovered by two Royal Navy helicopters. There were no injuries. MSC Napoli was subsequently taken under tow towards Portland, UK but, as the disabled vessel approached the English coast, it became evident there was a severe risk she might break up or sink, and she was intentionally beached in Branscombe Bay on 20 January 2007. A number of containers were lost overboard when the vessel listed heavily after beaching.

The investigation has identified a number of factors which contributed to the failure of the hull structure, including:

• The vessel’s hull did not have sufficient buckling strength in way of the engine room.

• The classification rules applicable at the time of the vessel’s construction did not require buckling strength calculations to be undertaken beyond the vessel’s amidships area.

• There was no, or insufficient, safety margin between the hull’s design loading and its ultimate strength.

• The load on the hull was likely to have been increased by whipping effect.

• The ship’s speed was not reduced sufficiently in the heavy seas.

In view of the potential vulnerability of other container ships of a similar design, the MAIB requested the major classification societies to conduct urgent checks on the buckling strength of a number of ship designs. Over 1500 ships were screened, of which 12 vessels have been identified as requiring remedial action; a further 10 vessels were identified as being border line and require more detailed investigation; and the screening of 8 container ships was still in progress at the time of publication. Remedial action has either been completed, planned, or is being arranged; where necessary, operational limitations have been agreed or strongly advised until the remedial work has been completed.

Recommendations have been made to the International Association of Classification Societies, which are intended to increase the requirements for container ship design, consolidate current research into whipping effect, and to initiate research into the development and use of technological aids for measuring hull stresses on container ships. 
Recommendations have also been made to the International Chamber of Shipping with the aim of promoting best practice within the container ship industry, and to Zodiac Maritime Agencies, with reference to its safety management system.


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## Lemschout

Allarstai Russell wrote:

"I think all the classification societies are back peddling at the moment and running to their PR organisations to get them to improve their image."

Maybe they will succeed with those who are vulnerable to PR stuff, but more will be needed to impress those who can have a close look at the structure of the bulkers. 

During a recent inspection I was in the toptanks of 10 year old bulker surveyed by a IACS class (not LR) and found these tanks more widely corroded than those of many bulkers built in the early 80s. 

If a thourough sand blast and an extensive coating are not carried out during the next dry dock, that ship will be a sailing coffin within 5 years.


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## djw1

Gentlemen,

Once we get the bulk carrier casualty data entered,
we will combine it with the existing tanker database
and put it up on the web site. In addition,
anyone who wants will be able to download the raw data.
We will also do periodic analyses of the data similar
to http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_explore.pdf.

Hope to have a progress report next week.

KTF

Jack


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## alastairrussell

*World Achilles * ON 356551 

21384 gross, 13977 net, 37635 deadweight.
6cyl 12000 BHP Polish built 2SA RND Sulzer.
15 knots, 38.5 tonnes/day 34 crew. 
7 holds of which 2, 4 and 6 were permitted to be empty when carrying ore cargoes.
No 2 of the 19 Greek built, BC35 class bulk carriers. the majority of the class was bought by the Niarchos Shipping Company.

1973	Completed by Hellenic shipyards in Greece (Yard number 1081).

1974 Sold to BHP and registered in Hong Kong and renamed *Iron ***berland.*

1986 Sold to Glenara Ltd of Hong Kong and renamed ****berlande*

1987 Lost 26 miles north east of the Pitcairn Island group when carrying ferro manganese fines from Bell Bay and concentrates from Newcastle to New Orleans. Ship started taken water in No. 1 and 2 holds and after pumping for two days the ship was abandoned. After 27 hours in the lifeboats the 27 crew were picked up by the British container ship Act 5 and taken to Auckland.


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## Lemschout

>World Achilles ...1987 Lost 26 miles north east of the Pitcairn Island group when carrying Ferro manganese from Bell Bay and concentrates from Newcastle to New Orleans. Ship started taken water in No. 1 and 2 holds and after pumping for two days the ship was abandoned.<

Maybe sunk by a whalelike the sailing ship Essex whose crew sought refuge on nearby Henderson, finally tried to row to Chili and had to eat the deckboy to survive? :-(

Anyway the seas are not particulary rough otherwise the folks of Pitcairn would not be able to board the passing ships very often.

That says a lot about the state of the ship and it would be interesting to know more about the cause of the failure.


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## alastairrussell

*Naess Parkgate *ON 309755 

40767 gross, 26079 net, 72030 deadweight.
9 cyl 20700 BHP Clark built 2SA RD Sulzer Engine.
15 knots 67 tonnes/day 38 crew.

Panamax bulk carrier from the same shipyard that built the Derbyshire.
The ship was strengthened for ore cargoes. She had 9 holds with Nos 2, 4 and 8 holds being allowed to be empty.

1966 Completed by Furness Shipbuilding Co Ltd on the Tyne (Yard number 520) for Turnbull Scott Co Ltd of London as the *Naess Parkgate*.

1970 Transferred to J and J Denholm ( management ) Ltd managers.

1972 Transferred to Denholm Ship Management Ltd.

1973 Bare boat charter to BHP for 5 years and renamed *Iron Parkgate*. 

1974	Charter contract revoked and vessel returned to owners care at Singapore.
After handover and when repairs were being carried out, an explosion and a fire took place in the engine room. An engineer superintendant and 13 dockyard workers were killed. 

1975 Renamed *Nordic Trader*1978 Sold to Anglo Nordic Shipping Company.

1978 Sold to Camerona Navigation Co Ltd of Liberia and renamed *Panamax Uranus.*

1983 Transferred to Far Eastern Navigation Corporation and renamed *Panamax Solar*.

1985 Reported to have been sold to Taiwan breakers.

In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tailshaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975. 

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR. 

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

*A Quote From the Master of the Titanic*

Lemschout, 

How about this quote?

"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."

(Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)


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## Lemschout

Thanks to Allastair Russel for his quote from E.J.Smith, and I shall certainly use it, if possible during a forthcoming PSC seminar in Canada. 

In those days communication was poor and all seafarers had to rely on their own experience, save for some interesting verbal exchanges among the more numerous members of the crew in those days.

But even today information about casualties is very poor on board.
At the end of the 80s, when I was working ashore for 3 years as superintendent, I discovered the Lloyd's List and its casualties records. Only then I understood how I was isolated from valuable information during so many years. For about ten years I could get the newspaper, but now I have to rely again on what transpires on the net. 

Anyway this flow of information is becoming too big for any single person to digest, it must be selected and processed in order to be used efficiently.
When I have the opportunity I push my administration to have a service in charge of this selection process, but as most of those who can decide have never sailed, they are even less aware of all the risks at sea than this trustful Captain Smith. It is not easy to keep a good feeling of the right safety priorities, and I believe that an experience in command helps a lot to acquire the ability to shift quickly one's focus when the cir***stances are requiring it. Actually we just learn to focus on not to focus too much on anything, to remain always receptive to new situations and assess them properly. As far as I know there is no STCW course about that, even on management level.


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## alastairrussell

Lemschout

I am pleased to hear that you will be shortly speaking at a PSC seminar in Canada. Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records!!

As a senior ship’s engineer there is nothing worse than joining an old, tired bulk carrier that your company has just bareboat chartered, only to find that all machinery records along with the running hours have been thrown over side.

One then checks the spare part lockers and finds that some of the spare parts are all worn out! Surely the classification society survey and damage claim records for the ship should be made available to the charterer prior to a final inspection of the ship! Is it time for IMO to take over as the record keeper of the ship?

I remember assisting an independent surveyor to inspect a small loaded bulk carrier that my company was going to charter. I was shocked when he lined the master up straight away and said that if he found any shipside or grab damage in his crawl through the ballast tanks that had not been declared then he and his company would hold him, the master, personally responsible. During the inspection we found that the main engine crankshaft deflections were excessive, the handover was delayed until the owner of the ship made improvements to the crankshaft alignment.

Alastair


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## Dave Wilson

alastairrussell said:


> Lemschout
> 
> *Is it time for IMO to take over as the record keeper of the ship?*
> Alastair


Have they not already done so with ISM?

Another thought. We maintain spares in a very meticulous manner and pride ourselves on knowing what is onboard. Historically we always insist that the C/Eng satisfies himself _*well in advance *_of saying changing a 'big end' or 'Main' to visually inspect the upper and lower shells as we have in the past been caught out (once)when finding the babetting of the spare shells were scored causing delays. I hope nobody suggests we put the old ones back in!


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## Lemschout

>_Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records_!!<

Good idea, unfortunately the same happens when a ship changes ownership. The brokers who make a lot of money when finalizing a sale contract, are sometimes forgetting some that must be transferred to the new owner. That was often the case with the ISPS CSR. And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.

Of course the IMO should extend its list of do***ents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.

Once I detained a bulker simply because the master had not been advised it nearly broke in two a few years earlier. The class (as R/O) tried to defend this ignorance, which was subject to the ISM system, by supposing the ship had changed class and the records had been lost.

Bad luck for them, I knew the ship had been under their supervision since new building. (Thumb)


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## djw1

Gentlemen,

For a glance at where CTX stands with respect to including
dry side casualties inthe CTX database,
pls see http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/sneak_at_dry.pdf.

KTF

Jack


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## MM²

*Several people have suggested ....................*

............ that IMO should maintain a public database of ship casualties.

I would say that this is becoming a necessity rather than just a good idea.

The more shipping can be put under thorough public scrutiny the safer it will become.


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## Mark Chirnside

Jack,

This seems to be a very worthwhile project. I wish you all the best of luck with it.

Best wishes,

Mark.


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## Dave Wilson

I am somewhat surprised that we have not witnessed more disasters in recent years than there have been. Around 2003 the market turned dramatically with many, many owners almost Bankrupt seeing employment for their ageing fleet gain momentum. Bulk Carriers (inxs of 20 years old) which were destined for either the Admiralty Marshall or the Breakers were given a new lease of life. What goes up always comes down. Many owners will have accrued massive profits from the market of the last 5 years I have not witnessed any real upgrading.


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## alastairrussell

Dave 

Thanks for your advice on IMO and the record keeping part being covered by the ISM.

I left the shipping game in 1985 so I am a wee bit out of touch!

Thanks

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

Jack

I like your database and I reckon it is what we need.

I remember reading somewhere recently (while googling) that it was one of the criteria laid down prior to the 1966 Load Line Convention, that flooding of one hold when loaded with ore was not to cause the ship to structurally fail and/or sink. I have searched through my computer and I just can not find the article!! 

With regard to the 1990 incident when the * MV Tao Yuan Hai * was loaded at Port Kembla while it was more than year out of class and your question “*Is it possible the Australians would load a class-less ship*”. I remember back before 1985 there were problems with the condition of some of the bulk carriers that were being used to load either steaming or coking coal at the State Government coal loader in PK for overseas ports. My answer to your question is that I am 100% sure that all ports in Australia would not load a ship that was known to be out of class.

In saying this it should be noted that in PK harbour in 70’s and 80’s after they built the new loader, there was no lay up or repair berth for large bulk carriers. To the best of my knowledge, if a ship was declared as being sub standard by the Australian government surveyor, there was no place to detain the ship while carrying out repairs! If a ship had already started loading coal it was then allowed to finish loading and sail even if some of defects had not been fixed. I think the ship was then placed on a ‘Do not come back to Australia list’. The anchorage outside PK on the east coast of Australia is a declared unsafe anchorage.

In them days we had a very strict federal government surveyor stationed in PK and I am told that over the years he even gained an international reputation! The wharfie's loved him, if they wanted a break when on nightshift they would phone him up and complain about the ships cargo handling gear that they were working with at the time. He would come in straight away and inspect if he thought the lifting gear might be unsafe! 

If he was called in to inspect a ship and found it to be substantially below standard, he would want it detained and repaired. Many times he was overruled by his superiors in Canberra and the ship was allowed to finish loading say coal, giving a severe warning and then placed on the banned list! 

I personally witnessed this government surveyor exploding with anger. He was carrying out a yearly safety equipment survey on our Australian ship at the time, when he looked across and saw a tired old looking bulk carrier docking at the coal loader , Apparently he had found this ship very substandard and unseaworthy several months before and had her placed on the banned list and here she was back in PK with a new name. I am not sure but the owners might have sold her and not tell the new owners about the ban as surely the original owner would not be so stupid as to send her back in the same condition to the same port!!. I remember being told that her deck fire main was full of holes and still unusable! 

Anyway, I was very impressed how he had managed to recognise the ship with her new name. He ran down our gangway got into his car and was gone, I had a terrible feeling he wanted to be the first man up her gangway when she tied up!

We did have structural problems with the flooded hold arrangement in one of our chartered 100,000 tonne bulk carriers. I also remember during a load line survey on that ship when the DNV surveyor turned to the C/O and said _“I see you don’t use all the extra hatch clamps when you flood the hold “. _ When the C/O face went red the surveyor then said _“don’t worry no one uses all these cleats. But remember one very important thing, if the ships sinks when you are in ballast and we send a diver down and he reports that all the hatch cleats have not been employed, you will be in trouble"_ Could this be the reason why hatches float off ?

The 6th last entry in your Dry bulk Casualties data base I found very interesting. I could not understand how the loss and subsequent oil pollution event of the *MV Selendang Aya *could be put down to a cracked main engine liner. I therefore had a look at the NTSB investigation report of the incident and I can say I am not very impressed with their report and I feel it has opened up a can of worms and I would just love to be able to ask a few questions. When the engine failed the ship was in really cold and heavy weather and there is no way they could have changed a liner at sea then if she was rolling heavilly. I cannot see why they could not have operated the six cylinder engine on five units up to say half ahead revs. When the liner cracked and the engine could not be started the ship was a 100 miles from where it hit the rocks and broke up?

Shafting the master of the ship for misleading the inquiry was a red herring and a proper snow job and did nothing to help them to find out why they could not start the engine with one unit isolated . I think the NTSB were playing the 'crew blame game' again. Anyway my heart goes out to all those involved and those lost in the helicopter accident.

KTF

Alastair


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## Dave Wilson

Lemschout said:


> >_
> And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.
> 
> Of course the IMO should extend its list of do***ents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.
> 
> (Thumb)_


_

Unfortunately, many owners (or managers) think their SMS is better than anyone else's and are reluctant to share their extra special expertise in this area(Jester). The NSF should reflect that the current SMS should be left on board. The reason sellers do not want this is that a properly functioning SMS says a lot which the seller might not want the buyer to see.
Further, SMS's come in all shapes and forms from the unwieldy to the minimalist. A lot of work needs to be done in this area._


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## djw1

Alastair,

The IACS entry on the Tao Yuan Hai
must be all screwed up as I suspected.

Selendang Ayu did disconnect NO 3,
but the engine would not restart.
This was blamed on very bad rings,
but they were not able to pull cylinders
to change the rings in the very bad weather.
The cracked liner came first, so it shows
up as the first event in the event sequence,
altho one can argue the failure to restart
was the more critical problem.
There is a machinery detail section in the data base
where both problems show up.

BTW, I am a firm believer in twin screw,
certainly for tankers.
See http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/twin_screw.pdf.

KTF

Jack


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## alastairrussell

Jack 

I would love to get to the bottom of the *MV Tao Yuan Hai *story as I found the following in Capt. P Woinin’s list of bulk carrier failures. His data appears to come from the Lloyds List newspaper. She could have loaded iron ore on the trip after she loaded perhaps coal in PK at the end of 1989 or in the start of 1990. She definitely would not have loaded iron ore in PK. Maybe they made a mistake up in Port Hedland and loaded the ship while she was out of class or has there been confusion between PK and PH? The following incident could have brought any mistake to a head? I quote:

1990-May 
*Bulker TAO YUAN HAI, 122750 dwt, 13 years old, loaded with iron ore, suffers structural failure with a hold flooded*

From the same list I see that both iron ore loading organisations in Port Hedland put a ban on all bulk carriers over 15 years old being loaded there. Did they not trust the international classification society’s to do the right thing anymore? I quote:

1992 
Australia HAMMERSLEY IRON & BROKEN HILL Pty ban bulk carriers over 15 years of age.

With regard to your comment on flooding of holds causing a major problem to bulk carriers I quote from same source:

In the leader *"STONES SINKS"* of the Lloyd's List of 27 June it is written: ".._It is clear that creative naval architects could do a very great deal to design a ship that could carry heavy cargoes and do not sink like a brick in the event that one or more holds being flooded." _The Load lines convention and its various amendments still (January 2002) does not require bulker to remain afloat if more than on compartment is flooded! Answering this leader, J.M.Ferguson of the LR, then chairman of IACS, wrote in the Lloyd's List of 4 July: _"The adequacy of classification requirements for bulk carriers is a matter which needs continuous assessment. At the 31st Session of IACS Council, on June 1-2 1995, it was decided that an ad hoc steering committee should be formed with the purpose of addressing the overall safety of bulk carriers." Almost 7 years later this _Steering committee did not prevent the LR classed *CHRISTOPHER *to also sink like a stone. 

Jack, I was not criticising your data base, it is OK , I was pointing the finger at the investigation as carried out and reported on by NTSB on the *MV Selendang Ayu *grounding. To me the events as recorded in their report do not make engineering sense. The engine when it was stopped would have been operating on heavy oil and if this had not been attended to immediately after stopping then the main engine would then have been very difficult to start in the then low ambient temperatures. Did they have trace heating on all the fuel lines? They could have stuffed up the air start system some way when isolating the start air to the defective unit. Lack of compression in a big banger, long stroke, slow speed diesel even in cold weather is suspect. They mention the broken rings as being the ‘root cause’ These types of engines are over ringed to hell and gone and all these rings do not suddenly break and there was no mention of the type of breakage or where the breakage was in the ring. Was it just broken butts. The ship was relatively new and would not have excessively worn liners which are normally the main cause for the rings breaking or wearing excessively. I am shocked that a C/E would want to phone his boss ashore and ask him for advice on fault finding and how to start his engine! 

This particular grounding has me worried because modern ships with this level of engineering expertise on board and all with HO fuel in their DB’s are transiting the Australian barrier reef every day! 

I am of the opinion that this NTSB investigation report is totally substandard and that they did not try to find out the true cause of the machinery failure and then make recommendations to stop it happening again! 

I remember when we cracked a liner on a reefer ship I was on. We were picking up the Panama canal pilot at the time and we quickly hung up the damaged units fuel pump and then shut the outlet and inlet cooling water valves to the its water jacket and carried on without stopping the engine. We manoeuvred all the way through the canal on 7 cylinders with the canal pilot being on the ’ _not to be told list’_. He was a bit peeved when our master would not allow the ship to do full sea speed in the canal lakes! When we bunkered on the Atlantic side we changed the liner, breaking even more of the Panama Canal Authorities rules.

I enjoyed reading your technical paper pushing the case for more twin screw tankers. I found it a very impressive risk management do***ent and that you put your case for the increased use of twin screw tankers very well and I am with you a 100%. In saying this, I am not yet convinced that these new electric drive propulsion units or pods that all the new passenger ships are being fitted with at the moment is the way to go. 

If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour. 

Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:

• Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.

•	The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.

I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that *risk management *is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?

I will finish off with the following:

1992-Feb.17
*In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."*

KTF

Alastair


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## djw1

Alastair,

I also felt that the bad rings story sounded fishy
and I doubt if NTSB got to the bottom of this one.
Having said this, they did pull the No 6 piston. Why?
It is also true that there are liner failures and liner failures.
We had aliner break into two parts on a nearly new ULCC
just below the collar.
The bottom two thirds hung up on the lube oil quills
or it would have fallen on the crank shaft.
There was no way this engine could restart
without pulling the liner.
Fortunately, the weather was calm 
and the crew was able to get the liner out
and proceed to sheltered waters.
No one the wiser.

When we pressed the maker Sulzer on why
they were completely unresponsive,
trying to blame the crew, even tho all the copious
engine data looked fine right up to the failure.
We did learn that the liner was desgined with little
or no margin against fatigue due to thermal cycling.
And we learned that there have been a lot of other
unreported liner failures.

Ironicallly, there is little commercial penalty
from going twin screw. The 7 or 8 pct increase
in initial cost is largely balanced by the increased
dwt on a given draft and extra speed in a boom.
Stena as well as BHP has built twin screw ships
on purely commercial grounds. But most owners
dont have the technical capability to properly evaluate
twin screw, and when the yards are busy, they will build
only standard ships, and all the standard ships are single screw.

KTF

Jack


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## djw1

Gentlemen,

The first batch of dry side casualties is now on the ctx website
at http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/2.7/search.html.
This is not the normal link and this version of the CDB
is still experimental. But with luck you should be able to see the data.

KTF

Jack


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## alastairrussell

*Capesized Ships Must be Twin Screwed*

The number one headline in the business section of today’s 'Australian' newspaper was that *‘BHP pushes ship rates to record’ *

This was followed in smaller print with the comment that *'The London market has been stunned by the scale of ship charter action'. *Apparently BHP has fixed 17 large Capesized bulk carrier charters to take iron ore from Port Hedland to China at record prices this week when they would normally hire only nine bulk carriers for this run in the month.

It was also stated that it is thought that today (20th May) at the Baltic Exchange in London that the Capsized bulk carrier charter rate would break through the *$300,000 per day*! The article also stated that 6 years ago before the commodity boom started that the Capsized charter rate languished at only *$17,000 per day*! 

Seemingly it is thought that the Asian steel mills are desperately trying to build up stocks of iron ore prior to a future price rise. The BHP contracted price for iron ore to China at the moment is *$US 60-70 a tonne * with the present spot price being *$US 200 a tonne.* I have to say that is this not the time for the classification societies or IMO to declare that all future capsized tankers and bulk carriers built, be twin screwed with separate engine rooms. Do they not think that it is time to take the pressure off the master and the chief engineer by building into their ship a wee bit of redundancy. I challenge any competent risk management professional to do a basic risk assessment on the present situation with Capesized ships and tell me why they should not be built with two main engines with separate engine rooms.

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

*In an IHI Drydock ND meant - No Defect - No Drop - Nice Dreams*

Jack

I agree with you, there are liner failures and liner failures. My first Sulzer ship had a rather run down 8 cylinder RD Sulzer and during my 9 month stay on that ship as second engineer we cracked 4 liners all at different times with two of them being changed at sea in good weather. 

All our 4 liner failures cracked vertically and all were caused by the 2.5 inch high flame ring failing catastrophically. I was told that these rings were made from a special alloy material and were fitted to protect the top of the cast liner from flame impingement. The ring had clearance measurements and was clamped by the cylinder head to the liner. During the failure bits of the ring, would then go through the problematic rotary exhaust valves damaging them and also the hot end turbo-charger blading. 

I had the opportunity to speak with the Sulzer rep for Australia at the time and when I quizzed him about our flame ring and other problems with ‘his engine’, he was very non committal and blamed everything on the company that built the engine. He kept saying _“we have had lots of problems with the engines from that particular licensee”. _ I learnt absolutely nothing from him and when I asked him _“where can be we buy flame rings that do not fail” _ I met with silence. Yes, I did give him a serve on what I thought about his engines!

It was years later after I had left that company, when reading a technical paper that I found out it was *our fault *that the flame rings had failed. Seemingly it was a laid down company procedure to blow the engine over on air on first movement. The procedure was thermally shocking the flame ring and causing the failure. This procedure was a carry over from their Doxford engined ships when they used to blow their engines over with starting air with indicator cocks open on first movement. We would then watch to see if a water jet or spray came out of any of the cocks. It was the chilling refrigerant effect of the compressed air followed by the sudden belt of heat when the unit fired up that was doing the damage. Every other company that I sailed with blew their engines over say 15 minutes before standby with a very short blast of air prior to them singling up the mooring lines. This method would enable the flame ring to recover from the cold blast and regain some heat back into the rings prior to the engine being started.

With regard to your post, was the liner that failed in your ULCC on a RD or a RND Sulzer? I have copy of a 1974 Sulzer technical bulletin here in front of me right now admitting that the RD engine and especially the RD 90 engines were prone to major horizontal cracking failures just as you describe. It recommends that the scavenge air flow be kept up at all times and attention be paid to the jacket cooling system making sure it was vented properly, as apparently the water flow just under the liner collar was poor and created severe corrosion and steam filming problems. The LR surveyors were on to this and when doing a main engine unit survey they were keen to condemn the liner if they found the expected defect. Better that the owner pays out now for the new liner than have the owner put a claim on the underwriters later on when it failed catastrophically. 

My do***ent also recommends fitting a reconditioned head ring when renewing the liner. I think the advice that you got from Sulzers saying that it was your engine room staff to blame might have been their way of helping you to make a successful insurance claim. What do you think? The cylinder oil quills were also a possible source of high ring and liner wear when they leaked jacket water on to the liner wear surfaces. We always put thread tape on the threaded part of the quill prior to screwing them into the liner.

My opinion of the Sulzer engine was to change dramatically when I started sailing with the newer IHI built Sulzer RND engines on IHI built bulk carriers all with good approved unmanned machinery spaces. IHI‘s form of quality assurance won me over to their new ways of doing things. The ships had an IHI designed fuel treatment system. Their UMS alarm system was tops and they also supplied fabulous do***entation and manuals (in English) on how to look after their ship and their engines. What a pleasure it was to get away from the older style British built RD engine with its pulse turbo-charging, rotary exhaust valves and those bloody flame rings! 

I blame Doxfords and Sulzers for handing out too many licences to too many engineering and shipbuilding companies without taking a major interest in the quality of the build or supplying QA procedures. I have had a good crawl around many Sulzers engines in my time and the standard of the machining and build varies substantially from licensee to licensee. 

I was second engineer on a J type Doxford engined panamax bulk carrier which used to dry dock every Christmas at one of the many IHI facilities in Japan. It was a wonderful repair yard with all the staff working to really good QA and safety systems. The repair yard was right in the middle of a large shipyard rattling out a series of identical 300,000 tonne oil tankers in a production run.

All staff from manager to the lowly labourer wore the same company uniform. I remember the repair staff had the letters ND on there shirt sleeves which I was told stood for No Defect - No Drop - Nice Dreams. 

One year our tail shaft was found to have cracks in the keyway area and had to be replaced. The tail shaft squad apparently made a wee bit of a mistake when they were returning our spare tail shaft into the tunnel area and the hinged section of the ships hull that was removed to take out our spare tail shaft was dropped into the sea. Yes, they were then refitting our tail shaft and propeller when we were afloat! Anyway the next day all the team came back with new shirts on with no ND on the sleeve. The leading hand responsible, who had just graduated from university was in a very angry frame of mind and was going round and physically kicking his team and verbally abusing them. His career record in the mighty IHI had now a blemish on it and it was their fault!

With regard to your post you might possibly be a wee bit wrong in thinking the liner would have ended up in the crankcase. Since the introduction of heavy oil being used as fuel in motor ships, all modern cathedral ships engines were made with scavenge spaces into which the bottom of the liner protruded. In this area there is piston rod seal/gland that prevents the scavenge sludge and products of combustion from reaching the crankcase area. I agree with you though that there is no way that you could have operated the engine with your type of liner failure.

KTF

Alastair


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## Lemschout

Thanks to Allastair for this detailed description of main engine problems.
Not being an engineer, I failed to understand some explanations but all this shows once more than recent engines can badly fail and that two of them could be necessary to escape disaster.

During the first ten years of my carreer we had very little trouble with our engine, a black out was exceptional and we spoke months about it.

During the last ten years I was happy if there was no black out for one week. 

These last 3 weeks I inspected, most often with an engineer, some twenty ships and two of them had a bad failure in the fews days before calling here, one a cracked liner, the other an exploded turbo charger. 

We observe also that Japanese built ships and engines are generally of good quality.


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## Tom McNeill

Alastair, 
A masterly article every word of which I can agree with, mostly from bitter experience. If I remember rightly Sulzer eventually recommended operating without the flame rings but I think this was only the RD.
Rgds.
Tom


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## djw1

Alastair et al,

Thanks great info. You real engineers have gone well beyond
my knowledge of the myriad ways, these big two strokes
can fall apart. But I will try to add what I can.

The engine that had the big liner failure was a 9RTA84TD.
Sulzer claimed it was the first such failure on this type
engine, but we know from Chevron people that
they had had at least two. This by the way is the engine
that suffered all the bearing girder failures.
21 that I know of, all with a thinned down design
and Korean castings. Our ships had the original
bearing girders cast by the Japanese.
We had no problems in this area,
backing up Pierre's and your contention that the Japs
as a whole due a better job with machinery.
We speced lots of Japanese machinery,
but we failed to spec Japanese liners which was a mistake.
But it is also true that the engine designs are very marginal.
See http:/www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/tromedy2.pdf, Chapter 5
for a fuller description of my adventures in Korea,
including the stern tube bearing saga.
And if you think Korea was bad, a lot of my old guys
are now in China. One said to me "compared with China,
Korea was paradise".

Sulzer was in no way trying to help us out with insurance.
Our policy was to carry very big deductables,
so there was no insurance claim.
In the end they admitted they could find no
crew error in all the engine data we had
right up to and thru the time of the failure.
Overall they were most unforthcoming.
One of my guys got one of the Sulzer guys
tipsey one night, and the Sulzer guy admiitted
they had done a big report on the thermal stresses
and thermal fatigue of these liners. He agreed to show
it to my guy the next day. But the next morning
with his boss sitting beside him, he claimed
there was no such report.

Thanks for the point about the liner not being able
to fall all the way down. I''ll try and avoid
displaying my ignorance at least in that regard
in the future.

KTF

Jack


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## alastairrussell

Dear Colleagues 

Thanks for your encouraging words.

Tom, I agree with you when you said “mostly from bitter experience”. You jogged my memory and I do remember hearing that some RD Sulzer ships were removing their flame rings. When I sailed on my last RD ship the *MV Iron Sirius (ex Sigsilver)* in the late 70’s I made sure that I renewed the flame ring every time we did a unit. 

I did my first trip in 1962 sailing down the Clyde on the *SS Martaban *and I never made it back up that river ever. I do realise now, since I have retired, that I have been very fortunate in gaining experience by sailing on many different types of propulsion machinery. I have always been a bit of a ‘Worker of the World’ who has moved around the shipping companies. I remember in Australia having to do a couple of 'pier head jumps' and this gave me sea time on a GE gas turbine ship and also on an old ‘steam up and downer’ (3 days on the *GTV Iron Monarch *and 5 days on the *SS Iron Warrior!*!). Yes, they were both in the BHP fleet at the same time! I can tell you I could not get off the GT job quick enough and I had to be dragged off the steam up and downer. It was a real eye opener and I needed the steam time!

Working for my last shipping company BHP was a pleasant surprise as they were heavily into mining, steelworks and oil and for them to be in ship owning and shipbuilding was really a wee bit of a sideline. During my period with them we engineers had heaps of technical backup from company’s metallurgy, structural engineering and oil laboratories. I remember being on one of their bulk carriers working on deck replacing all the corroded hatch hydraulic piping and its clamping with marine grade stainless steel tubing. We were also allowed to use the very expensive stainless steel Ermeto couplings. Working as an engineer with BHP and also dealing with their preferred classification society DNV lifted me and kept me at sea for another 14 years.

BHP had a technical exchange agreement with IHI of Japan. Many of our new ships were built by them and they also supplied many of the sulzer RND engines on our charter ships. It was only at the end when the BHP accountants put the boot in and forced the transport division to source the massive *MV Iron Pacific *from Korea, that the very expensive ‘teething problems’ appeared again. Jack, you tell me that its happening again with Chinese built ships versus Korean. I’m glad I am no longer at sea. 

In saying all of the above I have to say that I have a liking for Caterpillar diesel alternators and I have them running alongside Daihatsu’s as my favourite. My best and most fuel efficient steam plant award goes to the US designed and made General Electric steam turbine engine utilising only one boiler! The GE turbine was far superior to the British built Parsons turbine. My favourite fuel centrifuge treatment system has to be Alfa Laval from Sweden. I have sailed with old British steam engineers that used to rant and rave about sailing in US built T2 tanker engine rooms. I was in the old navy dry-dock at Brooklyn in 1969 when they were converting a couple of old wartime T2’s tankers over to container ships! What were their names and what happened to them?

Going right back to my days when doing my second’s at Leith Nautical College, we were told that the sulzer loop scavenge system of combustion created more thermal stress and piston ring problems to the liner than the uniflow system. The uniflow system was used in all the opposed piston engines and the B and W single acting engine. It is interesting to note that when the more efficient, slower 100 RPM long stroke Sulzer RTA engine arrived it had a uniflow scavenge system with a big B and W type poppet valve. I am sure Sulzers were well aware of the RD and RND problems but did not want pay the higher costs of manufacturing the poppet valve system or the extra bearings, journals and connecting rods for the opposed piston engine!

If you google Sulzer RTA and click on the Youtube entry, you will see a video taken inside the scavenge space of a RTA doing 22 rpm!

KTF

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

*The Final Report on the Pasha Bulker Grounding*

The final report on the *MV Pasha Bulker *Grounding has just been released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. This investigation report is 106 pages long and does not miss a trick or leave a stone unturned. The report looks into all aspects of the incident including the handling of large single screw bulk carriers in high winds when they are not in a fully ballasted condition. The ATSB also went into the reasons for the delays in loading coal in the Port of Newcastle and the safety and environmental risks in having so many ships at anchor off the port. The report surveyed all the masters of ships that were in and off Newcastle at the time of the grounding.

Google using the letters 'ATSB' and have a read of their report. The page 1 photograph is quite spectacular as it shows the ship blocking the number one surfing beach in Newcastle! 

From the ‘Australian Newspaper’ web site a few days ago. I quote:

_Nearly 17 per cent of the 750-strong global fleet of Capesizes were delayed at ports over the weekend, according to the Global Port Congestion Index, which tracks ship delays. Of the 129 bulk carriers at anchor, 52 are off Australia, with another 51 at ports in Brazil. Of the ships waiting off Australia, 38 are off Newcastle waiting for coal. _

regards

Alastair


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## djw1

Alastair,

The ATSB report onthe Pasha Bulker grounding does leave one large stone
unturned. The reports takes for granted the lousy low speed
maneuverabilty of modern bulk carriers (and tankers);
but no where does it even mention the obvious solution: twin screw.
Roughly the same thing happened to the Aegean Sea without the crew mistakes.

KTF

Jack


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## alastairrussell

Jack

I have been aware of the problems that can happen at the anchorages off both Newcastle and Port Kembla for some time. The ships that appear to get into trouble all the time are the large bulk carriers who have reduced their ballast or have pumped out their flooded hold while at anchor. In this case I agree with the ATSB report as I feel that when a SW storm kicks in along with a bit of a sea, even two screws thrashing around sucking air down are not going to solve any of the handling problems. All the regular visitors to these ports know that you must put to sea before the storm front moves in and not to wait until the ship starts to drag anchor (there are heaps of old chain and anchors lying down there on the bottom). The east coast port authorities have to make it mandatory that all ballasted ships have to stay ballasted right up until berthing or at least until they are behind the ports breakwater. 

In the 80’s we would never steam around at real slow speed for long periods. BHP marine engineers always wanted to keep the ME exhaust temperature in the exhaust trunking above the flash point of the cylinder oil which if I remember correctly was about 250’C. This was to burn off any build up of cylinder oil carried over into the large diameter exhaust trunking (RND). The ships that 'choof 'around at say slow ahead for days waiting for the storm to subside ended up in trouble when they speed the ME up to return to the anchorage. Apparently there would be a sudden ‘roar’ when the excess cylinder oil ignites in the trunking and this would over rev the turbo chargers to ‘hell and gone’ destructing them. The secret then was to steam up wind at say half ahead for several hours then stop the ME and drift or go sailing.

We had a beach front unit at Towradgi looking out to sea towards the Port Kembla anchorage and I remember the gale that put the *MV Sygna *ashore near Newcastle. I was on leave at the time and I spent the worst hours of the gale on that Saturday morning leaning against our big picture window try to stop it flexing excessively in the blasts of wind. I looked out to sea and saw several ships dragging anchor and moving towards our beach. The ships that managed to pick up their anchor and make it out to sea were the ships that were either loaded or properly ballasted with their propeller under water. I was told afterwards that the VHF radio went wild with ships screaming for tugs out at the anchorage. We had one ship which I reckoned had pumped out its flooded hold at some stage parallel with our beach right across our window. She was side on to the seas and her propeller was thrashing away pumping air and her anchor chain was right along the shipside. The Norwegian master ( same company as the *MV Sygna*) did a wonderful job and after letting go the anchor and chain steamed towards the beach to gain speed and then at the right moment threw the helm hard over and turned the ship round right on the surf line and then took her out to sea and safety. 

As an engineer I am pushing for twin screws as a means of insuring that large ships, especially tankers, have a means of propulsion at all times. Their lack of manoeuvrability is a concern but I feel the authorities could end up doing the same as they do with nuclear submarines. Which is, to ensure that they have two tugs meet or follow them out to sea at all times when they berth or sail from their base. 

I would like to take a punt and prophesize that in the future we will probably end up with a compromise which would be that all high risk ships will have say 6 diesel electric alternators running on distillate (not HO). These units would be placed high up in the hull and drive 2 electrically driven controlled pitch propellers (or pods!) placed in their own compartments low in the hull. There would be a steam turbo alternator too, utilising the waste heat from the diesels. The ship would be fitted with these new clever rudders that turn to high angles and give heaps of side ways thrust. All fuel would be stored in a safe place and be kept away from the double bottoms. 


KTF

Alastair


Ps See Below





*'Don't worry' call from ship to shore*

GREG WENDT

23/05/2008 10:57:00 PM

FROM his cabin porthole on the starboard side of the Pasha Bulker, the second mate could see the coast.

Unable to sleep because of the heavy rolling in the storm, he thought that the ship was headed to sea, and he did not understand why the coast was now on the starboard side, according to a report released yesterday.

Nobbys Beach was only 1.2 miles away, and the Pasha Bulker was rapidly approaching the shore, battling 50-knot winds and nine-metre swells, just minutes from grounding.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found the grounding of the Pasha Bulker on Nobbys on June 8 last year occurred despite a gale warning that should have prompted the master to ballast the ship for heavy weather and take it to sea.

The detailed report found that a number of other ships, including the Betis and Sea Confidence, attempted to ride out the gale at anchor and most dragged their anchors.

It details the sequence of events that led to the 40,000-tonne Pasha Bulker, now renamed the Drake, becoming grounded on Nobbys reef for 25 days.

The 57 ships in the queue off Newcastle received accurate warnings and forecasts of the east coast low that exploded out of the Tasman Sea and swept the Hunter's coastline with devastating fury on June 8.

Shortly after midnight the ships began dragging their anchors, and the storm was increasing rapidly in intensity. 

By 6am the Pasha Bulker was among 27 ships still at anchor.

The report said that at 6.37am the master was certain that the anchor was dragging and decided to weigh anchor.

By 7.48am the ship got under way and for more than an hour moved in a north-east direction, parallel to the coast, which was about one mile away.

"Many of the ships that had weighed anchor in the previous few hours were still in the area," the report said.

"There were frequent collision-avoidance related communications between these ships on the VHF radio.

"The visibility was about two miles in the persistent rain and spray in the wind which was gusting to about 50 knots."

The report said the master decided to alter course course to put the wind on the ship's port bow at 9.06am and try to clear the coast in a southerly direction.

The transport safety bureau investigation found the course change in the extreme weather was "poorly controlled" and the Pasha Bulker's heading became south-westerly, instead of south-south-east as intended.

Vessel Traffic Information Centre (VTIC) informed the master at 9.12am that the ship was in the "restricted area" and should leave and go to sea.

"The master thanked VTIC saying that he was 'proceeding to sea' and 'don't worry'," the report said.

The ship, rolling heavily beam-on to the large swell and wind, began to approach the coast at more than 2.5 knots.

At 9.27am VTIC again called the Pasha's master, advising the ship was getting closer to the coast and asked if assistance was required.

Declining assistance, the master said that in "about 10 minutes" the situation should improve.

But at 9.47am the third mate informed VTIC that the ship is "1.5 cables", just over the ship's 225-metre length, from the shore.

The Pasha Bulker was almost on Nobbys and approaching it at 3.1 knots.

"The master thought aloud that it might be better to go astern," the report said.

"At 0949, with the engine at full astern, he ordered 'hard-a-port'," it said.

Two minutes later the giant red hull of the Pasha Bulker was on the Nobbys bottom, both anchors in its hawsepipes, where it remained for 25 days, until its successful refloat following a massive salvage operation.

With giant waves thundering into the side of the ship, the master told the crew to prepare their lifejackets and ordered an immediate evacuation of the 21 crew.

In terrible conditions the Hunter's Westpac rescue helicopter hovered above the pitching deck of the ship and hoisted the crew members to safety.

As the world watched the daring rescue, authorities were turning their attention to several other ships off the port, the Santa Isabel, Betis and the Sea Confidence.

The Santa Isabel cleared its fouled anchor and was able to put to sea.

At midday the Betis was 2.8 miles from the coast and dragging its anchor in 60-knot winds, while the Sea Confidence was less than one mile from Stockton Beach.

Two tugs, Watagan and Wickham, were sent to sea and standby to assist the vessels.

The report said the master of the Betis obtained the ship's manager's approval to cut the anchor cable and the ship headed to sea at 4.10pm.

Two crew members on the Watagan were injured while trying to connect a line to the Sea Confidence.

After an eight-hour battle the Sea Confidence was able to weigh anchors and successfully put to sea at 8.06pm.

After the grounding, the Pasha Bulker was forced further onto Nobbys Beach by heavy seas and further storms that hit the area on June 9.

The report said the Pasha Bulker was seriously damaged and its condition continued to deteriorate while it remained on the beach.

Its battle scars included many splits, tears and fractures to its bottom plating and a nine-metre-long gash under the number three cargo hold.

"Oil tanks in the double bottom were not breached and no oil was lost overboard," the report said.

"The rudder was badly damaged as was the propeller, with all its blades bent."

The grounding of the Pasha Bulker had "remarkable similarities" to the grounding of the Sygna on Stockton beach on May 26, 1974.

The Sygna weighed anchor in a storm and in the 45 minutes it took to get under way the 90-knot winds had forced the ship close to Stockton Beach.

It grounded on the beach at 2am and the stress on the hull resulted in the ship breaking in two near its mid-section.

The crew were evacuated by helicopter and the ship's bow section was later freed from the beach.

But the stern of the Sygna could not be salvaged and its rusted skeleton still lies in the surf.


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## alastairrussell

*Vale Captain Bill Evans*

I have just heard from David Campbell a retired chief engineer (BHP) that Captain Bill Evans passed away on Monday in Wollongong and he will be buried at the Scarborough Cemetery on Saturday. Bill was 79 and his invalid wife died some months ago.

Bill was the very strict Commonwealth Marine Surveyor for Port Kembla about whom I wrote a few posts ago. 

I think it is appropriate that Bill’s name be recorded in this thread. His high and strict standards contributed to the safety of all Australian and International seafarers whose ships and bulk carriers loaded or discharged in Port Kembla.

As David said: “He was a Kiwi so when the Clarion Call comes and he rises to meet it, he will be facing New Zealand”


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## chadburn

From my time on Bulk Carriers and the one's I visited at the Botlek it would be easier to count the Vessels that have NOT had a failure, certainly those built in the 60's suffered badly and had doublers fitted around the amidships area in most cases, one being less than 2years old which put me off any further voyages and I went back to General Cargo at the first oppurtunity.


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## Cisco

*Trade Daring*

going back to the start of this thread... ´Trade Daring´ broke her back and sank alongside while loading in Tubaroa(sp) , Brazil, some years back...... 

That made the charterers and terminal operators sit up and pay attention to the problems with this class of ship.


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## chadburn

Har Addir, OBO ( built 1968) 75,000Tns. Whilst in full Ballast condition (2&8 holds flooded) suffered a structural failure between 8 hold and the Grain Tank on the Port side, the failure also ripped open the Cofferdam between 8&7 hold as well as ripping open the area containing the Duct Keel which immediatly flooded Knocking out all of the electrics in that area including the soleniods on the Martonair Valves which operated both the Ballast and Bilge suction valves. After she came back off her beam end by the Ballast water settling in No7 Hold it was found that the only way that she could be pumped out was through a manually operated bilge suction valve in the fore peak and by cracking the Duct keel access hatch open to allow the water from the Duct keel to flow through it, all other valves were useless until the water level was down far enough to open the Cofferdam doors and the access doors to the ballast valves to put the valves in an open position manually( by diving down to them) when required in order to get the vessel lightened enough to go over the sill and in the Dry Dock. The only manually operated valves From the deck on this vessel were the previously mentioned for'ad bilge valve and the saddle tank dump valves. Automation at it's best!!


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## chadburn

As a result of the incident above and the fact that the flooding of the Duct Keel stopped the use of most of the air operated valves barring Saddle Tank dumps and the one hand operated Bilge valve up for'ad it was clear something had to be done to alter this set up as it did leave us in a dangerous situation (thankfully it was in good weather and it happened during daylight hours) The "Fix" was to leave the bodies of the Martoniar valves in situ (next to the air operated butterfly valves) and move the soleniods with the mushrooms they are attached to on to the engineroom bulkhead next to the Ballast Control panel and pipe the activation air signal from the "mushrooms" by means of 3/16 copper pipe to the valve body which then activated the Butterfly valves. Her sister ship Har Saggi was changed on to this system a.s.a.p. as well as having her steelwork strenghened in the area that gave way.


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## djw1

chadburn et al

To get these harrowing experiences into the CTX database, I need the date
(at least year and month) and if possible the ship's IMO number.
I know this sounds anal, but, unless we record these invaluable recollections
systematically, we can be sure that things will just keep getting worse.

Keep the faith,

Jack


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## alastairrussell

*So What's New?*

Jack

I refer to two technical papers read at the first joint session of British and American Society of Engineers at the Carnegie hall in Pittsburgh in the 9th October 1890. The first paper was by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby under the name ‘*The Protection of Iron and Steel Ships against Foundering from Injury to their Shells’* and the other was by S. E. Seaton and was on ‘*The Development of the Marine Engine’*

Sir Nathaniel suggests that a steel ships hull should have sufficient subdivisions to enable it to float after one area has been flooded. He went on to say that in 1866 the Council of the British Institution of Naval Architects fully debated the subject and decided that and I quote “_*No iron passenger ship is well constructed unless her compartments be so designed that she would float safely were anyone with any one of them fill with water or be placed in free communication with the sea.”*_ They the BINA Council, recommended and I quote again that _*“All iron ships should be so divided and not only the largest compartment, but any two adjacent compartments, might be given up to the same without sinking the ship. This latter is an advisory clause, the wisdom of which is not disputed. The first, however is condemnatory of all badly constructed ships.” *_

Sir Nathaniel said and I quote _*“During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”*_

In the second paper the noted British marine engineer S E Seaton spoke about the ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’ and in it he recommended using twin screw ships for safety reasons, I quote: “_*Propulsion by twin screws has many practical advantages but it is chiefly now adopted from consideration of safety, in as much as a ship with two screws is less liable to have both injured at the same time, and therefore her whole propelling apparatus broken down, than one with a single screw; and in case of accidents to the steering gear she can be steered by varying the revolutions of the engines. More over a smaller propeller is required for each of the twin screw engines with that needed for a single engine of the same power; hence in the case of a deep draught ship, owing to the deep emersion the twin screw act a higher efficiency, and in the case of a shallow draught ship the same holds good, In as much as they are thoroughly immersed when the single screw of the same power would be partially out of the water.”*_

Sir Nathaniel was the very progressive Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy from 1872 until 1885. He was famous for his refusal to accept the use of steel in his naval ships manufactured using the early Bessemer process. It was only when improved quality steel, made by the new open hearth process was introduced that he relented. In the above paper he mentioned that he thought that loaded barges could be floated into a steel built ship through a large open door speeding up the loading and discharge! When did the LASH ships come out?

Google ‘Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’ and then read the full New York Times newspaper article on the engineering joint session held in October 1890. He talks about the merits of the iron ship against a wooden ship and S E Seaton talks about the developments in marine propulsion systems.


Alastair


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## djw1

Alastair,

Damn. And I thought I had invented twin screw.

Recent case in point is the grounding of the Giant Step near Kashima.
Master waited too long to raise anchor,
then main engine failed when he needed it most.
Most of the crew sent forward to raise the anchor were lost.
10 dead.
Go to www.gisis.org, search on Great Step, click
on investigation reports, for the sad story.

KTF

Jack


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## djw1

Alastair,

Correction. The GISIS site is gisis.imo.org.

Jack


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## Lemschout

Thanks for quoting those interesting papers which are confirming that some safety proposals are more than a century old. The lash ships became well a reality one hundred years later, just to discover that the concept is not so practical after all. We have some of them regularly calling Antwerp, but they will probably be the last of their kind. 

Regarding the paragraph: 
(_Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’._”)
nowadays it will be more difficult to ignore an important safety decision thanks to ISM code and the lawyers who shall refer to it in a court case.

Merchant shipping is changing so fast that they will always be some people who will take advantage of the slowness of the regulating bodies to build unsafe vessels. But thanks to internet and initiatives such as this database of bulker casualties, the few who are really dedicated to safety will get a fighting chance.

The Lloyd's List has just published an article about the quality and the importance of casualty investigation, quoting the Derbyshire RFI as an example of an investigation able to produce a sound legislation. But it took twenty years to achieve it, and the main incentive came from relatives of the victims, not from the government or any other bodies. 

The reaction of the owners was to sub-contract the management and the crewing of their vessel, hoping that a team of mixed nationalities from the third world could not trigger such a strong reaction.

It worked somehow for a decade or two, but now the seafarers start to catch up thanks to internet and the available legal instruments such as the PSC. It is enough for a relative of somebody on board to receive a letter or a message about a safety concern to trigger an inspection.

The IMO number is a powerful tool to trace unsafe ships, it is only sad it did not came earlier.


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## chadburn

When we were in the Botleck and after a night in the Katendrecht it was normally matter of "form" that we visited each others ships for a nightcap and I can't remember one Ore Boat that had not suffered from deck fracture's in the 60's/70's. The attraction for me was that they had such good facilities an board compared to some of the Tramp's I had worked on including one coal burner which was running the "Pond" in WW1!!.


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## djw1

Gentlemen,

Have uploaded a new set ofdry bulk casualties to the CTX data base.
Go to http://www.c4tx.org/job/cdb/prod/search.html,
select Structural failures from Cause Category, Dry bulk and Combos from Ship Type,
and click on Search. You should get a list of 228 casualties with 2113 known dead.
Click on ship name to see details for a particular casualty,
then click on Precis to see text descriptions/links.

Pls check out the casualties, you have special knowledge of
and send me any corrections, additions.

KTF

Jack


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## djw1

Correction. The Database is at

http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/prod/search.html

Jack


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## djw1

Correction 2.

The correct number for bulk/combo casualties is 172
with 1727 know dead.
Mea culpa.

Jack


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## alastairrussell

*Grounding of Ore Carrier MV Giant Step*

Gents

*Grounding of the Large Capesized Ore Carrier MV Giant Step IMO 8309282*

Lemschout said _“The Lloyd's List has just published an article about the quality and the importance of casualty investigation, quoting the Derbyshire RFI as an example of an investigation able to produce a sound legislation. But it took twenty years to achieve it, and the main incentive came from relatives of the victims, not from the government or any other bodies.”_

With reference to Jack’s post, I accessed the IMO GISIS website and downloaded the Japanese MAIA investigation report on the grounding of the 21 year old Giant Step on October 6 2006 off the Japanese port of Kashima causing the loss of life of 10 Indian crew members. I also downloaded the longer 1.9 Mb Panamanian government report but found this to be written in Spanish and I was unable to read it. According to the short 10 page 263kb Japanese report, on September 25 the large cape-sized Giant Step arrived and anchored off the Japanese port of Kashima 5.8 miles from the South Breakwater lighthouse waiting to discharge a full load of Australian iron ore.

On September 27 in winds of force 7 the captain repositioned his ship twice after dragging anchor on both occasions. Early on the morning of the 5th October while still at anchor waiting on a discharge berth and again in force 7 winds and with a forecast of extreme strength winds (affects of typhoon no 16?) the Master decided to put to sea. At 0840 the electric hydraulic pump unit needed to operate the windlass would not start and also the hydraulic oil header tank was found to be empty, by this time the wind had increased to Force 8 to 9. 

The Master put the engine at slow ahead at 0848 to reduce the drag but at 0908 the ship had dragged 0.7 of a mile towards the South breakwater light and by the time the hydraulic unit fault had been found at 0930 and then repaired and the hydraulic tank filled, she had dragged 2 miles south westward. On completion of repairs at 1310, the anchor was heaved up about half a shackle when the engine room reported a high exhaust temperatures caused _‘by operating the engine under excessive load for a long time’_! The engine speed was reduced and then stopped at 1339 and at 1358 harbour tugs were requested. The main engine came back into operation after the ‘scavenge fire’ was extinguished and the fuel to the affected cylinder isolated! When the anchor was ordered to be heaved up, the windlass failed again, making it impossible to heave up the 13 shackles of anchor chain. 

The master ordered slow ahead at 1436 and in a desperate attempt to prevent the vessel dragging anchor he ordered full ahead and again he was forced to reduce main engine revs (high exhaust temperature) I quote the report _‘but he was, then, forced to reduce it or completely stop the engine’_ !!! 

At 1600 the tugboat *Konga Maru *was in close vicinity and at 1605 the master gave orders to sever the anchor chain and this was completed at 1650 in dangerous conditions with the violent storm and the high wind waves sweeping over the windlass deck. 14 of the 26 crew members were up forward at the time and I quote the report again, _“Made an attempt to go ahead, by putting the helm hard over to starboard towards the weather side, and putting the main engine “full ahead”. _However, the vessel was not able to obtain the rudder effect and was driven south west towards the lee shore because of the NNE violent storm and high wind waves. At 1720 the Giant Step grounded and broke in two and she became a total loss with 10 of the crew up for’d losing the lifes. The MAIA report finding stated that the vessel ‘_did not take proper measures for taking shelter so as to ride out the rough weather and as a result, dragged her anchor’._

I was very disappointed with this 10 page report by the Japanese Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (Yokohama Branch) and I am of the opinion that the report should have been rejected by the IMO GISI group and returned to them stamped *unsatisfactory*. As a retired seagoing marine engineer I have been left in the position of wanting to ask more questions before being convinced that the investigation findings were correct. I just do not believe that this report is the official Japanese final report into this maritime accident which resulted in loss of life. The report is not up to a standard required for any legal action by a maritime organisation against the Master or other members of the crew, shipowner or charterer.

The report did not investigate and inform us of any reason for the initial failure in engineering procedures, maintenance and/or systems which led to the grounding. 

I feel that the accident inquiry failed to investigate and report on the following:

•	The make, model of the diesel engine and was there a history of scavenge fires with this engine or make of engine.

•	Both failures to the windlass hydraulic system and what repairs were carried out after the first failure.

•	Why the Master was misinformed about the reason for the high exhaust temperature.

•	Was there an excessive delay by the engineering staff in finding the fire in the no 2 unit scavenge space and did they take the wrong action to extinguish this fire.

•	Did the engineering staff have training and experience in dealing with a scavenge fire.

• Why the M E needed to be stopped to extinguish a scavenge fire in only one unit. 

•	What was the sludge and fouling condition in the scavenge spaces and liner ports and when were the scavenge's last cleaned.

•	No2 unit liner wear since new at last overhaul and running hours since last overhaul.

•	Did the fuel on board comply with ISO 8217 and have there been any previous problems with substandard bunker fuel (excessive amounts of catalytic fines). 

The whole purpose of any accident inquiry is to investigate and report on any human or equipment failure, so that we can all learn from the mistake of others and take action to improve the way things are done in the future. In saying this we do not have to reinvent the wheel we just have to follow the aircraft industry. 

With regard to the above accident inquiry, I appear to be missing something and I do have a feeling that there is some hidden agenda in the production of this accident report. So I will join Lemschout and the Lloyds Register in being concerned about substandard investigations and suggest that IMO ask the ISO to produce an international standard to cover investigations and reporting of Marine Accidents 

regards

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

Lemschout,

What does *‘ Shall favour participation in a formal investigation’ *mean and how does it work in the maritime accident investigation game? What does it really mean, and do they have to hand over the ship’s survey and repair records? 

regards

Alastair


From the IACS *'Code of Ethics'*

*3.7 Investigation into Ship Casualties*

In accordance with the general principles laid down in Clause 1 of the IACS Charter, the Society with which the ship concerned is classed shall favour participation in a formal investigation* into a ship’s casualty. A Society not classing the ship concerned shall not participate in any such formal investigation, except when required to do so by law or a formal request by IMO or the formal investigation body.

Where a Society other than the classing Society is involved in such investigation, that Society shall inform the Society with which the ship concerned is classed.


Note* : “Formal investigations” are those carried out by the flag Administration and / or by another government otherwise involved, or investigations performed in lieu of, or taking the place of,such investigations.


IACS Code of Ethics 1998, Rev.12 2006


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## djw1

Alastair,

Shall favour participation means nothing and is meant to mean nothing.
It is just PR.
All Class records are by contract with the Client (aka Owner) confidential.
And no FOC wants to upset its customers with a meaningful investigation.
So just about the only reports we get are fromt he coastal state,
Australia being the best.
GISIS has no system for vetting reports.
See http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/casdata.pdf for a more complete story.

KTF


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## alastairrussell

*20 metre apart with a converging speed of 30 knots!!!*

*Australian Transport Safety Bureau *

*Marine Safety Investigation Report - Final *

*Independent investigation into the near collision between the bulk carrier Ormiston and the roll-on/roll-off general cargo ship Searoad Mersey in Port Phillip, Victoria 16 May 2007 
*

Occurrence Details 

Occurrence Number:	242	Location:	South Channel Port Phillip Bay
Occurrence Date:	16 May 2007 State:	VIC
Occurrence Time:	0530 (UTC+ 10 Hours)	Highest Injury Level:None
Occurrence Category:	Incident	Investigation Type:

Occurrence Investigation

Occurrence Class: Investigation Status:	Completed
Occurrence Type:	Close quarters	Release Date:	23 July 2008 

Vessel Details 

Vessel:	Searoad Mersey	Flag:	Aust
IMO:	8914831
Type of Operation:	RO-RO
Damage to Vessel:	Nil
Departure Point:	Devonport	Departure Time: 
Destination:	Melbourne

2nd Vessel Details

Vessel:	Ormiston	Flag:	Aust
IMO:	7806661
Type of Operation:	Bulk carrier
Damage to Vessel:	Nil
Departure Point:	Melbourne	Departure Time: 
Destination:	Thevenard

•Abstract

At about 0230 on 16 May 2007, the bulk carrier Ormiston sailed from Melbourne, Victoria, bound for Thevenard, South Australia. At about 0512, the ship rounded the Hovell Pile beacon and entered the South Channel in Port Phillip. At about 0521, Ormiston entered 'The Cut', the narrowest part of the channel, from the east making good about 15 knots.

At about 0230, the second mate on board the roll-on/roll-off general cargo ship Searoad Mersey contacted Point Lonsdale vessel traffic service (VTS) to provide an estimated time of arrival at the entrance to Port Phillip and was advised of the traffic movements within the port. At about 0420, Searoad Mersey's master, who also held a pilotage exemption for Port Phillip and had conducted over 1300 transits of the port, contacted VTS and received updated traffic information, including Ormiston's estimated movements.

At about 0435, Searoad Mersey passed Point Lonsdale lighthouse and entered Port Phillip. At about 0521, when the ship entered 'The Cut' from the west making good about 15 knots, the master had forgotten that Ormiston was approaching and did not see the approaching ship until immediately before the two ships passed. At about 0523, Searoad Mersey and Ormiston passed within 20 metres of each other in 'The Cut' at a combined speed of about 30 knots.(Cloud) (Cloud) (Cloud) 

The ATSB investigation found that Searoad Mersey's bridge team members had not effectively implemented bridge resource management principles, were not keeping an adequate lookout and had lost situational awareness. The investigation also found that the ships did not communicate with each other until after the incident and that the Point Lonsdale VTS was not aware of the incident until after it had occurred. 

The ATSB has issued four recommendations and one safety advisory notice to address the safety issues identified in the report.

Download complete report [PDF 1.9 MB]


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## R58484956

For some very interesting reading (417 pages) (4 hours, maybe more) see
www.martrans.org/do***ents/2006/safety/The _tankership_tromedy.pdf


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## alastairrussell

R58484956

Thanks for that but I have already read Jack Devanney's book on that web site and I have it in my favourite's list. 

l am having a wee chuckle as your post is No 104 and Jack the author of the book you recommended (Tankship Tromedy -- The Impending Disaster in Tankers) post is No 102. Have a look in Jack's website as he has modified his database on defective tankers to include bulkcarrier incidents. 

Alastair

PS I am a slow reader I could not read it in 4 hours.


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## oceangoer

alastairrussell said:


> *Australian Transport Safety Bureau *
> 
> *Marine Safety Investigation Report - Final *
> 
> 
> The ATSB investigation found that Searoad Mersey's bridge team members had not effectively implemented bridge resource management principles, were not keeping an adequate lookout and had lost situational awareness.


What a load of Public Service gobbledegook.

If they hadn't got all this fol-de-rol of VHF radios and shoreside traffic management "helpers" they might just have kept a proper lookout.
"Bridge resource management principles/situational awareness" ... what a lot of codswallop.
First principles are the ones that matter.


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## Bill Davies

It would be more remarkable to list Bulk Carriers that did not have structural failures to some degree or another. I sailed in many and all, without exception, had some failures and usually manifesting itself when or after carrying Iron Ore.


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## muldonaich

*bulk carriers*

bill all this was caused by bad builders or poor masters at the end of the day no matter how many excuses we make up for them its the same in other industrys today kev.


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## Bill Davies

It is always easy to blame others. Let us just hope that those still in the industry learn from the mistakes of others. Recent posts in the 'Derbyshire' thread (JC) fill me with foreboding. The thought that ships are still being loaded in either alternate or block configuration is nothing short of criminal.

Bill Davies


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## muldonaich

im not blaming others bill be honest did you stick by your principles when the owner or charterer said no we want it loaded this way i only ever came across one old man in all my years at sea that did that and he was well respected for it by all in the office and on board kev.


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## Bill Davies

I have made many posts wrt this topic declaring just that. It must have been mid/late 70s when I decided I would never load a ship in the alternate hold/block configuration. And that decision was borne out of a few bad experiences. Where one is loading to discharge say Itabira Fine for Redcar and Pellets for Immingham that is a different story as you will be doing the short passage on half cargo and the stresses were more than acceptable and vessel in class. Being with foreign owners one had much more autonomy than my peers in the British Flag. Asking advice and entering into too much dialogue with shore staff was tantamount to handing in ones resignation. I preferred it that way.


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## Ian Stanley

alastairrussell said:


> *Naess Parkgate  *ON 309755
> 
> 40767 gross, 26079 net, 72030 deadweight.
> 9 cyl 20700 BHP Clark built 2SA RD Sulzer Engine.
> 15 knots 67 tonnes/day 38 crew.
> 
> Panamax bulk carrier from the same shipyard that built the Derbyshire.
> The ship was strengthened for ore cargoes. She had 9 holds with Nos 2, 4 and 8 holds being allowed to be empty.
> 
> 1966 Completed by Furness Shipbuilding Co Ltd on the Tyne (Yard number 520) for Turnbull Scott Co Ltd of London as the *Naess Parkgate*.
> 
> 1970 Transferred to J and J Denholm ( management ) Ltd managers.
> 
> 1972 Transferred to Denholm Ship Management Ltd.
> 
> 1973 Bare boat charter to BHP for 5 years and renamed *Iron Parkgate*.
> 
> 1974	Charter contract revoked and vessel returned to owners care at Singapore.
> After handover and when repairs were being carried out, an explosion and a fire took place in the engine room. An engineer superintendant and 13 dockyard workers were killed.
> 
> 1975 Renamed *Nordic Trader*1978 Sold to Anglo Nordic Shipping Company.
> 
> 1978 Sold to Camerona Navigation Co Ltd of Liberia and renamed *Panamax Uranus.*
> 
> 1983 Transferred to Far Eastern Navigation Corporation and renamed *Panamax Solar*.
> 
> 1985 Reported to have been sold to Taiwan breakers.
> 
> In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tailshaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.
> 
> There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.
> 
> Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?
> 
> Alastair


Alastair
I joined the Nordic Trader in Singapore after the fire as 3rd Engineer and completed the refit. We completly stripped, realigned and rebuilt the main engine before sailing to Newcastle Australia to load coal for France. Although the Nordic Trader proved to be capable of its designed functions it is probably one of the toughest ships I ever served on as far as hours worked just to keep everything working.
Some evidence of bulkhead cracking did reappear but extensive strengthening had been added in drydock.
The fact that she ended up at the breakers does not distress me in any way.
Ian


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## chadburn

We (Har Addir) were on our maiden trip from Narvik to the Botlek and I am fairly sure we moored in front of the "Parkgate" in April 1968 at the Botlek, at that time we still had the Furness Yard guarantee Engineer on board as we had suffered a structural failure previously which had flooded the Duct Keel and knocked the Ballast system out. He got an invite for the Chief and I to go aboard the Parkgate to have a look around, although she was just over a year old her Deck had split right across from around No 6 Hatch and had been repaired(EEK) . Our own failure bothered me but as the Har Addir was the lead ship of five and the biggest built by the Furness yard at that time I accepted that she was a working prototype and these thing's happen, when I saw the repairs on the Parkgate I knew I had to get off a.s.a.p. so it was up with my desk fold down typewriter and a letter looking for a transfer to the Companies Reefer's, which was typed about 0200hr's after a night at the "Dutch Barn"(Smoke) 
Ian, other than the Saddle Dumps (handmatic) what type of valved Ballast System did the Parkgate have, air or hydraulic?


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## John Cassels

Was the Naess Parkgate a sister ship of the Naess Talisman ?.


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## chadburn

Talisman was not built at the Furness Yard, but she still could have been of the same design but built elsewhere, the other two Naess vessel's built at the Furness Yard were the liquid sulpher carrier's Naess Louisiana and Texas in 1964


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## alastairrussell

Ian and Chadburn

I am glad to see that the bulk carrier structural and operational problems experienced in the 70’s, 80’s and early 90’s are still getting a mention. The international shipping establishment along with the classification societies and IMO have to be held responsible for the very poor and substandard rules and legislation that they introduced during the 1966 Load Line Convection (LLC).
I feel IMO cannot allow the lessons learnt from 1966 LLC mistakes to ever be forgotten. They should be made to have a large memorial constructed in the front of their HQ recording all the names of the bulk carrier seafarers lost by their incompetence. 

I notice that the Naess Parkgate and the Iron Sirius (Sigsilver) were built in 1966 at the same time (in different countries) and that the new 1966 LLC changes then allowed the Iron Sirius to revise its deadweight tonnage from 94,725 to 105,779 and that the freeboard was allowed to be reduced by 4 feet! She was the largest dry bulkcarrier in the world when she went into service.

Chadburn, apparently the 9 hold Naess Parkgate was strengthened for ore cargos and allowed to sail with hold 2, 4 and 8 empty. So surely she must have been one the first LLC ships to suffer from a major structural failure as she was only one year old when you saw her? I would love to find out the thinking that went on behind the scenes! Was it put down to being a design or a construction fault then or was she loaded incorrectly?

Ian, I heard that the fire you mentioned happening in the repair yard in Singapore was caused by an acetylene bottle exploding in the engine room, is this true?

I have attached an old Australian newspaper article dated 1992 and also a small section of the Wikipedia definition of the words *Coffin Ships*. 


*Bulk Carriers Labelled 'Coffin Ships'*

Sydney Morning Herald
Wednesday April 22, 1992
By BERNARD LAGAN CANBERRA: 

The "coffin ships" of the last century had returned to Australia in the form of badly maintained bulk carriers operated by owners who valued profits over human life, the former Federal Minister of Transport and current chairman of Parliament's transport committee, Mr Peter Morris, said yesterday 
In a stinging rebuke to international shipping operators, many of whom ply routes to Australia, Mr Morris told a Sydney shipping conference that questions needed to be asked of international maritime organisations as to why they were "stalling" when ships were sinking. 

Mr Morris's comments follow the break-up off the West Australian coast last year of the Greek tanker Kirki which was carrying 82,000 tonnes of oil. 

The ship had recently been surveyed but an investigation by WA authorities found numerous serious defects. 

The Kirki's break-up followed the sinking in February last year of the Japanese bulk carrier Sanko Harvest off the WA coast and the April 1991 disappearance of the large iron ore carrier, the Mineral Diamond, 3,000 kilometres west of Perth. 

Mr Morris disclosed that a Federal Parliamentary inquiry he had launched into ship safety had received a submission from Lloyd's Register in London. Lloyd's said its own recently completed studies had shown 70 per cent of bulk carrier losses involved structural failure. 

Lloyd's had also told the Australian inquiry that it had learnt that the international shipping industry expected bulk carriers to develop structural cracks but the industry had failed to recognised their importance. 

Lloyd's had added that commercial pressures placed on shippers and port authorities increased the likelihood of loading mistakes of bulk carriers. 
Such mistakes could contribute to structural failures. 

Mr Morris told the Australian Chamber of Shipping in yesterday's speech: "To me it is clear that the coffin ships of the last century have returned to haunt us in the form of badly maintained and inadequately crewed ships operated by cut-rate owners and operators who value a quick profit over loss of human life and environmental destruction." 

Herald inquiries yesterday disclosed that grave problems concerning the condition of bulk carriers and other large ships entering Australian ports have been passed to the Federal Parliamentary investigation. 

The respected Company of Master Mariners of Australia has told the inquiry, in a written submission, that all the evidence pointed to the conclusion that most bulk carriers and tankers calling at Australian ports did not meet acceptable minimum safety standards. 

It said Australian Government inspections of large ships needed to be improved because the Kirki foundered only a few weeks after an Australian inspection. 

The Port Hedland Authority in WA singled out Korean-owned bulk carriers and tankers as among the most "doubtful" ships visiting Australia. 

Many of the Korean-owned ships were more than 20 years old and were formerly Japanese-owned. 

Lloyd's told the inquiry that the average age of bulk carriers lost was 19 years, which tended to indicate the losses were "age related". 

The Port Hedland Authority also gave details of a case where political pressure was exerted from Canberra last year to allow a 41,000-tonne Greek freighter to escape surveyors' orders that it be repaired before leaving Australia. 

The Mary L had arrived in December in "very poor condition", the Port Hedland Authority's submission said. 


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Coffin ship is the name given to any boat that has been overinsured and is therefore worth more to its owners sunk than afloat. These were hazardous places to work in the days before effective maritime safety regulation. They were generally eliminated in the 1870s with the success of reforms championed by British M.P. Samuel Plimsoll. 

The term has also been used to refer to the ships that carried Irish emigrants escaping the effects of the potato famine as well as displaced Highlanders due to the Highland Clearances. These ships, crowded and disease ridden, with poor access to food and water, resulted in the deaths of many people as they crossed the Atlantic. Owners of coffin ships provided as little food, water, and living space as was legally possible – if they obeyed the law at all.

While coffin ships were the cheapest way to cross the Atlantic, mortality rates of 30% aboard the coffin ships were common.[1] It was said that sharks could be seen following the ships, because so many bodies were thrown overboard. [2][3][4]
•


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## chadburn

Alastair, she was indeed a new boat at around a year old which is what shocked me and gave me second thoughts on staying aboard this type of vessel after I saw another vessel had "cracked up". We were also a 9 hold job, as to the cause I could not say but the "expert's" on loading only came into play in the 70's and had their information from manuals written from the experience's of the people in the late 1960's, in fact a well known loading expert on this site even shows them on his profile as he could not have been aboard one in the late 1960's so he must have gained his "expertise" from reading them which is why I never took any notice of his preachings. Our failure was put down to design as at that time she was the largest vessel ever built at Furness and the lead ship of the Class of five all for Maritime O but held under "holding " companies until Maritime O had paid back the bank loan's for them.


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## alastairrussell

*Naess Parkgate*

Chadburn 

I am thinking that as Narvik is an iron ore port just inside the Arctic Circle it is possible that maybe our new Naess Parkgate could have been subjected to very low ambient temperatures when she was being stressed up during an iron ore loading ? 

I quote from an old note book: 

Certain specifications of carbon steels that have not been tested for low temperature service could experience reduced fracture toughness when stressed up at a temperature well below the metals ductile-to-brittle transition temperature (DBTT). 

If for example a ferrous material is inadvertently exposed to low temperature service (below the DBTT), this can be ok, as long as the material is not exposed to dynamic service stresses that could result in the introduction of cracks or brittle fracture. There should be no significant change in mechanical properties from inadvertent exposure to low temperature service.

I copied the following history of impact testing of shipbuilding steels from a Canadian Government investigation report into the structural failure experienced by the bulkcarrier ‘Lake Carling’ in March 2002 ( yes 2002!!) I suggest everybody should download this report and have a good read as I feel it is very good and honest investigation that looks into all the possible causes of the low temperature failure.

I did read somewhere in this forum that the majority of the liberty ships that suffered from catastrophic failures, that they all happened in the North Atlantic during the very cold winter months. It was also stated that one completed liberty ship even broke in two (with a loud bang) on a very cold day in the shipyard just before the ship was due to be handed over!

MARINE REPORTS - 2002 - M02L0021 

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

Marine Investigation Report
Hull Fracture
Bulk Carrier Lake Carling
Gulf of St. Lawrence, Quebec
19 March 2002
Report Number M02L0021

Fracture Toughness Requirements of Steel Used in Ship Construction

Historically, fracture toughness criteria for ship steel were initiated following some spectacular structural failures due to brittle fracture such as the Liberty ships and T-2 tankers during and subsequent to World War II.5 The investigations and research that followed established the Charpy V-notch (CVN) impact test as the accepted fracture toughness standard for some steels used in welded ship construction.6 In 1954, DNV became the first classification society to introduce the CVN impact test in order to qualify steel toughness.

Throughout the 1950s, classification societies endeavored to revise specifications to assure steel quality. In 1959, after numerous meetings, seven major classification societies published the Unified Requirements for Steel Ships. After much discussion, it was agreed that only class D and class E grades of steel were to have a CVN rating, which for grade D steel was set at 35 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) (47 Joules) at 0ºC. Over the intervening decades, many other investigations with respect to the fracture toughness and fracture behavior of ship plate materials have been conducted by several groups, including the Ship Structure Committee.

By 1974-75, standards had risen but brittle fractures in ships were still occurring even though ship design and crack arrester strategies, in addition to the fracture toughness of some (although not all) steel, had been adopted in an attempt to achieve fracture-safe performance. Accurate and reliable correlations between CVN energy and fracture toughness have been hard to establish.9 It has been shown that nil-ductility transition (NDT) temperature combined with dynamic tear energy is an accurate indicator of fracture toughness, and a reasonable base point for comparison of structural steels. However, CVN is still the industry standard.

Currently, the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) requirements describe four grades of normal strength steel.10 In this respect, DNV requirements are identical to those of IACS. All grades are of the same yield and tensile strength, as well as elongation, but each grade must demonstrate a required CVN impact energy at different test temperatures. The table below summarizes the requirements for normal strength steel, 50 mm or less in thickness.

Grade Temperature (ºC)	CVN (Joules) Longitudinal / Transverse
A	none required	none required
B	-	27(a)	20
D	-20	27	20
E	-40	27	20

(a) CVN tests are generally not required for grade B steel with a thickness of 25 mm or less.

Although there is no set minimum CVN for grade A steel (or grade B steel 25 mm or less in thickness), IACS gives guidance on steel exposed to low service temperatures on the assumption that this steel will have a longitudinal CVN of 27 J at +10ºC.11 Some classification societies, such as Lloyd's Register (LR), have introduced rules that require in-house checks by the steel manufacturer be made to ensure grade A steel achieves a minimum CVN of 27 J at +20ºC. Reportedly, DNV also has standards similar to LR for grade A steel, but these appear to be internal procedures as opposed to Rules.

In a recent review of the fracture properties of LR grade A ship steel, Lloyd's found that from a total of 39 samples coming from a variety of steelmakers word-wide, the lowest average CVN recorded was 49 J at 0ºC (from one sample), while the average value at this temperature amongst all 39 samples was much higher, at 134 J.12 Five samples, however, had fracture appearance transition temperatures (FATT) above 0ºC, and four other samples were between -6ºC and -1ºC.

The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) grain size of these samples ranged from 7.5 to 10, with over 97% of the samples (38 of 39) at 8 or greater.14 The smaller the grain size, the more grain boundaries are present in a given sample. As grain boundaries are inherently tough, metals with smaller grain size usually demonstrate a better fracture resistance than those with a relatively larger grain size.


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## chadburn

Alistair, things seem to have got out of kilter a bit, I did not serve on the "Parkgate" Ian did at a later date when she sailed under another name. My involvement with her was when we moored near to her at the Botlek(Rotterdam), at that time we had loaded at Narvik and had the Furness Rep on board as we had being having problems with our Ballast System due to salt water after we had a structural failure whilst on trials and in Ballast when the Duct keel flooded. As I remember it the Furness rep arranged for us to go with him to have a look at the "Parkgate" and we inspected the Deck. When she was built she was the largest built by Furness ( 9hold) 72,030dwt in 1966 until we (Har Addir) came off the slip (9hold) 76,500dwt in 1967 so the "Parkgate" was our forerunner in size to us. She was only just over a year old and that was the shocker for me as I had put our own failure down to a one off as the lead ship of a batch of five but clearly there were other problems involved and I made my decision to move off this type of ship a.s.a.p. Where the "Parkgate" was loaded I have no idea but for us to suffer a major failure whilst in Ballast and on trials led me to believe that this type of vessel being fairly new to the shipping world had design problems and problems with correct loading proceedure's as it was all new and proceedure's needed to be changed just the same as the VLCC who had tank cleaning problems with the Butterworth System which had been used for years on the smaller Tankers. I accept what you write in the above but it was in my view a learning curve for everybody as this size of vessel was a major step change in the moving of bulk cargo's in the those day's. Out of interest our vessel was built over the Winter period launch 11/67 completed end of March 1968, "Parkgate" launch 6/66 comp Nov 1966.


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn

I see I may have jumped the gun a bit as I thought Botlek was a steelworks somewhere in Europe where the Narvik iron ore was brought too. I admit to being a wee bit facetious in this context when I referred to the Naess Parkgate as being *‘our new ship’*. 

I was sailing on the Iron Sirius which was another British bare boat chartered iron ore carrier that was proving to a bit troublesome for BHP to operate just like the Iron Parkgate. BHP and the ships staff succeeded in lifting the condition and performance of the Iron Sirius but the Iron Parkgate proved to be just too defective. I am not sure, but it may have been the secret grounding which created the engine misaligned problem that was the straw that broke the camels back!! The Iron Sirius went on to be successful and carry 10,880,908 tonnes of iron ore and 508,316 tonnes of coal for BHP before being handed back to her UK owners in 1986.

I remember being quite shocked then at the lack of ethics and basic honesty in the bareboat charter handover procedures. All the Iron Sirius’s ER logbooks, maintenance records and the manuals for all the machinery appear to be to have been thrown over the side before handover. Some of the very necessary spare parts that had to be on board were found to be 2nd hand and worn out!! We had no recorded running hours for any of the main engine parts or units and also the Caterpillar alternators!!

Anyway Chadburn, forget the above, the good news is that IMO have declared 2010 to be the *Year of the Seafarer*. They go on and say that “ *It is recognition to the quiet contribution to the continual increasing demands of world trade and coping with the extremely high risk nature of the duties far from home.” *

*“ Without shipping and seafarers, half the world would freeze and the other half would starve”.*

I quote the IMO Secretary General who said *“the unique hazards confronting 1.5 million seafarers of the world which includes pirate attacks, unwarranted detention and abandonment, coupled with the predicted looming shortage of ships’ officers make it ever more in***bent to take immediate and effective action to forestall a situation from developing in which ships are not manned with sufficient skilled personnel!!!!!*

Chadburn, I have to admit to getting carried away and getting involved in delving into low temperature failures when the ambient temperature in the shade here in Gippsland Lakes area of Victoria was 40 degrees Celsius yesterday!! How are you handling the snow and ice?


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## chadburn

Alistair, being one of the older one's I can remember Winter 1947 in England and getting to school in my black wellies, these day's it does not seem to matter as to whether the school's open or not. I didn't have any problems with your statements it's all interesting reading as I thought you are or have been doing some research in regards to the failure's although I must point out that it was not just the Furness yard vessel's which suffered failure's. We were on charter to Krupps and offloading at the Botlek and the 5 vessel's of that Class were bought based on that 10 yr contract. In regards to Do***entation on handover I have come across that from the "other side", when I worked for Maritime Fruit and the Company started to go down the pan we were instucted to make sure all do***entation and I mean everything was either disposed of or put into boxes and landed ashore to be stored somewhere by the Company who sent a truck to pick them up and then we switched the systems off and handed over to the Bosun who was going to be the "Ships Husband". I was on the Baron Ardrossan an old steam job when we went for a spare bearing which was strapped to the bulkhead only to find it was made of wood. 2010 the year of the seafarer, I don't think shoreside have ever appreciated the seafarer and what they have to do even during the War Year's. The only jobs that have a greater risk are working down the Pit and Fishing Boats both of which are /were even less appreciated. Alistair what sort of Ballast system did your vessel have?


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## chadburn

Thought you might be interested in the following Alistair.
On a vessel with the machinery amidships with a cargo of Ore.
Condition. Bending moments; ( Cm=WL/ ). Shearing force tons; (Cs=W/S)
foot tons ; 





Hogging; 130,000; 44.8; 2,150; 6.3; 
Sagging; 51,000; 120.0; 1,050; 13.6; 

Machinery Aft. 
Hogging; 65,000; 89.8; 850; 15.9; 
Sagging; 157,000; 39.0; 1,600; 8.9; 

The values for the maximum bending moments and shearing forces for carrying of iron ore in bulk are given in the table above, the ore being taken as distributed in piles under the hatches as per general practice. There is a decided increase in the moment in the sagging condition in the case where the machinery is fitted Aft.


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## John Cassels

chadburn said:


> Thought you might be interested in the following Alistair.
> On a vessel with the machinery amidships with a cargo of Ore.
> Condition. Bending moments; ( Cm=WL/ ). Shearing force tons; (Cs=W/S)
> foot tons ;
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hogging; 130,000; 44.8; 2,150; 6.3;
> Sagging; 51,000; 120.0; 1,050; 13.6;
> 
> Machinery Aft.
> Hogging; 65,000; 89.8; 850; 15.9;
> Sagging; 157,000; 39.0; 1,600; 8.9;
> 
> The values for the maximum bending moments and shearing forces for carrying of iron ore in bulk are given in the table above, the ore being taken as distributed in piles under the hatches as per general practice. There is a decided increase in the moment in the sagging condition in the case where the machinery is fitted Aft.


Any names ?.


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn

I sailed on a fair few BHP bulk carriers and some of our low freeboard 1966 LLC ships did suffer from structural hull cracking and also green water damage up forward. Our ore carriers used to get clobbered by some big seas when crossing the Australian Bight heading for Port Hedland in ballast. We all used to prefer to take iron ore pellets from Whyalla up the east coast of Australia to Japan, then down to Port Hedland to pick up iron ore lumps or fines for Port Kembla. 

With regard to ballast systems I agree with LR that some of the post 1966 LLC structural problems should be blamed on the loading operation in some of the big iron ore ports. I remember there was bad feeling and a few blues going on between the BHP owned iron ore loading system in Port Hedland and the BHP shipping department back in the 70’s. The Port Hedland loading rate was ridiculous at times when they say put two loaders on our small panamax Iron Endeavour (built by Doxfords with a Doxford J type engine in 1969). We engineers were struggling to get the totally flooded hold and all the ballast tanks pumped out and stripped before she was down to her marks. 

There were also a few ‘communication’ failures between the ships staff and the loader operators which could have meant that ships were not loaded as well as they should have been!!

I cannot remember the name of the ballast control system on all the different ships but I had to do a few crawls up the duct keel to operate a few reluctant ballast valves! Two engineers were gassed and killed in the duct keel of the Iron Sirius when she was operated by Denholms, so I was always keen to keep all the watertight access doors closed at sea (I did not want the ER flooded) and I used to force ventilate the duct keel well before allowing anyone to access it.

If I am allowed to play favourites being that I was a committed *‘worker of the world’ *then, I have to say that in the end of my seagoing career all I wanted to do, was to sail on ships built by IHI of Japan fitted out with an IHI Sulzer RND engine along with Daihatsu alternators. I really liked there IHI developed UMS alarm systems along with an IHI developed fuel treatment layout which used Swedish made Alfa Laval FO centrifuges. My favourite classification society was always DNV so I only wanted to dry-dock in an IHI dry-dock (with their IHI QA system) using a DNV surveyor.


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## alastairrussell

Google using the words ‘Bulkcarrier failures’ and then click on ‘Bulk carrier web frame damage’ and have look at the photographs of the structure damage along with some botch up repairs to the MV Capetan Lefteris!!


The following came from the US government Ship Structure Committee website. Google using the words shipstructure.org and you can read reports on some interesting ship structure failures.

The Ship Structure Committee formed since 1943 at the recommendation of the Board of Investigation whose charter was to determine the causes of the brittle fracture experienced by welded merchant ships during World War II. 
"Early in the war, welded merchant vessels experienced difficulties in the form of fractures which could not be explained. The fractures, in many cases, manifested themselves with explosive suddenness and exhibited a quality of brittleness which was not ordinarily associated with the behaviour of a normally ductile material such as ship steel. It was evident that the implications of these failures on welded ships might be far-reaching and have a significant effect upon the war effort. In 1943, the Secretary of the Navy - James Forrestal, pursuant to his responsibility through the Coast Guard for certificating vessels in accordance with the Marine Inspection Laws of the United States, established a Board of Investigation to Inquire into the Design and Methods of Construction of Welded Steel Merchant Vessels." (footnote above) The Board was composed of the Engineer-in-Chief, United States Coast Guard - Rear Admiral Harvey Johnson; the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, United States Navy - Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane; the Vice Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission - Captain T. L. Schumacher; and the Chief Surveyor of the American Bureau of Shipping - Mr. David Arnott. 

Some interesting findings of the Board: 
•	4,694 welded steel merchant vessels were built by the Maritime Commission in the United States and considered in this investigation; 
•	970 of these vessels suffered casualties involving fractures; 
•	24 vessels sustained a complete fracture of the strength deck; 
•	1 vessel sustained a complete fracture of the bottom; 
•	8 vessels were lost, 4 broke in two and 4 were abandoned after fracture occurred, 4 additional vessels broke in two, but were not lost; 
•	the highest incidence of fracture occurred under the combination of low temperatures and heavy seas; 
•	Every fracture examined started in a geometrical discontinuity or notch resulting from unsuitable design or poor workmanship. 

As a result of these findings, there were a number of recommendations related to overcoming this brittle fracture phenomena which were "successfully" incorporated into the design and construction methodologies of these merchant steel vessels. However, the final recommendation of the Board was the impetus for this Committee and it reads as follows: "It is hereby recommended that an organization be established to formulate and coordinate research in matters pertaining to ship structure in the same manner as has been the practice during the tenure of the Board."(same footnote) Therefore the Ship Structure Committee was born in 1946. 

Since its inception, the Ship Structure Committee has worked diligently to sponsor and coordinate research and development projects and to provide industry with useable tools to improve ship design, construction, operation, inspection, maintenance and repair methodologies. The Committee membership has changed somewhat over the years. Initially composed of the USCG, ABS, USN, MARAD and the Military Sealift Command only a few years later, it has included the U. S. Army, Minerals Management Service, and Geological Survey. Currently, the Committee is composed of seven member agencies; ABS, MARAD, Military Sealift Command, NAVSEA Structures, Canadian Defence Research Establishment Atlantic (since 1994), Transport Canada (since 1993), the U. S. Coast Guard (Chair) and The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers.


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## chadburn

Sorry John no names, it was based on "typical" findings. Thank you for the info Alistair I will have a look at that, you have indeed gathered the reason why I asked you about the type of Ballast system because it was indeed a problem when loading. In regards to Duct keel work, after the flooding we went into the Tyne for repairs and the electric's were renewed in the Duct Keel by the shipyard ( I nipped home for a swift spot of leave as it would be my last for a while), because of the problems we had it was decided to keep the vessel on the milk run (Narvik/ Botlek) until everybody was happy that it had all been sorted. We no sooner had left the Tyne when problems with sticking v/v,s occured and we were in the Duct keel at sea trying to sort the system out, bearing in mind we were at times for,ard of where the previous failure had occured and therefore no way of getting out, very nerve racking for me on my first trip on an super size OBO with a Duct Keel.(EEK)


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## John Cassels

Chief , no intention to nit pick but I presume you are still recollecting experiences on the Naess Parkgate. Then you mention the dreaded word" "OBO ". ??.
Did 7 months on the Naess Talisman - who am pretty sure ( more than 40 years later) was a sister but as you say , not built on the Tyne.

As far as I can she remember , the Talisman was a fine ship though was my
first introduction to the longitudnal flexing action in heavy wx.


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## Billieboy

I've read through most of this thread, the early (1955-70) bulkers were nearly all mild steel 25-30 ton steel. The later builds as with the modern bulkers are approx 50ton high tensile steel, on the deck and bottom strakes and roundings. In 1986 I found a large 250K dwt bulker starting to crack at the hatch combing corners on it's maiden voyage, this was caused by hatch covers being fixed on the combing, removal of the aft anchor of the hatch cover solved the problem. 

I will add to this later.


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## greektoon

Billieboy said:


> I've read through most of this thread, the early (1955-70) bulkers were nearly all mild steel 25-30 ton steel. The later builds as with the modern bulkers are approx 50ton high tensile steel, on the deck and bottom strakes and roundings. In 1986 I found a large 250K dwt bulker starting to crack at the hatch combing corners on it's maiden voyage, this was caused by hatch covers being fixed on the combing, removal of the aft anchor of the hatch cover solved the problem.
> 
> I will add to this later.


You have completely lost me there Billie.

What do you mean by 25-30 to steel (forgive my ignorance).

Your last sentence makes no sense to me. I am not being pedantic as I would very much like to benefit from your experience. I have sailed on a few bulkers and ore carriers, including the BSC bulkers. It was a regular occurence for the local workshops at Port Talbot, Redcar and Immingham to come on board to weld up coaming / coaming stay fractures and weld doubler plates on cross deck strip fractures, particularly at the corners of access hatch corners.


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## Billieboy

Sorry Greektoon, I have to do a bit of revision I was rushing last night. Please ignore the post.


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## chadburn

John I did not serve on the Parkgate, that was Ian, I visited her at the Botlek to have a look at the damage to the Deck. The Furness Yard where the Parkgate was built is on the Tees not the Tyne. My last and somewhat enforced job ( Tax reasons) due to the "premature" failure of Maritime Fruit was a stint as Chief on a Greek Owned Bulk Carrier called the "Irenes Rhapsody" built by Barclay Curle with a hydraulic ballast system designed by Weirs. As a former steam man I would shout the praises of Weir's steam pumps from the crosstree's but their idea of a ballast system was complete c**p. I called it a day after this one, trouble was Mar F. were such a good Company to me it was difficult finding another Company to match them.


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn, 

What year did your Maritime Fruit Company go bad? I was 2E on a freezer ship called the Port Huon and in 1969 and we took on a fruit carrying contract taking Victorian fruit in AUS up to the east coast of the USA. 

We were told that a company from Israel had stuffed up in the first year ever that Australian fruit was allowed to be imported into the USA (AUS fruit fly!!!) and that we were taking over the contract!! 

She was bloody strange ship, 7000 tonnes that could do 21 knots (only in smooth water!!!!!) She had no bulbous bow and the only square hold in the ship was the engine room and in the engine room they an 8 cylinder Clark RD Sulzer @#$$%%[email protected]@##.


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## chadburn

Alistair, Maritime Fruit went bad in 1975, the order's were given to stop operating and in our case stay in port and clear the ship, it had been a rapidly expanding Company with 40 reefer's on it's book's (first build in 1964) which was why promotion was quite rapid. Unfortunatly most of them were still owned by numerous Bank's who with Salen forced the company into bankcruptcy. M.F's. engine of choice was B&W and as they were built in batches of the same Class moving between "sister" ships was not a problem for Engineer's although as you are aware not all "sister" ships behave the same. It was alway's best to try and avoid the first ship of the Class which had been the prototype and the last which was the bitsa.


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## chadburn

Further to my above (after playing Snap with an insistent Grandaughter) Mar. F. only actually owned four vessel's for "logistic" reason's the rest belonged to numerous Banks, it was the fastest growing fleet in the reefer trade but Salen and the Bank's decided to bring the whole lot tumbling down, as it was a "hostile" situation when vessel's were de-commisioned everything and I mean everything was removed including most of the fuel (bearing in mind the high fuel prices at that time) along with all the paperwork as it was known that Salen were after some of the fleet. Cunard picked up four of them. My own vessel and the last I was Chief on for MFC was the "Satsumacore" her B&W pushing out 11,500bhp/20kts. In regards to your comment about picking up a Contract after an Israeli owned Reefer "messed up", there is quite a story behind that one, I will pm you.
Getting back on track before someone complains there cannot have been a Bulker that did not have problems with cracking up no matter how it was loaded, the problems with the "over" stressing of vessel's carrying iron ore was a matter of great concern in 1923.


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## John Cassels

Can't help thinking how much the departed Bill Davis would have enjoyed 
this thread.
Would any of you happen to know what happened to him ( and why ) ?.


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn, I promise I won’t talk anymore about freezer ships after this post ! 

I had a look at the photos of your MFC freezer ships on the internet and I have to say that they all look good and appeared to be comfortable and seaworthy ships. I liked the bulbous bow, the long foc’sle deck and also the chine in the hull down aft. I was surprised to hear that Cunard bought four of them in the fire sale in 1975 as they got rid of most of their Port Line freezer ships in 1972. I tried to find out what service they were operated on but failed, they are recorded to have been sold to the Restis Group in 1981. I see that Blue Star bought a couple of the your ships, so I am thinking they must have been a real bargain! Do you not think that it might have been the ability of the new box boats to carry refrigerated containers that finished off your MFC?

I feel Cunard should have learnt their lesson when they built the three small and fast freezers ships in 1965. My Port Huon, the Port Albany and the Port Burnie were all sister ships with the Burnie having Paxman alternators instead of Allans $%%#@. They were all supposed to do two high speed trips to Tasmania in the one apple season (high freight rate), then sail back and forth across the Atlantic before placing themselves in Tassie for the start of the next apple season. Anyway the long closure of the Suez canal from 1967 to 1975 put the kibosh on this idea and then the French objections to the Tassie apples when the UK joined the EU in 1973 finished this trade off completely. 

The poor Tasmanians had to pull their apple trees out, but mind you, they did plant wine grapes in there place! I see now the modern automated Tassie grape/wine making system is now able undercut the older style, labour intensive made French wine in the UK! 

The Port Huon’s RD Sulzer engine produced 13000 BHP and it had a rather big barred speed range high up in the RPM range. It was weird, she would be screaming along at her service speed of 19.5 knots and then sail over a shallow patch, the ship would then squat down and this would pull the rpm down into the barred speed range. The engine would then try to shake the ship to bits so we had to immediately pull the stick back and slow her down to about 17 knots and leave it there until such times we got the call from above that we were now back in deep water. I can’t remember for sure but I do not think she had torsional de-tuner unit on the free end of the crankshaft!!

Chadburn, I was never a fan of Weirs pumps and any of their other rather dated equipment, I much preferred Hamworthy pumps along with de-laval fresh water generators. I also preferred sailing with the more robust USA made GE impulse steam turbines along with USA designed boiler and steam plant and gearing. It was a great unit and far better than the Parsons turbines with its Weirs close feed system.


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## chadburn

The first four were the only one's directly owned by M.F.C. and Israeli flagged, the fo'csle was not only long but strengthened to fit a Gun. The rest were owned by numerous Banks until MFC had fully paid for them, but of course they were all Managed by MFC. There were Sulzer engined ships in the fleet (Drammen), eight of them built by Smiths Docks (I never served on any of them) four of these were picked up very cheaply by Cunard plus another four of the largest Reefer's (Supercore's) in the fleet. The Israeli's were not allowed to use the Suez Canal and it was the Banks who foreclosed on MFC aided and abetted by Salen not the arrival of the box boats. As I indicated earlier I had a good time with MFC but you had to adopt a flexible approach like being called early back from your leave.
John, I have no idea what has happened to BD unless he is using another name but as far as I can make out his involvement in Bulk Carriers did not come into play till the mid/late 70's when most of the loading recommendation's were already down in writing as seen in his profile photo page.


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn, I was searching the internet for a Thomson Line of Dundee ship called the SS Iona built in 1892. A friend here in Paynesville has a gold headed cane which was presented to a relative called Frank Rollo. He was Captain of the steam ship Iona when she was the first ship into Montreal after the winter freeze up in 1910. 

I kept coming up with a Scottish coastal paddle steamer (Iona 3) which was built in 1864. Anyway, she turned out the first ship ever to be fitted with a Chadburn engine order telegraph. This telegraph was a very different and rare model and was made from the then very expensive metal aluminium. It apparently has just been sold for a big price! The inventor and patentee Bill Chadburn originally came from Sheffield before going to London and then onto a big new factory in Liverpool in 1903.

There is now a Chadburns Ship Telegraph Society which has a web site and its well worth googling and having a look see. 

P S IONA (III) was built by J & G Thomson Govan and launched on Tuesday 10th May 1864. Her Yard No was 77.

Built for David Hutcheson & Co she entered service on the Ardrishaig run until COLUMBA replaced her. IONA was employed on both the Clyde and among the Western Isles. The Caledonian Steam Packet Co, Ltd chartered her for a short period during the First World War.
After a long career of seventy-two years she was sold in March 1936 to Arnott, Young & Co (Ship breakers) Ltd and was broken up, along with COLUMBA, at Dalmuir.
Source: Clydesite/Duckworth and Langmuir-West Highland Steamers.

I am thinking she might not have carried iron ore or suffered from a structural failure as she was in service for 72 years!!!!


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## John Cassels

Iona carried ore in all holds so did not use the alternate hold loading
practice.


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## chadburn

Alastair, anything to do with Chadburn's seems to be expensive these day's including the chain, I was asked to look out for some (new) for an old steam job, the cost was prohibitive to say the least for the chap who wanted it so I put him in touch with Able to see if he had any off the scrapped vessel's that was in good condition, it was worth a try. I would think the Iona would have a Iron Hull. The problems with Hogging and Sagging were well known B.C. (before computer's), a chap called M W Thomson wrote a paper titled "Effect of variations in loading on longitudinal structural stresses in ships" in the early 1920's, Although of course it was more to do with concern's with the rivet's in the landing edge's of the shell plating in the forward and after bodies in way of the neutral axis


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## alastairrussell

John, I think you could be right as there were a couple of Iron furnaces and a granite quarry on the paddle steamers West Coast route. They used charcoal in the smelting process to produce the iron then (not Coke) and this was produced from timber taken from the hills up there. The quarry supplied all the cobbles for the streets of Glasgow and had 200 men cutting hard gray granite by hand!

Chadburn, as we now live in AC times, there is surely no excuse for any more catastrophic failures of ships structure. After giving up the sea I was involved in verifying new boiler and pressure vessel designs built to various Australian and overseas Codes and Standards. 

We were back then using computer software (programmed in Basic) which was developed for an old steam driven Wang computer. It was wonderful and I took to it like a duck to water. We just fed the computer with the dimensions and thicknesses from the drawing supplied by the manufacturer and it used to beep and flash if something was not in accordance with the standard. It was wonderful as we did not have to concentrate!! After this no one in that government section was allowed to be promoted unless they had made a successful PV and boiler software programme.

This was all 25 years ago and I had a look at the latest upmarket version of AutoCad recently and I was amazed at what’s available now. You hammer away at drafting/designing your say carbon steel structure on the computer and when you are happy with what you have done, you then slip it into the finite element section of the program where you load up the structure. You then see in a flash where you have been too generous with material, its coloured in different blues with the overstressed parts being shown in red. So it’s back to the drawing board, do a redesign and then try it again in the FE section. When you are happy with your loaded design you can then add a wee bit of corrosion allowance and check it out again.

I am a great believer of UMS engine rooms as they release highly skilled engineers from hanging around watching dials and gauges and allow them to do productive maintenance. Its better that the whole ship is rigged up with a good quality alarm system. This would mean installing and maintaining strain gauges fitted to the ships structure along with water ingress alarms and black boxes to record all the alarm conditions. 

It really upsets me hear that bulk carriers are even now, after all we have been through, not maintaining and testing the very important forward end water ingress alarms!!!


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## chadburn

How many vessel's (B.C. say pre 1965) failed due to the carrying of Iron Ore, any idea's Alastair?. Yes, they were smaller vessel's however most were never specially constructed to carry the weight of bulk ore just normal Tramper construction method's. If I remember correctly the "Parkgate's" deck repair was done by means of a Doubler which was rivet "stitched" on either side. Luddite I may be, but I prefer someone down below using MK 1 eyeball, not watching guages all the time, but going walkabout. There have been plenty of live's and ship's lost using the "modern" system due to the delay of the Duty Engineer getting down there realising he can't manage on his own then hitting the Engineer's general alarm, by then it's all too late. It will be interesting to read what happened aboard the "Endurance" and who if anybody was down below at the time.


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn, I just cannot see how anyone could possibly blame the introduction of the desktop computer and other forms of shipboard electronic equipment for the catastrophic failure of dry bulk carriers built to the 1966 LLC. You should surely be pointing the finger at the people who were responsible for increasing the stress on the ship, removing the ‘raised foc’sle deck and then sliding the plimsoll line up the ships side!!!!! 

I acknowledge that you cannot safely have one person on his own on watch in the ER. On our UMS ship the 2300 hr ER inspection was carried by one engineer and he carried a UHF radio with a mike and ear muffs. He was in contact with the bridge at all times and he also had to phone the bridge before going down below and after returning to his cabin. Your preferred method of manning the ER would need 6 watchkeepers climbing up and down many stairs, eye balling everything in the noisy and sometime stinking hot engine room! 

We surely have to learn from the aircraft industry and build in some equipment redundancy. The alarm and automatic change over of pumps on low pressure and sometimes alarm and auto slow down of ME on a high temperature was good. If any major fault continues the ME will be stopped automatically. All the alarm and shut down equipment were tested and maintained at regular intervals. All alarms are logged and investigated, log check sheets are recorded and filed. Alarm malfunction and Rouge alarms were always looked into and repaired. 

One of our small UMS ships with a medium speed engine experienced a crankcase explosion and no one was injured because there was no one in the engine room at the time! If I remember right, the ‘Capetown Castle’ air start line explosion killed 7 and the ‘Reina Del Pacifico’ crankcase explosion killed 28! If I then go into the ‘Spirit of Free Enterprise’ ( bow door open) rollover, it shows that a very simple alarm/indicator system on the bridge along with a signed departure checklist would not have gone astray. All very basic aircraft equipment type procedures!

Chadburn, I have sailed on a few very progressive Japanese built UMS ships with the same engineer manning and on the same run as them, and I can tell you that these ships were operated and maintained in a better and safer condition with 5 engineers than you would be with your 8 engineers ( with no UMS).


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## chadburn

Whoa, Alastair like the Nuclear Bomb computer's are with us and there is no turning back, however, there is in my view an "over relience" on computer's spitting out the correct info by people who have no knowledge of doing random checks out "manually" because the way the calculations were done are no longer taught (see interesting navigation error's off Nigeria). 
I agree totally about raised foc'sle's, looking back at the ships designed by the Furness Yard's own Draughtsmen non were built without a raised foc'sle's as far as I am aware including our 5, it was only when Swan's took over the Furness Yard that the raised foc'sle was literally "dropped".
There has alway's been a certain amount of equipment redundancy on ship's even on the old steam job's.
In regard's to the number of Engineer's down the Engineroom, if there are Engineer's who do not like going down to as you say "a noisy and sometimes stinking hot Engineroom" THEN THEY ARE IN THE WRONG JOB" because that's what Engineer's do.
Engineroom manning level's are my own preference purely on safety grounds. God forbid, I would rather a couple of Engineer's gave the ultimate than lose possibly the whole ship due to an Engineroom problem (along with a lot more of the Crew). Unfortunatly I have not saved any "data" in regards to vessel's lost due to the delay of the Engineer's getting down below quick enough using the "on call" system because I am now out of it and it's now all in my wake, however watching the Airbus "gracefully" crash into the woods in France because it was being flown by a Computer endorsed my view on the "over confidence" in computer's doing the job.


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## Billieboy

I was expecting that comment Chief! Never did like an engine room below 100F!


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn 

You are 100% right when you said that ‘ *THEN THEY ARE IN THE WRONG JOB’ *because in the 1950’s, it was the National Service/MN deal that kept marine engineers in the proverbial wrong job! When the British National Service stopped in 1960, experienced seagoing engineers left in large numbers and the flow of 21 year old marine engineers from the shipyards to replace them, slowed and then stopped.

In the sixties I witnessed a decline in marine engineering standards in all British shipping companies that I sailed with. I used to say that there are only two types of marine engineer. Those, after doing their watch who would go to their cabin and read cowboy books and the others, who would have a go at trying to fix the quite obvious problems that they see around them!

During this period I worked very hard on many British ships in all ranks up to 2/E. On my second deep sea ship I was away from home for 15 months as a 6E (no promotion or leave). It was full on when I was on watch as the diesel engine was on heavy oil in a poor setup!! The silly Sharples purifiers on the ship were designed for diesel oil operation and they were always blocking up with hard dried out sludge!!! We would not let the greasers clean the long bowls out because they were hot and they would drop them or treat them badly and this would knock them out of balance^@##$%! 

I blame the decline in engineering standards during this period on the following:

•	The shutting down of the National service system in UK in 1960. Up until then, you were allowed to do 6 years at sea in the MN rather than 2 years national service. It was very noticeable that the MOT used to check out and approve new start seagoing marine engineers prior to 1960 and that later on when the shortages appeared they stopped this practice!! They were also only too happy to handout heaps of ’ iffy’ dispensation certificates to second engineers. When I left Britain in 1970 the shipping companies were even starting to run out of C/E.

•	Changing all motor ships over to operate on the much cheaper heavy oil. In the rush to change over to heavy oil the ship owners ignored many of the very important requirements recommended by the great marine engineer John Lamb. Some of them being as follows: Not upgrading to self cleaning purifiers (see above), Not fitting a scavenge belt to some engines. Not fitting the necessary extra transfer pumps, fuel lines and bunker lines! The shipowners in their meanness did not seem to be concerned by the large increase in the maintenance work load for those on board the ship.

•	The London ship owners, Lloyds Register and the DOT/MOT were quite obviously in collusion and doing deals. This showed up in form of the following: 

1.	Blaming those on board for any failures and not carrying out a proper investigation.

2. The introduction of the substandard 1966 LLC changes. 

3. The Ro-Ro ferry roll-over disasters (Stability problems with the vehicle deck flooded)!! 

4.	During the 1973 fuel crisis the bunker quality of heavy fuel was allowed to deteriorate excessively and this created massive short term damage to many main engines all over the world. This showed up in the form a major increase in damage claims and towing home type salvage claims to the underwriters. 

Chadburn and BillieBoy, What can I say, I wish I was able to show you both round one of my favourite BHP DNV, UMS ships. I went two months on one UMS ship being on call every third night and I never got called out of the bed by an alarm. I won the prize but I did give the ER a good going over during my 2300 hrs inspection and much time was spent setting up the FO purifiers and sucking out the very small ER bilge sumps (ball floats). I like my sleep!

BHP was a mining, steel making, ship owning and shipbuilding company that had oil experts, naval architects, structural engineers and metallurgists, all in research establishments and on call when needed. One of my ships the Iron Endeavour (not UMS) had the very new J type Doxford engine. She was supplied to them along with heaps of the usual Doxford prototype faults. The ships engineers and the BHP fixed all the faults without much help from Doxfords as they were reluctant to admit to any defects. The main problem was the piston ring butts breaking in the ports and being blown into and damaging the turbo charger blades. BHP eventually got on top of all the problems and she went to run like the proverbial singer sewing machine. The ships engineers re-timed the cylinder oil injection and found that the very expensive Danish Darus ring worked well on the top hot piston and that the cheaper specially made Australian rings worked OK on the main piston. When I was there we threw a fortunes worth of poor quality Doxford supplied rings over the side!!!

I remember when working on a British ship in 1968 as 2/E and coming into port after a hard trip and being lined up with the C/E by an engineer super. We were taken apart by him for spending too much money on the engine stores, spare parts, crew overtime and repairs! He said that they could charter a German ship cheaper than it cost to run our ship! I went home on leave and when I looked in the local paper, I was shocked, there was an ad from a German shipping company wanting British second engineers (with tickets) and willing to pay 20% more than I was getting then and they said that they would pay for any overtime on top of that! We never got paid for overtime!!!

I will finish off by saying that I had a look in Google earth just to check and I can assure you that all the trident nuclear rocket assembly work shops, nuclear bombs stores and the operational nuclear submarine base are all still up there in the Gareloch area in the West Coast of Scotland. If you don’t like computers or UMS systems just send them up to Scotland along with anything else you do not want down south. 

Chadburn and Billieboy , Is retirement not just fabulous especially with the help from great web sites like ShipsNostalgia, computers, ETC. We can really get rid of any dirty water in our systems. My dirty water is tainted by 3% sulphur heavy oil, broken piston rings and ****ty sharples purifiers.

I am really looking forward to watching Murray play Federer in the men’s single AUS tennis titles on Sunday night our time. I will be watching it on my Sony super wide screen full HD TV with surround sound. I just love the new technology!!


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## Billieboy

Alistair, I think that the basis of your problems is the Diesel engine. I spent 8 months 11 days and seventeen hours on one once, my first and last! 

UMS, which I never sailed on, is today, a good system, but in the late seventies setting up the first BIG ships for it was a headache which I was glad that I never had. 

I've met plenty of supers just like yours, I tend to forget about them when I'm the super. It reminds me of a ship I was appointed to at 03.00 one morning. I arrived at about 08.45 to relieve the attending Super who´s wife was giving birth in H-K. I walked around a 16 cylinder Deutz on an SD-14, came back up to the captains cabin and said that all injectors had to go ashore for testing and setting, the lube.oil filter needed new candles, and the main air start rail filter needed renewal. The OM said, "but you've only been on board for five minutes" ! He came around fairly quickly too, after I showed him how to couple two cranes for heavy lifting. 

All in all, it's just experience, one collects it and never forgets it!


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## chadburn

Alastair,a slight change of your wording in regards to the lad's who were Ships Engineer's when National Service was still running THEY WERE IN THE RIGHT JOB BUT FOR THE WRONG REASON. Nearly all were the old fashioned time served lad's who had gone for their Grading at 20yrs old and then went to sea to avoid N.S., a lot went through and gained their 2nd's and Chief's before N.S. ended and they decided to come ashore. Problems started to arise with the forced introduction of the " Engineering Sandwich Cadet" system (discussed elsewhere) within some Companies and I have witnessed "Spanners at Dawn" encounters between time served Engineer's and Dilutees.
Billieboy is correct in regards to the problems with the early installations of Auto/U.M.S. system's which both he, I and other's on this site were involved in, unfortunatly what worked ok on land installation's failed in a spectacular ways at sea to the point where the Bridge "team" where even more wary of it and made sure it was disengaged before entering or leaving Port. Things have moved on, yet, today's vessel's fitted with highly sophisticated computerised system's you love still manage to bump into each other, run aground, or in the Airbus computers case decide to land the plane when the Pilot was only wanting to do a low flypast with everything hanging down, I am not against the gadget as I am known in the family as "Gadget Grandad" but having a super duper tele and possibly a B&O sound system is wasted money for me as my eye's (due to age) are failing and I am partly deaf (due to Engineroom noise) so I will stick with my old "tubed" F.S.T which can be repaired unlike the latest generation of LCD's which cannot be repaired but are simply thrown away (possibly at Gareloch) because it's cheaper to do that than shipping in spare part's from China. Is that progress?


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## alastairrussell

Billieboy and Chadburn.

I agree with everything you have both said. I think the first British auto ship was a Brocklebank ship called the Mahout and the auto system was sold under that name. After a technical paper was read to the Institute of Marine Engineers on the Mahout System, all the London cargo liner companies just had to have an auto engine room!! They had hopes of running the watch with just one engineer and a greaser. But as Chadburn says they soon found out the hard way that what works ashore in UK does not necessary work on ships or in the tropics. Our control unit I think was made by Honeywell from USA. Anyway there was a seawater pipe with an air cock right underneath it and the unit got an accidental soaking once and this I think stuffed it up completely!! I honestly think that the shipping industry gained from the lessons learnt from the auto ER disaster and they changed their approach and made sure that UMS system was a bit more bullet proof before being introduced. If the engineer who is on call for 24 hour period does not get enough sleep due to faulty alarms, he is lost to the maintenance team the next day. So it pays to keep the unnecessary rogue alarms to the minimum.

Billieboy I did not mean to be too hard on the engineer super as he was getting pressure from a brand new CEO who was a shoreside wallah who went on to make a big name for himself in shipping. This CEO decided to make sure that the senior ships staff got to see their costings. That was when the Chief Steward found out that he was paying twice as much as he should have for all his eggs. He reckoned he could save heaps of money if he was allowed to hire a truck and buy them from the local supermarket????? 

By moving around the British cargo liner companies and working both ashore and at sea for BHP in Australia, I have been lucky enough to have gained heaps of both good and bad experiences, and as you say, this cannot be taken away from me. I went through a marine diesel text book once and I think I have sailed with 90% of the engines including a double acting 2 stroke! My first ship had a parsons steam turbine and then later on, when I was after some more steam time I sailed on a BHP one boiler job with GE impulse turbine (made in the US and a top unit). I did a couple of pier head jumps for BHP and this gave me 3 days on a 3 month old gas turbine ro-ro &^%$#% plus 5 days on an old steam up and downer. I joined the steam up and downer at 6pm and we sailed and when we got full away at 9pm the chief left me with a couple of firemen and a greaser and was away up the stairs !! It was a wonderful experience but midnight could not come quick enough and then the 3/E showed me how to do a few things and also how to stop the reversing engine from creeping in! There was a problem with the exhaust turbine and if I remember right we had to keep about 20 psi of gland steam on to keep the vacuum up!!

Chadburn, I did the ONC course at night school and I had no trouble getting through the DOT pre-sea grading as a 5th year apprentice, but the shipping office refused permission for me to go to sea as I was blind in the left eye. It was only later on when the engineer shortages got worse that I was told to try another less strict shipping office and they accepted me. So you see, stopping the NS in the UK did let me get to sea. Anyway, I have just read that people from Northern Ireland did not have to do NS, is this true?

When I was accepted as a migrant to Australia in 1970 I saw a BHP ad for marine engineers and I applied and I was called all the way down to London for the job interview. The BHP London manager interviewed me and gave me a hard time about not telling him that I had only one eye! I just said that I thought my eye sight is normal because I can see without spectacles!! I would not have minded him having a go at me but he was sitting there with one arm missing!!. He then said that he would send all my paper work through to BHP shipping in AUS, but he is sure that BHP would not be hiring me seeing that I was blind in one eye. I held my peace and thankfully did not ask him what happened to his missing arm because BHP shipping overruled him and hired me. Apparently they were desperate for a one eyed Doxford experienced marine engineer as they had just chartered the Iron Endeavour with a J type Doxford main engine and believe it or not, because of her size the AUS DOT had ruled that the 4/E had to have a second’s ticket?

While I was waiting to become a migrant to AUS, I got a job working on a 6 months contract on two small Ro-Ro ferries in UK. It was strange as the majority of the engineers there only had dispensation 2/E tickets and they were frightened that I might want to stay in the job at the end of the summer and that one of them would get paid off. It was a strange outfit with the smaller of the two ferries sometimes sailing with too many passengers or with the plimsoll line being under water. They charged by the foot and not by weight!!!!! 

There was great relief from the other engineers when I showed them my job offer from BHP as a mere 4/E and that I would be getting twice the money that our Masters were then getting and twice the leave that UK deep sea engineers were getting! Anyway at the end of the contract when I went into pick up my final pay. I was shocked to find that 2 weeks holiday pay was missing and the local manager then said they were also refusing to pay about 26 pounds of travelling expenses. 

The manager said that I was just the same as a holiday student and they don’t get holiday pay!!! I just said to the manager don’t worry about it as I am leaving now, mind you, I will be making sure that the DOT gets a copy of my diary entries which shows the dates when the ferry was overloaded and also carried too many passengers. I said good bye to a few colleagues outside and when I was climbing into my car the local manager came rushing up to me and said promise me you will drop into the head office in Glasgow on your way south as a director of the company wants to have a chat to you!! I did pop in and I did get paid the money they owed me!

4 years later I sailed with a second mate who had worked for the same company deep sea and apparently he lost all his seagoing gear when flying home from a ship and the same company refused to cover him for the loss. He said do you still have that diary and can I borrow it. I told him the truth which was, I never had one in the first place!!


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## uisdean mor

Alastair
Bit of a mixed thread here so I will be brief. I worked on the Cunard? reefers. The were manned rather than owned and operated from South America (Colombia and Costa Rica) and Carribbean banana ports mainly to Antwerp with occassional runs to New York( usually an alternative or mixed fruit voyage - pineapples being one I remember). Charter was under Salen and the original Israel decor was still evident on the glass doors and tableware. So who knows who actually owned them - as stated elsewhere probably the banks with Salen - then having the electronic muscle ( data recorders, telex, et al) to manage them to a high degree to maximise cargo values. Good ships and hard working. One ship - the Chrysantema I think sufferred a bad engine room fire and the Ch/Eng P. Johnston ( I think - memory) was lost - stuck in a lift or at least at the lift door and could not get out.I worked as Freezer / assistant 2nd Eng and when all was going well - i.e. not needed as 2nd then ballast passages were a pleasure. Basically getting freezer plant maintenance done and ready for next cargo- rare bronzie times on the way across to Colombia. 
Rgds 
Uisdean Mor


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## WilliamH

uisdean mor said:


> Alastair
> Bit of a mixed thread here so I will be brief. I worked on the Cunard? reefers. The were manned rather than owned and operated from South America (Colombia and Costa Rica) and Carribbean banana ports mainly to Antwerp with occassional runs to New York( usually an alternative or mixed fruit voyage - pineapples being one I remember). Charter was under Salen and the original Israel decor was still evident on the glass doors and tableware. So who knows who actually owned them - as stated elsewhere probably the banks with Salen - then having the electronic muscle ( data recorders, telex, et al) to manage them to a high degree to maximise cargo values. Good ships and hard working. One ship - the Chrysantema I think sufferred a bad engine room fire and the Ch/Eng P. Johnston ( I think - memory) was lost - stuck in a lift or at least at the lift door and could not get out.I worked as Freezer / assistant 2nd Eng and when all was going well - i.e. not needed as 2nd then ballast passages were a pleasure. Basically getting freezer plant maintenance done and ready for next cargo- rare bronzie times on the way across to Colombia.
> Rgds
> Uisdean Mor


The ship with the bad engine room fire was the Gladiola, in addition to the loss of the Chief Eng, the Captain died a few days after the fire with heart problems, his name was Rick Woods a very sad loss, I sailed with him twice in my time with Whitco. I sailed as riding crew when the Gladiola was towed from Equador to Gotenborg for repairs to the fire damge.


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## chadburn

Both yourself (uisdean mor) and William H worked on some of the last ships built for Maritime Fruit before it went to the wall along with my job with them, I had joined them for more or less the same reason's as Alastair went foreign to Australia. The four vessel's were superb ship's built by Aalborg Vaerft, Aalborg in 1972/73( Gladiola, Orchidea, Iris Queen and Chrysantema 23,000bhp B&W ) and were bought very cheaply by Cunard from the Bank's and then on charter to Salen (who aided and abetted the Banks to foreclose on Maritime Fruit) These were the most advanced versions of the Supercore's


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## muldonaich

then the banks put salen out of the picture you reap what you sow .


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## greektoon

I hate lifts (elevators) on ships. I still refuse to use them.


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## chadburn

Certainly agree with you on that one greektoon.


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## Billieboy

Lifts are safe enough on ships, the safety factors are far higher for ships elevators because of the additional loading during pitching. The lift inspections and certifications does add quite a bit to the Chief's port work load, but for getting from the bilge flat to the Bridge control room on a large modern UMS vessel, it's the only way. With the override key, of course!


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## uisdean mor

Chadburn 
Yes - agree re quality. Did a drydock on Scythia - not sure what her original name would have been and the processes were relatively easy to complete due to the quality of machinery. This of course needs to be backed up by the maintenance record which saw dedication to detail. The main problems were aroung the exhaust valves on the main engines and we did manage to change one out in the river (Elbe) whilst waiting for pilot change and berth to free up. As always it was the small items of the seals on the valve guides which seemed to let the performance down. 
The Stal compressors for the fridge certainly kept me on my toes but all round excellent machinery and well laid out ships.
The "big brother" atmosphere was a bit hard to get used to at first but eventually the data recorder logs and telex - last minute change of orders type of operation worked to our benefit as we always managed to make money for the "owners" and we were always - more or less given cate blanche when asking for help or support re spares, maintenance, leave etc. First time I came across a superintendent who lived off plastic. Based his bank account in channel islands and lived out of a suitcase. Said he would be in it for a few years and then get a shoreside job as a surveyor or something similar - cannot remember a name now. 
Rgds 
Uisdean


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## chadburn

uisdean mor, the "Scythia" was called "Iris Queen" (3rd of 4 built1972) when she was under MFC ownership the Super who worked with the Builders on the machinery layout was a fellow Geordie called Tommy Thompson he at one time worked for Souter's and certainly knew his stuff. Barring for the vessel's built at Smith's which were Sulzer's (Cunard also grabbed 4 of 8 built I understand) the rest of the fleet were all B&W which made Engineer relief a lot easier along with the ordering of spares when groups of identical vessels were built. The one "weakness" with B&W was in the exhaust valves, it was the first thing I changed when I started work with Maritime and most probably the last thing as well as a "hands on" Chief.


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## alastairrussell

I find it upsetting to hear of any accident on any ship, especially a fatal one. Sailing as S/E and a C/E I have blamed myself for not foreseeing the possibility of a situation turning into an accident. Persons under my charge to whom I had a duty of care, have been injured and I will always feel someway responsible and I acknowledge that I failed them. We are all aware that going to sea puts us in higher than normal risk situation but I feel that it never lessened my responsibility. 

In saying all the above I feel that it is not for us to point the finger at the ships lift for causing the death of the chief engineer. Surely a proper investigation was carried out into the fire and the death. I would want to know the primary cause of the fire and the options the C/E had for escaping from that fire. Everyman and his dog knows that when a modern concrete high rise building fire alarm goes off, you escape down the internal fire stairs. You do not get in the lift. You know that the fire stairs area has no combustible material in it, is protected by self closing fire proof rated doors and is under forced air pressure to stop the ingress of smoke!

Lifts are safe and are a fact of life and very very necessary in panamax and above sized bulk carriers. How else are we going to carry equipment and tools up and down the different levels of the ER. All Australian ships in my day had to go through a complete yearly safety equipment inspection by a government inspector. All lift safety devices were on his check list and were tested including the escape hatch trip switch, alarms and telephone. The lever for overriding the winding engine brakes is sighted so that we can use it to lower the lift to a door, if required, in a black out.

On my BHP UMS ships all the engineers and the shipwright when at sea at 10 am on a Sunday morning, start checking all safety gear including fire flaps, lifeboat engines, fire pumps, every thing that was on the government inspector’s check sheet was inspected and tested if possible, including the lift safety devices. Anyone who wanted to come on that testing audit was welcome as it was a great familiarising exercise for every one.

I am very disappointed to hear that the engine control room is being placed on the bridge in some ships now. I would prefer to see one black ME operating stick on the bridge, one in the ER control room either on the same level as the ME cylinder heads or the next deck down. I want the ER control room, spare parts room and the workshop close together and all air conditioned. The ER control room has to be manned during manoeuvring and reasonably close to the totally manual engine side control. If you have the slightest ME control problem during manoeuvring you must rush down and operate the engine using totally the manual engine side controls and taking orders from the electric telegraph. 

Greektown and Chadburn, I did not mind getting in the lift in the right cir***stances! My fear was crawling down the Duct Keel, it was just like that movie ‘The Great Escape’. I would put danger tags all over the ballast control room and then force vent the duct keel,then I would go up to the bridge and personally check the charts for any shallow water!!! There was plenty of depth in the Australian Bight!!!


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## alastairrussell

I get angry when I hear the words *IN HINDSIGHT *being used in defence of an accident or machinery or structural failure. The modern technology and electronic gizmos and gadgetry that is now available to all, makes the words *IN HINDSIGHT *redundant!!! 

Lloyds Register’s third issue of their bulletin Technical Matters (dated September 2008) states that they have a highly qualified technical investigations team. They go on to say that to avoid future structural damage failures to a ships hull they will investigate any fractures, connection failures or plastic deformation by doing a finite element method (FEM) analysis. 

What wonderful news! Thank you LR Thank you!


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## chadburn

Duct Keels were I think most Engineer's nightmare they were certainly mine, my very first trip to sea (after serving on various smaller vessels) on the 75,000tn "Har Addir" on Trials and we had a structural failure(EEK) which flooded the Duct keel wiped all the Coils out on the ballast valve control Martonair valves and the subsequent problems after that due to salt water entering the air side of the ballast valve activation heads causing the bores to corrode something the shipyard lads had not cleaned out when they overhauled the system when we dry docked on the Tyne after the incident. Mind you I didn't go as far as going to the Bridge to check how much water would be under the keel whilst I was working down there but it was a concern that I would be working in the Duct Keel at various times for'ard of the area of the previous failure with no way of getting out but you just had to get on with it. However it was not as bad as the hydraulic ballast system on the Bulk Carrier "Irenes Rhapsody" where the v/v's were inside the adjacent ballast tanks and as she was getting on in years for a hardworking Bulker when I was aboard her they and the rest of the system were a constant source of trouble to me(MAD) , still on reflection It was better than the tunnel of possible no return called THE DUCT KEEL


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## Billieboy

Why am I thinking of stable doors?


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## John Cassels

Duct keels were not so bad , just a case of getting on with the job and
trying to forget where you were.


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## chadburn

John, going up and down the Duct Keel did not bother me at all whilst she was in build looking at the system being fitted (barring for sometimes a bit of shin damage) but when you witness a structural failure and then the unexpected flooding it certainly focuses the mind on what the possibility's were of getting out which were zero, as you say we just had to get on with it as there was no alternative and refusal was not an option. After the conference regarding the failure, on ship No2 (Mount Katherina) a quick fix to the system was carried out so that the Martonair valve "mushrooms" complete with coil and base adapter were fitted next to the Ballast control Panel in the Engineroom and the signal air piped to each Martonair valve body to activate the ballast valve itself.


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## surfaceblow

I did not mind the Duct Keels, on the last few ship's I was on with a Duct Keel we had a track made of angle iron on top of the webs and two pulleys installed and a cart set in-between the angle iron. On one ship I was in the duct keel working on a Pre Con Valve when a Mate came from the Foreward End to throttle the Ballast Valve. I found out that the Mates had damaged the vacuum priming system when they used it while ballasting so they had to throttle the Ballast Valve's to De-ballast the tanks. I had also found out that they were also climbing over each web to get to the valve's instead of using the cart. 

A few days after seeing the Mates in the Duct Keel we removed the wire to the holding coil in the Ballast Valves controllers so instead of having only open and close control of the valves you could throttle the valves position by holding the open or close button on the console. 

The only problem I had with any of the cart's was during an ABS Inspection the line attached to the cart broken while the ABS Surveyor was using the cart. The line was dry rotted so it had to be replaced.


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## alastairrussell

I found that it was a chalk and cheese situation when comparing the duct keel on a Panamax bulk carrier with one on the larger Cape-sized carrier. It was climbing through manholes and doing a WW2 POW ‘great escape’ type crawl as against going through a w/t door, down stairs and then having a bent down walk along a well illuminated passage way.

With all due respect John I am not talking about claustrophobia being the problem and maybe doing a quick inspection trip down the duct keel. I am talking about testing and making adjustments and trying to fix defective ballast valves. To do this you had to communicate with the ballast control room and at times this was quite difficult. 

We were supplied with really good motorolo portable UHF radios on our UMS ships and they worked well all over the ship including in the duct keel. I remember an RO feeling put out about these units as they were not under his control. Apparently he found out that our units power output was above legal requirements, so he turned the power output down without telling any one (base or master unit was on the bridge)!! The next time down the duct keel no communication ##$%%@.


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## uisdean mor

Alastair re Gladiola - hope Chadburn logs in. 
See http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/603/603.F2d.1327.76-3112.html

Not exactly BOT Inquiry but does give some detail. Described as a Shakespearean Comedy of Errors
Rgds 
Uisdean


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## Billieboy

alastairrussell said:


> I
> With all due respect John I am not talking about claustrophobia being the problem and maybe doing a quick inspection trip down the duct keel. I am talking about testing and making adjustments and trying to fix defective ballast valves. To do this you had to communicate with the ballast control room and at times this was quite difficult.


I've spent many happy hours in duct keels; but always in port or dry dock. In port when cargo was being worked the noise was phenomenal. On New buildings I've found unbelievable pipe configurations before and after the specific butterfly ballast valve. The configuration was pushing the dynamic flow velocity, and therefore the dynamic torque requirement of the hydraulic actuator, up to five times the design value. When the builders started to get a bit stroppy, I pointed out the minimum requirement of five diameters length of straight pipe before the valve. Valve timing used to be a problem as well, specifically in long ships where a generated hydraulic shock has sometimes nearly a kilometer to travel until it arrives back at the generating point, where the valve should still be open to let it through. 
Transport through some duct keels was made easier by trolleys (HHI ships were best for this), probably a bit dodgy on a ballast passage!


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## vasco

alastairrussell said:


> 1998-May 18
> Bulker NORTHERN ENTREPRISE (Bermuda, 37771 grt, built 1985) sustain a crack in her double bottom off Nova Scotia.


I sailed on this vessel the same year.

I cannot remember anything life threatening about and to list it as a structural failure may be a bit mis-leading.

To put things in perspective the Managers, Denholms, had a very thorough inspection routine for all its bulk carriers on this run (canada-s.america). Any repairs needed were promptly repaired in Canada, where the ships docked at maximum once a month.


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## chadburn

uisdean mor said:


> Alastair re Gladiola - hope Chadburn logs in.
> See http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/603/603.F2d.1327.76-3112.html
> 
> Not exactly BOT Inquiry but does give some detail. Described as a Shakespearean Comedy of Errors
> Rgds
> Uisdean


Oh Dear, sounds like a bit of DON'T PANIC, if it had not turned out to be so tragic with the loss of lives directly or indirectly it would be something akin to a Dad's Army episode. However it does highlight how most of the engineroom fires start on board U.M.S vessel's and there has been quite a number in the last few years I understand which have cost lives and ships.


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## uisdean mor

Chadburn 
Also a bit easy to blame the actual coupling in the pipe. Understanding at that time did not properly take account of fuel line hammer and the need for robust clamping and regular upkeep of the damping medium whichever that might be. Really a tragedy especially for he chief. He was ex Port Line and I had sailed with him in Brocklebanks which he hated - because of the run and the general conditions in India , Bay of Bengal etc.He saw the switch to MFR as an opportunity to return to the Port Line type cargoes and conditions.Alas for him he could not have foretold the future. Thankfully or us all really, neither can we . 
Rgds 
Uisdean.


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## alastairrussell

Uisdean

Thanks Uisdean for the info. You did a top job finding that! Is it not strange how we only find out who really owns a ship when there is a dispute which ends up in an Admiralty Court! I was surprised to find out that some of the MFC ships were owned by a British subsidiary of the Australian company Adelaide Steam. They themselves got into financial difficulties at the same time as MFC shut down !!! 

Who would have thought that a low pressure supply fuel line would have been found as the cause of the fire? Surely the blame must be pointed at the person who was responsible for approving the fitting of a HP hardened steel Ermeto (not Ermerto) sleeve or ferule into a completely different low pressure Serto pipe fitting @#$%^%. 

There is a Court of Inquiry report on a similar type of fire which also ended up with tragic loss of life. Google ‘Fire on HMAS Westralia’ This fire was caused by the failure of un-approved flexible fuel lines after they had been fitted to both main engines.

Chadburn, this Gladiola fire cannot be put down to a UMS system failure! The ship was at anchor and an alarm went off and an engineer responded, end of story! Mind you I do wonder why the Co2 dumping system did not extinguish the fire. Did they shut down and seal the ER up properly before activating the CO2? I would also like to know what kind of alarm went off in the ER and did it ring on the bridge. When was the main manual emergency alarm rung? Surely the C/E would have heard it in the fridge flat?

Everybody should be aware that since the fitting of turbo chargers to practically all new models of diesel engines, there has been a substantial increase in the number of engine space fires on all forms of marine craft and ships. Turbo-charged engines have higher exhaust gas temperatures and the hot end of the turbocharger and the exhaust pipes must be properly shielded from any spraying fuel or oil at all times. I myself would also prefer that all the cylinder injector pipes be shielded too with a drain going down to a small tank which is alarmed. I think this is only a UMS requirement! 

We had early problems with Ermeto ultra high pressure fuel pipe couplings as fitted to our new J type Doxford engine and also to the hydraulic hatch jack system on the Iron Endeavour. The Ermeto coupling was a very good HP pipe fitting that was successfully used in aircraft hydraulic systems for many years back then. Google ‘ermeto pipe fittings’ and read their fitting instructions (Very Important). 

Its initial use on board ships was problematic because of lack of care by the installers. When the problems appeared, we did a bit of research (If all else fails read the instructions). On the Doxford it was apparent that the hardened sleeves were cracking because they had been over tightened on installation. On deck it was different, there we found it was caused by some over tightening and also by corrosion (carbon steel fittings) and lack of pipe work clamping (1968 built ship so green waves on deck). 

The ships staff fixed the problems by replacing all the HP ME fuel pipes (6000psi) and ermeto fittings. On deck they replaced all the hatch hydraulic pipes, ermeto fittings and clamps using 316 grade stainless steel. 

Billie Boy, I agree with everything you have said on ballast systems. I found the big bulkies with their ballast control room up in the accommodation area a real worry. Some of the not so clued up Mates and relieving shipwrights would have our two massive ballast pumps making all sorts of weird noises with the pressure gauges needles gyrating all over the place! Some of them did not understand how to strip the tanks out properly. Any fool can pump ballast in but they have to be able to box smart when discharging ballast fast against the speed of the loaders. I reckon all the damage that was done to the ballast valves and ballast pipe work was when discharging ballast. I think that at times they used to accidently leave the pumps running with all the tank valves closed. This in certain cases would let the vacuum build up excessively before maybe opening up a full tank with a big head of water. Can you imagine how fast that wall of water would get up to in the ballast main when running the length of the duct keel @@#$%% 

When entering a port on a new cape-sized bulk carrier we belted a rocky bank. She was fully loaded with iron ore at the time and No 1 ballast tank was damaged and opened up to the sea. We were lucky because this was the only ballast tank in the ship that was not divided port and starboard and she did not list. I was detailed by the chief to go up ford and check that the duct keel was dry (It was). The chief mate was in the ballast room with the two pumps going like the clappers. At FWE the C/E went into the ballast room where the Chief Mate said to him “great news chief, it can’t be a big hole because we are holding the level steady”. The chief had to tell him that the reason the level was not changing was because the No 1 ballast tank was now at the same level as the sea outside!!!


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## uisdean mor

Alastair 
Please do not take this as gospel - only related over a few messages and a couple of beers over the years. 
Big question for me is why did the remote activation of the fuel supply pipe valves not work. As mentioned in the report there was a local mechanism ( by removal of a pin) but no mention of the remote. The scuttlebut is that the wires were either corroded or not linked at that time. Chief went back into the engine room to try to trip the valves but was overcome by the fumes pretty quickly. As said this only a "version" and may have no basis in truth but I did hear it from pretty reliable sources.
The link I sent obviously legal re cargo and I have been unable to trace any actually investigation of the fire.
Rgds 
Uisdean


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## greektoon

Alastair

it is a SOLAS requirement for ships (not only UMS) to have heated surfaces (temps above 220 degrees C) which may be impinged as a result of fuel system failure to be properly insulated.

Also flanged joints and threaded connections in fuel oil piping systems under pressure exceeding 0.18 N/mm2 should be fitted with spray shields.

High pressure fuel lines betwen the fuel pumps and the injectors shall be protected with a jacketed (sheathed) piping system capable of containing fuel from a high pressure line failure. The system should incorporate a collection tank and alarm.

See SOLAS Reg II-2 / 15.2.9, 15.2.10, 15.2.11

I would like to return to the subject of lifts on ships when I have time, maybe on a new thread. 

David.


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## Billieboy

High pressure fuel leaks are extremely dangerous even without raised temperatures or heated surfaces. There was a paper called something like, "The generation of static discharges in micro-droplet clouds". It was first discussed during the big meeting after the Shell "M", class, King Haakon, and other VLCCs exploded, However this tended to be static generated by water droplets. Later, long after IG systems had been invented and reasonably proven, several explosions occurred in pump rooms when flanges had been found leaking. In these cases it was assumed, and later proven in lab experiments, that under certain cir***stances a fine spray of crude from a leaking pipe and/or flange joint forms a cloud of micro droplets which acts in the same manner as a, 'Thunder Head', with droplets whizzing around in eddys and convective currents generating static until the charge is unloaded in a spark, at which time an over ripe or lean explosion takes place. IG is of no assistance in these cases as the pump room has to be accessible. 

As for the education of engineers with regard to emergency procedures the quick closing valve secrets always seemed to be kept by the Chief Engineer who, (at least during my time at sea), never seemed to instruct other members of the engine crew in their use or importance. 

With regard to Bulker ballast systems, high flow velocity, with poor pipe and valve configuration, contributed to large numbers of duct keel flooding caused by cavitated pipes leaking after hydraulic shock had been generated in the system. OBOs and VLOOCs seemed to get lots of these problems because of the ability to move ballast in and out using maximum pumping power, this could generate flow velocities of 19-22M/second, at these speeds a hydraulic shock could be catastrophic, as pressures of 190-220bars could be generated if a valve closed instantly. Ballast systems are class approved to 25bar max working pressure.


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## chadburn

Alastair, I appreciate the vessel was anchored at the time but I draw your attention to para 4 in the paper from Uisdean (As the ship was automatic there was nobody down the Engineroom). Fire was always my concern at sea and I am indebted to the R.N. B.O.S.T. system (which had just started in the South during my time) as to the do'es and don'ts, a system which the Merchant Crew's off R.F.A vessels are put through and other countries pay to put their vessel's through. It's a pity that Shipowners did not buy time (if possible) and put their own Crew's through it as it was certainly an eye opener on how quickly a minor situation becomes a major incident.
In regards to a lack of care by installer's that is very true, the main problem is that not all shipyard Marine Fitter's have served at sea and therefore their "mindset" is different from an ex seagoining Engineer/ Fitter who when installing a piece of equipment or pipework, he looks at it from the view that he may have to repair/overhaul it at sea. Mind you the Japanese were no better I went to Japan to look at a Bulker with Maritime O's Super and we went down into the Duct Keel to have a look at her Ballast System and found a worker grinding the high spots off the outside of a bend on the main Ballast pipe where it had rippled during bending. When it was explained to them in regards to the reduction in the pipe wall thickness (which they were obviously aware of) but also the effect of the ripples on the inside of the pipe would have re water flow, they agreed quite shame facedly to remove all the rippled bends and fit new pipes under supervision.


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## uisdean mor

Billieboy
The situation here which is causing concern is that the fuel feed pipes were "relatively" low pressure but fairly long, made in sections and not properly clamped. The report does say that future specs would recommend longer runs of piping. Not sure that alone was the answer?
Rgds 
Uisdean


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## Billieboy

The pressures on the crude system which caused some pumproom explosions, was nopt much more than 10 BAR, (147ppsi), which is quite a low pressure for ER fuel lines. I've seen a 600MW turbine destroyed by a 2.5BAR lube oil leak, when the Fire chief ordered, (in writing), the lube oil pump to be shut down!


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## chadburn

The vessel we went to see was The "Heythrop" being built at Hitachi Zosen, Sakai


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## Billieboy

*Heythrop* was one of the first bulk carriers fitted with ballast butterfly valves, spent a couple of days in Falmouth with Jimmy Stewart the P&O Bulk Super; he later went to ABS at the London office.


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## chadburn

Billieboy, your right, our vessel was also being built at the Furness Yard (1967) with the Butterfly type ballast valves operated by compound air heads via Martonair V/V's which was one of the reasons we went out there as well as looking at a Japanese built B&W.


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## alastairrussell

David, thanks for the info on the fuel pipe shielding and SOLAS fire regulations. With your prompting I have had a good look through the SOLAS, and the IMO web sites and I am impressed especially with the number of amendments and changes made to the bulk carrier regulations. I was not aware of these changes which included the age of the ship and other restrictions being placed on the ‘iffy’ practice of loading of alternate holds with high density cargoes.

I then had a look at the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) and Lloyds List website, reading everything on casualties and the common structural rules (CSR). The site was really good with everything out in the open and on display including lists of ships that were in and out of class! I was particularly impressed with the following information: 

_On 14 December 2005 the Common Structural Rules for Tankers and Bulk Carriers were unanimously adopted by the IACS Council for implementation on 1 April 2006. The Council was satisfied that the new rules have been based on sound technical grounds, and achieve the goals of more robust and safer ships.
The then Chairman of IACS, Bob Somerville, declared it "an historic moment - one of the most important single steps in the development of maritime rules that IACS has ever been involved with".
IACS now implements the CSR maintenance program (IACS Procedural Requirement No.32) via the IACS CSR Knowledge Centre (KC). All the agreed Q&As and CIs (Common Interpretations) are published on the IACS web site without delay in order to assist its Member Societies and Industry in implementing the CSR in a uniform and consistent manner._

I left the sea here in Australia way back in 1985 and although being a keen reader of the Institute of Marine Engineers literature and technical papers I have failed to notice these changes. I realise now that I have been more than just *‘sailing a wee bit off course’ *and I do now see that lessons have been gained from the mistakes of the past and what is more important, have been acted upon and in a competent manner. 

I was not aware that there was so much concern in IMO about the high failure rate and loss of life in bulk carriers. In fact there has been so many amendments and changes to the regulations that it must have been a quite difficult time for the surveyors and the port state inspectors. 1966 LLC which modified the 1930 LLC ( the first true international load line) had to be amended in 1971,1975,1979,1983,1995 and 2003!!!!!

I now declare that I am 100% ( this is my 100th post) behind the International Maritime Organisation, and all its sub committees and branches (SOLAS) and also the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS).

IMO have also to be congratulated for building a Monument in London to all international merchant seafarers and for declaring this year 2010 as the *‘Year of the Seafarer’*. I feel, mind you, that they should also have an IMO website recording all the names of the merchant seafarers who have lost their life on board merchant ships since 1959. This was when IMO took over control of world shipping with the intention to regulate the industry, bringing the safety of shipping into an International framework. 

I feel the names of those lost should be recorded under the ships name and that a simplified reason for the failure of the ship should also be recorded. Should the ShipsNostalgia website not forward on a petition to IMO of members requesting such a website??? I would be willing to donate a $100 ( my 100 post) to the cost of running such a website. 

It should be remembered that in the 1860’s after increased losses of ships due to overloading, that Sir Samuel Plimsoll pushed for change in the British parliament. In 1876 the UK Merchant Shipping Act made the load line compulsory. It was a long drawn out battle and Sir Samuel copped a lot of flack from the shipowners and the 1876 version of the act had to be a compromise. This enabled one upset shipowner to place the plimsoll line on the side of his ships funnel!! This problem was not corrected until 1894!!!


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## alastairrussell

Chadburn, I reckon most ships Engine rooms of that era were designed to be unmanned in port and also when in a safe anchorage. Modern donkey boiler controls and fire detection systems etc. were the bees knees and very reliable and were tested along with the CO2 alarm every week when at sea on BHP ships. We used a special spray can that cleaned the fire detector head at the same time. On one ship the workshop was on the top of the ER and every time we used the oxy acetylene unit or the electric welder in the workshop the flash would set the ER fire alarm off. All this equipment didn’t mean that the ship was approved for UMS operation by the classification society. 

When I went up for my chiefs ticket in 1972 here in Australia I had to do a hands on 4 day fire fighting course at the NSW Fire Brigade College, a St Johns first aid course and sit for a lifeboat ticket. I can tell you I was not a happy chappie having to learn all the compass points and be rowing a lifeboat around Sydney harbour one week before sitting for my Class 1 motor ticket. Later on when going up for my steam endorsement I had to go through a medical and also revalidate my previous tickets including the first aid and then do a dangerous goods and a ship management course at the National Maritime College. 

They tell me that later on they brought in a new thing which was that even, if you passed the medical you still had to be able to jump down from a height into a swimming pool in the dark and right an upside down life raft. I said to everyone, you have no idea the amount of inner strength an old one eyed Scotsman gets when his pay packet is being put on the line!!

I see looking at the new international marine qualifications system that all the above is now standard practice in the new STCW regulations.

Billieboy, I remember these big brand new shell tankers suffering from these massive explosions when they were tank washing. I read somewhere it was caused by something new that had never been experienced in smaller tankers. All Tankers had to be fitted with inert gas systems quick smart, if I remember right?

Uisdean, it’s a wee bit upsetting to hear what happened on the Gladiola. But everything that’s been said now seems to be fitting in. IMO says that all international ships that become a casualty or are part of serious incident will be subjected to an proper inquiry or an investigation. In Australia back then, every year our fuel tank spring loaded tripping valves were tested in front of a government surveyor. All the CO2 bottles levels were checked and the system given the all clear.


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## Billieboy

When carrying out HOT repairs in engine and pump rooms, I had to check the area, of course, then obtain the certificates and meet with the master Chief Eng and Mate to discuss the work and the timing. When everything had been done I gave my men the GO order, within minutes the fire alarm would go off, my men had been warned by me that the alarm would go off but to tell nobody. The ship's staff were always surprised and annoyed at me for not warning them to switch out that particular section. To which my answer was, "If it didn't go off, then you wouldn't know that it was working"! Caught one Chief and three Mates, twice or more with this. Another brand new 300K VLCC, had faults on the alarm system which set them off at the most inconvenient times, sometimes more than five times in one day, very dangerous situation; which took months to sort out, at the same time as trying to complete the check list for UMWS.

Alistair, yes, that was the, "M", class, it appears that fixed or temporary Butterworth/tank cleaning machines were creating their own weather systems in the tank. The larger volume of the tank was the problem. There was a Meeting called in London in 68-70 where more than 2000 tanker brains came up with Inert Gas Systems as the answer. Previously the odd tanker explosion had been caused by aluminium anodes or bits of butterworth machines, falling off and causing a spark


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## hawk zhou

why this story happened?I found most the ship owner always not care about the hull structure construct,now i supervising six bulk carriers ,but the owner change the specification like this:If any inconsistency is found between the Hull, Machinery and Electric Specifications, the description of the Specification which governs the installation or equipment shall prevail.in fact the hull must be prevail!so the tragedy happened!


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## Andrew Craig-Bennett

hawk zhou said:


> why this story happened?I found most the ship owner always not care about the hull structure construct,now i supervising six bulk carriers ,but the owner change the specification like this:If any inconsistency is found between the Hull, Machinery and Electric Specifications, the description of the Specification which governs the installation or equipment shall prevail.in fact the hull must be prevail!so the tragedy happened!


You are absolutely right! 

Seems like the industry has a short memory.


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## Iain B

*PSC Detentions*



Lemschout said:


> >_Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records_!!<
> 
> Good idea, unfortunately the same happens when a ship changes ownership. The brokers who make a lot of money when finalizing a sale contract, are sometimes forgetting some that must be transferred to the new owner. That was often the case with the ISPS CSR. And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.
> 
> Of course the IMO should extend its list of do***ents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.
> 
> Once I detained a bulker simply because the master had not been advised it nearly broke in two a few years earlier. The class (as R/O) tried to defend this ignorance, which was subject to the ISM system, by supposing the ship had changed class and the records had been lost.
> 
> Bad luck for them, I knew the ship had been under their supervision since new building. (Thumb)


Lemschout

In insurance we look at PSC data and try to use this as an additional input into risk rating. We have seen over the years changes in PSC and changes in the data that is produced. Now it seems we can only use detention information with any confidence due to the inconsistencies that we see from PSC inspections.

You say you detained a ship because the capt did not have any information of previous damage - Can you explain how that becomes a PSC detention?

What regulation would that be?

Thanks 
Iain


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## alastairrussell

Iain 

I have read all your posts and I have found them very informative. It’s good to see someone from the marine insurance industry getting involved with SN. 

From my experience it has always been a dark and secretive area. Like others, I have heard many rumours and talk about the cosy arrangements between the DOT, London shipowners, underwriters and the classification societies. I think that some of the procedures that went on then especially in the 1960’s proved over the years to be not conducive to constructing, manning, operating and maintaining a well found and safe ship. It is quite obvious to me that the British shipping establishment failed to show enough concern for the welfare of their seafarers.

The Shipping Establishment then allowed quite a number of different types of ships to be operated in a defective condition which caused some to fail catastrophically or become a major maintenance problem during the vessels normal life span. I myself point the finger at the approval of the following:

•	Existing motor ships being allowed to operate using heavy fuel oil instead of diesel fuel without all the very necessary and recommended modifications being carried out to the engine, fuel transfer and fuel treatment systems.
•	The lack of damage or water ingress stability in Ro-Ro ferries. 
•	The lack of consistency in survey standards within some classification societies. Standards appeared to vary depending on the country of registration and ownership. 
•	Defective and substandard changes approved at the 1966 Load Line Convention 

I myself witnessed first hand, some defective machinery surveying standards, this along with seeing a few not so good shipboard operational and maintenance practices being passed by surveyors. During the same period there was an excessively high turnover of engineers on board along with a decline in both the quality and skill level of ‘first trip’ marine engineers. This showed up in the form of an increase in operational and maintenance failures which placed extra stress and responsibility on the certificated senior engineers. 

It’s very easy for the shipping establishment to declare in the shipping press that 80% of all insurance claims are due to human error on board ship and leave it at that. This diverted blame from them and took pressure off the shipowner, the classification society and maybe even the DOT. It also stopped them having to investigate further and maybe report on the real reason for the failure! 

I have always thought myself then as being a concerned, conscientious and hard working engineer who tried hard to keep the ships machinery running smoothly. In the second half of the decade when sailing as 2/E, there was just not enough hours in the day, I got rather tired of working 12 hour days on old and run down British cargo liners, all the engine rooms were suffering from lack of maintenance mainly caused by operating the ME with a substandard HFO system. At that time, I remember seeing an advert in a British newspaper from a German shipping company wanting certificated British second engineers. They were offering me 20% increase in pay, plus they were going to pay me for overtime (paid overtime yippee!!).

I eventually migrated to Australia and worked with BHP sailing on their large iron ore carriers. This was a real eye opener to me, as it lifted me and kept me at sea for another 14 years. My first ship was the largest ship on the Australian register then, which was the MV Iron Endeavour. The Aussie DOT apparently ruled that the 4/E on board this ship had to have a 2/E engineer’s ticket! It was wonderful getting double the salary and leave and also having a massive decrease in workload and responsibility.

Since leaving the sea in 1985 I was involved in using risk management techniques when design verifying and regulating boilers and pressure equipment to Australian and International standards. With this in mind, I failed to see when setting a premium, why the insurer would require any more information from a PSC or the MCA surveyor that is not currently available in the appropriate authority’s web site? Anyway, I have just read in the latest MER magazine that the current PSC inspection system is to be replaced by a new ship risk profile system called Thetis in January 2011. The existing Sirenec Database will also be replaced by a new recording system for all port call information.

I may be simplifying the situation too much, but I think you do not have to be a rocket scientist to police and regulate the shipping industry. I remember way back in 1964, a US Coast guard officer going around the ship handing out 'on the spot' fines. He fined the repair company for running a welding set on the wharf without an attendant and he gave our oily water separator log book and also our sewage system a good going over. I was very impressed as he walked around the ship in his lovely white uniform boilersuit along with polished black jackboots, a hard hat, torch and a clipboard.

In this day and age when damage to the environment costs are now taking a prominent part in the cost of a shipping failure, surely ALL International merchant ships should be designed, built, manned, operated and be maintained in compliance with one series of International shipping Standards (IACC, IMO, ISO, etc). All Standards/Codes should be written in a clear, concise and easy to read manner using the words Shall ---- Should ---- May. All international ships must be policed and made to comply with the same ISO standards. As you have said previously insurance premiums are set based on a shipping companies claim history. Surely the premium charged should also take into consideration the amount of non conformities to the relevant Standard that has been recorded against that ships name. 

Any non conformities or non compliance to these International Standards found by any regularity surveyor or inspector after an inspection has to be acted on and then reported to IMO or the new Thetis system. 

I am a wee bit apprehensive when I read that all the Asian classification societies have very recently formed their own Association (ACS). Am I missing something and I have to ask is this a breakaway group that do not like the new procedures and rules as laid down by IMO and the IACS. 

Iain is it possible to access the findings of a court case in the Admiralty Court in London on the internet. The case I am interested in looking into was a charter party dispute involving a ship called the Parkgate or Iron Parkgate. When my company handed the ship back in Singapore there was a bad accident in the repair dock with loss of life. I think it was caused by an acetylene gas bottle exploding in the engine room. 

Regards 
Alastair


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## Iain B

Alastair

You raise a lot of interesting points, some of which would be difficult to answer with any certainty and I don't think I have any more insight into these matters than anyone else. 

The questions on how ships and shipping generally has developed and some of the mistakes that were made have been well covered in many forums. Everyone has their own personal experiences and will have their own opinions.

One of the best critiques of the shipping industry that I have read is Jack Devaney’s “The Tankship Tromedy” this looks at a lot of issues including the points you mention in your post. Jack Devaney is also an occasional contributor to this site. An excellent book I am sure you would enjoy reading it. 

When it comes to your thoughts about the “shipping establishment” I have to say that I can’t say that in 40 years I have ever seen any sign of the shipping industry acting in a co-ordinated or strategic way. The regulators regulate, usually as a result of political pressure, Insurers insure risks, shippers want more cargo carried for less and more reliably, ship yards and designers try to get an advantage by introducing what they think are better designs and new technologies, class societies act as both the client of the owners and the main resource for ensuring compliance. Flag states are either commercially minded or politically minded. The common denominator is that everyone, and commercially minded ship owners in particular try to make a profit and survive the next down turn.

Some bad designs and poor practices have been introduced and some are still with us, but on the other hand over the same period, ships have become bigger, more cargo is carried and more efficiently. There are fewer casualties, fewer accidents and less pollution. Losses are down and if you consider loss in relation the volume and value of cargo carried then huge reductions have been achieved. IUMI have recently published the statistics for 2009 which you may find interesting. http://www.iumi.com/index.cfm?id=7165

Like lots of other organisations, insurers look for indicators by which we can get a better assessment of the risk, PSC and all the other types of inspections and audits have provided a useful input over the years, but while the number and frequency of these inspections increase we have seen what we think is a big reduction in the quality and value of the inspections. 

We try to use PSC results, because they are published in the public domain, but we find that we cannot use them with any confidence any more because of the inconsistency and random nature of what is reported. Personally I am not convinced that clever systems and new inspection regimes like the one that the Paris MOU will introduce will make any difference. A system based on a sophisticated analysis of poor data can only be as good as the quality of the raw data. 

Over the years we have tried to engage with the provisions in quality management systems and tried to figure out how we can use that sort of information in our risk assessments and premium rating judgements. As you say we thought that the input and use of non conformances in particular could be helpful, and that is why I was interested in how PSC could detain a ship for such a management system issue. After some further enquiries with PSC and Class surveyors / auditors in London, I do not believe that PSC could detain a ship for something like what was described. 

On the last point about court reports, this is something that is also outside my day to day experience, but I can try to answer your question as well as I understand the situation. Law reports are produced and published, there is a web site, but it a subscriber only site http://www.i-law.com/ilaw/martimelist.htm

The law reports that are published are the notes of judgements handed down following a court case to resolve a legal dispute the law reports will usually be written by lawyers (or barristers) and intended for use by lawyers or barristers. These will usually be commercial cases and the judgements will be based on questions of law as much as the technical and operational facts of the event. A case in the admiralty court will be heard by a judge with specific knowledge of admiralty law and he will hear technical evidence – he is not a mariner and he does not make his own technical judgements. 

In the event of an accident like the one you mention there are a number of ways that it could have been settled. First the employer would pay contractual compensation to the injured employee. The injured person or family may wish to make a claim in damages (i.e. a claim in tort or “Suit”) against the owner or the yard and they would make a claim and gather evidence. The owner or yard would also gather evidence and then negotiate a settlement based on the facts available. 

When the owner or the yard settles the claim they go to their liability insurer to be indemnified for the claim (as long as it is a claim for an insured risk).

If the two sides cannot agree on a settlement they may go to court, but for a fatal injury such as this it is unlikely it would be an admiralty court. It is also worth considering that if the accident happened in Singapore it may fall under Singapore Jurisdiction. Alternatively sometimes claimants want to have the claim in a different jurisdiction such as the US (more on the side of the injured party). 

Sorry it’s a long post, and I hope it makes enough sense. 

Iain


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## alastairrussell

Iain 

Thanks for your reply with your advice on where to get some good shipping information. I really liked your IUMI and the Ilaw websites. 

What upset me and really started me off in this web site was finding out that one of my favourite ships was recorded on the international ’Ships of Shame’ list. She sank off South Africa with loss of 17 seafarers (16 were saved). It is thought that the for’d hatches either failed or floated off! It upsets me to think that some of our efforts and changes we made to that ships engineroom are now lying at the bottom of the ocean. 

The Iron Endeavour was a Panamax bulk carrier and was built on the Tyne in 1969 with the new J type Doxford engine. She was bare boat chartered to BHP for 14 years. The ships staff with the help of BHP research establishments and management overcame the deficiencies on the ‘as built’ ship. We found that one of the main problems with the J type was the poor quality Doxford supplied piston rings and we solved this by having them sourced elsewhere. The cylinder oil injection system was retimed and it was found that by fitting Australian made rings to the main piston and the more expensive Swedish made Daros ring to the top hot exhaust piston solved the problem. This stopped the high liner wear rate and also the piston ring butts from breaking, going through and damaging the turbo chargers blading!

When she was handed back to the owners she may have had a few age related and LLC 1966 generated defects in the hull, hold and ballast tanks but the engine room was going like the proverbial Singer sewing machine. I did read much later that Doxford’s blamed the demise of their engine on the LR for not giving the engine any dispensation in their continuous survey requirements for all the extra bearings and rods in the crankcase (opposed piston engine)! When they stopped making the J type and then the seahorse engine, they said the extra cost of manufacture along with the extra survey work required in the more complex engine put them at a cost disadvantage with competing engines. 

I have been a Jack Devaney fan for a while now and I agree with you that his book “The Tankship Tromedy” was good reading. I really agree with his view that the large tankers, bulk carriers and container ships should be twin screw ships. I just cannot see how insurers can do their complicated risk assessment calculations and possibly allow say a large 10,000 TEU container ship with its very high value cargo on board to operate with only one engine, one tail shaft and one propeller. Iain, I also like to read anything I can find written by the PSC surveyor Captain Pierre Woinin. 

I may have misled you slightly on the Parkgate (Naess Parkgate). I was not concerned so much about the gas cylinder explosion as that would surely have been treated as a shore side O,H and S accident. I am sure the Singapore authorities would have done the right thing and carried out a proper and correct investigation and taken the appropriate action. My heart does go out to the engineering superintendant and the 15 dockyard workers who died. Acetylene is a very unstable gas and there have been many accidents in dry docks all over the world caused by ‘hot’ acetylene bottles. 

I quote what I said in a previous post:

_In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tail shaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975. 

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR. 

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?_

I would also like a quote a note from an Australian ships history website under the name Iron Parkgate:

NOTE: _Legal ramifications of the repudiated charter contract were not settled, even with a 6 month legal battle in a London Court, until an out of court settlement was reached in 1979._

I remember hearing that it was a greaser who was washing the white painted ship side in the engine room when he spotted a tide mark through the paint. He showed this to the second engineer and this was the first indication to anyone including BHP the charterer that the engine room had at some stage been flooded or even worse, the ship had been aground!

Alastair


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## Andrew Craig-Bennett

alastairrussell said:


> Iain
> 
> Thanks for your reply with your advice on where to get some good shipping information. I really liked your IUMI and the Ilaw websites.
> 
> What upset me and really started me off in this web site was finding out that one of my favourite ships was recorded on the international ’Ships of Shame’ list. She sank off South Africa with loss of 17 seafarers (16 were saved). It is thought that the for’d hatches either failed or floated off! It upsets me to think that some of our efforts and changes we made to that ships engineroom are now lying at the bottom of the ocean.
> 
> The Iron Endeavour was a Panamax bulk carrier and was built on the Tyne in 1969 with the new J type Doxford engine. She was bare boat chartered to BHP for 14 years. The ships staff with the help of BHP research establishments and management overcame the deficiencies on the ‘as built’ ship. We found that one of the main problems with the J type was the poor quality Doxford supplied piston rings and we solved this by having them sourced elsewhere. The cylinder oil injection system was retimed and it was found that by fitting Australian made rings to the main piston and the more expensive Swedish made Daros ring to the top hot exhaust piston solved the problem. This stopped the high liner wear rate and also the piston ring butts from breaking, going through and damaging the turbo chargers blading!
> 
> When she was handed back to the owners she may have had a few age related and LLC 1966 generated defects in the hull, hold and ballast tanks but the engine room was going like the proverbial Singer sewing machine. I did read much later that Doxford’s blamed the demise of their engine on the LR for not giving the engine any dispensation in their continuous survey requirements for all the extra bearings and rods in the crankcase (opposed piston engine)! When they stopped making the J type and then the seahorse engine, they said the extra cost of manufacture along with the extra survey work required in the more complex engine put them at a cost disadvantage with competing engines.
> 
> I have been a Jack Devaney fan for a while now and I agree with you that his book “The Tankship Tromedy” was good reading. I really agree with his view that the large tankers, bulk carriers and container ships should be twin screw ships. I just cannot see how insurers can do their complicated risk assessment calculations and possibly allow say a large 10,000 TEU container ship with its very high value cargo on board to operate with only one engine, one tail shaft and one propeller. Iain, I also like to read anything I can find written by the PSC surveyor Captain Pierre Woinin.
> 
> I may have misled you slightly on the Parkgate (Naess Parkgate). I was not concerned so much about the gas cylinder explosion as that would surely have been treated as a shore side O,H and S accident. I am sure the Singapore authorities would have done the right thing and carried out a proper and correct investigation and taken the appropriate action. My heart does go out to the engineering superintendant and the 15 dockyard workers who died. Acetylene is a very unstable gas and there have been many accidents in dry docks all over the world caused by ‘hot’ acetylene bottles.
> 
> I quote what I said in a previous post:
> 
> _In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tail shaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.
> 
> There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.
> 
> Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?_
> 
> I would also like a quote a note from an Australian ships history website under the name Iron Parkgate:
> 
> NOTE: _Legal ramifications of the repudiated charter contract were not settled, even with a 6 month legal battle in a London Court, until an out of court settlement was reached in 1979._
> 
> I remember hearing that it was a greaser who was washing the white painted ship side in the engine room when he spotted a tide mark through the paint. He showed this to the second engineer and this was the first indication to anyone including BHP the charterer that the engine room had at some stage been flooded or even worse, the ship had been aground!
> 
> Alastair


At the time of the litigation I was an articled clerk with Constant and Constant who were BHP's London solicitors.

It was not an Admiralty Court case; it was a Commercial Court case, but because it settled there is no record of it.


----------



## Iain B

alastairrussell said:


> Iain
> 
> 
> I just cannot see how insurers can do their complicated risk assessment calculations and possibly allow say a large 10,000 TEU container ship with its very high value cargo on board to operate with only one engine, one tail shaft and one propeller.


 
Alastair

Of course I can't speak for the marine insurance industry or even any particular underwriter, but I think I would be safe in saying that the sort of risk assessments we do are not complicated and not sophisticated.

There are many ways to both control and mitigate the risk and within the shipping business a good selection of techniques are used. Indeed insurance is the first level of risk mitigation that is taken out by by ship owners. 

If we consider the example of the very high value container ship and cargo that you describe.

The total value of the risk is split and covered by different types of insurance. 
Hull & Machinery
Cargo
Liability (P&I)
There will probably be other risks specifically insured as well e.g. war risks, specific oil pollution risks, strike risks.

Those insurers will then re-insure to mitigate the potential loss for their part of the risk. Further protection is provided in law to the owner and insurer by the limitation conventions and the Hague Visby rules. 

This is where the risk input elements such as PSC and non conformances become useful. A lot of the defences the ship owner and insurer can rely on to mitigate the loss is based on showing that they exercised due dilligence to make the ship seaworthy and carry the cargo. We try to understand the relationship between the PSC detention record and loss ratio.

Along with the owners loss record and information about the ship type and size, PSC information in the public domain can give you an indication of the standard of due dilligence that is typical of the owner. 

Insurers are not arbiters of standards or quality, insurers are just financial organisations trying to make money by good underwriting and good claims handling. 

Insurers underwrite large ships with potentialy large risks because the relationship between the loss ratio and the premium income is sufficiently attractive. 

I went to the Cheltenham festival (horse race meeting) and was amazed to see normally sensible underwriters putting large sums of money on horses at long odds with not much chance of winning. I would think that underwriting a large container ship with one engine, one propellor and tail shaft is a better bet.


Iain


----------



## non descript

alastairrussell said:


> I tried to put this post on the Chen Neng 1 thread but it keeps getting dumped ( 4 times!!) So I am giving up and putting it in here
> 
> Alastair


No.. It worked FOUR times or you. (EEK) - But so as not to upset the flow, we have deleted the extra three there and seeing as this post has had a reply, we are leavening this duplicate here as well, as otherwise it would get confusing.
(Thumb)
Mark


----------



## Andrew Craig-Bennett

Tonga - I've shifted my reply to the original thread and deleted it here. Sorry.


----------



## non descript

Andrew Craig-Bennett said:


> Tonga - I've shifted my reply to the original thread and deleted it here. Sorry.


OK,. no worries. (Thumb)


----------



## alastairrussell

Sorry Tonga, I now realise were I went wrong!! I did not realise that we had moved onto a page 2 !! I will delete my post in this bulk carrier section.

Must try harder in the future!

Alastair


----------



## non descript

alastairrussell said:


> Sorry Tonga, I now realise were I went wrong!! I did not realise that we had moved onto a page 2 !! I will delete my post in this bulk carrier section.
> 
> Must try harder in the future!
> 
> Alastair


No apology needed, you were only working hard to add worthwhile comment and that's more than appreciated. (Thumb)
Mark


----------



## alastairrussell

Iain

Thanks for all the info on how the marine insurance system works. 

I remember being surprised when reading that the most profitable years for underwriters were the years just before the plimsoll line was introduced. All the overloaded ships were sinking right, left and centre and drowning their crews but I suppose because of this, the underwriters were able to charge very high premiums. Mind you its not all one way as I vaguely remember that an ex prime minister of Australia who became a name at Lloyds went on to lose a heap of money very quickly! I cannot remember his name (I must have a faulty memory just like a politician)

I am really looking forward to seeing how the Shen Neng 1 incident, investigation and salvage ends up. I see the 17 year old ship as being totally worthless, more so if the engine room DB’s are eventually damaged or if the ER gets flooded. Seemingly no one wants to time charter bulk carriers more than 15 year old and I think salvaging all the coking coal would not be an economic proposition. 

Tell me, Can the salvers and the insurers just remove all the bunker fuel and the lubricating oil from the ship and just leave her there to rust away over the next 100 years? Remember the bulk carrier Signa shambles at Stockton beach.

Are they by law entitled to do this? Can the Australian maritime authorities demand that the ship be removed and who pays to have her towed offshore and sunk? The last ship that was damaged and managed to dump some of its bunkers along the barrier reef did not have enough money in the kitty or in insurance pay out to cover the clean up. The Queensland taxpayers had to chip in and I feel this is wrong, wrong!!

In view of the above, it does not help either when Michael Grey in the march 2010 Shipping World and Shipbuilder magazine has a go at the Australian maritime authorities for levying visiting ships so they can boost their pollution insurance beyond that required by the IMO convention.

Way back, I attended a technical meeting and I have read a few papers on the salvage of a few fully loaded bulk carriers that have run aground in Australia. On all occasions they had a working engine room and power and were able to pump ballast in and out. On only one occasion they had to dump cargo to assist in the refloating. On one ship they sealed the impact cracks in the ballast tanks by placing hard wooden wedges in the cracks then they packed heaps of car panel beating bog around the wedges. Apparently the car bog hardens underwater quickly and the wedges are there to stop any movement when the hardening process is going on. 

I remember reading a book in the late fifties about the great Canadian (Nova Scotia) salvage company ‘Foundation Maritime’. Do you remember that liberty ship crawling into the English channel with a big list, wheat cargo had shifted. I cannot remember any names bar the name of the tug! ‘Tug Turmoil’ and how the mate of the tug jumped aboard to help the lone skipper. I think the skipper was a Norwegian? 

Iain can you tell those horse betting underwriters that when BHP built their first twin screw Bulk carrier (Iron Pacific) I bought a swag of BHP shares for less than $10 a share (memory) they are now at $43. Every Melbourne cup day instead of putting money on a horse I spend the money buying some penny dreadful Australian oil or mining share. Please note that none of them have hit pay dirt yet but I do have got a good feeling about Lakes Oil (LKO)!!!!

It will only be a matter of time before the shipping industry sees the light. The bulk carrier of the future will have a row of efficient diesel alternators running on low sulphur diesel oil (not 3% sulphur HFO) high up in the ship with all the fuel storage well away from the double bottoms. There will be an efficient waste heat recovery system along with some wind power generators to assist to the drive of the two small diameter electric drive propellers or propulsive units which will operate well when the ship is in a ballasted condition. Each propeller will have its own separate steering gear. We must build in heaps of machinery redundancy !


Alastair


----------



## Andrew Craig-Bennett

Alastair, I used to be a salvage lawyer and will do my best to answer: 

The short answer is that pollution prevention measures are not "no cure - no pay" but are remunerated on a cost plus basis by the P+I Club.

Coking coal is around $100 per ton at the moment so there is six million dollars at least in the cargo; assuming the ship is scrap we have maybe 8,000 light displacement tons in a Panamax at say US$150 /ldt, very conservatively. So salvage is a paying proposition at this stage.

Wreck removal is again covered by the P+I Club (which in this case is the London Club) assuming that the local authority has the power to require removal of the wreck. But at the moment this looks like a not too difficult salvage, rather than a wreck removal.


----------



## WilliamH

Alastair the ship you could not remember in your post 198 was Flying Enterprise, the masters name was Carlson.


----------



## Iain B

Alistair

Some more very pertinent observations and comments. I do not represent the marine insurance business and I can only express my own views. 

Marine insurance is a strange beast, but ever since the times of the phoenicians marine insurance has enabled and encouraged trade by mitigating the risk that merchants and adventurers face. In a modern context we see the world and risk in a different way, we do not like loss and we expect heads to roll when there has been a casualty. Public pressure on issues like pollution dominate the debate and a pollution incident is likely to produce a bigger public outcry that the loss of life of the crew. (likely to be a bigger claim on the owners insurance as well) 

I would suggest that the increase in value of your BHP shares has been due to their reserves of ore and China's demand for that ore, more than the Iron Pacific being built with a twin screw, but the twin screw idea is probably indicative of BHP's attitude to risk. I know that BHP ship billions of tonnes of ore around the world and I would bet that 99.99% of those shipments are in single screw ships, many of which will be more than 15 years old.

BHP do this successfully and increase the value of your shares because the probable success of all these voyages is very high and the risk is very low. They know this because they take it seriously and have a number of risk management systems, including a ship inspection and vetting scheme. The back stop risk management facility will be the insurances that they and the ships they use will carry. 

I am sure you are right and there will be continual pressure for more technological improvements for ship design. Each casualty will increase the calls for new legislation. It has been this way since the first SOLAS convention which was as a result of the loss of the Titanic. 

Ship owners will continue to be slow to build ships with the additional redundancy you mention until it is made mandatory through SOLAS or MARPOL. There is a significant additional cost involved in this sort of additional technology and so those owners that choose to include additional redundancy face a financial disadvantage in both capital expenditure and operational expenditure. If we cut the insurance premiums to zero, it still would not make up for the increase in capex and opex in most cases. 

Iain


----------



## Octavius

chadburn said:


> We (Har Addir) were on our maiden trip from Narvik to the Botlek and I am fairly sure we moored in front of the "Parkgate" in April 1968 at the Botlek, at that time we still had the Furness Yard guarantee Engineer on board as we had suffered a structural failure previously which had flooded the Duct Keel and knocked the Ballast system out. He got an invite for the Chief and I to go aboard the Parkgate to have a look around, although she was just over a year old her Deck had split right across from around No 6 Hatch and had been repaired(EEK) . Our own failure bothered me but as the Har Addir was the lead ship of five and the biggest built by the Furness yard at that time I accepted that she was a working prototype and these thing's happen, when I saw the repairs on the Parkgate I knew I had to get off a.s.a.p. so it was up with my desk fold down typewriter and a letter looking for a transfer to the Companies Reefer's, which was typed about 0200hr's after a night at the "Dutch Barn"(Smoke)
> Ian, other than the Saddle Dumps (handmatic) what type of valved Ballast System did the Parkgate have, air or hydraulic?


Now there is a blast from the past, the old 'Har Addir'.
And what did you sail on that vessel as Geordie?


----------



## chadburn

Octavius said:


> Now there is a blast from the past, the old 'Har Addir'.
> And what did you sail on that vessel as Geordie?


The clue's are there, I sailed on her from new. Is that Bill?


----------



## alastairrussell

Iain,

Thanks for your very interesting explanation on how Marine Insurance developed and operates. 

You are of course quite right and I have to admit my BHP shares only went up when the BHP got rid of their steelworks and of course their ships and became only a mining and oil company. The steel works were sold off and became two separate companies BlueScope Steel and One Steel. The ships in the BHP fleet appeared to have been sold off or returned to their owners. 

During the bad bulky *‘ Ships of Shame ‘* period, BHP refused to allow bulk carriers older than 15 years to load at its facilities. They were just too problematic and troublesome. I am not sure but this ban may have been lifted now with the improvements to the standard of bulk carriers. 

Remember during the bad years many of the bulk carriers had no protective paint coating on the inside of the ballast tanks. This along with the fact that basically no corrosion allowance was added or built into the strength of the hull structures was bad. 

Ore carriers also suffered badly from grab damage especially as the grabs got like the ships, bigger and bigger. When a 60 tonne grab was used on a small bulk carrier, the noise and vibration was hellish and you could not get any sleep at nights when discharging! 

When ordering a ship BHP used to specify extra thickness above the class requirements for the tank tops in an attempt to reduce grab damage costs. I was told later on that they did reduce grab damage substantially in Port Kembla when they started hiring female ore bridge drivers!

Anyway I have attached bit and pieces of previous posts that might be of interest to marine insurers. 

How about this quote from the master of Titanic to USA press people 5 years before he signed on the doomed Titanic?

[I_*]"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."

(Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)*_*

Jack*

_If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the 1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour. 

Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:

• Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.

• The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.

I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that risk management is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?_[/I]


1992-Feb.17
*In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."*


Iain, In the following you can see that its been *120 year battle *to have some machinery redundancy built into merchant ships. I reckon that Sir Nathaniel copped the same treatment as Sir Samuel Plimsol did back then 

_Jack

I refer to two technical papers read at the first joint session of British and American Society of Engineers at the Carnegie hall in Pittsburgh in the 9th October *1890*. The first paper was by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby under the name ‘*The Protection of Iron and Steel Ships against Foundering from Injury to their Shells’ *and the other was by S. E. Seaton and was on ‘*The Development of the Marine Engine’*

Sir Nathaniel suggests that a steel ships hull should have sufficient subdivisions to enable it to float after one area has been flooded. He went on to say that in 1866 the Council of the British Institution of Naval Architects fully debated the subject and decided that and I quote “*No iron passenger ship is well constructed unless her compartments be so designed that she would float safely were anyone with any one of them fill with water or be placed in free communication with the sea.” *They the BINA Council, recommended and I quote again that “*All iron ships should be so divided and not only the largest compartment, but any two adjacent compartments, might be given up to the same without sinking the ship.* This latter is an advisory clause, the wisdom of which is not disputed. The first, however is condemnatory of all badly constructed ships.” 

Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “*During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”*

In the second paper the noted British marine engineer S E Seaton spoke about the ‘*The Development of the Marine Engine’ *and in it *he recommended using twin screw ships for safety reasons,* I quote: “*Propulsion by twin screws has many practical advantages but it is chiefly now adopted from consideration of safety, in as much as a ship with two screws is less liable to have both injured at the same time, and therefore her whole propelling apparatus broken down, than one with a single screw; and in case of accidents to the steering gear she can be steered by varying the revolutions of the engines. More over a smaller propeller is required for each of the twin screw engines with that needed for a single engine of the same power; hence in the case of a deep draught ship, owing to the deep emersion the twin screw act a higher efficiency, and in the case of a shallow draught ship the same holds good, In as much as they are thoroughly immersed when the single screw of the same power would be partially out of the water.”*Sir Nathaniel was the very progressive Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy from 1872 until 1885. He was famous for his refusal to accept the use of steel in his naval ships manufactured using the early Bessemer process. It was only when improved quality steel, made by the new open hearth process was introduced that he relented. In the above paper he mentioned that he thought that loaded barges could be floated into a steel built ship through a large open door speeding up the loading and discharge! When did the LASH ships come out?

Google ‘Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’ and then read the full New York Times newspaper article on the engineering joint session held in October 1890. He talks about the merits of the iron ship against a wooden ship and S E Seaton talks about the developments in marine propulsion systems._

Iain , With IMO declaring this year 2010 as being the *Year of the Seafarer *it is surely time that a major effort is made by all concerned to bring all international commercial shipping under the one set of declared regulations and standards. Everything should be left to the IMO and International Association of Classification Societies. We cannot allow certain countries and regions like USA and the EU to turn the very necessary shipping industry regulations into a shambles. 

The USA and EU are being very selfish and I am sure that they do not care one ****** about the safety and wellbeing of the third world seafarers. I am sure they see the international commercial shipping industry as a place only for the second class citizens of the world who will work for second class pay and conditions!

Alastair



William

Thanks for that info on Captain Carlson and his ship the Flying Enterprize its all coming back to me .

My favourite movie back then was Spencer Tracy in *Captain Courageous*. Do you remember it ? They were fishing on the grand banks for cod in their blue nose schooner. It was wonderful camera work and the movie was years ahead of its time.

Alastair


----------



## alastairrussell

Iain

I was having a look in the Intercargo, Intertankco and the IMO web sites when I accidentally came across RightShip. It just goes to show how out of touch I am with what is going on in the real shipping world!! I was not aware that my favorite shipping company BHP was a founder member and a major shareholder of a private and now very successful international bulk carrier vetting system called RightShip. This organization has been operating for 10 years and has apparently taking over from the previous blanket ban on bulk carriers older than 15 years.

I am sure the success of this group of cargo owners in introducing this vetting system must be a wee bit of an embarrassment to the classification societies and maybe IMO. I am thinking surely the insurers and the underwriters (and seafarers) would prefer to use the RightShips star rating system than data gained from the present PSC system? 

I see the rating system takes into account if the required environmental protection equipment have been installed and if the ballast tanks have a protective coating!

The following was copied from a Rio Tinto Marine website:

*RightShip sets the standard for dry bulk ship vetting*

_Thanks to Rio Tinto Marine, ship vetting has become a well accepted HSE compliance process in all Rio Tinto business units. It has also achieved a leadership role in the global marine industry. 

RightShip, the ship vetting service founded by Rio Tinto and BHP-Billiton, screens the quality of ships before they are chartered to carry bulk cargoes like iron ore, coal and industrial minerals.

Prospective charters are scrutinised and rated for safety, operational condition and environmental performance to meet high standards. The system is the only online vetting service available; providing users with a timely and reliable rating system for their nominated vessels.
]
Last year RightShip vetted 9,600 ships on behalf of its partners and subscribers' chartering desks. The vetting process is aimed at ensuring that vessels meet certain standards in order to minimize business risk. 

RightShip determines a weighted risk rating for vessels by drawing on a wide range of regularly updated data that is benchmarked against regulatory standards. Ratings are continuously updated as new information is received. 

The system's output is cross checked by physical inspections which are undertaken by RightShip inspectors on a random basis covering about 650 ships a year.

Now RightShip has won a further seal of approval with the entry of international agriculture and food company, Cargill, into the ownership group. 

Like Rio Tinto and BHP-Billiton, Cargill is a major cargo owner. Cargill's involvement will bring significant volume growth and product diversification to RightShip that is expected to boost the number of ships vetted by RightShip by 40 per cent.

Together, the three partners will account for approximately 70 per cent of all dry bulk vessel demand. Bulk cargoes shipped by Rio Tinto worldwide account for approximately ten per cent of the world seaborne dry bulk trade.

Cargill's participation will widen RightShip's network, provide more capacity to improve its service offering and strengthen RightShip's ability to influence industry standards, says David Peever, managing director of Rio Tinto Marine.

RightShip currently has over 50 external customers using its online vetting system, operating in over 50 countries. Broadening the third party customer base continues to increase the influence of RightShip on the global shipping industry in a positive way and improves the safety standard of vessels at sea, says David.

RightShip's efforts have been recognised both within and outside the marine industry. It is recognised by a number of Port State Controls worldwide to have positively influenced the quality of ships calling at their ports. In 2004, it won a Lloyd's List Award for Innovation for its leading edge ship vetting system and services. 

More recently, RightShip won the Australian Governor of Victoria's Export Award for best exporter in the Services category. This award represents recognition of RightShip's success outside the industry.

In the four years since its formation in 2001, RightShip has become the industry standard for dry bulk ship vetting and changed the attitude of industry participants to HSEC compliance._

Alastair

PS I wonder how many stars the Shen Deng 1 has ?


----------



## Iain B

alastairrussell said:


> Iain
> 
> I was having a look in the Intercargo, Intertankco and the IMO web sites when I accidentally came across RightShip. It just goes to show how out of touch I am with what is going on in the real shipping world!! I was not aware that my favorite shipping company BHP was a founder member and a major shareholder of a private and now very successful international bulk carrier vetting system called RightShip. This organization has been operating for 10 years and has apparently taking over from the previous blanket ban on bulk carriers older than 15 years.
> 
> I am sure the success of this group of cargo owners in introducing this vetting system must be a wee bit of an embarrassment to the classification societies and maybe IMO. I am thinking surely the insurers and the underwriters (and seafarers) would prefer to use the RightShips star rating system than data gained from the present PSC system?
> 
> I see the rating system takes into account if the required environmental protection equipment have been installed and if the ballast tanks have a protective coating!
> 
> 
> 
> Alastair
> 
> PS I wonder how many stars the Shen Deng 1 has ?


Alistair 

I see you made a similar post on another thread but the questions you ask are a little bit different, so I hope you don't mine me responding with comments on each.

From our point of view we would like to use a better type of risk rating than PSC reports, but the Rightship rating seems to be based on not much more than PSC reports. There are other inputs, but anything I get to look at seems to be a pretty good ship (good risk) but with a number of PSC itmes following a PSC inspection in a certain type of port. 

I don't know how long this system has been going, they opened a London office and have been on a big selling campaign for a couple of years, getting people to sign up. As I understand it was started by Rio Tinto and BHP joined. Cargill joined recently and then the big Brazilian shippers and terminals. 

We are all looking for better information or better inputs to make risk decisions, but personally I am not yet convinced that a computer programme can make qualitative decisions on complex and dynamic risk factors which have a large unpredictable element in them. I guess that is why we employ humans and ask them to make value based decisions based on knowledge and experience. 

A good job too or I will be replaced by a computer programme. 

Iain


----------



## jrg

alastairrussell said:


> Iain,
> 
> Thanks for your very interesting explanation on how Marine Insurance developed and operates.
> 
> You are of course quite right and I have to admit my BHP shares only went up when the BHP got rid of their steelworks and of course their ships and became only a mining and oil company. The steel works were sold off and became two separate companies BlueScope Steel and One Steel. The ships in the BHP fleet appeared to have been sold off or returned to their owners.
> 
> During the bad bulky *‘ Ships of Shame ‘* period, BHP refused to allow bulk carriers older than 15 years to load at its facilities. They were just too problematic and troublesome. I am not sure but this ban may have been lifted now with the improvements to the standard of bulk carriers.
> 
> Remember during the bad years many of the bulk carriers had no protective paint coating on the inside of the ballast tanks. This along with the fact that basically no corrosion allowance was added or built into the strength of the hull structures was bad.
> 
> Ore carriers also suffered badly from grab damage especially as the grabs got like the ships, bigger and bigger. When a 60 tonne grab was used on a small bulk carrier, the noise and vibration was hellish and you could not get any sleep at nights when discharging!
> 
> When ordering a ship BHP used to specify extra thickness above the class requirements for the tank tops in an attempt to reduce grab damage costs. I was told later on that they did reduce grab damage substantially in Port Kembla when they started hiring female ore bridge drivers!
> 
> Anyway I have attached bit and pieces of previous posts that might be of interest to marine insurers.
> 
> How about this quote from the master of Titanic to USA press people 5 years before he signed on the doomed Titanic?
> 
> [I_*]"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."
> 
> (Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)*_*
> 
> Jack*
> 
> _If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the 1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour.
> 
> Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:
> 
> • Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.
> 
> • The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.
> 
> I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that risk management is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?_[/I]
> 
> 
> 1992-Feb.17
> *In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."*
> 
> 
> Iain, In the following you can see that its been *120 year battle *to have some machinery redundancy built into merchant ships. I reckon that Sir Nathaniel copped the same treatment as Sir Samuel Plimsol did back then
> 
> _Jack
> 
> I refer to two technical papers read at the first joint session of British and American Society of Engineers at the Carnegie hall in Pittsburgh in the 9th October *1890*. The first paper was by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby under the name ‘*The Protection of Iron and Steel Ships against Foundering from Injury to their Shells’ *and the other was by S. E. Seaton and was on ‘*The Development of the Marine Engine’*
> 
> Sir Nathaniel suggests that a steel ships hull should have sufficient subdivisions to enable it to float after one area has been flooded. He went on to say that in 1866 the Council of the British Institution of Naval Architects fully debated the subject and decided that and I quote “*No iron passenger ship is well constructed unless her compartments be so designed that she would float safely were anyone with any one of them fill with water or be placed in free communication with the sea.” *They the BINA Council, recommended and I quote again that “*All iron ships should be so divided and not only the largest compartment, but any two adjacent compartments, might be given up to the same without sinking the ship.* This latter is an advisory clause, the wisdom of which is not disputed. The first, however is condemnatory of all badly constructed ships.”
> 
> Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “*During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”*
> 
> In the second paper the noted British marine engineer S E Seaton spoke about the ‘*The Development of the Marine Engine’ *and in it *he recommended using twin screw ships for safety reasons,* I quote: “*Propulsion by twin screws has many practical advantages but it is chiefly now adopted from consideration of safety, in as much as a ship with two screws is less liable to have both injured at the same time, and therefore her whole propelling apparatus broken down, than one with a single screw; and in case of accidents to the steering gear she can be steered by varying the revolutions of the engines. More over a smaller propeller is required for each of the twin screw engines with that needed for a single engine of the same power; hence in the case of a deep draught ship, owing to the deep emersion the twin screw act a higher efficiency, and in the case of a shallow draught ship the same holds good, In as much as they are thoroughly immersed when the single screw of the same power would be partially out of the water.”*Sir Nathaniel was the very progressive Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy from 1872 until 1885. He was famous for his refusal to accept the use of steel in his naval ships manufactured using the early Bessemer process. It was only when improved quality steel, made by the new open hearth process was introduced that he relented. In the above paper he mentioned that he thought that loaded barges could be floated into a steel built ship through a large open door speeding up the loading and discharge! When did the LASH ships come out?
> 
> Google ‘Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’ and then read the full New York Times newspaper article on the engineering joint session held in October 1890. He talks about the merits of the iron ship against a wooden ship and S E Seaton talks about the developments in marine propulsion systems._
> 
> Iain , With IMO declaring this year 2010 as being the *Year of the Seafarer *it is surely time that a major effort is made by all concerned to bring all international commercial shipping under the one set of declared regulations and standards. Everything should be left to the IMO and International Association of Classification Societies. We cannot allow certain countries and regions like USA and the EU to turn the very necessary shipping industry regulations into a shambles.
> 
> The USA and EU are being very selfish and I am sure that they do not care one ****** about the safety and wellbeing of the third world seafarers. I am sure they see the international commercial shipping industry as a place only for the second class citizens of the world who will work for second class pay and conditions!
> 
> Alastair
> 
> 
> 
> William
> 
> Thanks for that info on Captain Carlson and his ship the Flying Enterprize its all coming back to me .
> 
> My favourite movie back then was Spencer Tracy in *Captain Courageous*. Do you remember it ? They were fishing on the grand banks for cod in their blue nose schooner. It was wonderful camera work and the movie was years ahead of its time.
> 
> Alastair


I was interested to see the comments regarding BHP shipping, and the Iron Pacific in particular. I sailed with Ironships for 16 years, and from 1993-1998 was 1/E on the Pacific. The reason for twin propulsion was to enable the largest possible ship to manouever into Port Kembla harbour. All other ships of the class were single prop. Although the ship had decent equipment installed, BHP parsimony saw that the variable pitch props were not backed up with shaft alternators-an economy that was very short sighted. MIDC reductions saw the crew reduced to sixteen-too few to run the ship effectively, especially with the electrician gone. The vertical integration philosophy of BHP-mine, transport, refine-worked well, and there was no reason apart from commercoial expediency to get rid of the fleet. The Pacific was bought by Bergesens, and we took it from Australia to Gijon, Spain, to hand over. The fleet remaining was managed by TK for three years, and is now part of ASP, with the Gas Carriers run by Shell.


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## alastairrussell

JRG

Thanks for your post I wondered what happened to the Iron Pacific (Berge Pacific), is she still in service somewhere? I just cannot imagine a ship her size having only 16 crew members on board, can you remember the positions of all the crew. 

Port Kembla is a difficult entrance when swinging the big iron ore carriers round to enter the inner harbour. I remember there being a difference of opinion amongst the PK pilots on the best way to bring the new 140,000 tonners into the iron ore berth! I was 2/E on the Iron Whyalla at the time when we bounced off the shore when she entered PK on her second voyage! We hit the rocks at the entrance to the inner harbour on her port side and this punched a hole into our No1 DB ballast tank. Apparently you could have driven a bus through the hole and the hull section was bent right up under the tank top. 

The forward end of the ship dropped right down into the mud, but fortunately with No 1 being not being divided port and starboard we did not develop a list and we were able to power the ship and our No 1 hold under an ore discharge crane before the tide started to drop away.

I remember, even though I had sailed for 2.5 years as C/E, BHP would not let me have a permanent position in that rank unless I had a 1st class steam endorsement! I did manage to get my steam time in on the Iron Hunter and the Iron Bogong before the new 140,000 tonners came on the scene and replaced many of the smaller bulk carriers. This created a surplus of qualified seafarers, so I went back to my 2/E position. This along with BHP giving notice of reducing the engineer manning further and doing away with the electrician was the ‘straw that broke the camels back’ for me. I accepted their very generous voluntary redundancy package and bailed out of being a seafarer. BHP will always be my favourite shipping company and favourite employer.

With introduction of unmanned engine rooms (UMS) to the BHP fleet back in the early 70’s we accepted this new technology along with the reduced manning. I remember when BHP took the UMS ship Iron Kestrel over from the London and Overseas Freighters Company when she was one year old. They had refused to trust the UMS system and had 7 engineers plus an electrician on board. Apparently their chief was quite concerned when BHP turned up and sailed her away with four engineers and an electrician and within 24 hours of departure had her ER running unmanned. 

Unlike other departments on board Australian ships, when sailing on identical Japanese built UMS ships we had the same engineering manning as the Japanese. So why do away with the very necessary electrician (the ship had 4 cranes)! I am sure they were trying to do the ‘ one from each department’ trick far too late in the game! 

Thanks again for the info

Alastair


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## Tugengineer1959

*The leros strength radio records*



alastairrussell said:


> 1998-Feb.8
> The bulker LEROS STRENGTH, 27469dwt, sinks with all hands (20 persons) off the coast of Norway after structural failure in bad weather. The ships is classed by RINA and flies the Cyprus flag.


Hi alastair, a Cypriot class surveyor played back a recording of the captains running commentary to the coastguard as the first hatch went, then the second hatch one thing missing, no audible alar
s were heard, maybe the master didn't muster the crew. It was very strange and eerie listening to that recording. Poor souls.


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## alastairrussell

Tugengineer

Thanks for your info on the Leros Strenght sinking. I agree that listening to the recording would sound very eerie. My heart goes out to the poor lost crew of the ship. 

The info you supplied from the radio recordings falls in with the typical structural failure of a fully loaded bulkcarrier carrying iron ore in heavy weather at that time.

I suggest you google the Youtube website and put a search through it using the words "The sinking of the MV Derbyshire". You will then see an animation of her failure made for the last British Royal Commision inquiry.

Alastair


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## chadburn

Has the Leros wreck been inspected?


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## David Campbell

*Derbyshire*

Alistair. Thanks for posting the You Tube, I had not seen it before.

It is chilling. Dave.


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## alastairrussell

Dave

Great to hear from you, how are things going up North? It is good see you that are still interested in the Big Bulkies so you are obviously firing on all cylinders.

Youtube has a got another frightening video taken from one of the big H and W cranes when a smaller tower crane comes crashing down!!! The bloke who was taking the shot could not stop swearing as he climbed down trying to get at the crane driver.

I find it quite upsetting to see that the mighty H&W shipyard along with their big building dry dock is being used to break up old bulkcarriers and tankers.

Have been researching Australia's biggest maritime loss of life in the sinking of the Japanese prison ship the Montevideo Maru. She one of their first diesel ships (twin screw Sulzer). Google ' The Montevideo Maru Tragedy'

Alastair


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## David Campbell

Alastair. Good to hear from You! I check the H&W website every week and last week they had 137 employees, a bit of a change, but still going.

I am heavy into Tablet computers, have always my Samsung Galaxy 10 beside me. It is my portable home library, everything of interest on the internet, I download to it and read at my leisure. I am a walking encyclopaedia of facts--Maratime.

Hope you and Meg are still Sailing. David & Hazel. Hazels friend is her iPad, she reads all the UK Papers every morning.


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## geoffakelly

Some information on the most dangerous ship i was ever on... I got off it knowing it was a death trap..And few weeks later watching the news ... 


At 11.35 a.m. on Monday, 5 February, the UK authorities informed the Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Shannon that the Isle of Man registered bulk carrier MV Tribulus was holed and taking in water at a position 48.30 degrees north, 15 degrees west (270 nautical miles south-west of Mizen Head). The UK Coastguard at Falmouth were responsible for co-ordinating the response, since this incident took place in the UK search and rescue region.

The vessel is 68,000 gross registered tons and was carrying 122,000 tonnes of iron ore from Seven Islands in Canada to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Twenty-five persons were on board.

Two RAF Sea Kings from Brawdy, South Wales, and one Royal Navy Sea King from Culdrose, Cornwall were dispatched to Cork to carry out the rescue. One Sea King helicopter refuelled at the Irish Lights helicopter pad at Castletownbere and flew to the casualty which at that time (17.10 on Monday, 5 February) was 230 nautical miles south west of Mizen Head. The two other Sea Kings remained on standby, one at Castletownbere and the other at Cork Airport.

Ten crew were lifted off and brought to Cork at 22.23 on Monday night. The rescue was carried out at the limit of the range of the helicopter and with exemplary courage and skill, given the sea conditions.

The current situation is that the vessel is making for Bantry Bay under its own steam at a speed of 7 knots. Its expected time of arrival is 4 a.m. on Wednesday 7 February. The vessel is being accompanied by the tug Salano which was [632] diverted on a voyage from Cobh to the Azores to assist. In addition the LE Eithne is alongside.

The Air Corps helicopter based at Shannon has been dispatched to Whiddy Island, Bantry where it is refuelled and on standby. The vessel has approximately 550 tonnes of heavy fuel oil on board, which is leaking slowly. Therefore, there is a risk of oil pollution from this vessel. A pollution operations group, under the chairmanship of a marine surveyor of my Department have been activated and will take responsibility for the direction and control of operations to prevent or minimise pollution damage. The group are expected to convene at Bantry this afternoon. Counter-pollution equipment, at this moment, is being loaded at Cork on the Irish Lights tender Gray Seal for transport to Bantry Bay. More is being flown in from Southampton. I have asked for the help of his Excellency, the British Ambassador, in progressing this matter. In addition, Cork County Council and the Naval Service are putting their stocks of dispersant at the disposal of the pollution operations group.

I consider that, unless there are grave reasons to the contrary, we should always provide shelter to vessels in distress. On the basis of the information available to me following an inspection by the LE Eithne, I intend to permit the vessel to take refuge in Bantry Bay in the interests of safety of life. If the vessel was refused admission there would be a serious risk to the life of the crew. In the event of the crew abandoning the vessel outside a haven, the drifting vessel would present a major hazard to navigation and a possible threat to the Kinsale Head gas platforms. Moreover, as experience has shown with the Kowloon Bridge, there would be a greater threat of pollution damage to the environment from an uncontrolled vessel than from one manned and assisted by other vessels.

Subject to weather conditions the arrival of the vessel in Bantry Bay will be planned to occur at dawn — that is somewhat later than in the normal course [633] of events — at which stage a final inspection would be made prior to clearance for entry.

The owners of the vessel, Shell Oil Tankers, which is fully insured, have offered all possible assistance in dealing with the vessel and any threat of pollution. The UK Department of Transport are also helping. At 1 p.m. this afternoon, the vessel was 100 miles south-west of Mizen Head.

Mr. Gilmore: I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply. Has he established the cause of the tear in the vessel, the condition and age of the vessel and if there is a danger of further damage to the vessel with a consequential risk of environmental pollution?

Mr. Wilson: In reply to the Deputy, the ten metre by three metre long plate of strong steel has split. It is a plate covering a hatch which is not loaded. Hatches 2, 4, 6 and 8 are empty. The in-between hatches are loaded with roughly 25,000 tonnes of iron ore. Hatch 8, the one that is damaged, did not have iron ore in it so, consequently the damage to the plate — I understand with this type of steel that if there is a small crack it runs along — did not lighten the vessel, so to speak The hatch has been broken and that is now filled with the requisite tonnage of water. The LE Eithne has reported that the damage cannot be seen except when there is a roll to port. The damage is on the starboard side. The ship is a product of one of the Japanese yards and is quite young.


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## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> Tugengineer
> 
> Thanks for your info on the Leros Strenght sinking. I agree that listening to the recording would sound very eerie. My heart goes out to the poor lost crew of the ship.
> 
> The info you supplied from the radio recordings falls in with the typical structural failure of a fully loaded bulkcarrier carrying iron ore in heavy weather at that time.
> 
> I suggest you google the Youtube website and put a search through it using the words "The sinking of the MV Derbyshire". You will then see an animation of her failure made for the last British Royal Commision inquiry.
> 
> Alastair


Thanks for the reference to Youtube and specifically to the animation "The Sinking of the Derbyshire."
As a former master of these types of vessels, and having myself come uncomfortably close to foundering in the North Pacific during that terrible winter of 1980 ( only shortly after the loss of the Derbyshire) my personal belief is that the animation does in fact represent what most likely happened on that terribly tragic occassion.
My ship however did have a raised foclsle which made all the difference, but in the aftermath, it became apparent that implossion of Hatches No. 1 and No.2 had commenced, but thanking god alone, had not completed.
We survived, but in my view, only just.
The ocean in full fury - defies all belief.
Let us never forget the Derbyshire, and those who were lost in her, and furthermore, cherish that animation - for the benefit of all, who continue to serve in similar vessels.


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## John Cassels

Which ship was this ? , or are you again going to tell us something without
giving any information ?.


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## oldman 80

Direct your query to T.C. - not I.
He might respond to you.
I certainly won't .


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## John Cassels

I thought so.

I think the vast majority of your posts are pure fantasy - only my opinion
of course but you do this so often - making a statement then refusing to
elaborate - that no other conclusion seems possible.


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## oldman 80

Well you are sure entitled to your opinion John.
What it is, - just doesn't really interest me at all.


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## WilliamH

Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.


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## John Cassels

WilliamH said:


> Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.


Have a funny feeling you're wasting your time William.

I too would like to know which ship and asked as much politely.
But it's not the first time oldman80 has put something on open
forum , then when one askes for a few more details all one gets
is a sarcastic remark. 
Bye the bye , would you happen to know who T.C. is ; cos I don't
so can't ask him.


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## Hamish Mackintosh

A good read on this very suject is"Return of the Coffin Ships"by Bernard Edwards ISBN1-883283-19-1.Altho a great deal is about the Derbyshire enigma, there are also lots of other ships mentioned, about structure failure and CREW failure


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## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.


The name of the ship is not important in my view William, as it could have been any of them, and indeed I suspect, may have been more than just one.
What is important is the recognition that these things do happen and are likely to happen again, probably more likely looking ahead.
Those dogs on those hatches up for'd - bad news in many cases - keep an eye them - amongst many other things. When lugs break, weld em - today if possible, not tomorrow, not the next day, the next month, the next year and so on. Not easy sometimes, but ASAP for sure.
Dogs however were not the culprit in the case I mention, but in the case of the Derbyshire - I suspect/believe that they were. We shall never know for certain though.
Keeping that tragedy "somewhat alive" - can only be beneficial.
Lest we forget.


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## oldman 80

Hamish Mackintosh said:


> A good read on this very suject is"Return of the Coffin Ships"by Bernard Edwards ISBN1-883283-19-1.Altho a great deal is about the Derbyshire enigma, there are also lots of other ships mentioned, about structure failure and CREW failure


Crew failures do occur, no doubt about that, but considering insurance matters, far more often "in presentation" than in fact, I believe.
The case I mention, there was no crew failure at all, very much the opposite in fact. 
Divine Intervention played a part - (whoever or whatever you may consider devine to be - according to your own beliefs.)
The book you mention - it is the word "Return" which concerns me the most.


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## muldonaich

tc was a ship manager in denholms the naess parkgate had a massive crack on her deck but she was called parkgate at that time .


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## oldman 80

muldonaich said:


> tc was a ship manager in denholms the naess parkgate had a massive crack on her deck but she was called parkgate at that time .


Hmm - I see. Now that too, is interesting.
Here we go again, Cracks, Cracks, Cracks, and more Cracks.
They eventually become the "food of nightmares" - to some.
(Read)


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## chadburn

I am fairly sure I went aboard the Naess Parkgate when we were moored ahead of her at the Botlek in April 1968 to look at the repair's carried out on an across Deck crack around No 5 hold area, at the time we had the Furness Guarantee Chief with us as it was our maiden voyage and he took me on board the N.P. As far as I can make out she was called the Naess Parkgate till 1974 and then the Iron Parkgate but I accept former Denholm employee's will know better than I


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## muldonaich

chadburn said:


> I am fairly sure I went aboard the Naess Parkgate when we were moored ahead of her at the Botlek in April 1968 to look at the repair's carried out on an across Deck crack around No 5 hold area, at the time we had the Furness Guarantee Chief with us as it was our maiden voyage and he took me on board the N.P. As far as I can make out she was called the Naess Parkgate till 1974 and then the Iron Parkgate but I accept former Denholm employee's will know better than I


you are right chadburn i made a mistake dont know what i was thinking about na macdonald was old man he built a cabin cruiser on board her maiden voyage 1966 built in sunderland brgds kev.


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## chadburn

Don't want to be pedantic(*)), 1966 on the Tees. Regards


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## muldonaich

chadburn said:


> Don't want to be pedantic(*)), 1966 on the Tees. Regards


sorry again brdgs kev.


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## Hamish Mackintosh

Derbyroy said:


> Forgive me i,me wrong but the Bulk Carrier "DERBYSHIRE" seems to have been missed,
> She according to all known investigations was a structrural loss.
> I.E. failure of a main structural bearing /member,
> just a thought .as she bore My Name.....my thoughts are ever with her crew and their families, "for those in peril "
> Derbyroy


I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure


----------



## oldman 80

Hamish Mackintosh said:


> I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure


I think your posting is pretty much right on the ball.
The animation refered to in earlier posts suggests that it only took two minutes from the time N0.1 Hatch failed until she was gone.
That's just not enough time to do anything.
I am not sure of the time of day she was lost, ie was it in darkness or in daylight.
The initial flooding through that forward hatch could have taken several hours and if during darkness would probably not have been noticed.
In my own experience, refered to earlier, we suffered a very bad incident just on dusk. Damage up forward was deemed very likely but could not be accurately determined until daylight next morning, as complete whiteout conditions existed and it just was not possible to make the trip forward to find out just what damage had been done due to extremely severe conditions at the time. In addition we had no steerage as we had no engine power to effect the turn required to have possibly allowed transit forward.
It was the longest night of my life - and until daylight next morning there was no way of determining what had happened up forward, and then it was a hair raising experience, quite terrifying in fact.
Thankfully the hatch hydraulic controls had been place in the close position, and left there as per standard (and modified) ship procedures.
In so doing it was possible to start the hydraulic power plant periodically through the night from the accomodation block thus ensureing the excentric hatch cam locks, which were prone to unlocking, were driven back to the locked positions if they had unlocked, which it became clear many of them had done.
The vessel on dusk had been completely overwhelmed by the sea, to the extent that a minimum, 10ft head of solid water had born down on the hatches (the tops of which themselves would have been about 10feet above deck level) for a considerable period of time, whilst she struggled so very terribly to break to the surface again. They (the hatches) just were not designed to resist that head of water. They suffered internal cellular damage, not readily apparent at the time, but they held. They were eventually properly repaired - but it must have cost a fortune.
In addition, some 4500 tonnes deadfreight was involved on that crossing - some railway train failed to arrive at the load port on time due to breakdown, and I decided not to wait for it. One of the best decisions I ever made in my life - as it turned out. That 4500 tonnes, had it been on board, would have ensured total hatch failure - I am sure. It's absence also gave leeway to trim by the stern somewhat, and keep the bow raised above what would have been normal.
Divine intervention, - for sure.
_Holes in the ocean - Yes they exist - and no one should think they do not._


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## Malky Glaister

Did not Chief Super Jim Cowie get killed on the Naess Parkgate. A locked funnel door and an engineroom fire with some repercussions round the fleet on UMS operations.

My memory is non too clear on this. It happened in a dockyard possibly Singapore.

Parkgate and talisman , two to keep off!

regards

Malky


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## A.D.FROST

WilliamH said:


> Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.


The clue may be in his avitar ERSKINE BRIDGE(Clarkson OBO)


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## John Cassels

A.D.FROST said:


> The clue may be in his avitar ERSKINE BRIDGE(Clarkson OBO)


No , not the Erskine Bridge.

Spent 8 months on her and she was a pure bulk carrier.
His avitar is an OBO , probably Spey/Avon Bridge or something
of that ilk.
We'll be waiting until the second coming before we get an answer.


----------



## A.D.FROST

John Cassels said:


> No , not the Erskine Bridge.
> 
> Spent 8 months on her and she was a pure bulk carrier.
> His avitar is an OBO , probably Spey/Avon Bridge or something
> of that ilk.
> We'll be waiting until the second coming before we get an answer.


Your right.Same photo. in Gallery SPEY BRIDGE (AVON as flush deck)
http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/gallery/showphoto.php/photo/30710/title/spey-bridge/cat/510


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> Did not Chief Super Jim Cowie get killed on the Naess Parkgate. A locked funnel door and an engineroom fire with some repercussions round the fleet on UMS operations.
> 
> My memory is non too clear on this. It happened in a dockyard possibly Singapore.
> 
> Parkgate and talisman , two to keep off!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


Ah yes - I recall that incident - but can't be sure of the ship.
Singapore yes and dry dock yes.
It was particularly tragic because he had a young teenage son. Denholm News paid a fine tribute to him and his teenage son I recall.

What about Commander Lake - he referred to me as the "frustrated engineer" which I actually considered as a compliment, although whether he meant it as such I am not sure. I think he was killed in a train crash London Euston to Glasgow. The night sleeper if my memory serves me correctly.


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## alastairrussell

Malky

I have read all the above on the Iron Parkgate and also other older inputs on her in this website and I have to say I think the true story of the Parkgate is not being told.

The ER explosion in Singapore was caused by an overheating acetelyne cylinder and it killed not only a Denholms engineer superintendant but I think 14 Singaporean engine room workers (poor souls). Our BHP superintendant engineer who was coming on board at the time was at the top of the gangway when the bottle blew up!

I feel that Oldman 80 is quite right in being a wee bit relunctant to mention names especially when the name Iron Parkgate comes up. The court case in London between the shipowner and the the charterer turned out to be one of the largest civil cases in London. The arbitration hearing was held in the National Liberal Club over several months and in the end the Judge informed both parties which way he was going and that they should go out and settle. It is rumored that the owners (shock horror the P&O) lost and had to pay out a substantial amount. I feel Andrew Craig Craig -Bennett who worked for one of the legal teams at the time and who contributes to this web site would be the one to ask for the real story or any further info.

During the above court case things came out that upset a few Australian shipping companies. It was that Lloyds Register had apparently two standards, one fo London Ship owners and other for Australian ships. Prior to being chartered to BHP she had apparently suffered from a secret grounding that no one knew about which had substantially affected the tail shaft and the main engine alignment!!! I believe that some of the other sub standard items at her early age was severe corrosion in her the ballast tanks and also in her main engine piston cooling system.

All the above plus all the construction defects that are mentioned in another post in this website.

Who do I blame, I feel that the Lloyds Register are to blame for the whole sorry saga of the Naess Parkgate from Birth to Death!! 

Regards

Alastair


----------



## oldman 80

QUOTE=Hamish Mackintosh;640718]I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure[/QUOTE]



_I recall_ looking at some underwater photos which showed the situation you describe. It was a long time ago, and I cannot recall where / which website they were on. However I seem to recall, and I could be wrong, that the hatch cover was missing. With respect to the mooring rope you describe - yes that was clearly visible as you describe.
Although the scenario you describe is certainly possible and cannot be disregarded completely I find it very difficult to accept it unconditionally.
I am pretty sure the hatch cover was not there, and if I am correct I believe the following is a more likely explanation of that mooring rope leading out of the hatch coaming.
It does of course depend also on the normal procedure that the crew would use when stowing mooring ropes away, but one method often but not always used was as follows.
When stowing the ropes away after leaving the last port, they were generally lowered into the stowage space each rope being lashed to the next one usually with a rope stopper. The last rope to go down however may have been lowered to about 20 feet of it's bitter end which would roughly coincide with the distance from the hatch coaming to the nearest winch/windlass barrel end. At that point approximately, the vertical part of the rope would be lashed to the side of the ladder to hold it in that position, and the remaining twenty feet (approx) would then be just lowered into the hatch, and the hatch secured. The intention would be for the hatch to be opened nearing the arrival port, the loose twenty feet approx hauled out by hand and led to the nearest drum end. The lashing holding the vertical part of the rope would then be released, the winch/windlass started and the whole string of mooring ropes hauled up on deck.
That being the case, and it is only a distinct possibility, then considering that mooring ropes at that time were invariably synthetic and buoyant, I believe the last twenty feet or so may just have floated out of the hatch when the vessel foundered, giving the impression that it was being hauled out by the crew.
I find it difficult to believe the ship was that close to her destination that moorings were being brought on deck, particularly with a typhoon approaching. That the hatch had been deliberately left open under such cir***stances seems unlikely, but it could have been.
The foregoing theory is of course dependent on whether my recollection of those underwater photographs showing the hatch cover still there - or not there. I have a strong feeling it was not.
Unfortunately I don't know/cannot recall where those underwater photo's came from - i.e. which web- site.
If the hatch cover was not there, (as I seem to recall) then my theory is very valid, and the most likely explanation, I believe.

Despite the foregoing I think it almost certain her loss was clearly not due to structural failure - which is the main point of your posting. She sank very quickly because of undetected flooding in her for'd compartments through that hatch.

(I also recall seeing photographs of that hatch with securing dogs lugs clearly broken. Taken - I am not sure where or when.)

However we can but speculate - quite accurately even - perhaps, but we will never know for sure.
The only thing we can be certain of is, that it was a terrible day for British Shipping - a tragedy of enormous proportion.
I hate dwelling on it - even considering it, for that matter.
But it must be remembered, lest it is forgotten.
_There, but for fortune_ - as they say.


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> Malky
> 
> I have read all the above on the Iron Parkgate and also other older inputs on her in this website and I have to say I think the true story of the Parkgate is not being told.
> 
> The ER explosion in Singapore was caused by an overheating acetelyne cylinder and it killed not only a Denholms engineer superintendant but I think 14 Singaporean engine room workers (poor souls). Our BHP superintendant engineer who was coming on board at the time was at the top of the gangway when the bottle blew up!
> 
> I feel that Oldman 80 is quite right in being a wee bit relunctant to mention names especially when the name Iron Parkgate comes up. The court case in London between the shipowner and the the charterer turned out to be one of the largest civil cases in London. The arbitration hearing was held in the National Liberal Club over several months and in the end the Judge informed both parties which way he was going and that they should go out and settle. It is rumored that the owners (shock horror the P&O) lost and had to pay out a substantial amount. I feel Andrew Craig Craig -Bennett who worked for one of the legal teams at the time and who contributes to this web site would be the one to ask for the real story or any further info.
> 
> During the above court case things came out that upset a few Australian shipping companies. It was that Lloyds Register had apparently two standards, one fo London Ship owners and other for Australian ships. Prior to being chartered to BHP she had apparently suffered from a secret grounding that no one knew about which had substantially affected the tail and the main engine alignment!!! I believe that some of the other sub standard items at her early age was severe corrosion in her the ballast tanks and also in her main engine piston cooling system.
> 
> All the above plus all the construction defects that are mentioned in another post in this website.
> 
> Who do I blame, I feel that the Lloyds Register are to blame for the whole sorry saga of the Naess Parkgate from Birth to Death!!
> 
> Regards
> 
> Alastair


Aye indeed Alistair - I believe your assessment to be spot on.
I'm very much a DNV man myself.


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## Duncan112

oldman 80 said:


> QUOTE=Hamish Mackintosh;640718]I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure




_I recall_ looking at some underwater photos which showed the situation you describe. It was a long time ago, and I cannot recall where / which website they were on. However I seem to recall, and I could be wrong, that the hatch cover was missing. With respect to the mooring rope you describe - yes that was clearly visible as you describe.
Although the scenario you describe is certainly possible and cannot be disregarded completely I find it very difficult to accept it unconditionally.
I am pretty sure the hatch cover was not there, and if I am correct I believe the following is a more likely explanation of that mooring rope leading out of the hatch coaming.
It does of course depend also on the normal procedure that the crew would use when stowing mooring ropes away, but one method often but not always used was as follows.
When stowing the ropes away after leaving the last port, they were generally lowered into the stowage space each rope being lashed to the next one usually with a rope stopper. The last rope to go down however may have been lowered to about 20 feet of it's bitter end which would roughly coincide with the distance from the hatch coaming to the nearest winch/windlass barrel end. At that point approximately, the vertical part of the rope would be lashed to the side of the ladder to hold it in that position, and the remaining twenty feet (approx) would then be just lowered into the hatch, and the hatch secured. The intention would be for the hatch to be opened nearing the arrival port, the loose twenty feet approx hauled out by hand and led to the nearest drum end. The lashing holding the vertical part of the rope would then be released, the winch/windlass started and the whole string of mooring ropes hauled up on deck.
That being the case, and it is only a distinct possibility, then considering that mooring ropes at that time were invariably synthetic and buoyant, I believe the last twenty feet or so may just have floated out of the hatch when the vessel foundered, giving the impression that it was being hauled out by the crew.
I find it difficult to believe the ship was that close to her destination that moorings were being brought on deck, particularly with a typhoon approaching. That the hatch had been deliberately left open under such cir***stances seems unlikely, but it could have been.
The foregoing theory is of course dependent on whether my recollection of those underwater photographs showing the hatch cover still there - or not there. I have a strong feeling it was not.
Unfortunately I don't know/cannot recall where those underwater photo's came from - i.e. which web- site.
If the hatch cover was not there, (as I seem to recall) then my theory is very valid, and the most likely explanation, I believe.

Despite the foregoing I think it almost certain her loss was clearly not due to structural failure - which is the main point of your posting. She sank very quickly because of undetected flooding in her for'd compartments through that hatch.

(I also recall seeing photographs of that hatch with securing dogs lugs clearly broken. Taken - I am not sure where or when.)

However we can but speculate - quite accurately even - perhaps, but we will never know for sure.
The only thing we can be certain of is, that it was a terrible day for British Shipping - a tragedy of enormous proportion.
I hate dwelling on it - even considering it, for that matter.
But it must be remembered, lest it is forgotten.
_There, but for fortune_ - as they say.[/QUOTE]






This Photograph ? http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgu...QzKUIH1LoHJ0AWY7IHQBg&ved=0CEUQ9QEwBA&dur=677

I spoke to a consultant who acted on behalf of the Derbyshire Families at the reopened inquiry and in the course of the investigation he spoke with a Chief Officer that had sailed on the vessel and, as you describe practise was to secure the mooring line with a heaving line to the ladder to aid retrieval when approaching port. 

Of more interest to me is why there is little damage to the hatch hinges on the coaming, if the hatch had been ripped off by stress of weather prior to the foundering I would have expected either the hinge plates to be more distorted or the remains of the hatch cover to be visible, which begs the question had the hinge pins been removed for maintenance and the hatch lid replaced relying only on the dogs to locate it? Don't know but I've done that myself.


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## John Cassels

Kevin , was not the Naess Parkgate a sister of the Naess Talisman ?.

Spent nearly a year on the latter - fine ship .


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## WilliamH

Oldman I think it was Bill Forest that was tragically killed on the overnight sleeper from London to Glasgow.


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## A.D.FROST

John Cassels said:


> Kevin , was not the Naess Parkgate a sister of the Naess Talisman ?.
> 
> Spent nearly a year on the latter - fine ship .


Yes they were sisters from different parents so you could say they are half sisters that turned out to be Bastards.
TALISMAN bt by Lithgows owned by Nile Shg.
PARKGATE bt by Furness SB owned by Turnbull Scott.


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## muldonaich

A.D.FROST said:


> Yes they were sisters from different parents so you could say they are half sisters or Bastards
> TALISMAN bt by Lithgows owned by Nile Shg.
> PARKGATE bt by Furness SB owned by Turnbull Scott.


yes you are right a d kev.


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## oldman 80

DUNCAN 112:
Ref your post #242,

Thank you for the web address of the relevant underwater photo of that hatch.
You have raised an interesting point re possible maintenance on it.
I have a feeling the photographs I originally looked at were shot from the other side of the hatch, and indeed come to think of it may indeed have been a video taken from the ROV.
I seem to recall more rope being visible than in the picture you just directed me to, but I could be wrong.
Anyhow, looking at the photo you directed me to, it seems to me that the rope is leading aft from the hatch coaming. That being the case then I suggest the hinges for the clearly missing hatch cover were at the forward end of the hatch, and that when the hatch was torn off it has torn the for'd coaming right across at about half height.
The inboard dog, at the aft end, (and I think that is what they are, not hinges,) looks to me Like the securing lug/lugs has been broken at the point it attaches to the coaming.
Anyhow, it is clear the lid is not there as I had thought, so the "float out" of that tail end of the mooring ropes seems highly likely to me, as I originally was sure I remembered from viewing photo's from a fairly long time ago.
Thanks again for assistance in the matter.
Cheers.


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## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Oldman I think it was Bill Forest that was tragically killed on the overnight sleeper from London to Glasgow.


Maybe, but the name means nothing to me, as I never met the guy you mention although the name has a familiar ring to it.
It was Commnder Lake I am sure, but come to think of it Denholm news said he was travelling with somebody else so maybe it was both of them that were killed.
Malky would probably know - he is very much the railway train expert, and indeed always has been.


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## Malky Glaister

Well Thanks for that Gerry!!
I recall the accident on the railway but cannot recall the deceased names. I think Bill Forest was one but I am not sure about Lake.
There were bad times what with Cowie and also the Bilbao deaths.
I will try to look up the rail accident details.

regards

Malky


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## Malky Glaister

The train crash that OLDMAN referred to was (I Think) the Nuneaton accident of July 5th 1975 in which 4 people died, two passengers and two train crew.
I seem to recall that it was Bill Forest and not Lake who died but I not at all sure.
Details of the accident are available on the web.
The clas 86 locos were better built than some OBO's of the same vintage!

regards

Malky


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## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> The train crash that OLDMAN referred to was (I Think) the Nuneaton accident of July 5th 1975 in which 4 people died, two passengers and two train crew.
> I seem to recall that it was Bill Forest and not Lake who died but I not at all sure.
> Details of the accident are available on the web.
> The clas 86 locos were better built than some OBO's of the same vintage!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


Ah yes Nuneaton - thats the place. I'm still almost 100% sure Lake was one of the deceased.
The Bilbao incident - that was a bad one for sure - E.R. D.B. sounding pipe deadweights - if my memory serves me correctly.
I saw Bill Beattie in the office shortly afterwards - he was clearly shocked and distressed. If she was like the Bern - it doesn't suprise me.
That Rope store hatch in the underwater photo of the Derbyshire, (#242)
Why was it (the coaming) not "stayed" in any way ?
Just appauling.


----------



## alastairrussell

I am of the view that the Derbyshire sinking has to be classed as a structural failure. 

If I remember rightly (my poor memory) it was basically caused by two legislated design failures that were written into the new 1966 Load line Convention. This Act apparently allowed new tonnage to have the plimsol line moved up the hull a 'wee bitty' and it also introduced or allowed a defective formulae to be used to calculate the strength of the steel hatch cover. 

The changes introduced in the 1966 Act along with the removal of the foc'sle deck on some larger bulk carriers exposed the forward end of the ship to damaging green seas coming on board and doing damage.

With regard to the Derbyshire's rope hatch I would love to have a close look at the hatch dogs and the hatch cover. I was always a believer in having a row of welds placed on the flat forks to stop the dogs being accidentally knocked or washed off. With a thick rubber gasket being used it could have allowed half the dogs to be washed off during the sinking if the hatch door came under external pressure when the ship was sinking. I feel the rope in the photograph has probably been blown or has floated out during the sinking.

With regard to the Iron Parkgate, I have just remembered that the charterer only found out about the grounding and the engine room being flooded, when a greaser was soogying down the bulkhead. Very faintly under a single coat of fresh white paint he spotted a discoloured tide mark!! Is anyone telling me that Lloyds were not aware of the flooding and the crazy crankshaft deflections. 

Yes I am also a DNV fan.

Alastair


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## John Cassels

It was indeed Bill Forest that died in the Nuneaton train crash.
Have his obituary somwhere in the piles of old Denholm news 
in the loft.


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## Malky Glaister

John Cassels said:


> It was indeed Bill Forest that died in the Nuneaton train crash.
> Have his obituary somwhere in the piles of old Denholm news
> in the loft.


I was pretty sure it was Bill Forest. I was going to suggest some one have look in the Denholm News.

I rather stupidly trashed mine on receiving my redundancy notice.

They contained a great deal of info.

I watched the Derbyshire animation. Horrific for everyone on board.

Those on the bridge. It does not bare thinking about.

regards

Malky


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## alastairrussell

Malky

Surely, Surely the 'Denholm News' must have mentioned something about the Parkgate running aground. Surely, Surely some of you Denholm boys who contributed posts to this website must have known about the ' incident' and the subsequent crankshaft deflection problems of the Parkgate? Sshs Sshs mums the word!!

Alastair


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## chadburn

It use to be the practise that the fork end's were turned upover so that the dog and screw could not fall out of the fork unless the dog was screwed well back.


----------



## Malky Glaister

alastairrussell said:


> Malky
> 
> Surely, Surely the 'Denholm News' must have mentioned something about the Parkgate running aground. Surely, Surely some of you Denholm boys who contributed posts to this website must have known about the ' incident' and the subsequent crankshaft deflection problems of the Parkgate? Sshs Sshs mums the word!!
> 
> Alastair


There will be no doubt that the mushroom treatment was prescribed frequently!!
I don't recall the Naess Parkgate incident at all though it sounds very serious indeed. May depend on when it happened. If the ship was not under DSM Glasgow then it may well not have appeared in the magazine.

I do know that both her and the Talisman had very poor reputations and were to be avoided. Possibly the RD engines put engineers off.
I only recall a couple of chaps who had been on them.

regards

Malky


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## John Cassels

Malky , was 3rd.mate on the Talisman 1968 and as far as I can remember
she was a good ship , no problems on her.

Alister , think I know what happened with the Naess Parkgate but will take a
leaf out of oldman80's book - I know but I'm not telling .. so there !.


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## WilliamH

John, I believe in another post you mentioned that you joined the Connon Forest in December 1976in Felixstowe, just after I left the ship. I have been meaning to ask did you notice that an anchor and all it's chain was missing.


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## muldonaich

na mac took her out of some port in japan ithink no tugs no pilot picked up survivors on the way out cant remember if it was tyfoon or sunami mind is not what it used to be maybe john will remember brgds kev.


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## randcmackenzie

I think the report of a grounding of the Parkgate is a fable.

However, was she not the ship to suffer engine room flooding in Hokkaido when the double bottom lids, the tunnel access lids from the hold, and the doors from the Engine Room to the tunnel were all left open after survey?

While they were still open, ballasting was commenced, and the engine room flooded enough to submerge the Main Engine lub. oil pumps.

All might yet have been well had they been washed and dried out, but somebody tried them and they burnt out.

They and the lecky were flown down to Yokohama for rewind, well the motors anyway, and the story was the lecky unwound a bit too, with the ship delayed until they all returned.

The Australian charterers had severe difficulty keeping her going, and ironically enough her first cargo after redelivery was coal from Newcastle N.S.W.

Her arrival was greeted with all kinds of forecasts of disaster and unmitigated gleeful pessimism on the waterfront, but she berthed impeccably, loaded her cargo entirely without incident, and sailed.

Much to their collective disappointment.

To be fair she had a poor reputation, and was, among other things, blessed with Paxman generators and Weir Pacific ballast valves.


----------



## oldman 80

randcmackenzie said:


> I think the report of a grounding of the Parkgate is a fable.
> 
> However, was she not the ship to suffer engine room flooding in Hokkaido when the double bottom lids, the tunnel access lids from the hold, and the doors from the Engine Room to the tunnel were all left open after survey?
> 
> While they were still open, ballasting was commenced, and the engine room flooded enough to submerge the Main Engine lub. oil pumps.
> 
> All might yet have been well had they been washed and dried out, but somebody tried them and they burnt out.
> 
> They and the lecky were flown down to Yokohama for rewind, well the motors anyway, and the story was the lecky unwound a bit too, with the ship delayed until they all returned.
> 
> The Australian charterers had severe difficulty keeping her going, and ironically enough her first cargo after redelivery was coal from Newcastle N.S.W.
> 
> Her arrival was greeted with all kinds of forecasts of disaster and unmitigated gleeful pessimism on the waterfront, but she berthed impeccably, loaded her cargo entirely without incident, and sailed.
> 
> Much to their collective disappointment.
> 
> To be fair she had a poor reputation, and was, among other things, blessed with Paxman generators and Weir Pacific ballast valves.


_I have a feeling_ you are right with respect to the flooding during ballasting (parkgate) - it certainly happened on at least one vessel and the inevitable deluge of "circular letters" followed.
It could have been another ship but in my mind (today) the prefix Naess was certainly associated with the incident.
When the same sort of thing happened with crude oil as oppossed to ballast water - the consequences were even more severe.
Who could possibly forget "The Wooden Plug" incident - (new building - maiden voyage).
It apparently sat on somebodies desk in an office ashore with a sign on it, - "The Million Dollar Plug" - at least that's what was commonly believed, although I never saw it myself. ( that was for the clean up within the ship alone which was not a great success and the ship suffered badly all her life. An enormous sum of money in those days)
Conical in shape fashioned for a 4" diameter (approx) hole. Fitted during sea trials by shipyard as a temporary measure - but forgotten - - for pressure testing cargo holds. Rediscovered on first crude oil loading - nasty incident.
"Teething Problems" - they can be exceedingly drastic sometimes.


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> I am of the view that the Derbyshire sinking has to be classed as a structural failure.
> 
> If I remember rightly (my poor memory) it was basically caused by two legislated design failures that were written into the new 1966 Load line Convention. This Act apparently allowed new tonnage to have the plimsol line moved up the hull a 'wee bitty' and it also introduced or allowed a defective formulae to be used to calculate the strength of the steel hatch cover.
> 
> The changes introduced in the 1966 Act along with the removal of the foc'sle deck on some larger bulk carriers exposed the forward end of the ship to damaging green seas coming on board and doing damage.
> 
> With regard to the Derbyshire's rope hatch I would love to have a close look at the hatch dogs and the hatch cover. I was always a believer in having a row of welds placed on the flat forks to stop the dogs being accidentally knocked or washed off. With a thick rubber gasket being used it could have allowed half the dogs to be washed off during the sinking if the hatch door came under external pressure when the ship was sinking. I feel the rope in the photograph has probably been blown or has floated out during the sinking.
> 
> With regard to the Iron Parkgate, I have just remembered that the charterer only found out about the grounding and the engine room being flooded, when a greaser was soogying down the bulkhead. Very faintly under a single coat of fresh white paint he spotted a discoloured tide mark!! Is anyone telling me that Lloyds were not aware of the flooding and the crazy crankshaft deflections.
> 
> Yes I am also a DNV fan.
> 
> Alastair



_Well Alastair_ I do not think there can be any doubt that structural failure of a kind, must now be reintroduced/reinstated as the initial event which lead to the flooding which resulted in the loss of the Derbyshire.
Certainly any "on going" suggestion of “Crew Negligence” can now be be thrown out of the window .
The underwater photograph of that rope store hatch *tells it all*, does it not?
What the hell were the designers, builders and indeed Class thinking of ? Common sense alone should have been sufficient in respect of the construction of that rope store hatch – One would think , irrespective of regulation, statute, or anything else for that matter. It’s just unbelievable – and yet at the same time it is not. *“ JUST LOOK AT IT !!!!.”
*It beggars belief that there is no staying or bracketing of that coaming, none whatsoever, and considering the location, and the flush decker she (the Derbyshire) was - that boarders on criminal negligence, I suggest.
It is almost like the builder has at some stage just decided an access is required, so we will just cut a hole in the deck, and stick a bit of a "Fence" around it, with a silly little lid, on the top, -- AND we will do “IT” at the forward extremity of the vessel. 
I think we can with some certainty say she was neither Clyde , Scandinavian or even Belfast built, but probably Lloyds classified. They were never the same after they went bust in the 1960's (or maybe it was early 70’s) - and then "restructured" (or whatever they call it), and started "contracting out" their work, seemingly to anyone and everyone. The day of the respected, much revered and admired, Lloyds Surveyor had now become a thing of the past.
I think, most people, like myself, would tend to have considered the possible Structural Failure aspect of the Derbyshires loss, as being related to *catastrophic* hull failure of some kind, perhaps like that experienced by the Kirki off W.A. or even that by the ill- fated Tanker "Prestige".
Anyhow returning to the underwater photograph of that rope store hatch, I wonder just what it (the photo) was selected for ? What was the motive (if any) of presenting it to the enquiry ? In that regard I wonder if it was not in fact an attempt to enhance the "crew negligence" argument ( well they would do that, - wouldn’t they ?) ref: my post # 225 in this string. (_assuming that Number 225 isn’t subsequently altered by deletions or other means - looking forward.) [ For your guidance in relation to this matter, the posting commences with the words “Crew failures do occur” and concludes with the words “which concerns me the most”.]
_Looking at that photo today, what it clearly shows in my view, is that crew negligence can be all but eliminated from any argument, ( the Rope “Float out” - theory being of the essence) although many will no doubt continue to advocate differently.
The marine insurance industry, both traditional underwriters and P&I, has for long, had much to answer for when it comes to that process which became so prevalent, (the maritime “ witch hunt” ), namely:- The Culture of Blame, and The Criminalisation of Shipmasters , which inevitably and rapidly became The Criminalisation of Seafarers, in general.
In my experience, the cases of genuine "crew negligence" were in fact, few and far between, over a very long career at sea. Where they did occur, they were essentially minor in nature. Mistakes were made for sure – but negligence ? – essentially No.
I left the sea believing that more than 90% of the guys who sailed with me were amongst the cream, of the cream, of the cream. Furthermore, where inexperience perhaps limited the ability of some, such limitation was more than adequately compensated for by unprecedented degrees of willingness and enthusiasm. There were exceptions of course, but 90%, well that must surely be a pretty good score. No cause for complaint there I suggest. However, with regard to the other 10%, well I am of the view that perhaps 5% of them did damage of the "damage irrecoverable" kind, and perhaps another 5% of that 10%, probably included pre-meditated sabotage. (It happens)
Additionally, there were those ashore who apparently came to believe ships personnel were machines that could be continually run and run and run, 24/7 without let up, to the point of destruction, it seemed. (Fatigue is a killer, and probably the greatest killer of them all.)
There are limits to what humans can endure, and in drawing that to head office attention, in no uncertain terms - just did not go down well at all, with some, (indeed too many). There again - not by all. However the ensueing arguments - well you just get sick of them in the end - most of them just pathetic, - so they were.
Anyhow, I note from this string, that you have an apparent passion for bulk carrier history and therefore I believe, bulk carrier welfare (be they wet / dry or both) and that is most heartening, I suggest.
*Look after the vessel*, and for sure, there is a very high probability that she in turn will *look after her cargo and crew*.
_That after all, is what it is all supposed to be about - or I at least once thought._
*Neglect her* - and the consequences will be catastrophically severe, sooner or later- for sure.
Keep up the good work - lest the dark days return once again - and you can bet your last dollar they will - should open websites like this disappear. 
I do not believe the IMO alone can exercise the degree of control required, - no matter what they believe - but they appear to have made some differences - for sure. They can't possibly do it all though - *that's up to the guys on the ships, - as indeed it always has been.[/B] 
That fact alone is perhaps deserving of much wider recognition than has hitherto been the case. 
Of course there will always be those web "contributors" who think they are the Bees Knees, are clearly Paranoid, objectionable in the extreme, have chips on their shoulders larger than an “ old growth” Huon Pine. Continental Europe has more than its fair share of them, and always has had, I believe. 
(For example:- In Holland they have few morals, few ethics, they border on the obscene, they smoke dope, and practice euthanasia. ) 
We must strive to learn to ignore them, for they are worthy of no attention at all.
DNV that sure is the way to go - at least it used to be. Not perfect perhaps, but certainly the best available - I'd say. 
Am I biased ? Well perhaps, - just a bit - but I have every right to be after all.
The fact I am typing this today, is unquestionable evidence of that.
Finally I am intrigued by your mention of the 1966 Load Line Rules and that reference to a defective formulae for the purpose of the determination of hatch cover strengths. 
I am sure I have heard mention of that before, not in text, not on a website, but on reflection, I believe it was during verbal conversations in my office on board, - between hatch cover manufacturers, dock yard officials, and Classification Surveyors engaged in a very costly refurbishment of hatch covers Nos. 1 to 9, in dry dock - mid to late 1982 (approximately). The details of the discussions I cannot remember, only the gist of them and formulae were definately a part of them.
My seriously crippled vessel found a hole in a fuming and furious ocean, she fell into it, and the sea collapsed in on top of her, overwhelming her completely – only the upper two decks and wheelhouse remained above water. Late November, early December 1980 (about), - trans north, north pacific.
She struggled and struggled terribly, she shook and she screamed and she moaned, and that abominable noise (like a railway train tearing itself apart) of that extended “mortal conflict” between W and B, (either could have prevailed - and it went on for seemingly ages,) - and the sensation of that “earthquake” on board, will remain with me for ever. That is the best description I can give.
Structural failure – NO, that did not occur, just bending and buckling – that’s all. BUT SHE HELD.
Hatch No 1. Slewed and displaced, but essentially still on the rails. (Some hydraulics “ juggling” required.)
I never saw weather like it before, or again afterwards. Just horrific, unbelievable stuff, and for so long, - without let up. It was a bad winter for sure. (I never left the wheelhouse/chart room for 11 long days and 12 nights apart from one terrifying trip forward after dawn)
But she survived, all be it quite badly wounded, as it later became apparent, and that’s all that really matters in the end. 
Had the Derbyshire been built elsewhere, and been with a different classification society - Well we can but speculate, Can we not ?
It won’t do much good though, I feel.
“Being prepared”, on the other hand, - that is different – it should result in survival, at least.
Let’s Keep that message alive, for it is incredibly good advice.
And No, I was never a boy scout, but I was a military Cadet - after leaving the cub scouts – that is. (Dib, Dib, Dib !!!!! - or whatever it was that we said.)
Very influential years – so they were. And perhaps even, - the best of my life. Well almost.
Kindest Regards.*


----------



## alastairrussell

RandC Thanks for the info on the ER being flooded through the Duct keel. This fits in with the duct keel ballast valve problems that I experienced when sailing on an undermaintained and tired old Bulky. When the remote control system packs up our shipwright spent quite a bit of time down in the DK in port with a UHF walky talky manually operating some of his ballast valves!
The first thing I did when I joined one of my BHP bulkies and also prior to leaving a port was to check that the ER Duct keel door had been bolted up. If we had to go down the duct keel for any reason when she was at sea I ventilated the duct keel using an electric fan and two of us would use the for'ard duct keel access. I would also pay a visit to the bridge to check the chart for any shallow bits on the route (I am a trusting soul)! I believe Denholms lost two engineers in the duct keel on the MV Chelsea Bridge (MV Iron Sirius) when it was under their management!
You have to remember that both the Parkgate and the Derbyshire incidents have been fully investigated in the Courts. In the Iron Parkgate case I believe we won and it was rumored that it was when a Denholms chief engineer broke down under cross examination and admitted telling porkies that the judge told both parties to go out and settle!
After major repairs in Singapore at the owners cost I would not be yiking that bringing the Parkgate under a coal loader in Newcastle and sailing without any delay as a win, its what happens at sea that counts. I have to ask you how many of the Parkgate's engineers wandered up to the BHP shipping office in Newcastle then and asked for job when they paid off the Parkgate? I sailed with one of them on a BHP ship and he was a good hand.
I have always been a believer in 'Buyer Beware' and I am thinking maybe there was not enough inspection carried out by BHP prior to signing the charter do***ents. I remember signing onto newly chartered BHP ship on the monday and on the tuesday both lifeboats were condemmed by a government inspector and had to be replaced by BHP. In Australia we have to pass a yearly safety gear inspection! 
Regarding the Derbyshire it appears that the dispute is still going on. I recommend that we all google the words ' MV Derbyshire Blogspot.com and click on 'disclosures and critical comment' and have good read.

regards 
Alastair

PS I was wrong, 15 Singaporean engine room staff were lost during the acetylene bottle explosion not 14 .


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## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> RandC Thanks for the info on the ER being flooded through the Duct keel. This fits in with the duct keel ballast valve problems that I experienced when sailing on an undermaintained and tired old Bulky. When the remote control system packs up our shipwright spent quite a bit of time down in the DK in port with a UHF walky talky manually operating some of his ballast valves!
> The first thing I did when I joined one of my BHP bulkies and also prior to leaving a port was to check that the ER Duct keel door had been bolted up. If we had to go down the duct keel for any reason when she was at sea I ventilated the duct keel using an electric fan and two of us would use the for'ard duct keel access. I would also pay a visit to the bridge to check the chart for any shallow bits on the route (I am a trusting soul)! I believe Denholms lost two engineers in the duct keel on the MV Chelsea Bridge (MV Iron Sirius) when it was under their management!
> You have to remember that both the Parkgate and the Derbyshire incidents have been fully investigated in the Courts. In the Iron Parkgate case I believe we won and it was rumored that it was when a Denholms chief engineer broke down under cross examination and admitted telling porkies that the judge told both parties to go out and settle!
> After major repairs in Singapore at the owners cost I would not be yiking that bringing the Parkgate under a coal loader in Newcastle and sailing without any delay as a win, its what happens at sea that counts. I have to ask you how many of the Parkgate's engineers wandered up to the BHP shipping office in Newcastle then and asked for job when they paid off the Parkgate? I sailed with one of them on a BHP ship and he was a good hand.
> I have always been a believer in 'Buyer Beware' and I am thinking maybe there was not enough inspection carried out by BHP prior to signing the charter do***ents. I remember signing onto newly chartered BHP ship on the monday and on the tuesday both lifeboats were condemmed by a government inspector and had to be replaced by BHP. In Australia we have to pass a yearly safety gear inspection!
> Regarding the Derbyshire it appears that the dispute is still going on. I recommend that we all google the words ' MV Derbyshire Blogspot.com and click on 'disclosures and critical comment' and have good read.
> 
> regards
> Alastair
> 
> 
> 
> PS I was wrong, 15 Singaporean engine room staff were lost during the acetylene bottle explosion not 14 .


_"Buyer Beware"_ - you hit the nail right on the head, - yet again.
Australian Operations, were obviously different to Denholms.

2nd hand tonnage however, is always a bit dodgy.
Indeed so are new ones.
Bulkness and or Bankness - didn't they end up with BHP also, and in the courts. I have some recollection that they did. Over what though, I can't remember.
Thanks for the info re-Derbyshire blogspot.
Just tragic - absolutely it was.

Edit:- Lost engineers - Chelsea Bridge - I think they were lost in a double bottom - "diving" on a suction strum box or the like, using SCBA's (of the old demand valve type) - something of a No. No. No.No. Can't be sure it's the same incident though - but probably is.


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## John Cassels

Roddy , can you remember which one had the Pepel incident , was it
the Gallic Bridge ?.


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## Malky Glaister

The overload! Yes I think it was Gallic Bridge. Several thousand tons of ore had to be hand shifted ashore!!

regards

Malky


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## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> The overload! Yes I think it was Gallic Bridge. Several thousand tons of ore had to be hand shifted ashore!!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


"The overload" Malky.
Was that Gallic Bridge ?
I have a feeling it was not - ( the Ship Loader operator fell asleep)
Was it not Gallic Bridge that ripped her bottom open in Sierra Leone.
The master sailed when no pilot was available, for some reason which I cannot recall.
Mid 1970's - I think.


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## randcmackenzie

Hello John.

My memory says:

There were two Pepel/Freetown incidents.

At Pepel I know they started the last run without checking the drafts because they were distracted by deballasting.

The ship ended up by the head, which was corrected by debunkering to a barge and reloading it off Freetown, and also using local labour to hand transfer sufficient ore from 1 to 9, but I don't think it was several thousands.

And I think it was the Gallic Bridge.

The other much more serious event was when the master dropped the pilot somewhere close to shore, hit a rain squall in the channel, and grounded hard on the Carpentier reef.

She had to be lightered to get her off, and because she had no pilot in a compulsory pilotage area, she was ruled unseaworthy and insurers were able to walk away from the claim.

Very badly damaged, she was escorted to Lisbon for repairs, but the resultant bill sank Clarksons.

The Master was one of Denholm's best. He was offered a 2nd Mate's job which he refused, and later went to work with the MNAOA ashore. Rather a sad story, he was a broken man after that.


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## randcmackenzie

Hello Alistair.

"_You have to remember that both the Parkgate and the Derbyshire incidents have been fully investigated in the Courts. In the Iron Parkgate case I believe we won and it was rumored that it was when a Denholms chief engineer broke down under cross examination and admitted telling porkies that the judge told both parties to go out and settle!"_

I think it might be hard to say who 'won' especially if we are relying on rumors - my recollection is that nobody did really.

_After major repairs in Singapore at the owners cost I would not be yiking that bringing the Parkgate under a coal loader in Newcastle and sailing without any delay as a win, its what happens at sea that counts. I have to ask you how many of the Parkgate's engineers wandered up to the BHP shipping office in Newcastle then and asked for job when they paid off the Parkgate? I sailed with one of them on a BHP ship and he was a good hand._

I don't know how many, but I would doubt.
In these days Denholms men were very well paid and on good conditions.
BHP's wages would also have been good, but advancement was much slower - at least in my days on the Aussie coast all the engineers on the old steamers held Chief's tickets and promotion was slow.

An engineer with a Chief's ticket in Denholm was almost always a Second, and yes, I agree they were good hands.

Their main strength was their flexibility - it was quite common for Denholm to take a ship from this or that bank, where the owner had disappeared, all records were removed, sometimes severe sabotage was left behind, and often ships in very bad shape.

But, one way or another, they kept them trading.

The 'Caveat Emptor' does not apply so readily to ship managers, though some ships should have been left severely alone.

However, in many cases they had strong connections through other ships with the banks involved, and could not easily refuse to take on the management, at least until a buyer was found.

Best regards.


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## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> RandC Thanks for the info on the ER being flooded through the Duct keel. This fits in with the duct keel ballast valve problems that I experienced when sailing on an undermaintained and tired old Bulky. When the remote control system packs up our shipwright spent quite a bit of time down in the DK in port with a UHF walky talky manually operating some of his ballast valves!
> The first thing I did when I joined one of my BHP bulkies and also prior to leaving a port was to check that the ER Duct keel door had been bolted up. If we had to go down the duct keel for any reason when she was at sea I ventilated the duct keel using an electric fan and two of us would use the for'ard duct keel access. I would also pay a visit to the bridge to check the chart for any shallow bits on the route (I am a trusting soul)! I believe Denholms lost two engineers in the duct keel on the MV Chelsea Bridge (MV Iron Sirius) when it was under their management!
> You have to remember that both the Parkgate and the Derbyshire incidents have been fully investigated in the Courts. In the Iron Parkgate case I believe we won and it was rumored that it was when a Denholms chief engineer broke down under cross examination and admitted telling porkies that the judge told both parties to go out and settle!
> After major repairs in Singapore at the owners cost I would not be yiking that bringing the Parkgate under a coal loader in Newcastle and sailing without any delay as a win, its what happens at sea that counts. I have to ask you how many of the Parkgate's engineers wandered up to the BHP shipping office in Newcastle then and asked for job when they paid off the Parkgate? I sailed with one of them on a BHP ship and he was a good hand.
> I have always been a believer in 'Buyer Beware' and I am thinking maybe there was not enough inspection carried out by BHP prior to signing the charter do***ents. I remember signing onto newly chartered BHP ship on the monday and on the tuesday both lifeboats were condemmed by a government inspector and had to be replaced by BHP. In Australia we have to pass a yearly safety gear inspection!
> Regarding the Derbyshire it appears that the dispute is still going on. I recommend that we all google the words ' MV Derbyshire Blogspot.com and click on 'disclosures and critical comment' and have good read.
> 
> regards
> Alastair
> 
> PS I was wrong, 15 Singaporean engine room staff were lost during the acetylene bottle explosion not 14 .



I have to take issue with you on this one.
Are you sure it was a Chief Engineer from sea staff who was telling the "porkies".
It seems to me it was more likely to be someone else. Someone from the office, - perhaps. I Could be wrong though. In any case, it might not have been so much a case of "_porkies_" as you put it, but rather a case of *Mistaken Belief*.
It depends I suppose, on the individual concerned. 
*And yes* somebody else, who recently posted is right, DSM often took over vessels that were Bank mortgage defaults. (Chase Manhatten in particular, I seem to recall) When they were Greek mortgage defaults, you can be sure there were going to be many many problems ahead. In Later years there was a US Company mortgage default which I am aware of - and it was no better. In fact, by then,the Management Company, the Offshore Management Company, had, in my view, inadvertently perhaps, crossed a critical line - the Violation of seafarers rights, if not indeed, Crimes against Seafaring Humanity. The duty of care - had quite litteraly gone up in smoke.
Unfortunately protecting against that sort of thing, is all but impossible - *the managers cannot control the owners - and in these cases, they were the banks, the big ones too (ie Bank repossessions). So therefore let it be clear the banks have so much to answer for also, and I am of the belief that has being going on a lot longer than some people might think. (long long before the GFC - long long before it - for decades in fact.
*When that happened, (Mortgage default take over) invariably all previous records would have been destroyed - I can't say by who though - that's the mystery - but I could make an educated guess - but that would be pointless, in my view.

To conclude, I don't want to imply you are a "whinger" or anything like that, but how much did BHP pay for those ships ? Were the "defective aspects" in any way reflected in the price they paid for them ?
It is just possible - I suggest.


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## John Cassels

Thanks Roddy. The overloading incident had the result that a fleet notice
was issued to the effect that the engineers were to remain responsible for
all ballast operations in the ER. And yes , problems with deballasting/stripping
was the reason given at Pepel. Remember it well but not too sure which
ship was involved.
Regarding the Naess Talisman . I never saw a ship that flexed so much in
heavy weather , she literaly used to bounce.


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## alastairrussell

Oldman, Thank you for your excellent post. You definitely have a way with words and I think you should be writing your seagoing story. Your wee bit about your crippled vessel was absolutely tops and had me cringing in my seat.

I went to sea the same year you did. I sailed down the Clyde on my first ship and we nearly ran aground in Wales when the newly fitted auto steering gyro ran out of mercury with the 2 mate compounding the error by getting his lighthouses mixed up. Luckily a car came round a corner at 2 am and this helped to sorts things out! It was hard to starboard just as they were soot blowing the boilers down below! I left the seagoing industry in 1985 and became a OH&S Boiler and Pressure vessel inspector for a government Department.

I have been in bad weather in all kinds of ships but my most frightening one was on my favorite bulkcarrier the Iron Endeavour when crossing the AU bight heading for Japan. She was a Panamax, built to the new 1966 load line specs and to just fit in the locks in the canal. The subsequent cross section of the hull made her look like plank floating on water and she used to flex something terrible in heavy weather . She had high tensile notch toughened steel in her sheer strake and also in her underwater extremes. It was unbelievable, in our lounge if you bent down slightly you could see the waves coming down the ship in heavy weather. The hatches were going up and down like keys in a piano. In the real bad weather the whole Foc'sle deck along with winches used to disappear from view! 

She had a wonderful engine room and it was very disappointing when the hull started developing cracks. She was eventually handed back to her owners at the end of her charter and I can tell you it really upset me having to add her to my list of structural failure bulkies. She sank off South Africa with loss of life when one and two hatch covers floated off! 

I agree, I get quite angry every time I read in say my MER magazine that 80% of all ship accidents/ failures are caused by human failure on board!!!! The reason bulkcarriers are not being maintained properly and even damaged is that the iron ore loaders and discharge grabs are getting bigger and bigger and this keeps reducing the turn round times to the point that proper and very important maintenance cannot be carried out. We used to love it when the strikes were on in Port Hedland and heaps of ships were at anchor in a safe anchorage so that we could carry out some very necessary ME maintenance . There has been a few mistakes made in loading iron ore onto the ships in Port Hedland and also the loaders have not been very good at passing on the tonnages from their meters to the ships staff. 

The bastards put 2 loaders onto our panamax and loaded us at 7000 tonnes an hour. We were a BHP ship loading BHP iron ore and I can tell you there was no love lost between the two groups. In Port Kembla they solved the grab damage to the ship problem (60 tonne grab I think) by hiring female ore bridge drivers.

Have you read Captain P Woinin's 'Doomed Bulkies' articles he is a Surveyor from Belgium ( great man) and also the book 'Tankship Tromedy' which can be read on the internet. Google both names.

Regarding the the Parkgate court case the poor chief was apparently the only good guy mixing it with a bad bunch and there was a bit of sympathy for him by the seagoing staff on the BHP side . If you take the kings shilling you have to follow orders, their orders. I have been in a few courts on the prosecution side and also as an expert witness. I myself can only tell the truth and I will not tell porkies. I am not smart enough to survive under a cross examination as I would be caught out just like the C/E! The C/E would not have had a chance against a top London barrister. Every investigation that I carried out where I have recommended prosecution that ended in court, I have won by telling the truth and nothing but the truth. 

Oldman, you are spot on and you have got me on your last 'whinger' paragraph. I throw in towel on this one, you are right,you are the winner and I am still shaking my head!

Regards 

Alastair

PS If you go back a few posts you will be able to read about my very last standby at sea when we punched a huge hole in No 1 DB tank in brand new 140,000 tonner when entering the inner harbour at Port Kembla!


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## Duncan112

Oldman,

Thanks for your comments in your 247, the only thing that made me suspect that it was the hinge brackets you could see in the photograph was the fact that there are 4 sets of brackets, one with a dog still in place which made me suspect the two outer brackets were the hinge brackets. Unfortunately I seem to recollect that the investigations have been hampered by the fact that the "As Built" drawings have all mysteriously vanished from the builders archives (IIRC they were some of the first things on the bonfire when the yard closed) Lloyds and the owners records. 

There is no doubt that the loss of "Derbyshire" has improved bulk carrier safety (Probably not as far as we would like though..) but the question remains, IF "Derbyshire" had been constructed to present day standards and there was no question of structural failure or initial water ingress were the conditions so atrocious that she would still have foundered? I don't know and wouldn't like to guess, as you have had experience of these conditions and fortunately survived would you care to provide informed comment as to how much effect the change of design standards would have had to your experience?

Thanks


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## Hamish Mackintosh

It is interesting to note that the inquiries do not agree with you gents, structure failure. The first dive was inconclusive, and the second dive done by a Woods hole oceanographic team, was a fifty seven day operation at a cost of four and a half million dollars, where 137000 pictures and hours of video film were taken, the first thing they threw out the widow was a structure failure at frame 65(?)and the missing hatch became the focal point, so the conclusion was "Human Error" and that with the flooding of the forepeak, the ship went down by the head ,and the hatches were stove in, which caused the vessel sink However as the author points out, the wreck is "torn" apart ,with seven sections scattered on the ocean floor with more than 2000 pieces lying around her, the wheel house and accomodation were never seen, add to this the fact that her cargo was scattered on top of her, which suggests a cataclysmic even on or near the surface. It is also pointed out that several bulkers some with as many as four hatches flooded remained afloat, some for a number of days, which suggests that in the case of the Derbyshire had the forepeak flooded that nothing would be so instantanous as to negate the reason for no sos


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## chadburn

From the photograph's that I saw the M.E. is not in the Hull, the valve that can be seen appears to be the built up spare, my understanding is the M.E. is some distance away. As far as the situation regarding Bank's and foreclosure's are concerned when this happened in MFC the instruction's both myself and the Master received were to remove all paperwork from the vessel and send it to H/O where it would be stored for security and legal reason's.


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## oldman 80

Hamish Mackintosh said:


> It is interesting to note that the inquiries do not agree with you gents, structure failure. The first dive was inconclusive, and the second dive done by a Woods hole oceanographic team, was a fifty seven day operation at a cost of four and a half million dollars, where 137000 pictures and hours of video film were taken, the first thing they threw out the widow was a structure failure at frame 65(?)and the missing hatch became the focal point, so the conclusion was "Human Error" and that with the flooding of the forepeak, the ship went down by the head ,and the hatches were stove in, which caused the vessel sink However as the author points out, the wreck is "torn" apart ,with seven sections scattered on the ocean floor with more than 2000 pieces lying around her, the wheel house and accomodation were never seen, add to this the fact that her cargo was scattered on top of her, which suggests a cataclysmic even on or near the surface. It is also pointed out that several bulkers some with as many as four hatches flooded remained afloat, some for a number of days, which suggests that in the case of the Derbyshire had the forepeak flooded that nothing would be so instantanous as to negate the reason for no sos


That bit (In red), is in my view, bordering on "clap trap".
I'll come back to the rest later (implosion & accomodation to be included)
I have to go out now.
Please do not be, or feel "put down" by the foregoing comment, - your post is excellent as it keeps both the issue, and the memory alive.
That can only be good for the future.
In case I do not return - (accident or something for example,) - at least they found her and video'd what they found, and compared with HMS Sydney - relatively quickly. That is the only real positive which came out of her loss - a great triumph for "people power" I suggest.
Keep up the good work - Shipsnostalgia.


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## alastairrussell

_Received this email/ Xmas card today from the Commisioner of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. You will be able to see the full version on their website which covers all forms of transport.

Alastair_

Marine
Marine safety
Marine safety investigations and reports
Marine safety issues and actions
Marine publications
Maritime weekly summaries
National jurisdiction for maritime investigations
Procedures
Terminology, investigation procedures and deciding whether to investigate
Reporting
Mandatory marine accident or incident notification
REPCON - Marine Confidential Reporting Scheme

Australian Transport Safety Bureau Blog InFocus


*'No-Blame' Investigations

*Monday December 17, 2012

*Each time the ATSB publishes the report on one of its investigations, we say:
It is not a function of the ATSB to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an investigation report must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings. 
*
This statement is based on what is required of us by law. More simply put, we’re not in the business of blaming people for accidents or incidents – but we are in the business of explaining what happened so we can minimise the chance of it happening again. In shorthand, we say we’re a ‘no blame’ organisation.

I’ve seen more headlines than I’d like that start with the words ‘ATSB blames’. We don’t.

This approach has major benefits for improving transport safety. Our acting consistently in accordance with the ‘no blame’ principle ensures people are willing to give us lots of sensitive information without fear that the information will be used against them. This helps us understand dimensions of an accident or incident that might otherwise be unknown to us.

We use this information to identify safety issues (that is, areas where steps can be taken to reduce risks in transport safety), to promote positive safety action and to educate industry. The goal is always to improve safety. 

Despite this, it is surprising how often people read one of our investigation reports as apportioning blame. I’ve seen more headlines than I’d like that start with the words ‘ATSB blames’. We don’t.

That being said, it is sometimes the case, despite our best efforts, that the facts of an accident or occurrence speak for themselves. And sometimes we have to put those facts on the table so everyone understands what happened and why we have arrived at our conclusions.In the same way, sometimes people assume that the ATSB should be the regulator of safety. In an overall system of safety, a regulator ensures that operators are managing safety risks well. If safety risks aren’t managed to a proper standard then, at times, the regulator will need to find fault. By contrast, our role is to understand whether the system of safety itself needs to be changed to improve safety. The two roles are complementary – but very different.

Our investigators take our no-blame mandate very seriously. It is a foundation of their work and of ATSB culture more generally. Besides being a legislative requirement, the no-blame philosophy extends to the way we directly cooperate with anyone involved in an occurrence. We think we’re generally doing pretty well at this, but of course we always welcome feedback.
I’d be interested in your thoughts about no-blame investigations. Do you think they are an effective way to improve safety?

On a final note, I’d like to take this opportunity to wish you a happy festive season. Travel safely. I look forward to continuing our conversation on safer transport next year
. 
Written byMartin Dolan,Chief Commissionerat 10:00


No-blame
2 Comments :
Mark Newton said... 
While it's true that sometimes the facts of an investigation speak for themselves, it's also true that selectivity regarding the facts presented in the investigation report can make the report speak in ways that the full corpus of facts would not, and perhaps should not, reflect. This is the problem that the ATSB has had with the Pel-Air investigation. By emphasising the role of the pilot and diminishing the roles played by Pel-Air and CASA, the ATSB has severely undermined it's own reputation. One cannot read that report without walking away with the understanding that the ATSB has firmly and conclusively blamed the pilot. Until the well-canvassed defects in the report are addressed, the ATSB will suffer a credibility problem whenever it talks about "no blame" investigations. - mark
December 17, 2012 10:37
View all comments byMark Newton 

Chris H said... 
The media will always simplify and sensationalise. If your investigators found the fuel cock selected to an undamaged empty tank, you would say 'A likely contributing factor was the pilot selected an exhausted fuel tank'. The media will headline that as 'Pilot runs on Empty', which implies blame. Short of not publishing, no amount of sugar coating will change that. For those of us that are in aviation extensively, the accident investigations are an invaluable source of information and we'd never want this information to be watered down or made politically correct. The problem will always be the media who take this detailed technical data and sensationalise it for Joe Public. I think those of us that read these reports can see past blame and take what we need from them so as we minimise our own risks. That is the whole point of these reports and in my opinion they work! Please continue publishing your reports in as mush detail as you can get away with these days.
December 17, 2012 10:53
Website : 
View all comments byChris H
Comment


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## oldman 80

Duncan112 said:


> Oldman,
> 
> Thanks for your comments in your 247, the only thing that made me suspect that it was the hinge brackets you could see in the photograph was the fact that there are 4 sets of brackets, one with a dog still in place which made me suspect the two outer brackets were the hinge brackets. Unfortunately I seem to recollect that the investigations have been hampered by the fact that the "As Built" drawings have all mysteriously vanished from the builders archives (IIRC they were some of the first things on the bonfire when the yard closed) Lloyds and the owners records.
> 
> There is no doubt that the loss of "Derbyshire" has improved bulk carrier safety (Probably not as far as we would like though..) but the question remains, IF "Derbyshire" had been constructed to present day standards and there was no question of structural failure or initial water ingress were the conditions so atrocious that she would still have foundered? I don't know and wouldn't like to guess, as you have had experience of these conditions and fortunately survived would you care to provide informed comment as to how much effect the change of design standards would have had to your experience?
> 
> Thanks


Hi Duncan 112.
Sorry for the delay in getting back to you on this one - I have had an absolute deluge of emails in the last couple of days not only in respect of this string but others also.
Additionally I have had other matters (Unrelated) to attend to.

To try to answer your question:-
(aaa)I was not on board Derbyshire when she was lost, so I cannot say ensactly what the conditions were like at the time. 
(bbb) However I have experienced several typhoons/hurricanes over the years.
(ccc) For sure they are extreme events but the critical thing is that they are, in general, relatively short term events. That fact is essentially "of the essence".
(ddd) Therefore the answer to your question - quote -_IF "Derbyshire" had been constructed to present day standards and there was no question of structural failure or initial water ingress were the conditions so atrocious that she would still have foundered?_ has to be:- almost certainly not.
Had she been in those conditions for days and days upon end, and the ocean had indeed "built up" like it can do after weeks of hurricane force winds, blowing virtually continuously across a vast fetch of ocean then that is a somewhat different situation, BUT even so, provided she was not crippled mechanically, and could still manouvre in those conditions, then it is most likely she would *easily survive*, indeed almost certainly so - but of course, there are exceptions to all things, nothing is guaranteed.
I hope the foregoing answers your question.
Its the best I can do.
Rgds.


----------



## Duncan112

Oldman,

Thank you for a succinct and germane reply which gives a reasoned answer to my question. As you wisely point out in your 277 discussion keeps the memory and issue alive - as these men have no grave but the sea the least we can do is make their memorial a safer existence for those that follow.


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## Hamish Mackintosh

Another couple of points regarding the "Derbyshire"which I have seen no mention of was- On the voyage prior to her demise she had loaded coal in Australia for Fos-sur-Mer in France and while crossing the south Indian ocean ran into heavy weather ,where she sustained minor damage on deck and the Flooding of her forecastle space, repairs were carried out at sea, and she arrived in the Fos on the 20th of June, where Capt Underhill joined her she then went to New York for bunkers ,thense on to Sept IIes to load Iron ore in the form of a fine sand like substance containing 65% iron going by the name of"carol concentrates"The weather in Canada had been very wet with constant rain, the ore is transported to the loading terminal(350miles) from the source in open rail cars where it is dumped in open stockpiles untill required, so consequently it is very wet, the water content was calculated to be around 3.6% which equates to 5668 tons of water in a cargo of 157,447 tons of ore, which gave Capt Underhill concern as he was worried about liquefaction, and for the amount of times he had to run the pumps he was concerned they had loaded more water than the calculations indicated. However there is no more mention of either of these incidents in the enquires. I am taking this from the afore mentioned book,which has many more examples of dissapearing bulkers


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## oldman 80

Hamish Mackintosh said:


> Another couple of points regarding the "Derbyshire"which I have seen no mention of was- On the voyage prior to her demise she had loaded coal in Australia for Fos-sur-Mer in France and while crossing the south Indian ocean ran into heavy weather ,where she sustained minor damage on deck and the Flooding of her forecastle space, repairs were carried out at sea, and she arrived in the Fos on the 20th of June, where Capt Underhill joined her she then went to New York for bunkers ,thense on to Sept IIes to load Iron ore in the form of a fine sand like substance containing 65% iron going by the name of"carol concentrates"The weather in Canada had been very wet with constant rain, the ore is transported to the loading terminal(350miles) from the source in open rail cars where it is dumped in open stockpiles untill required, so consequently it is very wet, the water content was calculated to be around 3.6% which equates to 5668 tons of water in a cargo of 157,447 tons of ore, which gave Capt Underhill concern as he was worried about liquefaction, and for the amount of times he had to run the pumps he was concerned they had loaded more water than the calculations indicated. However there is no more mention of either of these incidents in the enquires. I am taking this from the afore mentioned book,which has many more examples of dissapearing bulkers


_One can reasonably assume that by the time she had reached the Indian Ocean by far the vast amount of water from the cargo would have drained to the bilges and been pumped to a holding tank/tanks. (Certainly long before she approached Japan.)
As she dived head long to the sea bed, that iron ore would likely have smashed her bulkheads to pieces - they are not designed to have cargo suddenly stowed on "top of them".
By the time the sea had reached Nos 6/7, the stern would have been "unsupported" - (out of the water). At that time she would have "snapped" just for'd of the engine room. However she was already lost by then.
Come to think of it, I think the Titanic snapped too - I could be wrong though.
Once separated the accomodation/stern section would instantly roll over and sink, in my view._

Edit:- Accomodation/aft section - journey to sea bed - very likely on a completely different "trajectory" to the cargo carrying section of the hull.


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> That bit (In red), is in my view, bordering on "clap trap".
> I'll come back to the rest later (implosion & accomodation to be included)
> I have to go out now.
> Please do not be, or feel "put down" by the foregoing comment, - your post is excellent as it keeps both the issue, and the memory alive.
> That can only be good for the future.
> In case I do not return - (accident or something for example,) - at least they found her and video'd what they found, and compared with HMS Sydney - relatively quickly. That is the only real positive which came out of her loss - a great triumph for "people power" I suggest.
> Keep up the good work - Shipsnostalgia.


Well as you can see Hamish Mackintosh - I am back.
Your reference to different conclusions re Official Inquiries and "us" here in this string is really very understandable.
You need go no further that the case of Air New Zealands DC 10 accident on the slopes of Mount Eribus in the Antarctic, for an explanation of that. (Mid late 1970's)
At the end of the inquiries the commissioner/Chief Justice (whatever he was) summed up by saying he had been faced with an "orchestrated litany of lies" by Air New Zealand Management, and "expert" witnessess. In the final event, the matter went all the way to the Privy Council, before reasonable findings resulted.
I do not know if the Derbyshire matter went that far, but I suspect not.

Finally may I ask, Are you a M.N. Cadet by any chance ?
I hope so, because if you are, then you are to be commended for your interest, and I have no doubt a great future awaits you at sea.
In that respect, ( if it is the case ), may I suggest you try to add a bit of common courtesy to your many obvious attributes.
I thank you for your interest in these matters.
(Read)


----------



## Hamish Mackintosh

That I think is the authors point, the Derbyshire was found in SEVEN sections, with hundreds of smaller pieces scattered around her which suggests an extremely violent breakup over a very short time.quote-In addition,a shimmering effect was observed on the seabed as the light from the ROV's cameras was reflected by individual particles of iron ore sand.Not only is this shimmering phenomenon observed on the sea bed but also over the wreckage. These two facts have led to the conclusion that the cargo showered down from the surface,taking longer to descend than the wreckage.Given that the expert assessment of the evidence is correct, then the case for sinking by internal explosion is very strong. But an explosion caused by what? Unquote


----------



## oldman 80

Explosion on board - well that could never be ruled out completely - she was an OBO after all.
However I would doubt it, even more so as you mentioned her previous cargo was coal.
The cargo would almost certainly take longer to descend to the sea bed than the wreckage - once released from the confines of the hull.
Internal *explosion* - always possible yet remote in her case, I would suggest.
Major Implosion on leaving the surface - well absolutely - no doubts about that.

Edit:- _Berge Vange or Berge Istra - I Can't remember which, disappeared with all hands and without explanation - southern ocean I think. Near the estimated time of her loss, Satellite's had picked up what was considered to have been a flash which may have been an explosion of some kind in that area in which it was believed she was lost. That's what my memory is telling me - at this time - it's not doing me much good though, maybe even the opposite.
_


----------



## oldseamerchant

oldman 80 said:


> Explosion on board - well that could never be ruled out completely - she was an OBO after all.
> 
> [/COLOR][/I]


Have you ever sailed in combination carriers Oldman?


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## WilliamH

Re. Pumping hold bilges while caring ore cargoes.
I spent 12 months on the Chelsea Bridge running between the St. Lawrence and Port Talbot with iron ore. The cargo surveyors in Port Talbot claimed the ship was not delivering the stated tonnage that had been loaded. We normally pumped the hold bilges daily, but this practice was stopped on the Masters or head office orders, I don't know which. Often there was water, maybe a 1ft lying on the tank tops after discharge. My conclusion could the staff onboard the Derbyshire have been told not to pump the hold bilges in order that they deliver the correct tonnage of ore.


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## oldman 80

oldseamerchant said:


> Have you ever sailed in combination carriers Oldman?


HA HA HA - very funny indeed.
Read my posts. 
******.

Edit:-for ******* read *anker!


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## John Cassels

oldman 80 said:


> HA HA HA - very funny indeed.
> Read my posts.
> ******.
> 
> Edit:-for ******* read *anker!


Hence the question.


----------



## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Re. Pumping hold bilges while caring ore cargoes.
> I spent 12 months on the Chelsea Bridge running between the St. Lawrence and Port Talbot with iron ore. The cargo surveyors in Port Talbot claimed the ship was not delivering the stated tonnage that had been loaded. We normally pumped the hold bilges daily, but this practice was stopped on the Masters or head office orders, I don't know which. Often there was water, maybe a 1ft lying on the tank tops after discharge. My conclusion could the staff onboard the Derbyshire have been told not to pump the hold bilges in order that they deliver the correct tonnage of ore.


I suggest that is *absolute rubbish* - she was a Bibby's ship.
Bilges would have been pumped on a very regular basis - to nominated/ & properly calibrated holding tanks (DB's/slop tanks- whatever-depending on convenient availability) and if and when they were full, then overboard, but only after accurate records of quantities had been kept. Through a separator as well - I don't doubt.
*The first preference* would be retain all water on board until arrival Disport - always. If not possible - then as described above.
Standard procedure in Denholm - also in Bibby's you CAN BE SURE.
They were a very reputable company after all, - so don't come that crap.


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## WilliamH

Oldman you can suggest what ever you want but while I was on the Chelsea Bridge the contents of the hold bilges were pumped directly overboard, until we were ordered to stop doing it and leave the water that drained from the iron ore in the hold, until after discharge. I was not aware that you were on the vessel at the time.


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## oldman 80

I was never on any of the DSM managed straight Dry Bulkers. Just the wet&dry variety. (OBO's and Ore/Oilers) Thats the "downside" of having come from Cheveron, I suppose.
(well no not really - after the 2nd generation of OBO arrived, I came to quite like them. A vast improvement on Generation No. 1. Had they gone to Generation 4, then I think they'd have become excellent vessels. -They call it evolution.
However I am, to this day, still aware of the content of DSM circular letters - which I obviously read, and adhered to - so far as possible - whilst it would appear many others did not !!!!!!!!
I can only assume that is the reason they made me Master and did not Farm me out to CAST or the like, as they did with so many.
For H.O. to have said - Do not pump dry cargo bilges, - seems outrageous to me. (possible though, I suppose - back in the 1950's perhaps). In any case I do not think any shipmaster in Denholm UK would have paid the slightest bit of attention to such a directive - nor indeed a shipmaster from any other UK company either. - (well almost). I can only think of one or two who might have - both alcoholics. 

Edit:- after DSM circular letters add the following words, Company Rule Book and Operational Procedures Manuals. Foregoing applied to all UK fleet vessels.

(Sad)


----------



## alastairrussell

_Your reference to different conclusions re Official Inquiries and "us" here in this string is really very understandable.
You need go no further that the case of Air New Zealands DC 10 accident on the slopes of Mount Eribus in the Antarctic, for an explanation of that. (Mid late 1970's)
At the end of the inquiries the commissioner/Chief Justice (whatever he was) summed up by saying he had been faced with an "orchestrated litany of lies" by Air New Zealand Management, and "expert" witnessess. In the final event, the matter went all the way to the Privy Council, before reasonable findings resulted.
I do not know if the Derbyshire matter went that far, but I suspect not.
_

Oldman,

I reckon that the DC-10 aircraft as built had a lot in common with the new bulk carriers being built to the new 1966 load line conventions. She was a bulk carrier of the air that suffered from the same problem as the sea going bulkcarriers in that the large cargo doors structurally failed. 

If I remember right the early DC-10's all had defectively designed cargo doors that failed catastrophically. I have the DC-10 book 'Destination Disaster' in my library and I cannot find it!!! The sudden failure created an explosive decompression that destroyed the passenger floor along with all the very important controls to the aft end of the of the aircraft!!!! Was there not an air crash over Paris when a DC -10 was full to the gunnels with English rugby union supporters?

Anyway, I vaguely remember the ANZ accident being caused by Mount Erebus being in the wrong place in the electronic chart or by the electronic flight control system being wrongly programed by a shoreside wallah in the ANZ head office. 256 died in the crash.

I Googled the accident and I have pasted the following from one of the web sites

Alastair


*Investigation into the causes of the crash
*

_Early in the investigation into the causes of the disaster, it became clear that there was no mechanical reason for the crash. The information on the flight recorder tapes showed there had been no emergency in the cockpit of the aircraft.
Attention was then focused on the possibility of pilot error, pointing to the inexperience of the two pilots in flying in the Antarctic. 
A report by the chief inspector of aircraft accidents, Ron Chippindale, came out in May 1980. It stated that the decision of the captain in dropping to a height below the approved level, and continuing at that height when the crew was not sure of the plane’s position, had been the main cause of the accident. 
Just weeks before Chippindale’s report came out, the government announced a one-man Royal Commission of Inquiry. On 27 April, 1981, Justice Peter Mahon, released his report. This report placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
Mahon found that Captain Collins had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres, and could not be said to have been guilty of unauthorised low flying.
Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $150,000. The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
Debate on where the blame for the crash should be placed continued. The changed flight path was in line with Mount Erebus but would have been safe if there had been no drop in height below the recommended level. Later court decisions questioned the way in which Mahon conducted his investigation.
_


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> _Your reference to different conclusions re Official Inquiries and "us" here in this string is really very understandable.
> You need go no further that the case of Air New Zealands DC 10 accident on the slopes of Mount Eribus in the Antarctic, for an explanation of that. (Mid late 1970's)
> At the end of the inquiries the commissioner/Chief Justice (whatever he was) summed up by saying he had been faced with an "orchestrated litany of lies" by Air New Zealand Management, and "expert" witnessess. In the final event, the matter went all the way to the Privy Council, before reasonable findings resulted.
> I do not know if the Derbyshire matter went that far, but I suspect not.
> _
> 
> Oldman,
> 
> I reckon that the DC-10 aircraft as built had a lot in common with the new bulk carriers being built to the new 1966 load line conventions. She was a bulk carrier of the air that suffered from the same problem as the sea going bulkcarriers in that the large cargo doors structurally failed.
> 
> If I remember right the early DC-10's all had defectively designed cargo doors that failed catastrophically. I have the DC-10 book 'Destination Disaster' in my library and I cannot find it!!! The sudden failure created an explosive decompression that destroyed the passenger floor along with all the very important controls to the aft end of the of the aircraft!!!! Was there not an air crash over Paris when a DC -10 was full to the gunnels with English rugby union supporters?
> 
> Anyway, I vaguely remember the ANZ accident being caused by Mount Erebus being in the wrong place in the electronic chart or by the electronic flight control system being wrongly programed by a shoreside wallah in the ANZ head office. 256 died in the crash.
> 
> I Googled the accident and I have pasted the following from one of the web sites
> 
> Alastair
> 
> 
> *Investigation into the causes of the crash
> *
> 
> _Early in the investigation into the causes of the disaster, it became clear that there was no mechanical reason for the crash. The information on the flight recorder tapes showed there had been no emergency in the cockpit of the aircraft.
> Attention was then focused on the possibility of pilot error, pointing to the inexperience of the two pilots in flying in the Antarctic.
> A report by the chief inspector of aircraft accidents, Ron Chippindale, came out in May 1980. It stated that the decision of the captain in dropping to a height below the approved level, and continuing at that height when the crew was not sure of the plane’s position, had been the main cause of the accident.
> Just weeks before Chippindale’s report came out, the government announced a one-man Royal Commission of Inquiry. On 27 April, 1981, Justice Peter Mahon, released his report. This report placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
> Mahon found that Captain Collins had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres, and could not be said to have been guilty of unauthorised low flying.
> Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $150,000. The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
> Debate on where the blame for the crash should be placed continued. The changed flight path was in line with Mount Erebus but would have been safe if there had been no drop in height below the recommended level. Later court decisions questioned the way in which Mahon conducted his investigation.
> _


Indeed you are correct about the DC 10 and cargo doors.
Your analogy with bulk carriers back in those days is quite pertinent, quite appropriate in fact.
The big DC 10 crashes resulting from the early cargo door locking systems were in the vicinity of Chigaco "O" Hare (if my memory services me correctly ) but the airline escapes me at this time. The other big one was as you suggest in the vicinity of Paris and it was Turkish Airlines.
The Mount Eribus incident was something quite different. It beggars belief that an airline management could allow such deplorable practices so far as flight planning went. The crew of the aircraft had nothing to do with it, although ANZ were quite ruthless in trying to lay the blame totally at their feet. Dead men tell no tales and all too often I feel, may be denied the postumous representation/advocay they deserve. Finally the truth came out, but it took years - and only with the final appeal through the Privy Council.
Can any of us doubt that the Derbyshire incident has not yet been fully explained, although *we must be thankfull that the wreck was found.*
Will the remains of those lost ever be returned to their families. No I would doubt it, but at least we know where they are,(approximately.) We do therefore have a sort of "defined grave" for them, all be it at the bottom of the ocean, but thats better than no idea of their whereabouts at all.
As for the Navigation blunder at ANZ, it was monumental in size and almost unbelievable in cause. I'll P.M. you about that - be prepared for a shock. You cannot blame the individual responsible though, " the system " was rotten to the core. No cross checking in place - non whatsoever. God almighty, if we had run ships like that, we'd all be in jail.


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## Duncan112

DC10 cargo door problem reminds me of the malaise that afflicted ferry doors where it was possible to think the locking bars were fully home without them being so, and no failsafe indication of the locking bars position. Add in a few short cuts on maintenance and you have a potential disaster - all for a few extra cubic feet of freight space!!

There was also an issue with the engine pylon bolts - I think this was traced to the engine and pylon being removed as a unit rather than separately to save maintenance time - all of which has no real relevance to this thread but interesting all the same.

For those of you interested in the relationship between design flaws and human failings I can recommend "To Engineer is Human" by Henry Petroski


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## Malky Glaister

I stood by and sailed with OLDMAN 80 on Anglia Team. She was an OBO and carried both dry and oil whilst he was onboard.

Therefore I know that he has sailed on this type of vessel.

I sailed on some horrors of this type. Cast heron, Cast Fulmar and Cast Puffin ex Bibby's Australia Bridge.

regards

Malky


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## oldseamerchant

If you read post 285 and 284 reference to and explosian you should be able to figure out why the question arose.


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## Malky Glaister

Implosions usually also cause debris to thrown out as an explosion would.

I personaly, have not followed the Derbyshires case preferring not to know I suppose as I was sailing often on the type.

I have viewed the graphic of her final couple of minutes which I found horrifying in the extreme.

The vessel appears to be driven down by her engine for a few but vital seconds as a submarine might. All the more frightening for those viewing the crisis from the wheelhouse.
That she snapped into several sections is no surprise but where the accommodation went may never be known.

Basically I am not able to see your drift oldseamerchant I am afraid.

I also, as well as sailing with oldman 80 on these types of ship know he was master of Scandia Team and possibly master on Spey Bridge (maybe Chief officer).

They were very difficult and dangerous ships to operate and frankly in the early days the officers left a lot to be desired regarding pumps, inert gas and the control systems.
I once had a 2nd mate on his first day watch ring the telegraph astern and ahead at noon with the inevitable disaster down stairs. One case of beer in the fridge

Sharp learning curve for all, some did not survive.

The Berge ships were something else again

regards

Malky


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## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> Implosions usually also cause debris to thrown out as an explosion would.
> 
> I personaly, have not followed the Derbyshires case preferring not to know I suppose as I was sailing often on the type.
> 
> I have viewed the graphic of her final couple of minutes which I found horrifying in the extreme.
> 
> The vessel appears to be driven down by her engine for a few but vital seconds as a submarine might. All the more frightening for those viewing the crisis from the wheelhouse.
> That she snapped into several sections is no surprise but where the accommodation went may never be known.
> 
> Basically I am not able to see your drift oldseamerchant I am afraid.
> 
> I also, as well as sailing with oldman 80 on these types of ship know he was master of Scandia Team and possibly master on Spey Bridge (maybe Chief officer).
> 
> They were very difficult and dangerous ships to operate and frankly in the early days the officers left a lot to be desired regarding pumps, inert gas and the control systems.
> I once had a 2nd mate on his first day watch ring the telegraph astern and ahead at noon with the inevitable disaster down stairs. One case of beer in the fridge
> 
> Sharp learning curve for all, some did not survive.
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


_So true Malky, so true .
Those of us who stood by the buildings were at least fortunate in as much as we got some pretty good "briefings" in the yard, from the builders and designers.
Those who did not benefit from those briefings - and just joined later - were somewhat disadvantaged in that respect.
That ahead/astern incident you mention - good lord - that must have been a bit of a "humdinger" - but it certainly doesn't suprise me.
The builders briefings certainly would have been of benefit to that guy.
_

P.S. all my guys went home to their families after their tours, without exception. But that's what I was paid for- after all.


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## Malky Glaister

""P.S. all my guys went home to their families after their tours, without exception. But that's what I was paid for- after all. ""

I made it my business to ensure that the guys on board got home in one piece also. It was tough at times but there are many tales to tell on that subject.

regards and seasons greetings to all

Malky


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## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> ""P.S. all my guys went home to their families after their tours, without exception. But that's what I was paid for- after all. ""
> 
> I made it my business to ensure that the guys on board got home in one piece also. It was tough at times but there are many tales to tell on that subject.
> 
> regards and seasons greetings to all
> 
> Malky


Indeed there are Malky.
Your previous post:- I was only C/O on Clarksons OBO's.
I do not think I would ever have accepted command of one of them, under any cir***stances at all.
In fact after the avatar one, I would never have returned to one of them, in any capacity at all.
I keep the avatar as a reminder, and also as a tribute to Captain John Dunnipace, whom it was that freed me up from bridge duties, whilst those welding riding squads were on board. (6 guys I think). (We just drifted for a month). They were experts in their field, absolutely they were, and I was not going to let an opportunity like that pass by. Others might, but not I.
I grabbed it whist it was available - with both hands - and yes those guys were happy to teach me how to weld properly, they were quite pleased to, in fact. I actually became good at it believe it or not, and I suppose enjoyed it - took a bit of time though. It is not very often you get opportunities like that. If you do, - you just have to grab them.


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## Doug Shaw

If I am correct in thinking the ship in your avatar, oldman 80, is the Spey Bridge, I believe she eventually broke into two sections and sank (in the Med, I think). Fortunately there was no loss of life, but I don't know any other details. She would have been about twenty years old by then and had undergone several changes of ownership. The Muirfield was another ship formerly managed by DSM that went to the bottom, but again I don't know the details.

Regards
Doug


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## oldman 80

Doug Shaw said:


> If I am correct in thinking the ship in your avatar, oldman 80, is the Spey Bridge, I believe she eventually broke into two sections and sank (in the Med, I think). Fortunately there was no loss of life, but I don't know any other details. She would have been about twenty years old by then and had undergone several changes of ownership. The Muirfield was another ship formerly managed by DSM that went to the bottom, but again I don't know the details.
> 
> Regards
> Doug


Correct re my avatar.
I did hear she had sunk, ( from this website) and was amazed to learn she had lasted so long. I didn't think she would make her 10th Birthday. Maybe I was an even better welder than I thought. If indeed it was the same Spey Bridge you refer to, and not a names sake.
The Muirfield - I have no idea what happened to her after she went out of DSM Management. Whilst she was with us she became world famous for "discovering" the Muirfield Seamount near the Cocos Islands. A lot of damage done there, but nobody believed the story until about 10 years later when finally the Australian Navy went out to the Area did a proper hydrographic survey and confirmed it.
Her bottom was ripped open quite badly and huge great boulders lodged in her D.B. 's so far as I remember from the photographs taken in a Singapore Dry dock.
She was a straight Dry Bulker, I think not OBO or Oil/ORE


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## John Cassels

Muirfield was an OBO.


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## Gulpers

John Cassels said:


> Muirfield was an OBO.


Indeed she was - heard her called a few names and OBO was one of them! [=P]


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## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Indeed she was - heard her called a few names and OBO was one of them! [=P]


She might have been called an OBO, by some,* but she wasn't*, at least not if we are talking about the DSM managed Dry Bulk Carrier which "discovered" the previously uncharted seamount sometime around early 1973.
At the time she was owned by BISCO (British Iron & Steel Corpn) and so far as I can recall they were her first owners - ie she was built for them.
I cannot see BISCO having any interest at all in an OBO 
(or oil/ore-er) for that matter, just ore and coal, which for the benefit of some, are dry cargoes, which may on occassion be damp to a greater or lesser degree, and indeed generally are.
Sometimes however they may get wet, - the discovery of that Seamount, was probably one such occassion, although maybe not, as I believe that *all* *of her tank tops* remained pretty much in-tact. Something of a miracle considering she was at Full Sea Speed at the time of contact with the seamount.
It seems likely she had deep D.B.'s, (or deeper than normal) - special strengthening for high density ores - I assume.
Since that time (1973 about) there have been other vessels carrying the same name - nothing to do with DSM though, so far as I am aware.
She left DSM management sometime after repairs, but where she went, I do not know. Maybe sold to BHP - but that's just a guess.


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## Doug Shaw

> Maybe sold to BHP - but that's just a guess.


She was sold to the Chinese, with long-term charter to British Steel. I did the hand-over dry-docking in Portugal. Apart from the mate (whose name I can't recall) and I, the DSM crew left immediately on arrival. The new owner's crew were not allowed aboard, so between us we had to manage all the work for both British Steel and C Y Tung (?).

The Muirfield was indeed an OBO. She had twin dual pressure boilers, which wouldn't have been necessary for a straight bulker. They gave no end of trouble. She was launched in 1970 under the Norwegian flag, named the Tibetan, and I don't believe she came under DSM until a year or two later.

Regards
Doug


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## alastairrussell

Oldman

Now this is secret, please do not tell anyone!! 

Negotiations are underway at the present time that could see some of the US military’s most advanced drone aircraft based on the Australian Indian Ocean territory of the Cocos Islands. Yes, Australia is going to give the Cocos islands away to very close friends. You will note that the Cocos and Christmas island are much much closer to Indonesia than to Australia.

This deal will of course be on condition that Denholms keep all their tired Bulkies with flooded bilges well away from CI say outside a 70 mile radius. Even then they might have to keep their bilges dry. I tried to find the loaded draft of the Muirhead and failed but I cannot see how she managed to hit the rocks as they are reported to be well down . Maybe she hit the wreck of the German light cruiser Emdem which was sunk by the HMAS Sydney near there in ww2. Were the Muirhead and the QE2 using a British chart when they hit uncharted rocks?

Regards

Alastair

PS My old class mate 'Peem' Hamilton was one the 4 crew lost when the RAF Vulcan bomber crashed in Chicago when practising for an airshow at O'hare airport. There were no bombs onboard! He was attached to the Dambuster 617 squadron


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## randcmackenzie

Muirfield was most definitely built as an OBO for Wilhelmsen - her original name was Tibetan.

Denholm supers strongly advised British Steel not to touch her but were over ruled.

She suffered from, inter alia, poor generator capacity and design, hugely corroded upper and lower stools and ballast tanks, and systemic lack of maintenance, due to limited investment by the owners.

Though mainly employed on BISCO's iron ore trades, she did carry oil in her time with Denholm, and due to the expense of changing her notation to bulk carrier, she retained the OBO notation throughout, though manifestly unfit to carry oil.


----------



## Gulpers

Jerry,

Sorry, you are mistaken. Never sailed on Muirfield but was on her when she dry docked in Greenock - I was in the same yard on Nordic Crusader.

Muirfield's details below. (Thumb)

Ship Detail
Ship Name SALVIA
Shiptype	Bulk/Oil Carrier (OBO)	
LR/IMO No.	7027356	
Gross	82,014
Call Sign	D9II	
Deadweight	153,256
MMSI No. 
Year of Build	1970
Flag	Korea, South	
Status	Total Loss
Operator	Unknown	
Shipbuilder	Eriksbergs

1997-11	Unknown
1982-00	SALVIA 
1978-00	Atlantic Splendour 
1972-00	Muirfield 
1970-00	Tibetan 
Originally Tibetan


----------



## Gulpers

Some photographs and more discussion about Muirfield in *this* thread. (Thumb)


----------



## randcmackenzie

Muirfield Seamount q.v.

The recollections of those on board at the time, some of whom I sailed with, seem to make it clear she hit an uncharted rock and not an Aussie booby trap.

They knew it was a rock, there was a big boulder buried in the double bottom, didn't need much forensic evidence, really.


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> Oldman
> 
> Now this is secret, please do not tell anyone!!
> 
> Negotiations are underway at the present time that could see some of the US military’s most advanced drone aircraft based on the Australian Indian Ocean territory of the Cocos Islands. Yes, Australia is going to give the Cocos islands away to very close friends. You will note that the Cocos and Christmas island are much much closer to Indonesia than to Australia.
> 
> This deal will of course be on condition that Denholms keep all their tired Bulkies with flooded bilges well away from CI say outside a 70 mile radius. Even then they might have to keep their bilges dry. I tried to find the loaded draft of the Muirhead and failed but I cannot see how she managed to hit the rocks as they are reported to be well down . Maybe she hit the wreck of the German light cruiser Emdem which was sunk by the HMAS Sydney near there in ww2. Were the Muirhead and the QE2 using a British charts when they hit uncharted rocks?
> 
> Regards
> 
> Alastair
> 
> PS My old class mate 'Peem' Hamilton was one the 4 crew lost when the RAF Vulcan bomber crashed in Chicago when practising for an airshow at O'hare airport. There were no bombs onboard! He was attached to the Dambuster 617 squadron


O.K. I won't - I promise
( I'll get the hang of this "colouring in" - quite soon)
That is true - I had noticed that.
Very wise - better still - scrap them.
Now that is very interesting as the photographs I saw clearly showed the bolders she collected. I cannot believe they were put there just for the benefit of the photo's - they were huge.
It is just possible I suppose, but it does not explain the rocks.

As for the charts - no idea about QE 2, but Muirfield - almost certainly

Edit:- P.S.:- re-PS. I don't recall the Vulcan bomber incident at all.


----------



## Cisco

Muirfield Bank is on the chart...can't remember which one - 'West Coast of Oz ' or some such.... 70 miles SSW of Cocos.... 13.10S 96.11E...least depth 18 metres.


----------



## oldman 80

randcmackenzie said:


> Muirfield was most definitely built as an OBO for Wilhelmsen - her original name was Tibetan.
> 
> Denholm supers strongly advised British Steel not to touch her but were over ruled.
> 
> She suffered from, inter alia, poor generator capacity and design, hugely corroded upper and lower stools and ballast tanks, and systemic lack of maintenance, due to limited investment by the owners.
> 
> Though mainly employed on BISCO's iron ore trades, she did carry oil in her time with Denholm, and due to the expense of changing her notation to bulk carrier, she retained the OBO notation throughout, though manifestly unfit to carry oil.



Oh yes - *now that is indeed quite possible* - the Spey Bridge lost her certification for oil - she should have been sent to scrap at that time, in my view, (she was bad) unless new owners spent an absolute fortune on her, - perhaps they did.
Anyhow it seems my welding may have "held" for a long time, it was only intended shortish term - until next docking.

Edit:- And of course you are clearly talking about the days when DSM had Superintendents who were the cream of the cream - Cowie and Airey - for a start.


----------



## oldman 80

Cisco said:


> Muirfield Bank is on the chart...can't remember which one - 'West Coast of Oz ' or some such.... 70 miles SSW of Cocos.... 13.10S 96.11E...least depth 18 metres.


Yes, today perhaps, - But that depth is after the Muirfield "Knocked the top off it" - I believe.
(Ouch)


----------



## Cisco

Tibetan/Muirfield's summer draught.... 55'7" = 16.9 metres.

One wonders how many other big bulkers bound round the Cape to Sunda Strait had 'missed it by that much'.


----------



## Malky Glaister

I do recall a photo of Muirfield in the Denholm News with a knot in the anchor chain !!
A pile of junk I was glad to have missed her though not by much.

regards

Malky


----------



## alastairrussell

I remember us copping a lot of maintenance and damage problems with the anchoring equipment when the big bulkies arrived. I also remember reading that when the really big tankers have an engine failure at sea whilst in ballast they have to be positioned immediately while they still had way on , this was so they can then be sailed away from danger. If they built up speed and drifted down wind (over 2 knots) and let the anchor go the chain and the windless would apparently be ripped off the ship! I always thought something was wrong! 

Now I see how the classification Societies get away with it. The flyer below is the result of a high windage ro-ro ship failure (Norcape), the full notice 4/2012 can be viewed in the MAIB website. I wonder why the IACS did not send us all a flyer about the EU Commission's 'dawn raids' on their headquarters office?

Regards

Alastair

_An extract from the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Requirements concerning mooring, anchoring and towing states: 
The anchoring equipment required herewith is intended for temporary mooring of a vessel within a harbour or sheltered area when the vessel is awaiting berth, tide, etc.
The fact that the anchor cable rendered indicated that the cable had slipped through the guillotine bar arrangement. Investigation revealed that the locking pin, which should have held the bar in place, was not engaged when the cable rendered. It transpired that the vessel’s SMS for anchoring operations contained no reference to the use of the locking pin when anchoring. 
The IACS requirements in relation to the strength of the windlass brake and stopper (guillotine) states:
A chain stopper should withstand a pull of 80% of the breaking load of the chain. The windlass with brakes engaged and cable lifters disengaged is to be able to withstand a pull of 45% of the breaking load of the chain.
The guillotine/chain stopper housing is the strongest part of the anchoring equipment and is designed to take the load of the cable when a vessel lies at anchor. In this case, the load of the cable transferred to the windlass as the cable slipped, and this initiated the failure mechanism which culminated in the catastrophic failure of the dog clutch.
The severe yaw that developed was due to the windage of the vessel’s superstructure, which generated forces in excess of the design load of the anchoring equipment.
To try and prevent such accidents occurring in the future, owners and operators are strongly advised to review their SMS procedures for anchoring to ensure they address the above safety issues and, specifically:
1. That masters have clear guidance on the capability of their vessel’s anchoring system, including:
Any limitations of the anchor system components, including that of the windlass.
Effects of windage in various load conditions
Risks associated with excessive yaw.

2. That the SMS guidance on anchoring is vessel-specific and highlights that, when at anchor, the weight of the cable should be taken on the guillotine fittings, which should be correctly engaged (Nautical Institute, Mooring and Anchoring Ships, Volume 1, 2009. ISBN: 978 1 870077 93 4 refers).


This flyer and the MAIB’s investigation report are posted on our website: 
www.maib.gov.uk_


----------



## oldman 80

randcmackenzie said:


> Muirfield Seamount q.v.
> 
> The recollections of those on board at the time, some of whom I sailed with, seem to make it clear she hit an uncharted rock and not an Aussie booby trap.
> 
> They knew it was a rock, there was a big boulder buried in the double bottom, didn't need much forensic evidence, really.


(Thumb)
Hmm - that fits in with the info I recall from the time.
It was in fact the tip of an underwater mountain which no one knew about.
She was at full speed when she hit, but when she did, all they knew was that they had hit something, but they did not know what it was.
She continued, now slowly on her way, her tank tops holding - thank god.
Only when she reached Singapore, diver assistance, and ultimately dry dock was the truth revealed, but it was many years before it was finally proven that what she hit was actually the tip of that undersea mountain.
The old story - we hit an uncharted outcrop, (or whatever), of rocks, was just considered "a likely story". Then finally some 10 years later the Aussie Navy went out and surveyed the area and confirmed it.
You just can't rush the Aussies - but they generally get there in the end.
At least that's my story, as it was relayed to me, and I'm sticking to it. 
And yes, as someone else mentioned, she did undoubtably carry oil when with Denholm - all ships did, but not necessarily as Cargo perhaps.
I understood she did not carry oil - hence the assumption she was not an OBO. It now appears she may have been allowed to carry oil as cargo - but did not. Why would she in any case - for BISCO.
It also now appears she was not BISCO owned but simply Bareboated. That's certainly possible - no doubt.
It was a long time ago, but she sure found that mountain all right.
(Read)


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Some photographs and more discussion about Muirfield in *this* thread. (Thumb)


Wow - how come I missed that string before ?
No doubt about it from those photo's - she had been an OBO for sure, or maybe ore/oil.
Amazing how similar she was to the second generation OBOs ie the Team Ships - they obviously shared the same gene's.
BUT WHERE ARE THE PHOTO's OF THE ROCKS in her D.B.'s (Double Bottoms) ?????
They are out there somewhere. !!!!
(Read)

Edit:- Re - "Shared same genes" - above. Should perhaps read, shared same genes deficiency. (Bridge Wings)


----------



## John Cassels

You said Muirfield was " straight dry bulker not an OBO or Oil/Oi"".

We'll all be pleased to note that the World's authority on OBO welding
finally recognises what an OBO looks like.


----------



## alastairrussell

Oldman

What is a teardrop turn?" Peem was the flight electronics officer and the aircraft only had two ejection seats for the pilots. The other two had to use a rear escape hatch! I suppose its a wee bit like the lifeboats on the Titanic!

alastair

_On 12 August 1978, Vulcan B.2 XL390 of No. 617 Squadron crashed during an air display at Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois in the United States. The crew had been authorised to carry out a display at Chicago Lakeside airport but the captain elected to carry out an unauthorised display at Glenview before departing for Lakeside. After a low-level run, probably below 100 ft (30 m), the aircraft was pulled up for a teardrop turn[clarification needed] which was not properly executed and the aircraft crashed killing all on board.[221]_


----------



## oldman 80

Cisco said:


> Muirfield Bank is on the chart...can't remember which one - 'West Coast of Oz ' or some such.... 70 miles SSW of Cocos.... 13.10S 96.11E...least depth 18 metres.


O.K. smart ass - we all know the thing is there now.
The point is, it wasn't on the chart back in 1973 - nobody knew it was there, they did not have the slightest idea of it's existance although it had probably been there since the beginning of time itself.
It's a big place is the ocean - enormous in fact.
Had it not been for the Muirfield we still would not know, in all probability.
Had her tank tops not held - well - just read this string, and the one on the Derbyshire - when you have the time - that is.
(Sad)


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> Oldman
> 
> What is a teardrop turn?" Peem was the flight electronics officer and the aircraft only had two ejection seats for the pilots. The other two had to use a rear escape hatch! I suppose its a wee bit like the lifeboats on the Titanic!
> 
> alastair
> 
> _On 12 August 1978, Vulcan B.2 XL390 of No. 617 Squadron crashed during an air display at Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois in the United States. The crew had been authorised to carry out a display at Chicago Lakeside airport but the captain elected to carry out an unauthorised display at Glenview before departing for Lakeside. After a low-level run, probably below 100 ft (30 m), the aircraft was pulled up for a teardrop turn[clarification needed] which was not properly executed and the aircraft crashed killing all on board.[221]_


Thats a new expression on me. (teardrop turn)
I think it may be more commonly known as the "stall turn" or "wing over" - a magnificent manouvre to make when you get it right. Just "out of this world" - in fact. 
Mind you, if you start it at 100 feet - you had better be an absolute expert at it. It could be, indeed would be, very very *messy* if not. (fatality probably guaranteed)
Personaly I wouldn't have even have thought of attempting to start it below 1000 feet and would prefer 3000 ft minimum. But at that height (and above) - just magnificent, - so it is.
Now that is *airmanship* - if indeed it is the "teardrop turn" - as you describe it. Yes indeed, much much better, than anything else I can think of, sex included.
I was first taught how to do it when I was 14 years of age - and managed it with reasonable success, although somewhat frightened, back then. (RAF-Chipmunk - Flight Lt. Fry, my history teacher - amongst other things, including being an altogether incredible guy).
I Never had the opportunity to try it again until I was 43 + years of age - then I gave it a go, in a Deckathlon, with an instructor, of course. The first attempt after all those years, was near perfect - but it all fell to pieces the second time, and I really had to "work on it" after that. Just Magic - pure magic, so it is, - when you get it right, - but not at all nice, when you don't get it perfect.
* BUT RIGHT, - It is art, it is dance, it is magnificense, and all that goes with it, all conveniently rolled into one.*
_At least that's what I think it is._
But to do it in a Vulcan - well I just don't know about that, sounds a bit dodgy to me, - but possible, I suppose.
(Thumb)


----------



## oldman 80

John Cassels said:


> You said Muirfield was " straight dry bulker not an OBO or Oil/Oi"".
> 
> We'll all be pleased to note that the World's authority on OBO welding
> finally recognises what an OBO looks like.


TAKE A HIKE, JOHN.
You really have a problem - so you have.


----------



## chadburn

alastairrussell said:


> Oldman
> 
> Now this is secret, please do not tell anyone!!
> 
> Negotiations are underway at the present time that could see some of the US military’s most advanced drone aircraft based on the Australian Indian Ocean territory of the Cocos Islands. Yes, Australia is going to give the Cocos islands away to very close friends. You will note that the Cocos and Christmas island are much much closer to Indonesia than to Australia.
> 
> This deal will of course be on condition that Denholms keep all their tired Bulkies with flooded bilges well away from CI say outside a 70 mile radius. Even then they might have to keep their bilges dry. I tried to find the loaded draft of the Muirhead and failed but I cannot see how she managed to hit the rocks as they are reported to be well down . Maybe she hit the wreck of the German light cruiser Emdem which was sunk by the HMAS Sydney near there in ww2. Were the Muirhead and the QE2 using a British chart when they hit uncharted rocks?
> 
> Regards
> 
> Alastair
> 
> PS My old class mate 'Peem' Hamilton was one the 4 crew lost when the RAF Vulcan bomber crashed in Chicago when practising for an airshow at O'hare airport. There were no bombs onboard! He was attached to the Dambuster 617 squadron


Oldman is I think correct, it is known as a wing over or stall turn, It is very impressive when done with a Vulcan at low level unfortunatly the aircraft mentioned dived in, the RAF's Display Vulcan came very close doing the same at Teesside Airport. Fortunatly the Pilot managed to recover and the same Vulcan still flies today under Private ownership.
RandMc has it about right in regard's to the Tranche 1 OBO's, some were built and never used for oil cargoes but the "facility" was there if required.


----------



## Malky Glaister

Oldman 80 does not profess to be a coded welder and expert on OBO repairs.
He did however get his hands dirty unlike many of his profession.
I learned a huge amount from riding squads which enabled me to do repairs saving a few companies tens of thousands. Not just welding and other steel work but in engineering in all forms. 
Anyone, to this day who can and will teach me anything, I admire immensely.
I am currently being shown how to sort out a young foal !!

Oldman 80 is to be admired for his work in keeping such as Spey Bridge going. I was Junior Chief (a Denholm rank, combined Chiefs ticket required) on her for six months, a heap of junk but much , much better than the Cast boats I was on in a similar capacity.

I can tell quite a few stories about complete idiots who went on to command, better out of the way most of them.

Anyway i am off shortly to the Horse Shoe bar in Glasgow in a roundabout way.
Seasons greetings to all who sailed on sal****er and got wet.

regards
Malky


----------



## John Cassels

Evening Malky; I have never proposed that he was a coded welder.

But see his post # 303 ; "amazed Spey Bridge lasted so long .. MAYBE I
WAS AN EVEN BETTER WELDER THAN I THOUGHT ".

And post # 315 ; MY WELDING MAY HAVE HELD FOR A LONG TIME.

If this is not an example of self importance twaddle in drawing attention
to oneself , then I don't know what is.

I would hope that none of his attempts were accepted by class.

Have a good one ( or two ) in the Horseshoe . Last time I was there was 
with Bruce Lucas - 1980 or so.


----------



## alastairrussell

If you Google the 'Cocos Islands' and then go into Google earth and then click on the satellite view you can see a range of 'pointy bits on the sea bed 70 miles SW of the island. I see also the Island has a lovely looking international Airport so I am thinking who built it and when?

Alastair


----------



## Cisco

oldman 80 said:


> O.K. smart ass - we all know the thing is there now.


Charmed I'm sure....

It's obvious that she discovered it... that's why it has her name on it.

Its spelt 'ar.se' by the way.


----------



## Cisco

alastairrussell said:


> I see also the Island has a lovely looking international Airport so I am thinking who built it and when?
> 
> Alastair


I think it has been there long time..... back in the days of Super Constellations and stuff I'm pretty sure Qantas used to stop there on their way to S Africa.


----------



## Cisco

1952... here you go Alastair http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/27101522


edited.... I once meet a Spitfire pilot who had been based on Cocos during WW2 so I guess it was an int airport back then http://www.ausairpower.net/Cocos-Islands-1945.html

Way off topic but there you go...


----------



## oldman 80

Cisco said:


> Charmed I'm sure....
> 
> It's obvious that she discovered it... that's why it has her name on it.
> 
> Its spelt 'ar.se' by the way.


(Thumb)
Only joking - no offense meant.

Edit:- That ausairpower link is fantastic. I'd recommend it to all. What a gold mine of aviation treasure. Thank You.


----------



## alastairrussell

Thanks Cisco

They have an old Qantas Super Constellation in flying condition in the Albion Park Aircraft Museum. They also have a Vulcan bomber and a Concorde airliner in the East Fortune aircraft museum in Scotland. They landed the Concorde off a barge next to a power station near Dunbar (transformer cranes) and then they towed it through many many farms to the old WW2 East Fortune airfield!

Thanks 

Alastair


----------



## oldman 80

chadburn said:


> Oldman is I think correct, it is known as a wing over or stall turn, It is very impressive when done with a Vulcan at low level unfortunatly the aircraft mentioned dived in, the RAF's Display Vulcan came very close doing the same at Teesside Airport. Fortunatly the Pilot managed to recover and the same Vulcan still flies today under Private ownership.
> RandMc has it about right in regard's to the Tranche 1 OBO's, some were built and never used for oil cargoes but the "facility" was there if required.


THE WING OVER or STALL TURN
I suppose another good way to describe it would be to say it is the perfect "cartwheel" in the sky.
At least that, I think, is how a child of my generation would describe it.
"Absolute bliss" - when perfected.
(A)


----------



## alastairrussell

Google youtube and place a search under 'Vulcan bomber Falklands' and you would see a lengthy video on the struggle they had sailing the tired old Vulcans to the Falkland islands. One of them suffered a structural failure when they could not pressurise the cockpit (poor bastards). I have got to keep this Vulcan post in line with 'Bulk carriers that have suffered from a structural failure' thread haven't I.


----------



## chadburn

oldman 80 said:


> THE WING OVER or STALL TURN
> I suppose another good way to describe it would be to say it is the perfect "cartwheel" in the sky.
> At least that, I think, is how a child of my generation would describe it.
> "Absolute bliss" - when perfected.
> (A)


It is indeed, especially when done with an aircraft the size and the profile of a Vulcan. There was on this Site a short piece of film showing a B52 attempting the same thing unfortunatly it side slipped into the ground.
Alistair, it was indeed a major undertaking to get a Vulcan to the Falklands and even on the return journey the Crew were thinking of the possibility of a ditching if they could not find the flying petrol station. Fatigue is indeed a problem and with the change from frame and plate construction to module building of ship's coupled with lack of experience in that method in the early day's which is most probably why the beams did not exactly match up on the Kowloon Bridge(different module's) although like oldman I don't believe that was the reason why the vessel split in that area.


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> Google youtube and place a search under 'Vulcan bomber Falklands' and you would see a lengthy video on the struggle they had sailing the tired old Vulcans to the Falkland islands. One of them suffered a structural failure when they could not pressurise the cockpit (poor bastards). I have got to keep this Vulcan post in line with 'Bulk carriers that have suffered from a structural failure' thread haven't I.




Hmm - in a round about sort of way I suppose.
"Keeping in touch", "Finger on the Pulse" - that sort of thing.
Nudge, Nudge, (*))(*)) - Know what I mean ?


----------



## alastairrussell

_From my collection on the Derbyshire. I will do a wee bit of further searching and find out who wrote it ??

Alastair_


Sunday, 12 October 2008

*MV Derbyshire tragedy 

*The MV Derbyshire, a 91,655 gross tons bulk-carrier was was built in 1976 by Swan Hunter Shipyard, Teesside, for the shipping company Bibby Line. The vessel was registered at Liverpool and classified by LRS. 

On 9 September 1980, during Typhoon Orchid, MV Derbyshire dissapeared off the south coast of Japan, with all hands on board (42 crew and two wives). She was, and remains, the largest UK ship ever to have been lost at sea. 

The Report of the Formal Investigation (FI) held in 1987 first concluded that the loss of the MV Derbyshire had been due to a force majeure event, the vessel having probably been "overcome by the forces of nature in typhoon Orchid". 

The wreck was eventually found in June 1994, during a search launched by the International Transport Workers' Federation and led by the American shipwreck hunter David Mearns. The search team were also able to deploy a ROV to survey the wreck and collect photographic evidence from the site. 

Later on, using evidence from the underwater survey, the Investigation assessors purported - on the basis of a rope seen emerging from the Bosun’s store hatch opening and of an examination of the disposition of that hatch’s toggles - that the loss of MV Derbyshire had been caused by the negligence of the crew, who had allegedly failed to secure the hatch lid, which lead to fore end flooding and structural failure.

The discovery of the wreck prompted the British Government to re-open the Formal Investigation into the sinking of the vessel - investigation which began in April 2000. This time, the investigation reached the conclusion that the ship had sunk because of fore end flooding and structural failure, and as a result of inadequacies in the legislation in force at the time of build, and that the rope emerging from the Bosun’s store hatch opening was nothing more than post-casualty debris, thus absolving the crew of any responsibility for the tragedy. 

The Investigation found that damage to the forward vents, hatches and equipment on the upper deck initiated the unfortunate sequence of events that led to the vessel's loss. Flooding of the vessel’s forward spaces through these damaged vents and hatches gave the vessel a trim by the bow, thereafter the main cargo hold hatch covers were subjected to seawater loading and collapsed – flooding number 1 hold first, then number 2 hold, then number 3, and so on until the vessel sank. 

*Several important questions, however, have remained unanswered: 

*1. The mushroom vents on the MV Derbyshire obviously failed. Were they therefore adequate? 

2. The vessel had been issued with a Load Line certificate. But did the vents comply with the requirements of the Load Line Convention? 

3. Did the construction and workmanship of these vents conform to the shipyard's or appropriate British standards? 

4. Did the fillet welding on the windlass seat have adequate throat thickness and, was the workmanship satisfactory?

In due course, these questions and several others will finally be addressed. 


Posted by gadfly at 04:33 1 comment: 

Labels: corruption, DfT, government, John Prescott, MV Derbyshire, RFI, technical[/QUOTE]


----------



## alastairrussell

_Another one from Gadfly

Alastair
_

Tuesday, 6 December 2011

*More ordinary abuses 
*
A few weeks ago we read reports that Her Majesty the Queen had signed the amendment “to ensure that the UK’s justice system can no longer be abused for political reasons” and Israeli politicians do no longer stand the risk of being welcome with an arrest warrant when visiting Britain. 

Fair enough, but we cannot help wonder why Her Majesty cannot also ensure that the UK's justice system is no longer abused (and not only abused, but made a mockery of) for party political reasons by Her Majesty’s government, when the abuses do not affect foreign dignitaries, but her Majesty’s more ordinary subjects. The sovereign is deemed, after all, to be the fount of justice, in whose name justice is delivered by the British courts. 

Her Majesty has known (even better than us) about these abuses for at least four years and knows very well what the families of the sea tragedies' victims and we have gone through all this time - about the continual harassment, intimidation and the systematic destruction of our lives. Yet, for as many years, we've been left to fend ourselves against revenge-seeking criminals. It is true that the Royal Family have shown us their support from time to time, and we are deeply grateful for their encouragement, especially during the hostile Labour regime, and for the hope that when the Tories returned to power our troubles would end. [*] 

However, so far, no amendment has been signed or word has been delivered in our favour, and things for all concerned have gone from bad to worse. (We understand that, at the same time, the phone hacking saga and other associated political pressures have caused Her Majesty’s government a lot of discomfiture and that, therefore, promises cannot be honoured on time.) Yet, we would very much like to know why such outrageous abuses can get ignored for so long.

Of course, our Head of State is now very old; so, perhaps in asking such questions now there’s hardly any point - if there’s ever been one.

UPDATE: I have been offered wonderful career prospects in Scotland to shut up.


----------



## oldman 80

* SAY NO MORE, SAY NO MORE !!!!!*

Read my Posts !!!!

Especially # 263 posted 15/12/12 at 1414 hrs.

I repeat, JUST LOOK AT IT - the construction of the coaming on that rope store hatch.


GOD DAMN IT - JUST LOOK AT IT !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


LR well we might have guessed it


EDIT:- This posting is in response to #340 above Alastair Russell posted today at 11. 37. hrs. You can forget the rest of the crap.


----------



## alastairrussell

_*This is an abrieviated version of Gadfly's full do***ent. If you want to read the full version google 'MV Derbyshire disclosures by Gadfly.

The computerised Finite Element Analysis proving the substandard strenght of the hatch covers is good reading.

Alastair

PS Oldman there is more to come 


*_
Saturday, 19 March 2011 

*The 1966 Load Line Convention and the loss of the MV Derbyshire [*] *

*Background

*Many of you will have seen the Load Line markings on the sides of seagoing ships, some may even have wondered what they are for. The markings are also commonly known as the Plimsoll mark in honour of the British politician who, in the 1870s, was responsible for the UK legislation which curbed the loss of life caused by the foundering of over-laden ships and from ‘coffin ships’ (over-insured ships that were worth more to their owners when sunk than when afloat).

In the image above, the circle with the horizontal line drawn through its centre shows the deepest draft to which a ship may be safely loaded in seawater at summer temperatures (i.e. do not fill past this mark!) while the TF, F, T, S, W, WNA load lines to the right of the circular mark show how deep the ship may be loaded when it is sailing in waters with differing temperatures and densities (Tropical Fresh, Fresh and the seawater load lines for Tropical, Summer, Winter and Winter North Atlantic). A ship is prohibited from taking cargo onboard that would cause the relevant Load Line mark to be submerged i.e. it would then be illegally overloaded. 

The load line mark fixes the maximum allowable draft and thus how much cargo (deadweight) any particular ship may carry (oil, iron ore, bananas, grain, cars, chemicals etc. etc.) and it may be said that the price of just about everything we come across in our daily lives is thus affected to some greater or lesser extent by the positioning of these small marks on the sides of a ship.

The location of these marks is governed by the rules of an International IMO (UN) Convention with their placement determined for each particular ship by means of a standardised, detailed calculation which takes into account the ship’s type, size, proportions, buoyancy, strength, stability etc. The vertical distance of the Load line mark from the upper deck is known as the freeboard and in general terms the greater the freeboard, the safer the ship will be. However the downside to having a large freeboard is that the ship’s ability to carry payload is reduced. 


The first International Load Line Convention was held in 1930 and the second was held in 1966. As far as the MV Derbyshire is concerned, it is the regulations of the 1966 Load Line Convention that are of interest.

*1966 Load Line Convention

*By the mid 1960s, the world’s leading maritime nations, freight companies, ship owners, insurers and Classification Societies had become aware of the fact that the 1930 Load Line Convention’s regulations were out of date and that due to advances in ship design, construction standards and technology it would have been possible for the more modern ships, that were then joining the fleet, to load to a deeper draft and thus be able to carry more cargo. In particular the fact that welding had superseded riveting in ship’s hulls and that steel hatch covers had overtaken wooden hatch boards and canvas covers now meant that the world’s fleet was being replenished with new vessels that were stronger and more seaworthy than those envisaged at the time of the 1930 convention. 

In 1966, the UK then had the largest merchant fleet in the world and thus a rewrite of the Load Line Convention was something that the UK Government was obliged to take a keen interest in. UK ship-owners were obviously very concerned with their vessels’ payloads; hence the positioning of the Load Line marks on the sides of their ships was of crucial importance to their business, the costs of transporting goods and to the profitability of international trade. 

Bearing this in mind, it is easy to appreciate the UK Government’s position at the start of the 1966 Load line Conference (page 149 in the Derbyshire RFI report advises us that):

The UK’s material objectives were to seek deeper loading (reduced freeboard) for tankers and dry cargo ships with steel hatch covers. 

While most nations had similar objectives, the principle debate at the International Conference was on the accompanying technical measures, safeguards and standards that would need to be imposed to allow the additional cargo to be carried safely at sea. The outcome that most delegates sought from the Convention were affordable, efficient ships which would be able to carry more cargo, without a reduction in the safety levels that were being achieved prior to 1966 Convention. 

An important part of the debate on safety concerned the minimum technical standards that would be required for steel hatch covers. Commenting on this event, the Derbyshire RFI report (page 151) suggests to us that the UK’s delegation fought valiantly for stronger hatch covers on vessels of Derbyshire’s type, against overwhelming international opposition, but that unfortunately they failed in their quest.

The Ministry of Transport and the UK delegation did all that reasonably could be done to obtain agreement to enhanced hatch cover strength. The failure to persuade a majority of the 52 national delegations to accept these proposals has to be seen against the background …etc. 

However, this information from within the RFI report gives a somewhat false impression on the actual course of events at the 1966 Conference. At that time, the UK’s primary objective was to obtain deeper loading for bulk carriers and tankers, while their proposal for enhanced hatch cover strength was only of secondary importance - merely a ‘safety’ concession which would give a degree of credibility to their argument for deeper loading. (In fact it was not even a concession on the UK’s part, as existing national legislation already contained enhanced strength requirements for hatch covers on UK ore carriers that were sailing with ‘tanker freeboards’ see Fig. 2. below). 

The 1966 Load Line Conference concluded on 5 April 1966 and Statutory Instrument number 1053, The Merchant Shipping (Load Lines) Regulations, brought the regulations of the Load Line Convention into force in the UK on 21 July 1968. The explanatory text at the end of this UK instrument gives a brief summary of the changes brought about by the new regulations:

...The principal change is that new ships as defined in section 32(4) of the 1967 [Load Line] Act are required to comply with more stringent constructional requirements (conditions of assignment) specified in Schedule 4. This qualifies them for reduced freeboards under Schedule 5, thus enabling them to be more deeply loaded than heretofore.
The MV Derbyshire Re-opened Formal Investigation (RFI) and the Load Line Rules (see pages 145-161 in the Derbyshire RFI report) 

The final report from the Derbyshire RFI does not mention the commercial interests that were at play during the 1966 Conference and focuses instead on elements of the technical debate between the experts from the world’s maritime nations. As mentioned previously, in this limited scenario (and with hindsight), the UK Government has managed to cast itself in a heroic role, fighting a laudable battle for increased safety standards on seagoing ships and only failing to achieve their goals when faced with overwhelming odds.

While the text in the Derbyshire final report may make pleasant reading for our Government officials it does not correspond with the facts of the case, as the official records from the 1966 Load Line Conference show:

The contents of the above do***ent show that the UK delegation wished to attain drafts for seagoing ships that were significantly deeper than those previously granted to ore carriers i.e. they were seeking freeboard reductions and drafts for ore carriers that went far beyond those allowed for ‘tankers’ under the 1930 Convention (the UK’s proposals for reduced freeboards are indicated in red, in the sketch on the following pages (Fig 3.) - allowable ‘tanker freeboards’ are also indicated in the same sketch by the dotted line – ‘1930 Tanker’).


It is important to note that the UK’s proposal for stronger hatch covers at the 1966 Conference was directly linked and secondary to their proposals for reduced freeboards. When the majority of delegates at the Conference did not accept the UK’s proposals for reduced freeboards (deeper loading), the UK delegation lost much of their interest in hatch covers and did not press on with their case for an enhanced standard of strength. 

The Derbyshire RFI final report [**], however, manages to give the false impression that the UK’s objective was merely to seek ‘tanker freeboards’ for ore carriers, facilitated by stronger hatch-covers when, in fact, the UK was seeking a far greater reduction in freeboards than had been the practice in the years prior to the 1966 Conference. 

Fig 2. The UK’s standard practice for allowing reduced freeboards on ore carriers, prior to the 1966 Load Line Convention, is outlined in the Board of Trade minute below:

Fig. 3 The graph shows the minimum freeboards allowed by the 1930 Load Line Convention for Steamers and Tankers, together with the UK’s proposed curve of freeboards for bulk carriers as presented by delegates at the 1966 Load Line Conference. The final agreed curve of freeboards (B-60 - as defined in the regulations of the 1966 Load Line Convention), which applied to the Derbyshire, is also shown. 

On page 17 of the Derbyshire RFI final report, Justice Colman states that the UK Government cannot be criticised for failing to secure an agreement to its proposals for increased hatch cover strength. We’re not quite sure that we agree with him on that point: the UK government could certainly have been criticised for not implementing the Convention’s provisions for hatch cover strength in their entirety and also for interpreting the Convention’s minimum requirements for hatch cover strength incorrectly:

1.Regulation 27(7)(c) of the 1966 International Load Line Convention was partially omitted from the text of the UK’s 1968 Load Line Regulations (the part that is underlined below). This regulation was very important in that it stipulated minimum standards for hatch cover strength when reduced freeboards were allowed (as in the Derbyshire’s case) 

27(7)(c)… provided that the Administration is satisfied that:

(c) the covers in positions 1 and 2 comply with the provisions of regulation 16 and have adequate strength…”

This omission meant that there was no statutory requirement for the hatch covers on UK bulk carriers, with reduced freeboards, to have adequate strength; the UK regulations merely stated that the hatch covers should comply with the strength requirements of regulation 16. In regulation 27(7)(c), the Convention clearly stipulates that it is the responsibility of individual Administrations (e.g. the UK Government) to satisfy themselves that, on ships with reduced freeboards, the hatch cover strength is adequate.

2.Regulation 16 of the Load Line Convention, which lays down minimum hatch cover strength requirements, was also applied improperly by the UK in that the authorities allowed an erroneous formulation for hatch beam section modulus to be used to determine hatch cover strength - one which would consistently underestimate hatch cover stress levels by about 10% (the error could lead to deficient hatch covers being installed on UK ships and, as discussed previously [LINK] the hatch covers installed on the Derbyshire were deficient in strength because of this error - see Appendix 1). 


3.The UK’s Load Line regulations, which entered force in 1968, contained a lower strength requirement for bulk carrier hatch covers than that contained in the regulations they superseded (the UK’s requirements for hatch cover strength were reduced by about 15% when the 1968 regulations came into force - see Appendix 1.)

*To summarise:

*•In 1966 the UK’s merchant fleet was the largest in the world and the UK Government of the day (Harold Wilson’s Labour government) looked upon the 1966 Load Line Convention as a commercial opportunity that would enable deeper drafts to be assigned to cargo vessels in the UK fleet. 

•At the time of the 1966 Load Line Conference, the UK delegation proposed a significant reduction in freeboards (~ deeper drafts), which did not gain the support of other maritime nations and the resulting regulations for freeboards were far more modest in scope (for a vessel like the Derbyshire the difference between the freeboards initially proposed by the UK and the freeboards that were included in the 1966 Load Line Convention would amount to about 5000 tonnes in lost cargo capacity).

•A provision for enhanced hatch cover strength was also included within the UK’s proposals for reduced freeboards, however, when their proposal on freeboards did not find support, their case for increased hatch cover strength was dropped.

•The 1966 Load Line Convention’s final regulations contained a minimum strength standard for hatch covers, together with a provision whereby this minimum strength could be increased on vessels that were assigned reduced freeboards. The UK did not implement this provision.

•If the UK Government had been seriously concerned about hatch cover strength standards on bulk carriers with reduced freeboards, then they could have taken action to impose higher standards on UK ships – the regulations of the 1966 Load Line Convention actually encouraged such a practice but left the detail of such standards to the discretion of individual nation states. On page 153 of the Derbyshire final report, Justice Colman accepts that the UK Government could have applied more stringent hatch cover strength standards than those laid down in the Convention, but then justifies the authorities’ subsequent inaction with the dubious notion that, had more stringent standards been adopted by the UK, then this would have resulted in “serious damage to the British national interest as a leading merchant marine flag state”. 

(Though it is difficult to accept that a few extra tonnes of steel on the hatch covers of a large, new, bulk carrier would have led to the collapse of the UK merchant fleet!)

•The main conclusion that emerged from the Derbyshire public inquiry was that the 1966 Load Line Convention regulations for hatch cover strength were seriously deficient and that it was this factor, together with severe weather, that led to her loss.

•We would suggest that, if the regulations of the International Load Line Convention had been implemented in full and also interpreted correctly by the relevant UK authorities, it is possible that the Derbyshire would have survived the perils of Typhoon Orchid.


*Appendix 1
* --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Report of the Re-opened Formal Investigation (RFI) into the loss of the MV Derbyshire (page 211) - official questions and answers :

“16.7 In so far as material to the loss of the “DERBYSHIRE” was the design of the hatch covers of the “DERBYSHIRE” in accordance with the standards applicable at the time she was built?

- Yes.

16.8 Is that design satisfactory in the light of what is now known?

- No: seriously deficient.”

[**] RFI report Para. 10.21 “The stronger hatch covers proposed by the UK were put forward in response to application to bulk carriers of the tanker freeboard” 

Posted by gadfly at 18:22 No comments: 


Saturday, 12 March 2011

*The emerging pattern *



These are my mates, that make their wills their law. (William Shakespeare, The Two Gentlemen of Verona. Act V, scene iv) 


In the four and a half years that we’ve been running this blog, we have highlighted and commented on a multitude of serious ‘anomalies’ associated with the re-opened official inquiries into the sinkings of the trawler Gaul (36 lives lost), the OBO MV Derbyshire (44 lives lost) and most recently in the FV Trident investigation (7 lives lost).


Our studies over the years have exposed a number of common themes running through each of these inquiries, from which, in fact, a clear and recurring pattern has emerged:

1.Evidence presented in court that could lead to a finding of fault or blame (and which could lead to litigation) was suppressed, while evidence supporting the government’s preferred outcome was promoted. Nonetheless, the possibility of negligence or errors on the part of the crew (who obviously could not defend themselves) was always a theme that the court’s official investigators were happy to explore. 

2.Over many years, public officials have treated the families of the deceased in an offhand, uncaring manner and actively thwarted their aspirations to learn the truth of what had happened and what caused those tragedies.

3.A number of personnel/experts/organisations have been repeat players in two or more of these public inquiries, while in the field of physical and computer modelling and tank testing the same overseas research facility has always been chosen to deliver crucial technical input to each investigation. 
4.The government (the DfT), although responsible for setting and enforcing safety standards on UK ships, has been effective in distancing itself from even the slightest hint of criticism in each and all of these public inquires


With the above points in mind, and being slightly more cynical now, we thought we would re-visit the Derbyshire 2000 RFI. 

On page 17 of its final official report we find that:

the UK Government cannot be criticised for failing to secure agreement…

On page 21 we find that: 

This report does not recommend that the UK Government should act unilaterally…

On page 24 we read that: 

The long delay […] in organising an underwater survey cannot be the basis of any criticism of the UK Government

And from page 151 we learn that:

…the UK Government cannot be criticised for reaching this solution. The Ministry of Transport and the UK delegation did all that reasonably could be done to obtain agreement to enhanced hatch cover strength. 


So that’s it then, the inquiry judge has told us that the DOT, MOT, DETR (or whatever the DfT was known as at that time) cannot be criticised for anything associated with the Derbyshire tragedy. 

Posted by gadfly at 16:09 No comments:


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## alastairrussell

_From Gadflys blog
Alastair_

*OBO MV Derbyshire lost in 1980 with all 44 persons onboard.
*
The Formal Investigation into the loss of the MV Derbyshire concluded in 2000 and its final report was published on 8 November of that year. The principal finding and recommendation to come out from the Derbyshire RFI was that the regulations for hatch cover strength were seriously deficient and that the International Convention on Load Lines (1966) needed to be amended urgently to rectify this shortfall.

The regulations of the Load Line Convention were thus redrafted at IMO to include requirements for specially strengthened hatch covers to be fitted to the forward cargo holds of all new cargo ships (not only bulk carriers). The new amendments were finalised at IMO [*] in 2002 and came into force Internationally in 2005.

However, they did not legally come into force for UK flagged vessels at the same time because the UK’s own Merchant Shipping legislation had not been amended to give legal force to the new Load Line Convention requirements for hatch covers. Today, the legislation still has not been revised.

The relevant UK rules are contained in Statutory Instrument (SI) 1998 No. 2241: The Merchant Shipping (Load Line) Regulations 1998.

There is no reason why these rules could not have been amended in a timely manner; in fact, the UK Load Line regulations were recently modified by Statutory Instrument (SI) 2005 No. 2114, so as to implement the following changes:

“……… in the definition of "pleasure vessel" or "pleasure craft", as the case may be, for each reference to "husband or wife" substitute "spouse or civil partner".

Now, that was extremely important - and also revealing of our government’s legislative priorities as regards Maritime safety.


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## alastairrussell

A wee bit from Gadfy's Blog

*Conclusions
*
The stress levels in the transverse girders and longitudinal inboard side plate, as revealed by the FE analysis, significantly exceed the allowable stress levels that are given within the 1966 Load Line Convention. It is notable, that the stress levels in some areas are more than 40% above the statutory maxima. Elevated stress levels indicate that the hatch cover’s factor of safety against catastrophic collapse may have been significantly reduced. And a failure in the longitudinal inboard side plate could lead to a domino-like collapse of the remaining hatch structure. 

On the basis of the calculations summarised above, it is clear that the strength of the Derbyshire’s hatch covers did not comply with the standards that were applicable at the time she was constructed, and that, therefore, the RFI statement to the contrary was incorrect.


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## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> _From Gadflys blog
> Alastair_
> 
> *OBO MV Derbyshire lost in 1980 with all 44 persons onboard.
> *
> The Formal Investigation into the loss of the MV Derbyshire concluded in 2000 and its final report was published on 8 November of that year. The principal finding and recommendation to come out from the Derbyshire RFI was that the regulations for hatch cover strength were seriously deficient and that the International Convention on Load Lines (1966) needed to be amended urgently to rectify this shortfall.
> 
> The regulations of the Load Line Convention were thus redrafted at IMO to include requirements for specially strengthened hatch covers to be fitted to the forward cargo holds of all new cargo ships (not only bulk carriers). The new amendments were finalised at IMO [*] in 2002 and came into force Internationally in 2005.
> 
> However, they did not legally come into force for UK flagged vessels at the same time because the UK’s own Merchant Shipping legislation had not been amended to give legal force to the new Load Line Convention requirements for hatch covers. Today, the legislation still has not been revised.
> 
> The relevant UK rules are contained in Statutory Instrument (SI) 1998 No. 2241: The Merchant Shipping (Load Line) Regulations 1998.
> 
> There is no reason why these rules could not have been amended in a timely manner; in fact, the UK Load Line regulations were recently modified by Statutory Instrument (SI) 2005 No. 2114, so as to implement the following changes:
> 
> “……… in the definition of "pleasure vessel" or "pleasure craft", as the case may be, for each reference to "husband or wife" substitute "spouse or civil partner".
> 
> Now, that was extremely important - and also revealing of our government’s legislative priorities as regards Maritime safety.


Well Alastair you certainly have been doing your homework, and perhaps with more people like you, one day Justice may be done.
Like Mount Eribus - Privy Council here we come ?


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## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> A wee bit from Gadfy's Blog
> 
> *Conclusions
> *
> The stress levels in the transverse girders and longitudinal inboard side plate, as revealed by the FE analysis, significantly exceed the allowable stress levels that are given within the 1966 Load Line Convention. It is notable, that the stress levels in some areas are more than 40% above the statutory maxima. Elevated stress levels indicate that the hatch cover’s factor of safety against catastrophic collapse may have been significantly reduced. And a failure in the longitudinal inboard side plate could lead to a domino-like collapse of the remaining hatch structure.
> 
> On the basis of the calculations summarised above, it is clear that the strength of the Derbyshire’s hatch covers did not comply with the standards that were applicable at the time she was constructed, and that, therefore, the RFI statement to the contrary was incorrect.


Well blow me away - would you believe it ?
I wouldn't mind betting they were Mcgregor hatch covers, the same as Clarksons OBO's Spey and Eden Bridge.
The next generation - Navire hatch Covers (DNV) were vastly superior in construction - yet even they started to fail - North North Pacific - Late November, early December 1980, - but that failure did not complete.

"DEADFREIGHT" - Praise the Lord.
_Canadian Railways_ - thank you for the breakdown !!!!!


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## duncs

Hi, re OBOs, if you're ex Denholms, any ideas what the 'EB Carrier' originated as? I,m sure she was British built. She was Turk flag when I was on her. Thanks and rgds, D


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## oldman 80

EB Carrier ?
Please clarify


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## duncs

Hi OM, I was on the OBO MV EB Carrier circa 90/91 as ETO. Turk owner "Mr Somnez". Denholms were deff concerned in management. I was freelance and latterly only brit aboard. I handed over to a Turk E/O. Owner wanted to carry oil, ergo, I wanted off . I'm certain she was Brit built. Approx 170,000DWT. 2chimneys, 1 boiler uptakes, 1 ME u/t. I've been wondering for some time, what she started off as? Fairly certain under DSM. tks & rgds D


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## oldman 80

duncs said:


> Hi OM, I was on the OBO MV EB Carrier circa 90/91 as ETO. Turk owner "Mr Somnez". Denholms were deff concerned in management. I was freelance and latterly only brit aboard. I handed over to a Turk E/O. Owner wanted to carry oil, ergo, I wanted off . I'm certain she was Brit built. Approx 170,000DWT. 2chimneys, 1 boiler uptakes, 1 ME u/t. I've been wondering for some time, what she started off as? Fairly certain under DSM. tks & rgds D


Sorry - can't help you at all.
I've no idea what you are talking about.


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## duncs

Thats OK, OM. Thanks for replying. I think the owners rep was Kenny MacLeod, if that rings any bells. Thanks again, have a good one, bi


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## Cisco

EB Carrier (obo carrier, gt 71967, built 1974,) gets a mention here in a Denholm thread
http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/archive/index.php?t-2874-p-3.html


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## duncs

Hi, thanks for that Cisco. I'm still none the wiser re her origens. I,m certain she was there, under another name in DSM. Tks & Bi


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## Cisco

more accessable here http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/showthread.php?t=2874&page=22 post #540


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## duncs

Hi, tks C, someone in DSM sailed on her. Looked in disch bk and Capts name looks like C Diedrick, its not too clear. Och well, I,ve learned a little bit more. Tks & Bi
P.S. I saw a lot of names I knew in that thread.


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## John Cassels

Duncs , this could be it.

In the 80's , a good pal of mine Kenneth MacLeod was top man of Northern
Marine , part of the Stena group. The OBO you are referring to could either
Nordic Crusader or Nordic Conquerer. Both had twin funnels.


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## Malky Glaister

Crusader and Chieftan were sisters. I have a feeling that Conqueror was an OO.

I sailed as J C Eng on both the first two named, one as HELM.

regards

Malky


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## duncs

Hi, John, tks for that. I'm getting closer! It must be the same Kenny, headman for Somnez. I sailed wi him mid 70's Stirling Bridge. EB Carrier was a wreck, K kept her going for the Turk. I'll chase up the names (ships) u gave me. Mni tks & bi.
Duncs


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## Gulpers

Duncs,

E B Carrier was indeed one of Denholm Ship Management's vessels.
Originally Nordic Chieftain, she was a sister ship of Nordic Crusader. I sailed on Nordic Crusader and if that experience is anything to go by, believe me, you made a wise decision signing off E B Carrier before attempting to carry an oil cargo!

Broken Up India, August 1994
1993-11	Bulk Athena 
1992-00	Comtrade 
1989-03	E. B. Carrier 
1988-00	Chihirosan 
1986-00	Inci-S 
1983-00	Helm 
1981-00	Cast Heron 
1974-11	Nordic Chieftain


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## Gulpers

Duncs,

Some photographs of Nordic Chieftain and Nordic Crusader *here* in our Gallery. (Thumb)


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## duncs

Hi, Gulpers, many tks yr reply. Re EB Carrier, most of my time was spent getting the IGS working. Also getting alarms onto the gennies(I think they had been submerged). We passed an IGS survey in Singapore(Oh **** no!!), on way to Iskenderun(Turkey), owner wants to carry oil!!! Get me off!!!
Many tks to all, I think I now have EB's history.
rgds
Duncs


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## duncs

Gulpers, pics bring back memories. I had to replace that radar scanner at top of mast. Also up stbd chimney to fix whistle on app Suez. Fun and games!!!
tks & bi, 
D


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## Gulpers

Glad to help duncs. (Thumb)


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## duncs

cloved feet gather no moths


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## oldman 80

Well there you are Duncs - now you know.
Always worth a post - at least on this website.
I' d been away from Denholm for a good few years by the circa you mention. (1990/1991.)
What I'd like to know - At the time you were on her, which classification society was she under ?

Edit:- AND of course - when the IG system was down had she had her certification/classification for oil suspended ?


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## randcmackenzie

EB Carrier - ex Naess Chieftain/Nordic Chieftain/Cast Heron/Helm


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## Gulpers

randcmackenzie said:


> EB Carrier - ex Naess Chieftain/Nordic Chieftain/Cast Heron/Helm


Sorry, she was never Naess Chieftain. 
Naess Crusader was launched in 1973 and had her name changed to Nordic Crusader in January 1974. 
The Chieftain wasn't launched until later in 1974 and only ever had the Nordic forename. 

See post #360 (Thumb)


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## Bigmo

Joined the EB Carrier in Singapore in October 1989 after engineroom flooding and crew mutiny. At the time there were at least two NITC vessels under DSM in the same yard.


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## oldman 80

duncs said:


> Hi, John, tks for that. I'm getting closer! It must be the same Kenny, headman for Somnez. I sailed wi him mid 70's Stirling Bridge. EB Carrier was a wreck, K kept her going for the Turk. I'll chase up the names (ships) u gave me. Mni tks & bi.
> Duncs


Please correct me if I am wrong, but this guy Kenny or K, headman for Somnez, as you put it - I assume he was shore staff, not ships staff.
That being the case, then I suggest it *was not* he who "kept her going" - as you put it. *Ships staff are the guys who keep ships going* - shore staff do other things, - and *all too frequently* the things that aren't nice, such as misleading authorities & classification societies, lavishly entertaining bent surveyors, ensuring that when things go wrong the picture is painted to ensure Ships Staff carry the can whilst owners and managers retain the odour of Roses, and other like matters. It was their job after all. In the case of the ill fated tanker "Prestige", what the French Minister of Transport (I forget his name) described as Shipping Gangsters. 
I think also that Malky is right, the vessel you refer to was an Ore Oiler, not OBO, but I could be mistaken on that one.
Cheers.
(Pint)


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## Gulpers

Photograph of Naess Ambassador *here*.

Later renamed Nordic Conqueror *here*. (Thumb)


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## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Photograph of Naess Ambassador *here*.
> 
> Later renamed Nordic Conqueror *here*. (Thumb)


Oh my God - You have done it again - the Nostalgia is once again flowing. How do you do it ?
*Naess Ambassador* - I now remember her well. (Ore/Oil)
Built in Nagasaki 1972. (mitsubishi - I think)
Captain Brian French stood by her, and I believe took her out on Maiden Voyage.
I was in Nagasaki at the time, doing Guarantee Docking on James E O'Brien (Chevron). I first got to know Brian French at that time, - little did I know that a few years later I'd be sailing under him as C/O with DSM on Chemical Venturer or Explorer - I can't remember which.
(Wave)


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## Gulpers

No problem - more info (Thumb)

I remember digging out some information on her when Helen Barr tried to get me to join her (the ship) when she was Cast Narwhal. Can't recall now why I didn't go because I was quite looking forward to driving something that size! (EEK)

1983-00	Castor 
1980-00	Cast Narwhal 
1974-00	Nordic Conqueror 
1972-09	Naess Ambassador	Liberia 
Originally Naess Ambassador;
New building price $23,000,000

Shiptype	Ore/Oil Carrier	
Built	1972	
GT	132,305	
Deadweight	268,728

SHIP BUILDER
1972-09 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. 
Nagasaki Yard/hull No.: 1684

Significant Events
1986-06	Broken Up by National Ship Demolition Ltd in Taiwan
1986-03	LR Class Withdrawn
1986-02	Status changed to Total Loss
1983-00	Name changed to CASTOR
1980-00	Name changed to Cast Narwhal
1974-00	Name changed to Nordic Conqueror
1972-09	Name changed to Naess Ambassador, Flagged by Liberia
1972-05	Status changed to Launched
1972-01	Status changed to Keel Laid
1969-09	Status changed to On Order/Not Commenced


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## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> No problem - more info (Thumb)
> 
> 1983-00	Castor
> 1980-00	Cast Narwhal
> 1974-00	Nordic Conqueror
> 1972-09	Naess Ambassador	Liberia
> Originally Naess Ambassador;
> New building price $23,000,000
> 
> CONSTRUCTION OVERVIEW
> Shiptype	Ore/Oil Carrier
> Built	1972
> GT	132,305
> Deadweight	268,728
> 
> SHIP BUILDER
> 1972-09 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.
> Nagasaki Yard/hull No.: 1684
> 
> Significant Events
> 1986-06	Broken Up by National Ship Demolition Ltd in Taiwan
> 1986-03	LR Class Withdrawn
> 1986-02	Status changed to Total Loss
> 1983-00	Name changed to CASTOR
> 1980-00	Name changed to Cast Narwhal
> 1974-00	Name changed to Nordic Conqueror
> 1972-09	Name changed to Naess Ambassador, Flagged by Liberia
> 1972-05	Status changed to Launched
> 1972-01	Status changed to Keel Laid
> 1969-09	Status changed to On Order/Not Commenced


 *WOW* - this excitement might be the death of me. There is some bell ringing in my head in relation to the name Castor. I think she gained some international notoriety under that name - for what though, I cannot remember. I note Cast is in the mix also.


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## Gulpers

Cast were indeed involved - I added this edit to my original message. (Thumb)



> I remember digging out some information on her when Helen Barr tried to get me to join her (the ship) when she was Cast Narwhal. Can't recall now why I didn't go because I was quite looking forward to driving something that size! (EEK)


----------



## randcmackenzie

duncs said:


> Hi, tks C, someone in DSM sailed on her. Looked in disch bk and Capts name looks like C Diedrick, its not too clear. Och well, I,ve learned a little bit more. Tks & Bi
> P.S. I saw a lot of names I knew in that thread.


Carl Diedricks Duncs, from South Africa, lived in England somewhere and was a Sunbeam Talbot buff.


----------



## randcmackenzie

Gulpers said:


> Sorry, she was never Naess Chieftain.
> Naess Crusader was launched in 1973 and had her name changed to Nordic Crusader in January 1974.
> The Chieftain wasn't launched until later in 1974 and only ever had the Nordic forename.
> 
> See post #360 (Thumb)


http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=304226

Hello Gulpers. Follow this link - launched as Naess Chieftain, name changed when fitting out. I was on the beauty 3 times.


----------



## randcmackenzie

John Cassels said:


> Duncs , this could be it.
> 
> In the 80's , a good pal of mine Kenneth MacLeod was top man of Northern
> Marine , part of the Stena group. The OBO you are referring to could either
> Nordic Crusader or Nordic Conquerer. Both had twin funnels.


Hello John.

The Kenny MacLeod could also be the ex-Denholm man of the same man who is now head honcho in Songa/Blystad.

But the Conqueror had only one chimney.


----------



## randcmackenzie

CASTOR was a Gulf War casualty, sufficiently badly damaged to be a CTL.

Rumour had it her double bottoms were shot anyway.

She ran very well right up to the end of her days, I sailed with someone who was chief on her as Castor, and see an earlier post by Tommy Tait on this forum.


----------



## Gulpers

randcmackenzie said:


> http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=304226
> 
> Hello Gulpers. Follow this link - launched as Naess Chieftain, name changed when fitting out. I was on the beauty 3 times.


No problem but someone had better tell Lloyds Intelligence that they have duff info then! (Sad)
I'll go with their details rather than Shipspotting.com (Thumb)


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Cast were indeed involved - I added this edit to my original message. (Thumb)



Now that is interesting !!!
I note she was 14 years old when broken up. That sounds reasonable to me considering her size and the stresses she would have been subjected to over her lifetime.

You might like to consider the following:-
The Sea Team fleet, built in Gothenburg (and in one case Landskroner) were originally built with an effective lifespan of 8 years in mind. All years after that were a bonus - in my opinion.

Why you didn't join her as Cast Narwhal I don't know but as I have stated elsewhere I would never ever have agreed to any appointment with Cast under any cir***stances at all. It became fairly obvious to me that Cast was being used as a convenient dumping ground for "*Past their use by date*" O.B.O.'s and Ore Oilers - maybe even more. At least that is how I read the situation back in those days (mid 1980's).

Happy New Year, and keep up the excellent work.

(Pint)


----------



## Gulpers

oldman 80 said:


> Now that is interesting !!!
> I note she was 14 years old when broken up. That sounds reasonable to me considering her size and the stresses she would have been subjected to over her lifetime.
> 
> You might like to consider the following:-
> The Sea Team fleet, built in Gothenburg (and in one case Landskroner) were originally built with an effective lifespan of 8 years in mind. All years after that were a bonus - in my opinion.
> 
> Why you didn't join her as Cast Narwhal I don't know but as I have stated elsewhere I would never ever have agreed to any appointment with Cast under any cir***stances at all. It became fairly obvious to me that Cast was being used as a convenient dumping ground for "*Past their use by date*" O.B.O.'s and Ore Oilers - maybe even more. At least that is how I read the situation back in those days (mid 1980's).
> 
> Happy New Year, and keep up the excellent work.
> 
> (Pint)


See randcmackenzie's post #380. It would appear that she was still in reasonable condition and operating safely until her total loss in the Gulf War. (?HUH)


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> See randcmackenzie's post #380. It would appear that she was still in reasonable condition and operating safely until her total loss in the Gulf War. (?HUH)


_Ah yes - CASTOR & Gulf War - that's it.
Ore Oilers were a better ship so far as stress tolerance was concerned - I reckon._


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> Oh my God - You have done it again - the Nostalgia is once again flowing. How do you do it ?
> *Naess Ambassador* - I now remember her well. (Ore/Oil)
> Built in Nagasaki 1972. (mitsubishi - I think)
> Captain Brian French stood by her, and I believe took her out on Maiden Voyage.
> I was in Nagasaki at the time, doing Guarantee Docking on James E O'Brien (Chevron). I first got to know Brian French at that time, - little did I know that a few years later I'd be sailing under him as C/O with DSM on Chemical Venturer or Explorer - I can't remember which.
> (Wave)


_To Clarify:-
At the time of her building in Nagasaki Brian French might have been C/O standing by - ie not yet promoted to Master. I'm not sure, but he was definately standing by her as one or the other - for sure._


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> No problem but someone had better tell Lloyds Intelligence that they have duff info then! (Sad)
> I'll go with their details rather than Shipspotting.com (Thumb)


Yes indeed, you are right on the button yet again, but I hope you ran that one past Bill Fraser or the survivors thereof.
(*))


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> See randcmackenzie's post #380. It would appear that she was still in reasonable condition and operating safely until her total loss in the Gulf War. (?HUH)


Except for her D.B.'s I believe - which fits entirely with Japanese built early 1970's - I submit.

Edit: for submit, read proclaim.


----------



## alastairrussell

_A small section from Captain Pierre Woinin's technical paper read to the International Federation of Shipmasters Association's meeting in Vladivostok in 2002. If you want to read the whole paper google *'Derbyshire-Christopher: 21 years of unseaworthiness for Bulk Carriers'.

Alastair
*_*
CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES 

Sadly a good deal of the efforts of the RFI was devoted at clearing the DERBYSHIRE crew of negligence after an absurd conclusion of the first formal assessors of the submarine expedition. Nevertheless a series of recommendations were made to the British DETR and through it to the IMO, to IACS and at the same time to the Lloyds Register. But, save for the strength of the hatch covers where immediate action had been requested by Judge Colman, these recommendations mostly involved long studies instead of direct action to deal with the structural weaknesses of the existing bulk carriers. 
One of the recommendations (RFI-14.7) was: Masters of bulk carriers should be made fully aware of the possible dangerous consequences of water entry into forward spaces and consequent reduction of freeboard. Any competent master of a bulk carrier is normally aware of this severe threat, as on those large vessels it is almost impossible to pump out a flooded forward compartment when the ship had been initially loaded on even keel. Nonetheless the RFI report got a wide publicity, the Lloyd=s Register (LR) had to answer as a party in this inquiry, therefore it was obviously aware of Judge Colman recommendation. As the LR is also deeply involved in the ISM Code implementation, it could absolutely not ignore that ISM 1.2.2.2 requires a company to "establish safeguards against all identified risks", and the recommendation of Judge Colman dealt for sure with identified risks. Had the master of the CHRISTOPHER been warned accordingly as it was a LR ship? It would be very interesting to know if this ISM like essential precaution had been done and recorded.

A classification society has a main duty to inform any management about these risks for the following obvious reasons: 

It provides a Class certificate which guarantee a minimum level of seaworthiness. 

It has often Flag state duties which includes the delivery of a "Safety Construction" certificate. 

It claims to provide the best expertise on shipbuilding and requires for its surveys the high fees linked to such a high level of expertise. 

Therefore it could be expected from a responsible body that it would not wait for the regulations to undergo the lengthy process of implementation before interfering with a serious known risk to the seaworthiness of a vessel under its care. But here we must point out that it was already a shame that we had to assume that the Classification Societies waited until the RFI to discover the structural weaknesses of the bulkcarriers, this while they have the best data available on the many previous incidents with those vessels. With each new casualty, and at times two of them occurred each month, improvement to the structure or the equipment should have been urgently devised by those responsible for the construction of the bulkcarriers and, if these improvements could not have been directly fitted, in the meantime a drastic reduction of cargo intake should have been imposed by those bodies. Acting otherwise simply meant sending unseaworthy ships at sea, gambling with the lives of those on board. That was much more the spirit of the ISM code than imposing a meaningless but time consuming clerical work on the ship's crew just to make believe that the paper-ship is OK and that the insurance will pay when the boat will go down. Furthermore in 1998 the Belgian Shipmasters= Association(BESMA) sent a registered letter to IACS to formally warn about hatch cover weakness, this on the base of a study by Professor Faulkner. IACS confirmed by fax that this letter had been distributed to all IACS Classification Societies. Obviously it did not helped much to prevent the disaster with the CHRISTOPHER.

It cannot be said that during all those years from the DERBYSHIRE sinking to the publication of the RFI the Classification Societies did not react on bulkcarriers lack of seaworthiness. They issued a few timid recommendations on the loading of these vessels, they carried out many more detailed, and expensive, surveys of the structure, they participated in many conferences on the issue. But they never considered more drastic measures such an increase of the scantlings for HTS steel, the fitting of a forecastle on new builds, the reinforcing of the hatch covers on the existing ships, a substantial increase of freeboard of old vessels.*


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> _A small section from Captain Pierre Woinin's technical paper read to the International Federation of Shipmasters Association's meeting in Vladivostok in 2002. If you want to read the whole paper google *'Derbyshire-Christopher: 21 years of unseaworthiness for Bulk Carriers'.
> 
> Alastair
> *_*
> CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES
> 
> Sadly a good deal of the efforts of the RFI was devoted at clearing the DERBYSHIRE crew of negligence after an absurd conclusion of the first formal assessors of the submarine expedition. Nevertheless a series of recommendations were made to the British DETR and through it to the IMO, to IACS and at the same time to the Lloyds Register. But, save for the strength of the hatch covers where immediate action had been requested by Judge Colman, these recommendations mostly involved long studies instead of direct action to deal with the structural weaknesses of the existing bulk carriers.
> One of the recommendations (RFI-14.7) was: Masters of bulk carriers should be made fully aware of the possible dangerous consequences of water entry into forward spaces and consequent reduction of freeboard. Any competent master of a bulk carrier is normally aware of this severe threat, as on those large vessels it is almost impossible to pump out a flooded forward compartment when the ship had been initially loaded on even keel. Nonetheless the RFI report got a wide publicity, the Lloyd=s Register (LR) had to answer as a party in this inquiry, therefore it was obviously aware of Judge Colman recommendation. As the LR is also deeply involved in the ISM Code implementation, it could absolutely not ignore that ISM 1.2.2.2 requires a company to "establish safeguards against all identified risks", and the recommendation of Judge Colman dealt for sure with identified risks. Had the master of the CHRISTOPHER been warned accordingly as it was a LR ship? It would be very interesting to know if this ISM like essential precaution had been done and recorded.
> 
> A classification society has a main duty to inform any management about these risks for the following obvious reasons:
> 
> It provides a Class certificate which guarantee a minimum level of seaworthiness.
> 
> It has often Flag state duties which includes the delivery of a "Safety Construction" certificate.
> 
> It claims to provide the best expertise on shipbuilding and requires for its surveys the high fees linked to such a high level of expertise.
> 
> Therefore it could be expected from a responsible body that it would not wait for the regulations to undergo the lengthy process of implementation before interfering with a serious known risk to the seaworthiness of a vessel under its care. But here we must point out that it was already a shame that we had to assume that the Classification Societies waited until the RFI to discover the structural weaknesses of the bulkcarriers, this while they have the best data available on the many previous incidents with those vessels. With each new casualty, and at times two of them occurred each month, improvement to the structure or the equipment should have been urgently devised by those responsible for the construction of the bulkcarriers and, if these improvements could not have been directly fitted, in the meantime a drastic reduction of cargo intake should have been imposed by those bodies. Acting otherwise simply meant sending unseaworthy ships at sea, gambling with the lives of those on board. That was much more the spirit of the ISM code than imposing a meaningless but time consuming clerical work on the ship's crew just to make believe that the paper-ship is OK and that the insurance will pay when the boat will go down. Furthermore in 1998 the Belgian Shipmasters= Association(BESMA) sent a registered letter to IACS to formally warn about hatch cover weakness, this on the base of a study by Professor Faulkner. IACS confirmed by fax that this letter had been distributed to all IACS Classification Societies. Obviously it did not helped much to prevent the disaster with the CHRISTOPHER.
> 
> It cannot be said that during all those years from the DERBYSHIRE sinking to the publication of the RFI the Classification Societies did not react on bulkcarriers lack of seaworthiness. They issued a few timid recommendations on the loading of these vessels, they carried out many more detailed, and expensive, surveys of the structure, they participated in many conferences on the issue. But they never considered more drastic measures such an increase of the scantlings for HTS steel, the fitting of a forecastle on new builds, the reinforcing of the hatch covers on the existing ships, a substantial increase of freeboard of old vessels.*


*

Once again - Your contributions to this string/website are absolute gems - I think

IFSMA - I was an individual member but resigned. Economic reasons mainly.

Happy New Year.
(Pint)*


----------



## duncs

Hi, Randcmackenzie, mni thanks. - Carl/S.African/vintage cars - jogged the grey matter. A real gentleman. Before he left EB Carrier, he gave me my disch bk, and told me "get off when you get the chance". Tks to all ex DSM for info received. I know a great deal more now.
Best rgds to all for '13,
Duncs


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> _Ah yes - CASTOR & Gulf War - that's it.
> Ore Oilers were a better ship so far as stress tolerance was concerned - I reckon._


 Oh dear, now that's me being a little bit less than precise - is it not.? A more accurate description would of course be "The Tanker War" as opposed to "Gulf War".
Having said that, it does throw a slightly different light on Dunc's dilema of the early 1990's - does it not ?


----------



## alastairrussell

_From Jack Devanney's *'Centre for Tankship Excellence'* in their *'Down Ratchet and Deterioration of Tanker New Building Standards Paper'
*
Alastair
_
7. *FATIGUE ANALYSIS *
Finite Element analysis even if carried out in the manner we suggest would still not examine the connection details. Prompted by an epidemic of fatigue cracking in 1980's built tankers, class introduced "fatigue analysis" to check these areas. Given the societies' inability to enforce qualitative standards, they probably had no choice. Fatigue analysis can in theory help to improve the robustness of connection details, such as bracket toes, stiffeners to web connections, etc. But the practice leaves much to be desired. 

Prior to about 1985, there was no such thing as fatigue analysis. Designers would select connections and bracket details that were known to be robust and, if they didn't, Class would require improvement. The goal was to eliminate failure due to fatigue rather than to increase fatigue life. Thanks to advances in computer power, it became possible to consider simulated voyage trading patterns, the resultant cyclic loadings and their application to the transfer functions of the proposed structure connections. A number of heroic assumptions are required in this process, but the end result is a guess at the mean time to failure, called the fatigue life. 

The rule standard fatigue life is 20 years. Most tankers operate for 25 years or more. It has always puzzled us as to why Class would set an average time to failure less than the expected ship life. When Hellespont specified a 40 year fatigue life, some class software had to be recoded to accept the larger number. But an equally pressing problem is that fatigue life depends critically upon the trading pattern that was implicitly included in the specification. According to both LR and ABS, a ship trading in the North Atlantic has a very different fatigue life than one trading in Indian Ocean. In this case, the class software is almost certainly correct, at least in a qualitative sense. The most graphic example of this is the American flag tankers trading on the Alaska-West Coast route. In this very severe environment, some of these ships turned out to have fatigue lives of one or two trips. Closer to home for Hellespont, if a new VLCC trades Mongstad to Philadelphia rather than Ras Tanura-Yokohama, it's fatigue life is halved. The nominal 20 year life become 10. 

This whole approach assumes that our knowledge of ocean sea spectra throughout the world is so complete that we can fine tune our structures right up to the point of planning for an average time to fail that is well within the expected life of the ship. The transfer functions themselves are gouges that are based primarily on offshore oil industry studies of generic joints and brackets and then extrapolated to actual ship details in a semi-judgemental manner. The mechanism as to how sea state spectra is converted to wave forces and then to shear and bending moments on the hull and then transferred via primary and secondary structural members to the connections is at best an idealization. Loading and discharging loads are completely ignored despite the fact that this cycling is implicated in the early cracking seen in North Sea shuttle tankers. There is no consideration of ballast exchange and its effect on the loading of the structure. 

Here is just one example of how divorced from reality the Class rules have become. In computing the "fatigue life", the rules add port time to the fatigue life. In a 10 voyage year with 5 days port time per voyage, the naively anticipated fatigue life of 20 years is actually 315 days x 20 or about 17.5 years. This sort of adjustment assumes we can predict the fatigue life within 15 percent. We have proven over and over again we cannot. In reality, fatigue life is a misnomer. Fatigue life is nothing more than an index, 50 is better than 30 which is better than 20. That's about all you can say. 

Our whole approach to fatigue is overly aggressive. It seems as if every time we have a choice between a conservative assumption and an unconservative, we choose the unconservative. This is probably the result of inter-class competition. In any event, the ships are still cracking early in their lives. Given all the uncertainties a far more conservative approach is the only prudent alternative. At a minimum Class should require a guessed at mean time to failure, well in excess of the ship's expected life, at least 40 years. We should run the voyage simulation over all reasonable trading patterns and design to the resulting fatigue envelope rather than some average. Given intelligent design, the increase in overall ship price will be barely noticeable.


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> _From Jack Devanney's *'Centre for Tankship Excellence'* in their *'Down Ratchet and Deterioration of Tanker New Building Standards Paper'
> *
> Alastair
> _
> 7. *FATIGUE ANALYSIS *
> Finite Element analysis even if carried out in the manner we suggest would still not examine the connection details. Prompted by an epidemic of fatigue cracking in 1980's built tankers, class introduced "fatigue analysis" to check these areas. Given the societies' inability to enforce qualitative standards, they probably had no choice. Fatigue analysis can in theory help to improve the robustness of connection details, such as bracket toes, stiffeners to web connections, etc. But the practice leaves much to be desired.
> 
> *Prior to about 1985, there was no such thing as fatigue analysis*. Designers would select connections and bracket details that were known to be robust and, if they didn't, Class would require improvement. The goal was to eliminate failure due to fatigue rather than to increase fatigue life. Thanks to advances in computer power, it became possible to consider simulated voyage trading patterns, the resultant cyclic loadings and their application to the transfer functions of the proposed structure connections. A number of heroic assumptions are required in this process, but the end result is a guess at the mean time to failure, called the fatigue life.
> 
> The rule standard fatigue life is 20 years. Most tankers operate for 25 years or more. It has always puzzled us as to why Class would set an average time to failure less than the expected ship life. When Hellespont specified a 40 year fatigue life, some class software had to be recoded to accept the larger number. But an equally pressing problem is that fatigue life depends critically upon the trading pattern that was implicitly included in the specification. According to both LR and ABS, a ship trading in the North Atlantic has a very different fatigue life than one trading in Indian Ocean. In this case, the class software is almost certainly correct, at least in a qualitative sense. The most graphic example of this is the American flag tankers trading on the Alaska-West Coast route. In this very severe environment, some of these ships turned out to have fatigue lives of one or two trips. Closer to home for Hellespont, if a new VLCC trades Mongstad to Philadelphia rather than Ras Tanura-Yokohama, it's fatigue life is halved. The nominal 20 year life become 10.
> 
> This whole approach assumes that our knowledge of ocean sea spectra throughout the world is so complete that we can fine tune our structures right up to the point of planning for an average time to fail that is well within the expected life of the ship. The transfer functions themselves are gouges that are based primarily on offshore oil industry studies of generic joints and brackets and then extrapolated to actual ship details in a semi-judgemental manner. The mechanism as to how sea state spectra is converted to wave forces and then to shear and bending moments on the hull and then transferred via primary and secondary structural members to the connections is at best an idealization. Loading and discharging loads are completely ignored despite the fact that this cycling is implicated in the early cracking seen in North Sea shuttle tankers. There is no consideration of ballast exchange and its effect on the loading of the structure.
> 
> Here is just one example of how divorced from reality the Class rules have become. In computing the "fatigue life", the rules add port time to the fatigue life. In a 10 voyage year with 5 days port time per voyage, the naively anticipated fatigue life of 20 years is actually 315 days x 20 or about 17.5 years. This sort of adjustment assumes we can predict the fatigue life within 15 percent. We have proven over and over again we cannot. In reality, fatigue life is a misnomer. Fatigue life is nothing more than an index, 50 is better than 30 which is better than 20. That's about all you can say.
> 
> Our whole approach to fatigue is overly aggressive. It seems as if every time we have a choice between a conservative assumption and an unconservative, we choose the unconservative. This is probably the result of inter-class competition. In any event, the ships are still cracking early in their lives. Given all the uncertainties a far more conservative approach is the only prudent alternative. At a minimum Class should require a guessed at mean time to failure, well in excess of the ship's expected life, at least 40 years. We should run the voyage simulation over all reasonable trading patterns and design to the resulting fatigue envelope rather than some average. Given intelligent design, the increase in overall ship price will be barely noticeable.


Sorry that statement I dispute absolutely. (I think) [University of California if my memory serves me correctly.]
There had been - but they did not like the results they were getting, so quite simply stopped it.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.


----------



## alastairrussell

Oldman 

I think you may be getting your *'fatigue analysis' *mixed up with the more modern computerised software packages that go under the name *'Finite Element analysis' *systems which would have come out around the middle 80's

The FEA systems are absolutely brilliant and can help engineers to build super duper structures. Very basically when they load a structure up on their computer screens, the under stressed bits come out deep blue with over stressed bits coming out bright red. They then redesign the structure by taking off material from the blue bits and adding it to the red bits and they then test it again on their super duper computer.

The most famous *Fatigue Analysis *testing that I can remember was the one they did to the early version of the De Havilland Comets after the two crashes. The problem was found to be similar to the early failures of the all welded Liberty ships in WW2.

Alastair


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> Oldman
> 
> I think you may be getting your *'fatigue analysis' *mixed up with the more modern computerised software packages that go under the name *'Finite Element analysis' *systems which would have come out around the middle 80's
> 
> The FEA systems are absolutely brilliant and can help engineers to build super duper structures. Very basically when they load a structure up on their computer screens, the under stressed bits come out deep blue with over stressed bits coming out bright red. They then redesign the structure by taking off material from the blue bits and adding it to the red bits and they then test it again on their super duper computer.
> 
> The most famous *Fatigue Analysis *testing that I can remember was the one they did to the early version of the De Havilland Comets after the two crashes. The problem was found to be similar to the early failures of the all welded Liberty ships in WW2.
> 
> Alastair


WOW that's just fascinating - *but No* I don't think I'm getting it mixed up at all, although *stress analysis* might be a more precise analysis. I'm refering to around 1971 or thereabouts. Besides those "_Finite Element Analysis_" things you talk about - I have no idea what they are, but I certainly wouldn't worry about them too much.
*Liberty Ships* - well many were still going twenty years later - not bad considering they were rumoured to be built for one trans-atlantic crossing only - with everything else a bonus after that.


----------



## alastairrussell

Low temperature embritilment of the steel plate in the winter months was a problem along with the originally hull being designed for riveting and not a welded structure. Because of the large number ships being made quickly improvements and modification to the design to spread the loads around was introduced very rapidly to eliminate the cracking. All the following was found in Wikipedia!!!!!!!!

Problems

Early Liberty ships suffered hull and deck cracks, and a few were lost to such structural defects. During World War II, there were nearly 1,500 instances of significant brittle fractures. Twelve ships, including three of the 2,710 Liberties built, broke in half without warning, including the SS John P. Gaines,[10][11] which sank on 24 November 1943 with the loss of 10 lives. Suspicion fell on the shipyards which had often used inexperienced workers and new welding techniques to produce large numbers of ships in great haste.[12] The Ministry of War Transport lent the British-built Empire Duke for testing purposes.[13] 

Constance Tipper of Cambridge University demonstrated that the fractures were not initiated by welding, but instead by the grade of steel used, which suffered from embrittlement.[12] 

She discovered that the ships in the North Atlantic were exposed to temperatures that could fall below a critical point when the mechanism of failure changed from ductile to brittle, and thus the hull could fracture rather easily. The predominantly welded (as opposed to riveted) hull construction then allowed cracks to run for large distances unimpeded. One common type of crack nucleated at the square corner of a hatch which coincided with a welded seam, both the corner and the weld acting as stress concentrators. 

Furthermore, the ships were frequently grossly overloaded and some of the problems occurred during or after severe storms at sea that would have placed any ship at risk. Various reinforcements were applied to the Liberty ships to arrest the crack problems, and the successor design, the Victory ship, was stronger and less stiff to better deal with fatigue.

Several designs of mass-produced petroleum tankers were also produced, the most numerous being the T2 tanker series, with about 490 built between 1942 and the end of 1945.


----------



## oldseamerchant

This thread has morphed into individuals trying to out smart each other. Can you get back to the real cause of structural failure which we lesser mortals can relate to. FEA/LL1966 my XXse


----------



## WilliamH

oldseamerchant said:


> This thread has morphed into individuals trying to out smart each other. Can you get back to the real cause of structural failure which we lesser mortals can relate to. FEA/LL1966 my XXse


Not yet please, I have some questions.
How was an enquiry able to reach their conclusions about the primary cause of the vessel foundering without inspecting the engine room and accommodation block?
Is it possible that a distress signal was sent but not picked up?


----------



## randcmackenzie

Gulpers said:


> Duncs,
> 
> Some photographs of Nordic Chieftain and Nordic Crusader *here* in our Gallery. (Thumb)


Hello Ray,

Take a look at the pictures - one of them would seem to show her name being changed from Naess to Nordic.

To be honest, I can't remember if her drawings and manuals said Naess or Nordic, but it sticks in my mind somewhere that she was Naess before delivery. I would be equally sceptical of Lloyds and Shipspotting!

Happy New Year.


----------



## Gulpers

randcmackenzie said:


> Hello Ray,
> 
> Take a look at the pictures - one of them would seem to show her name being changed from Naess to Nordic.
> 
> To be honest, I can't remember if her drawings and manuals said Naess or Nordic, but it sticks in my mind somewhere that she was Naess before delivery. I would be equally sceptical of Lloyds and Shipspotting!
> 
> Happy New Year.


Yeah, thanks for that, see what you mean - they probably just spelled "Nordic" wrong at the first attempt. (Jester)
If she was anything like the Crusader, she would have been a nightmare! Built in "Wonderland" indeed! [=P]
All the best and have a Guid New Year. (Thumb)


----------



## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Not yet please, I have some questions.
> How was an enquiry able to reach their conclusions about the primary cause of the vessel foundering without inspecting the engine room and accommodation block?
> Is it possible that a distress signal was sent but not picked up?


Good Point. Indeed quite possible if all her aerials were down - a likely scenario, I suggest.
Rgds. Oldman 80


Edit:- What went wrong with the "quote" function. And Also, Please consider - "*SENT*" - _but not transmitted._


----------



## alastairrussell

_A wee bit of info taken from a USA Do***ent on the liberty ship

Alastair_

The vast majority of the 250,000 pieces that went into each Liberty Ship were utilized to produce approximately one hundred multi-ton sections that were then assembled on the shipways. Nevertheless, some items still had to be handled individually. For example, huge and unwieldy propellers weighing 21,000 pounds and manufactured elsewhere had to be positioned beneath the stern of each Liberty Ship while the vessel was still on the building ways. 

World War II introduced a major change in the way ship’s hulls were fabricated. Riveting was largely replaced by welding. While this new technique enabled ships to be built faster, there was an unexpected price to pay. There was limited knowledge at the time about the danger of locked up stresses in metal fabrications, accompanied by a phenomenon called ‘brittle fracture’. 

Several Liberty Ships were lost, most often in the cold and rough waters of the Arctic Ocean where an unfortunate ship’s hull would develop serious cracks, occasionally even resulting in a ship breaking completely in two. Once this condition was identified and studied, minor changes in hull design and rigid controls for welding techniques eliminated the problem.


----------



## oldman 80

*AND NOW*, I'd like to ask a question myself, in relation to the enquiries into the loss of the Derbyshire.
Who were the "expert witnesses" who appeared at those enquiries, and just what did they have to say.
I have a funny feeling that we may be looking at another case, just like Air New Zealand and Mount Eribus, classified by the Enquiry "Commissioner" as being an _"Orchestrated Littany of Lies"_, on the part of Air New Zealand and some in the Aviation Industry, and which classification, resulted in a review by the Privy Council, which finally cleared the aircrew of blame for the disaster - much to the disappointment of some.


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> *AND NOW*, I'd like to ask a question myself, in relation to the enquiries into the loss of the Derbyshire.
> Who were the "expert witnesses" who appeared at those enquiries, and just what did they have to say.
> I have a funny feeling that we may be looking at another case, just like Air New Zealand and Mount Eribus, classified by the Enquiry "Commissioner" as being an _"Orchestrated Littany of Lies"_, on the part of Air New Zealand and some in the Aviation Industry, and which classification, resulted in a review by the Privy Council, which finally cleared the aircrew of blame for the disaster - much to the disappointment of some.


The Mt Erebus disaster was probably one of the first electronic navigation accidents. Had the crew plotted the raw position data onto a sectional chart the accident wouldn't have happened, but this wasn't part of standard operating procedure, and as far as I know never became so (anywhere). We've seen similar accidents at sea since the Mt Erebus event although the maritime versions were not as catastrophic. 

I recall 2nd Mate saying to me during my apprenticeship. "Being a good navigator is being a good guesser, you never know where you are, you only know where you think you might be" It turned out to be very good advice.


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> Is this referring to Derbyshire?


yes it is.


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> The Mt Erebus disaster was probably one of the first electronic navigation accidents. Had the crew plotted the raw position data onto a sectional chart the accident wouldn't have happened, but this wasn't part of standard operating procedure, and as far as I know never became so (anywhere). We've seen similar accidents at sea since the Mt Erebus event although the maritime versions were not as catastrophic.
> 
> I recall 2nd Mate saying to me during my apprenticeship. "Being a good navigator is being a good guesser, you never know where you are, you only know where you think you might be" It turned out to be very good advice.


But that is not how aircraft of that sophistication operate, not then and not now.

The flight planning so far as flight route/track was concerned was done on the ground in the flight planning department and entered into a master computer on the ground. It was a standard route which had been flown frequently, but for some reason was altered by someone whom I believe was an experienced two dimensional navigator, in the hours before the flight departed. The flight crew turned up on schedule before departure, did their bit of flight planning, met briefings, fuel calculations, weight and balance etc etc, stuck a floppy (or it's equvalent) into the Master Computer, picked up the standard flight track waypoints (which had been altered, but nobody bothered to tell the flight crew - or anyone else for that matter) went out to the aircraft and uploaded the supposedly standard flight track into the aircrafts "computer" and off they went. The track they were used to following took them some 20 miles clear of Erebus, but the waypoints had been altered sometime in the hours before departure, and the aircraft tracked directly into the mountain in what was known as *sector whiteout* conditions. At least that is how I remember the eventual findings of the Privy Council - I studied the case quite intensely, as part of my own aviation studies. There may be some slight inaccuracies but that was the gist of it.
Transfering "raw data" to sectional charts as you put it, isn't the way things are done on sophisticated flight decks - not even today. Had there been a system in place which required alterations to waypoints to be double or preferably treble checked before being altered in the Master Computer in the *flight planning department* - _that is what would have prevented the disaster - but no such system existed at that time.
_At sea 2 officers always determined the noon position and days run independently, compared their determinations, and decided the position and days run accordingly. Any significant difference was detected and resolved. The 2/o laid off courses etc on the charts, but these were always double and treble checked by (a) the OOW on taking over a watch, and (b) by the Master at his convenience. Had the 2/o laid off a course over the top of shallow water or isolated obstruction - then it would have been noticed and corrected if not by the 2/o at the time, then by the OOW or Master, maybe even all three. Amazingly the airline did not follow similar type procedures.
Air Nav is 3 dimensional - not 2, and besides you don't fly directly at a mountain if you intend to descend for sightseeing purposes, any more than you would at sea lay off a course on a chart leading directly into, say the Sandettie Light Vessel - for example, or whatever. However unfortunately that in effect is what happened to TE 901 , and all because the airlines system allowed it to. 
They changed that system of course - but the price of that system failure - was enormous. You would have though common sense alone would have caused the airline to have adequate cross checking in place in cases where standard route waypoints were altered - for whatever reason.
Plain simple bad management practices and procedures, which cost around 260 people their lives. The flight computer followed a standard ANZ electronic flight plan/track which had been altered, and nobody was informed of that.
Not only that but the aircrew had actually been briefed on the flight plan by the airline before it was altered - but the aircraft followed an altered flight plan, (which no one was told about), not the one it was supposed to follow.
At least that's how I recall it from memory.

As for that second mate who advised you - well I have some doubts about him - he didn't get a navigation planning job with ANZ by any chance did he ?
(Sad)


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> But that is not how aircraft of that sophistication operate, not then and not now.
> 
> The flight planning so far as flight route/track was concerned was done on the ground in the flight planning department and entered into a master computer on the ground. It was a standard route which had been flown frequently, but for some reason was altered by someone whom I believe was an experienced two dimensional navigator, in the hours before the flight departed. The flight crew turned up on schedule before departure, did their bit of flight planning, met briefings, fuel calculations, weight and balance etc etc, stuck a floppy (or it's equvalent) into the Master Computer, picked up the standard flight track waypoints (which had been altered, but nobody bothered to tell the flight crew - or anyone else for that matter) went out to the aircraft and uploaded the supposedly standard flight track into the aircrafts "computer" and off they went. The track they were used to following took them some 20 miles clear of Erebus, but the waypoints had been altered sometime in the hours before departure, and the aircraft tracked directly into the mountain in what was known as *sector whiteout* conditions. At least that is how I remember the eventual findings of the Privy Council - I studied the case quite intensely, as part of my own aviation studies. There may be some slight inaccuracies but that was the gist of it.
> Transfering "raw data" to sectional charts as you put it, isn't the way things are done on sophisticated flight decks - not even today. Had there been a system in place which required alterations to waypoints to be double or preferably treble checked before being altered in the Master Computer in the *flight planning department* - _that is what would have prevented the disaster - but no such system existed at that time.
> _At sea 2 officers always determined the noon position and days run independently, compared their determinations, and decided the position and days run accordingly. Any significant difference was detected and resolved. The 2/o laid off courses etc on the charts, but these were always double and treble checked by (a) the OOW on taking over a watch, and (b) by the Master at his convenience. Had the 2/o laid off a course over the top of shallow water or isolated obstruction - then it would have been noticed and corrected if not by the 2/o at the time, then by the OOW or Master, maybe even all three. Amazingly the airline did not follow similar type procedures.
> Air Nav is 3 dimensional - not 2, and besides you don't fly directly at a mountain if you intend to descend for sightseeing purposes, any more than you would at sea lay off a course on a chart leading directly into, say the Sandettie Light Vessel - for example, or whatever. However unfortunately that in effect is what happened to TE 901 , and all because the airlines system allowed it to.
> They changed that system of course - but the price of that system failure - was enormous. You would have though common sense alone would have caused the airline to have adequate cross checking in place in cases where standard route waypoints were altered - for whatever reason.
> Plain simple bad management practices and procedures, which cost around 260 people their lives. The flight computer followed a standard ANZ electronic flight plan/track which had been altered, and nobody was informed of that.
> Not only that but the aircrew had actually been briefed on the flight plan by the airline before it was altered - but the aircraft followed an altered flight plan, (which no one was told about), not the one it was supposed to follow.
> At least that's how I recall it from memory.
> 
> As for that second mate who advised you - well I have some doubts about him - he didn't get a navigation planning job with ANZ by any chance did he ?
> (Sad)


You have completely missed the point. If I were you I would confine myself to commenting on subjects you know something about.


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> You have completely missed the point. If I were you I would confine myself to commenting on subjects you know something about.


HA HA HA
Well go on then - enlighten us all.
What point have I missed.


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> Have you perchance read the Derbyshire thread already on SN?
> Would be interested to hear what your "likely scenario" view is on Derbyshire's antennas.


Well actually No I have not read the Derbyshire string at SN although I have glanced through parts of it. It's far too "close to the bone", even sadening / depressing for me.

"Likely scenario" - well much the same as the one I was faced with in late 1980 - already refered to in this string. From memory one down another "effectively shorted out" by it - or something like it. Oh yes and some intermittent troubles with newly fitted Satcom also - antenna "not tracking" properly. ( all subsequently rectified eventually - but it takes considerable time. ) A Distress msg not required though & Company fully aware of vessels predicament at time, and had been for a long time, - Classification Society also. 120 St. Vincent St., "on the ball" - so to speak - at least on that occassion.

Plse also note:- my original post @ 11.29 hrs yesterday was *"Likely Scenario - I suggest",* not just " likely scenario " - as you appear to have implied. This is a discussion, is it not ?

All a good reason perhaps to go and have another go at locating and viewing that accomodation / bridge section in some detail. Who knows what might be seen ?


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> HA HA HA
> Well go on then - enlighten us all.
> What point have I missed.


Just because manual plotting is not practiced on 'sophisticated' flight decks doesn't mean that it wouldn't have prevented a disaster. I'm not blaming the crew, just making a simple point. But clearly not simply enough.


----------



## alastairrussell

NoR

Please do not let the 'oldman' get to you, he can be a wee bit off course on what he wants to remember sometimes! Maybe he sailed too long with Denholms!

He sails under the Aus flag in this website so why do you not ask him the following:

1. What was Australia's biggest maritime disaster (loss of life)?

2. How many years before the Titanic disaster did an Australian parliament introduce a law to ensure that all Australian coastal ships have sufficient lifeboats onboard?

3. Why was the White Star management allowed to substantially reduce the lifeboat numbers on the Titanic that the H&W designer had recommended during the design process?

4. Why were some of the directors of the P&O put up on *Corporate Manslaughter *charges after the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' sinking when they did not own the ship at the time of the disaster? Is this another 'Parkgate' Case?

5. How can the UK investigators allow a mere rating to be blamed for the for'd door being left open on the 'Herald of Free Enterprize'?

6. What was the reason for the Australian RoRo ship 'Straitsman' rolling over in the river leading up to Melbourne?

All I can say is *thank you, thank you, Gadfly, Jack Devanney of the USA and Captain Pierre Woinin of Belgium.* I am sure all seagoing marine engineers are with you 100%.

Regards
Alastair


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> Just because manual plotting is not practiced on 'sophisticated' flight decks doesn't mean that it wouldn't have prevented a disaster. I'm not blaming the crew, just making a simple point. But clearly not simply enough.


Well thank you for that, at least it introduces some clarity into the discussion.
You may be interested to learn that the Captain of the aircraft did in fact plot the standard/normal (before it was altered) flight plan - the one he had been briefed on by the airline, on the relevant air charts/maps at home on his kitchen table the very afternoon before the flight. He was apparently showing his children where he was going the next day - a sort of educational exercise if you like.
Some other points worth considering perhaps :- Human Factors:- transfer of data by electronic means believed to negate the possibility of human error being made when entering waypoints. Good theory I suppose but totally irrelevant in this case.
Shortly after the accident, an ANZ flight planning department employee left the company. Obviously that presented problems for him in obtaining further employment, or he at least perceived it as such. It was after all big big news all over the world for a long time.
He obviously decided to return to his own world again, the Maritime World. His CV just read, " _left Air New Zealand, having completed my objective" _. Unfortunately he did not qualify that statement by clarifying what his objective had been - at least not on paper.
He could have meant something like " I had discovered just how shocking the airline management was - and therefore left to return to my real profession" . On the other hand maybe he meant something else - who knows. Of further interest, and unique coincidence, the guy was an ex BISN 2nd Officer who had, I believe, served on the D Class vessels many years previously (Dwarka, Dara, Dumra etc) - so one can assume he would have been very familiar with the double or *triple checking practices of the Merchant Navy*, - and I suspect, would have been horrified to learn that an airline didn't do that sort of thing - at least not in the ANZ case under discussion. 
And one final point, I passed all my aviation examinations both theory and practical, with flying colours - but it took several years.
*DID YOU* ?
Have a good new year.
(Pint)


----------



## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> NoR
> 
> Please do not let the 'oldman' get to you, he can be a wee bit off course on what he wants to remember sometimes! Maybe he sailed too long with Denholms!
> 
> He sails under the Aus flag in this website so why do you not ask him the following:
> 
> 1. What was Australia's biggest maritime disaster (loss of life)?
> 
> 2. How many years before the Titanic disaster did an Australian parliament introduce a law to ensure that all Australian coastal ships have sufficient lifeboats onboard?
> 
> 3. Why was the White Star management allowed to substantially reduce the lifeboat numbers on the Titanic that the H&W designer had recommended during the design process?
> 
> 4. Why were some of the directors of the P&O put up on *Corporate Manslaughter *charges after the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' sinking when they did not own the ship at the time of the disaster? Is this another 'Parkgate' Case?
> 
> 5. How can the UK investigators allow a mere rating to be blamed for the for'd door being left open on the 'Herald of Free Enterprize'?
> 
> 6. What was the reason for the Australian RoRo ship 'Straitsman' rolling over in the river leading up to Melbourne?
> 
> All I can say is *thank you, thank you, Gadfly, Jack Devanney of the USA and Captain Pierre Woinin of Belgium.* I am sure all seagoing marine engineers are with you 100%.
> 
> Regards
> Alastair


(Wave)
Now that's another good posting is it not ?
Obviously you have the answers to your questions, so why not answer them yourself, rather that getting someone else to do your "work" for you ?

You might like to include "Why does Australia have no Merchant (Commercial) Navy - worth mentioning ?.
Laurie Brereton answered that one perfectly I think.
"A Basket Case", are the words that he used, if my memory serves me correctly .

You may also like to ponder how long it took you Aussie Marine Engineers to wise up and stop buying inferior, past it's use by date D.S.M. tonnage, then whinging about it in the aftermath. Granted *you eventually* did, (Stop buying it) after which, they cast their eyes towards the Canadians, - I believe.

(Pint)


----------



## Malky Glaister

I would be VERY surprised if any radio equipment would survive the plunge to the seabed. Probably nothing would survive.
Conjecture, true!

take it easy all you guys!!!

regards

Malky


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> Well thank you for that, at least it introduces some clarity into the discussion.
> You may be interested to learn that the Captain of the aircraft did in fact plot the standard/normal (before it was altered) flight plan - the one he had been briefed on by the airline, on the relevant air charts/maps at home on his kitchen table the very afternoon before the flight. He was apparently showing his children where he was going the next day - a sort of educational exercise if you like.
> Some other points worth considering perhaps :- Human Factors:- transfer of data by electronic means believed to negate the possibility of human error being made when entering waypoints. Good theory I suppose but totally irrelevant in this case.
> Shortly after the accident, an ANZ flight planning department employee left the company. Obviously that presented problems for him in obtaining further employment, or he at least perceived it as such. It was after all big big news all over the world for a long time.
> He obviously decided to return to his own world again, the Maritime World. His CV just read, " _left Air New Zealand, having completed my objective" _. Unfortunately he did not qualify that statement by clarifying what his objective had been - at least not on paper.
> He could have meant something like " I had discovered just how shocking the airline management was - and therefore left to return to my real profession" . On the other hand maybe he meant something else - who knows. Of further interest, and unique coincidence, the guy was an ex BISN 2nd Officer who had, I believe, served on the D Class vessels many years previously (Dwarka, Dara, Dumra etc) - so one can assume he would have been very familiar with the double or *triple checking practices of the Merchant Navy*, - and I suspect, would have been horrified to learn that an airline didn't do that sort of thing - at least not in the ANZ case under discussion.
> And one final point, I passed all my aviation examinations both theory and practical, with flying colours - but it took several years.
> *DID YOU* ?
> Have a good new year.
> (Pint)


 The ANZ management acted in a pretty despicable way, I don't find that surprising, many companies will throw their employees (dead or alive) to the wolves when it suits them.
I don't blame the people in the navigation section who entered the incorrect data after all to err is human. What was lacking it seems was any quality control which might have picked up the error. I bet a few other airlines overhauled their procedures in the light of the Erebus incident.
The sad thing is that the INS (?) system had the correct position information within it. I remember at the time whilst still being primarily a mariner not understanding why the crew had not been plotting their position, I didn't know then that on an aircraft navigational information is processed before being presented to the pilot, even with simple aids like VOR and ADF (RMI). In times past the mariner dealt with totally raw information which he had to process and assimilate, this lead to a certain way of thinking, hence my old 2nd Mates saying about "never really knowing where you are only thinking you do"....only a slight over statement. 
I expect you remember that we had it drilled into us that aids to navigation were just that 'aids' and not to be trusted, I never got over that and still harbour vague suspicions about electronic navigation - it's ok as long as you keep one foot and one eye in the real world.


----------



## Malky Glaister

""it's ok as long as you keep one foot and one eye in the real world.""

Quote from NoR 's # 418

It took me sometime before I got used to automation until I realised that it couldn't do much that I couldn't only do it much quicker and without time limit!

I then also realised that the computor systems were only as good as the program writer and most of us will have suffered to some degree in banking for example.

I am an engineer but I could never understand the fact that the radar scanner will pass 900 feet sir when the ship is 1000 ft long. A miss is as good as a mile but the converse is also true!

A good New Year to EVERYONE !!

regards

Malky


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> The ANZ management acted in a pretty despicable way, I don't find that surprising, many companies will throw their employees (dead or alive) to the wolves when it suits them.
> I don't blame the people in the navigation section who entered the incorrect data after all to err is human. What was lacking it seems was any quality control which might have picked up the error. I bet a few other airlines overhauled their procedures in the light of the Erebus incident.
> The sad thing is that the INS (?) system had the correct position information within it. I remember at the time whilst still being primarily a mariner not understanding why the crew had not been plotting their position, I didn't know then that on an aircraft navigational information is processed before being presented to the pilot, even with simple aids like VOR and ADF (RMI). In times past the mariner dealt with totally raw information which he had to process and assimilate, this lead to a certain way of thinking, hence my old 2nd Mates saying about "never really knowing where you are only thinking you do"....only a slight over statement.
> I expect you remember that we had it drilled into us that aids to navigation were just that 'aids' and not to be trusted, I never got over that and still harbour vague suspicions about electronic navigation - it's ok as long as you keep one foot and one eye in the real world.


Yes very true, but aviation is different.
ANZ did indeed act in a dispicable manner but they didn't get away with it in the end - mainly due to the persistence of some guy from Glasgow I think.
Now you be a good fella and just sit there and look out the window.
It 'll be fine - don't worry.


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> Yes very true, but aviation is different.
> ANZ did indeed act in a dispicable manner but they didn't get away with it in the end - mainly due to the persistence of some guy from Glasgow I think.
> Now you be a good fella and just sit there and look out the window.
> It 'll be fine - don't worry.


Well just for the record when I left the sea I became an aviator, retired 9 years ago with 16,000 hrs (10,000+ in command on jets) Does that change your opinion of my opinion?


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> Well just for the record when I left the sea I became an aviator, retired 9 years ago with 16,000 hrs (10,000+ in command on jets) Does that change your opinion of my opinion?


Well those hours beat me by a long way - for sure.
And no, - not really.


----------



## oldseamerchant

NoR said:


> Well just for the record when I left the sea I became an aviator, retired 9 years ago with 16,000 hrs (10,000+ in command on jets) Does that change your opinion of my opinion?


Sure as hell impresses me.


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> ""it's ok as long as you keep one foot and one eye in the real world.""
> 
> Quote from NoR 's # 418
> 
> It took me sometime before I got used to automation until I realised that it couldn't do much that I couldn't only do it much quicker and without time limit!
> 
> I then also realised that the computor systems were only as good as the program writer and most of us will have suffered to some degree in banking for example.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I am an engineer but I could never understand the fact that the radar scanner will pass 900 feet sir when the ship is 1000 ft long
> 
> 
> 
> . A miss is as good as a mile but the converse is also true!
> 
> A good New Year to EVERYONE !!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky
Click to expand...

 
Please clarify Malky - I'm not sure what you mean ?


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> ""it's ok as long as you keep one foot and one eye in the real world.""
> 
> Quote from NoR 's # 418
> 
> 
> 
> Code:
> 
> 
> It took me sometime before I got used to automation until I realised that it couldn't do much that I couldn't only do it much quicker and without time limit!
> 
> I then also realised that the computor systems were only as good as the program writer and most of us will have suffered to some degree in banking for example.
> 
> I am an engineer but I could never understand the fact that the radar scanner will pass 900 feet sir when the ship is 1000 ft long. A miss is as good as a mile but the converse is also true!
> 
> A good New Year to EVERYONE !!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky



That's true of *automation* - absolutely.
*Instrumention* in aviation is amazing. IMC you rely on it 100% but it is really good gear. They have it really well worked out, procedures being the key to it. However their are limits for how long you can do it - so "auto" is 1st preference for the reason you have stated. (If you have it, and it works) However it is amazing what you can do, when you have to - ILS for example - really clever stuff - COOL, Calm and Collected - the human can fly it (blind) right down onto the ground, - but once again "auto" will make a better job of it - No emotional involvement/input - I suppose.
You probably wouldn't choose to do it manually, you'd choose an "alternate" instead, but if you had to - you would - it can be done.
You train, train, train - for it. Amazing stuff is avionics, indeed excellent stuff, in the main.

N.B. I'm getting quite good at working this website control box thing, up at the top. Why don't you try it ?
Testing, Testing, Testing. (Wave)
(Pint)


----------



## Malky Glaister

Most large plant these days cannot be operated manually. Power stations for example. Even the steam ships of the eighties were difficult to operate manually for any length of time.

As to the radar scanner.

These were usually placed on the mast above the wheelhouse perhaps, 1000 ft from the vessels bow! I recall more than one Master going ballistic to a few third mates regarding CPA (??) ie the bow will come far to close to an object which the main mast will miss! 
No doubt this problem no longer exists.

Derbyshire. Anyone any estimate of the velocity of seabed impact for the vessels bits. I would imagine the accommodation block would be a crumpled wreck after hitting the bed and it is unlikely that any welded on fixtures would survive. I don't know so its just conjecture from me

regards

Malky


----------



## John Cassels

oldseamerchant said:


> Sure as hell impresses me.


And me as well.


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> Most large plant these days cannot be operated manually. Power stations for example. Even the steam ships of the eighties were difficult to operate manually for any length of time.
> 
> As to the radar scanner.
> 
> 
> 
> PHP:
> 
> 
> These were usually placed on the mast above the wheelhouse perhaps, 1000 ft from the vessels bow! I recall more than one Master going ballistic to a few third mates regarding CPA (??) ie the bow will come far to close to an object which the main mast will miss!
> 
> No doubt this problem no longer exists.
> 
> Derbyshire. Anyone any estimate of the velocity of seabed impact for the vessels bits. I would imagine the accommodation block would be a crumpled wreck after hitting the bed and it is unlikely that any welded on fixtures would survive. I don't know so its just conjecture from me
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


Rodger that Malky & Thanks.
I must have been in third dimensional (aviation) mode at the time.
"Radar Scanner passing 900 ft" - got me a bit confused - meaning "on climb or descent" ????

All sorted now though - CPA Port, CPA stbd, CPA aft - probably ok.
CPA ahead - OH ! OH ! - structural failure likely - I'd suggest.
No worries though - if you got them Austarc 12P's I suggested - they're magic. The secret must be in the flux - it can't be anywhere else.
Rgds. Jerry.
PS when using them, - just touch it and stroke it - don't tap it !!!!!

(egg)


----------



## alastairrussell

NoR

You are definately a class act and you've got my vote to be commodore of this thread for the next three months. You sucked the Oldman right in and then shot him down in flames at the end with your airline flying experience. Well done, your timing was perfect. 

I am thinking he must getting a wee bit desperate when he starts quoting AUS politicians with regard to shipping operations in Australia.

I myself can quote what Peter Nixon the Minister for Transport stated in parliament many years ago in his tirade against Australian manned ships and that was “ Do you know that it costs the same per tonne to ship iron ore from Port Hedland to Japan as from Port Hedland to Port Kembla” Not one person in parliament replied or questioned him or stated that it was exactly the same steaming time between the two ports and that we on the AUS ships had to bash our way across the bloody Australian Bight. He was also not aware that some of the big BHP Bulkies were getting two paying cargoes per round voyage!

If you go into the Denholms thread you can read how everyone complains about the Sig Silver (Chelsea Bridge) which ended up as our Iron Sirius. I am telling you the only Denholm ship that we could not resurrect was the 'Parkgate' and this was only owing to a secret grounding which caused a major misaligned of the ME to the tailshaft! This case ended up in a London court for 6 months and the hot rumour was that BHP won case and received a big big pay out! 

With regard to the Iron Sirius and the other Denholm ships that we chartered, the well paid and highly skilled AUS trained engineers worked really hard, working long hours to lift (Oh lift, Yes, we even fitted the engine room lift that was cancelled by Silver line during construction!!!) the other ships. My favourite will always be the Iron Sirius, with the long hours we put in along with the help from the DNV (not LR) and IHI the builders of the ship and engines she ended up a good workhorse for the mighty BHP. Yes, Yes, DNV allowed us to have oxyacetlene and electric welding equipment on board!!!!!!! 

From 1973 until 1986 while sailing for BHP she carried 10,880,908 tonnes of iron ore and 508,316 tonnes of coal!

NoR you do realise that NoR is the abbreviation of Notice of Race in Sailboat racing? 

Anyway, the answer to question 1 is the 'Montevideo Maru Tragedy' (please google).

Number 2 is 26 years ----and this is in regard to the legislation that was introduced after the collision between the AUS coastal steamers the 'SS Keillawarra' and the 'SS Helen Nicol' off Coffs harbour in 1886. This was when the lookout shouted out “I can smell smoke, I can smell smoke” (please google as you will find that the smoke was blocking out the nav lights).

regards
Alastair


----------



## Cisco

alastairrussell said:


> Number 2 is 26 years ----and this is in regard to the legislation that was introduced after the collision between the AUS coastal steamers the 'SS Keillawarra' and the 'SS Helen Nicol' off Coffs harbour in 1886. This was when the lookout shouted out “I can smell smoke, I can smell smoke” (please google as you will find that the smoke was blocking out the nav lights).
> 
> regards
> Alastair


Radio was a different matter.... I believe coastal steamers without radio were still disappearing in the Paddock as late as the mid 20's .


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> Come on alasdair don't degenerate this thread into a "Derbyshire."
> OM80? Well not too hot on marine-radio or radar matters but anyone who can tell oldseamerchant he has
> 
> 
> 
> onanistic
> 
> 
> 
> tendencies, boots JC into touch and flies SN better than NoR definitely (r) definitely gets a my vote.
Click to expand...

Sorry - but I just looked it up in my dictionary - but it's not there.
Please advise .

Edit:- I can't find it in my Thesaurus either.


----------



## NoR

alastairrussell said:


> NoR you do realise that NoR is the abbreviation of Notice of Race in Sailboat racing?


I didn't know that I was using it in the MN sense. Notice of readiness is when the master informs the charterer that his ship is ready for loading or discharging.

Re OM80, I wasn't trying to suck him in, only to make a point so simple that it hardly needs making. In the end I used a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Not sure it worked though.


----------



## oldseamerchant

R651400 said:


> Come on alasdair don't degenerate this thread into a "Derbyshire."
> OM80? Well not too hot on marine-radio or radar matters but anyone who can tell oldseamerchant he has onanistic tendencies, boots JC into touch and flies SN better than NoR definitely (r) definitely gets a my vote.


I don't think anyone is interested in your vote. Your contribution would be meaningless to this thread and your 'bullet making ' comments worthless.


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> osm certainly has found it!


O.K. then, but I still don't know what it means.
I wouldn't let it disturb you though - try to remain focussed.
Have you tried the "ignore" facility which can be found at each members profile page. Just click on the member, select view members profile, and when you get there just click on the ignore this member option then remember to select "save".
Sometimes it is best to just ignore some posters. (Read)
There are some other controls too which I'm beginning to experiment with (at the top of the message box)
(Pint)


----------



## surfaceblow

oldman 80 said:


> O.K. then, but I still don't know what it means.
> I wouldn't let it disturb you though - try to remain focussed.
> Have you tried the "ignore" facility which can be found at each members profile page. Just click on the member, select view members profile, and when you get there just click on the ignore this member option then remember to select "save".
> Sometimes it is best to just ignore some posters. (Read)
> There are some other controls too which I'm beginning to experiment with (at the top of the message box)
> (Pint)


If you are interested in the meaning of onanistic you can try the link below:

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/onanistic

It was noting to do with ships. 

Joe


----------



## John Cassels

R651400 said:


> Come on alasdair don't degenerate this thread into a "Derbyshire."
> OM80? Well not too hot on marine-radio or radar matters but anyone who can tell oldseamerchant he has onanistic tendencies, boots JC into touch and flies SN better than NoR definitely (r) definitely gets a my vote.


Any idea which JC you're referring to ?.


----------



## oldman 80

surfaceblow said:


> If you are interested in the meaning of onanistic you can try the link below:
> 
> http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/onanistic
> 
> It was noting to do with ships.
> 
> Joe


Thank you for that info/reference. 
One lives and learns does one not ?


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> or...OM80 posting #288 this thread for info.
> 
> "Igbore" button? Can't really see the point.
> Focus? Have to say it's a bit difficult to stay focussed with subject material jumping from marine to aviation like a cat on a hot griddle.
> Verbose verbatim quotes with one line replies jumping to verbose verbatim quotes with inter-spaced psychedelic replies.
> No worries! A welcome change from the "Derbyshire" thread debacle!


Well you know what they say - "Variety is the spice of life" and "it takes all types ". (_some guys just ain't nice guys at all_)
Re your comments on the Derbyshire thread - I agree.
As for the ignore button, I still reckon you should give it a go - *if only to see what it does. *


----------



## alastairrussell

NoR

When I started off in the 'derbyshire' thread with my list of failed bulkies the Moderator stopped me using it and he rearranged things and placed my posts in a separate thread under his chosen title 'A list of bulkcarriers that have suffered a structural failure'. He quite rightly did not want me to upset the relatives of those who were lost in the Derbyshire sinking.

All I wanted to do right from the start was make sure that the errors and mistakes that were introduced in the 1966 Load Line convention were not forgotten or swept under the carpet. My heart goes out to the large number of mainly third world seaman who were lost when sailing on these Doomed Bulkies . 

Way back I was quite happy getting 20000 hits on my thread and at the same time was a wee bit disappointed when it died a natural death. At first I was annoyed when the Denholm cowboys hijacked my thread and moved in and used it as a buddy buddy thread. But low and behold they brought the thread to the front of the bulkcarrier section again. They even allowed me drop in the occasional bits on substandard ships but of course they are not interested. 

They are responsible for having helped to raise the hits to over 30000 now but I have found that you have to start a 'Argie Bargie' or a stirring session regularly to get them going to receive more hits. NoR, please do not leave this thread we ALL need you.

Alastair


----------



## Gulpers

alastairrussell said:


> Way back I was quite happy getting *30000* hits on my thread and at the same time was a wee bit disappointed when it died a natural death. At first I was annoyed when the *Denholm* *cowboys* hijacked my thread and moved in and used it as a buddy buddy thread. But low and behold they brought the thread to the front of the bulkcarrier section again. They even allowed me drop in the occasional bits on substandard ships but of course they are not interested.
> 
> They are responsible for having helped to raise the hits to *over 40000* now but I have found that you have to start a 'Argie Bargie' or a stirring session regularly to get them going to receive more hits. NoR, please do not leave this thread we ALL need you.
> 
> Alastair


Alastair,

Don't get too excited, your thread currently has 33,250 hits - you will need the help of us Denholm cowboys to get your total up to anywhere near 40k. 
This message is not classed in your 'Argie Bargie' category. (Thumb)


----------



## Gulpers

alastairrussell said:


> Way back I was quite happy getting *20000* hits on my thread and at the same time was a wee bit disappointed when it died a natural death. At first I was annoyed when the Denholm cowboys hijacked my thread and moved in and used it as a buddy buddy thread. But low and behold they brought the thread to the front of the bulkcarrier section again. They even allowed me drop in the occasional bits on substandard ships but of course they are not interested.
> 
> They are responsible for having helped to raise the hits to over *30000* now but I have found that you have to start a 'Argie Bargie' or a stirring session regularly to get them going to receive more hits. NoR, please do not leave this thread we ALL need you.
> 
> Alastair


Ah - you appear to have revised your figures Alastair! (Wave)


----------



## alastairrussell

Gulphers 

Your too too slow I changed it 4 minutes before loaded up your post. I was only testing you and you failed again!

Big bad Al


----------



## Gulpers

> *Gulphers*
> 
> Your too too slow I changed it 4 minutes before loaded up your post. I was only testing you and you failed again!
> 
> Big bad Al


At least I can spell your name correctly! B\)


----------



## Coastie

Coastie sits back, holding his belly and chuckles!B\)


----------



## Malky Glaister

I am glad to say that all the Denholm Cowboys did not have too many bulk carrier disasters for itemising in this thread.

regards

Malky


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> I am glad to say that all the Denholm Cowboys did not have too many bulk carrier disasters for itemising in this thread.
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


How right you are,
How right you are.
And certainly not the wet & dry specialists.
(Ouch)


----------



## alastairrussell

Gulpcsbers

Have you not noticed I am not the full quid. I always put in the weather report into any ones name when its extreme. I was working away on my computer in my hot office in a heat wave yesterday (40'C in the shade), even my faithful dog left my side and moved into the air-conditioned section of the house. You can see that csb (cool sea breeze) does not look good or fit in.

Malky

You should know that all the disasters happened after you passed your ships over to the new owners in a substandard state with no machinery records, log books and worst of all *no ships machinery manuals.* All this was carried out on Denholm management instructions. I do not blame the seagoing staff for this I blame LR as well as your management. 

BHP never did this and we engineers were proud of the hard work and care we took looking after ALL of our ships. We were of course maybe 'encouraged' into this outlook by our extremely left wing and bolshy crew who would jack up the ship up at a moments notice.
Anyway, some one told me that 5 tonne of paperwork was air freighted to London for the Parkgate court case.

The 60's were terrible times for British ships engineers. It started when the national service system finished and all the experienced 'professional' and experienced third engineers left the sea in a rush. No one wanted to go to sea then and the shipowners got desperate. They even hired me and I was/am blind in one eye. They were hiring junior engineers who had phony trade papers!

Conditions deteriorated when the shipowners with LR approval rushed to change their old wartime and post wartime motor ships over to burn the real cheap heavy oil without following all the brilliant UK marine engineer John Lamb's recommendations. I sailed on a B&W double acting opposed piston ship which was changed over to HO without enough fuel transfer pipework so the generators were being run on contaminated diesel oil!!! The main engines sometime (when the ship was trimmed level) used have real bad scavenge fires every day. The hours we juniors engineers spent in the sticking hot fumy purifier flat trying to keep the silly and stupid sharples purifiers running when they were only designed for DO!! In the late 60,'s heaps of the London companies ships were operating with dispensation second engineers. These were not good times. 

My first ship in 1962 was a Glasgow steamer so I did a year there with no promotion from 6/E (everyone wanted steam time). I then got a job on MANZ line freezer motor ship as 6/E engineer (15 month trip away from UK). I am sure I must have been the commodore 6/E for all of the UK MN then when I paid off.

Regards
Alastair

PS Its only 30'C here today


----------



## oldman 80

BUYER BEWARE.!!!!!!
No records - no purchase. It really is as simple as that, or should be.
But of course some buyers just don't want to know - the "Ostrich" type of buyer, and they frequently are the ones who should really know better in the first place.
If necessary pay extra for the records - and don't try doing it on the cheap !!
Don't bring your whinging in here - cuz you won't get much sympathy - not even if you should !!!


----------



## Malky Glaister

"" You should know that all the disasters happened after you passed your ships over to the new owners in a substandard state with no machinery records, log books and worst of all no ships machinery manuals. All this was carried out on Denholm management instructions. I do not blame the seagoing staff for this I blame LR as well as your management. "" quoted from Alistair's #450.

Now, having had to incinerate several tons of ships papers, for several different outfits. I recall that it was the lawyers that required this and not the Management teams. They issued the orders of course. I have been on the receiving end too on more than one occaision and I am not on my own there.
As Chief I made it MY business to hand over the current running hours so the new chap had something to work with. I also left reasonable hand over notes.
Disposal of the Instruction books is quite wrong and those are in effect ships fittings and fixtures (to borrow the expression from the pub trade). I would have left them onboard should I have been involved.
Denholm got their share of garbage tonnage, some pretty awful ships. I did 7 months on BERN for example.
As oldman80 said most of the new builds for DSM had a life expectancy of 8 years only. Well buyer beware as they say.

I sailed with many a fine thirds well into the seventies.
I agree with your comments on HFO and also John Lamb.

The dash to foreign flag sealed the Red Ensigns fate. It has gone and will not return.

Seems to me that most of your list of failures, Alistair, are third world tonnage.

regards

Malky


----------



## alastairrussell

Malky

With regard to your post 452.

Thanks for your input and I agree with most of what you say. Its that I just do not want what went on back then to be forgotten or brushed under the carpet by people like the 'oldman'. 

Their has been major improvements and corrections made by the international shipping organisations such as IMO and the International Classification Societies who are now supposed to be working as one. We must have all maritime organisations working to one standard and remember its not just Bulkies that were the problem. How long has the free surface effect problems been around on the RO-RO ships. There must be one standard for all !! 

We can't have LR having one standard for British ships and another for Australian ships. These days are now finished and shonky ship owners will not be able to dump their tired sub standard ships on third world countries. The Port State Inspections (not sure this is the right name) have put a stop to that?

I was chief on the Iron Sirius for a 2.5 year period when it had a bad name for long hours of work. She became the the Engineer super's 'bad boy ship' and was referred to as 'the prison ship' or the 'Iron Bastille'. When a new engineer came up the gangway the first question was “what have you done wrong” In the period I was there not one bad engineer came up that gangway, they were all top hands. I have now this theory that only good engineers with ability can afford to tell boss were to go!!!! 

I always handed over about two fullscap pages of notes when I went on leave and I did not mind being without the ME books as I was OK on the RD sulzer.

I am thinking its not the 'oldman's' job to put a time life on a big bulky. That's for other more highly qualified people who know what a FEA system is and they are usually employed by the builders and the classification society! His days are over!

Regards

Alastair


----------



## Malky Glaister

From what I recall, the shipbuilder and the owners made it clear that the new build O B O s had a useful working life of 8 years. I will not go into further details for obvious reasons. They would then be sold on. Oldman 80 and myself were standing by the construction of, in my case three of 6 and we were together on ship 2. Therefore it is not OLDMAN80's sole opinion.

I really have no idea what these class societies were up to. My job was to have all surveyable items ready for inspection and if the item was not upto scratch I pointed this out. I also was certificated top survey most items and to this end I was rigorous.
My brother in law is still active in sea going engineering in the Melbourne area and I have never heard him mention class.

Towards the end of my career I had to put up with damned awful ships, owners and the prats who came onboard to inspect this that and everything. My job appeared to be hide it or be sacked. sacked several times towards the end.
As I have said before glad to retire and never lost a work/ship mate during my time.
Denholms put hard workers on the poor ships. 12 hour days on the bulk liquid sulphur carriers for example. More on Clansman (2 trips for me!)

It is my considered opinion that all these OBO s should have been scrapped at 12 years of age but it couldn't happen.

regards

Malky


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> From what I recall, the shipbuilder and the owners made it clear that the new build O B O s had a useful working life of 8 years. I will not go into further details for obvious reasons. They would then be sold on. Oldman 80 and myself were standing by the construction of, in my case three of 6 and we were together on ship 2. Therefore it is not OLDMAN80's sole opinion.
> 
> I really have no idea what these class societies were up to. My job was to have all surveyable items ready for inspection and if the item was not upto scratch I pointed this out. I also was certificated top survey most items and to this end I was rigorous.
> My brother in law is still active in sea going engineering in the Melbourne area and I have never heard him mention class.
> 
> Towards the end of my career I had to put up with damned awful ships, owners and the prats who came onboard to inspect this that and everything. My job appeared to be hide it or be sacked. sacked several times towards the end.
> As I have said before glad to retire and never lost a work/ship mate during my time.
> Denholms put hard workers on the poor ships. 12 hour days on the bulk liquid sulphur carriers for example. More on Clansman (2 trips for me!)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It is my considered opinion that all these OBO s should have been scrapped at 12 years of age
> 
> 
> 
> but it couldn't happen.
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky
Click to expand...


Well blow me over - you are absolutely "right on the button again".
12 years max - it's time to get away from them or risk going to the bottom with them.
Of course, like all things, there are the odd exceptions, especially in cases where the effort had been made to hold them together, but sometimes that was not possible either. Even in those cases 15 years would be an absolutely maximum - not to be exceeded under any cir***stances.
These guys we are dealing with here do not understand ship management at all. When the owners are a tight bunch of penny pinching basta**rds then the managers are completely hung up.
The guy just has no idea - just a "whinger" of enormous proportion.
And a Loader of bullets, for someone else to fire, I suspect.

(Cloud)


----------



## duncs

This thread is brill, I got really great info, but I think you guys are going to implode! Re Derbyshire, gas bottles(butane stored focsle, blow torches), explosion! I,ve seen it happen.
keep slugging it out.


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> From what I recall, the shipbuilder and the owners made it clear that the new build O B O s had a useful working life of 8 years. I will not go into further details for obvious reasons. They would then be sold on. Oldman 80 and myself were standing by the construction of, in my case three of 6 and we were together on ship 2. Therefore it is not OLDMAN80's sole opinion.
> 
> I really have no idea what these class societies were up to. My job was to have all surveyable items ready for inspection and if the item was not upto scratch I pointed this out. I also was certificated top survey most items and to this end I was rigorous.
> My brother in law is still active in sea going engineering in the Melbourne area and I have never heard him mention class.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Towards the end of my career I had to put up with damned awful ships, owners and the prats who came onboard to inspect this that and everything. My job appeared to be hide it or be sacked. sacked several times towards the end.
> 
> 
> 
> As I have said before glad to retire and never lost a work/ship mate during my time.
> Denholms put hard workers on the poor ships. 12 hour days on the bulk liquid sulphur carriers for example. More on Clansman (2 trips for me!)
> 
> It is my considered opinion that all these OBO s should have been scrapped at 12 years of age but it couldn't happen.
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky
Click to expand...

Which company were you with then Malky ?
I do not doubt for one minute the validity of your comment.
Indeed,Right on the button - I bet.
This A. Russell guy - he really is the proverbial "twister" - be carefull - not that you have to be anymore. I just ignore him.
However I agreed with his comments on Lloyds - we at least benefited from DNV. Even Spoiled by them, maybe, in those early days.
Incidentally what did Scandia become when she was sold on - do you remember. ?
I had her for 3.5 years, and was destined for more had Fred Keddy not been taken ill on a H.K. ship - it was over to HK after that - intially supposedly "on Loan". What a nightmare !!!!
No comparison at all - just unbelievable - almost. The same sort of thing you are talking about - terrible owners - just shoking - shipping gangsters I'd say.
(Smoke)


----------



## John Cassels

Alistair ; ever sail on the Iron Cavalier ?.


----------



## Gulpers

oldman 80 said:


> Incidentally what did Scandia become when she was sold on - do you remember. ?


Here you go OM. 
She appears to have been broken up in India in November 2002. (Thumb)

Ship Name ABANT	
Ship-type Bulk/Oil Carrier (OBO)	
LR/IMO No. 7364132	
Gross 55,843
Call Sign TCHB	
Deadweight 105,550
Year of Built. 1974
Flag Turkey	
Status Broken Up
Operator Yildiz Deniz Tasimaciligi	
Shipbuilder Oresundsvarvet

1985-00 ABANT 
1974-04	Turkey 
1974-00	Scandia Team 
Originally Scandia Team


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Here you go OM.
> She appears to have been broken up in India in November 2002. (Thumb)
> 
> Ship Name ABANT
> Ship-type Bulk/Oil Carrier (OBO)
> LR/IMO No. 7364132
> Gross 55,843
> Call Sign TCHB
> Deadweight 105,550
> Year of Built. 1974
> Flag Turkey
> Status Broken Up
> Operator Yildiz Deniz Tasimaciligi
> Shipbuilder Oresundsvarvet
> 
> 1985-00	ABANT
> 
> 
> 
> 1974-04	Turkey
> 
> 
> 
> 1974-00	Scandia Team
> Originally Scandia Team
Click to expand...

OK Thanks for that Gulpers.
Something wrong with the bit in quotes.
ABANT in 1985 yes that fits perfectly.
She was under sales negotiation when I left her - nothing finalised though. Very much still Sea Team at that time. (Team Ship VI)
Broken up India - Yes that's what I had heard, but thought it was earlier than 2002. At least she got there - so many didn't.
I note it appears she changed her Classification Society to L.R. at some point.
As far as OBO's went, she was the best of the bunch 
That's when you tend to get a bit emotional about a particular ship, but they can't last for ever, as indeed neither can we.


----------



## alastairrussell

Malky

Mate, Buddy, China, we have a lot in common and I advise you to be careful with what you say in this thread. People may be watching what you say. Way back we had a few top hands contributing to this thread namely Jack Devaney from the USA and Captain Pierre Woinin from Belgium ( lemschout) and a Lloyds underwriter.

I too also worked ashore for a period but I had to give it away and I went back to sea with them as I could not put up with all the politics and union problems when working on the waterfront in Port Kembla. In 4 words ' Lack of Job Satisfaction' Yes, yes I married a very understanding wife. Malky If you are ever out in AUS visiting your sister please pop down to Paynesville on the Gippsland Lakes and we can have a chat.

Very Very basically, you have to realise that your shipping company accountants worked out a top financial shipping investment and that was to build a cheap and nasty bulk ship and then run into the ground over say a 5 year period and then sell it to an overseas shipping company so that they can over insure the run down ship and then send it to sea with some poor down trodden third world seamen so that they could drown themselves.

Surely, surely, you must realise that is not the right way of doing things! 

Regards
Alastair


----------



## Gulpers

Oldman 80,

Yes, I wondered about the Turkish reference in 1974. Seemed unlikely to me as well - possibly an error when originally put on database.

There is a possibility that she was broken up in 1997, in India, according to another source. (Thumb)

Just found attached photograph which will bring that lump back into your throat.


----------



## WilliamH

alastairrussell, your post 453.
I did two spells on the Chelsea Bridge Nov1970 until May 1972 with leave in-between. I was employed by Silver Line, but during my second spell the vessel was moved to Denholms management, though I stayed an employee of Silver Line. I found the main engine to be very reliable and never had any major breakdowns. The turbo alternator was an absolute dream, it ran from dry-docking to dry-docking. I admit it was a hard work for the engineers and the pumps, compressors and Caterpiller diesel alternators required a lot of attention, my hardest job was trying to get the managing companies to supply spare gear. One thing I do remember by sighting across the tops of the hold ventilators from my office window (I was CE), when the vessel was moving in 
moderate seas, the vessel could be seen to "rippling", this was quite alarming when I first saw it. For all this flexing of the hull I can't remember any cracks being found in the hull. I would be interested to know how old she was when she went for scrap.


----------



## alastairrussell

John or JC

With reference to your post 458

No john, it was before my time with BHP but I am pally with Dave Campbell who was C/E on one the first two motorships that BHP chartered ( the Clipper and the Cavilier). He used to be a follower of this thread. He was C/E of the Jolly Green giant called the 'Iron Somersby' for donkeys years and is now retired in Wollongong in NSW

regards Alastair


----------



## Gulpers

WilliamH said:


> I would be interested to know how old she was when she went for scrap.


Ship Name	IRON SIRIUS	
Ship-type	Bulk Carrier	
LR/IMO No.	6706670	
Gross	57,318
Call Sign	GVWE	
Deadweight	107,477
Year of Build	1967
Flag	United Kingdom	
Status	Broken Up China 07/1986
Shipbuilder	IHI - Aioi


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Oldman 80,
> 
> Yes, I wondered about the Turkish reference in 1974. Seemed unlikely to me as well - possibly an error when originally put on database.
> 
> There is a possibility that she was broken up in 1997, in India, according to another source. (Thumb)
> 
> Just found attached photograph which will bring that lump back into your throat.


Thank you so much for that photo, although she is not looking her best perhaps.
Taken in my time - I think - between the Horsburgh and Raffles heading for docking - I suspect ? That wire over the stem is the give away and that oily mess over the side near the gas barrier. - I think.
That ship worked a "miracle" - so she did.

And 1997 breakup sounds a bit nearer to what I heard once before - but I can't remember where from. 
All the best.


----------



## Gulpers

Did any of you guys sail with Jim Binnie from Fort William? Nice guy.
He was C/O on Nordic Crusader when I knew him and I believe he went from her to his first command on one of the SeaTeam ships ...... and did he take his bagpipes with him?


----------



## Malky Glaister

Alistair, Thanks for the invite. I will certainly keep it in mind. I do try to keep myself in order with my writings and agree with your words. Some others should really do the same. However no one is being careless with words as far as I can see.
I understand the economics of building ships to a certain degree. This applies to everything eg aircraft, road vehicles, rai vehicles etc. It may apply to infrastructure projects but with a much longer life expectancy.
The selling for further use of decrepit floating plant to inscruitable owners and crewed by hapless third world folk and perhaps under command of an also hapless UK national is to be condemned. 
We live in a rotten world, rotten from top to bottom but with a multitude of decent folk struggling to put things to right. An impossible job I am afraid as money talks.

Scandia Team.. Thanks Gulpers again for the info.

I stood by the building of this ship, the final one of the first batch.
She was different! All others were built in Gothenburg in the famous covered dock where ships gradually emerged from the building sheds stern first and then floated out. Scandia Team, yard number242 was launched in the conventional style and was therefore differently constructed both fore and aft to take the launch stresses. The main engine was built onboard rather than lifted in as a complete unit. Above were two very large I beams to facilitate the installation. These were left in situ as they were not to be used again. Otherwise only etail mods applied.
Another thing not genreally known was Arundels hull no 856 (?) not 857 as that was Anglia Team, was sold to SCINDIA to India and was called WHALCHAND (spelling?). Whereas we had several hundred defects notede she had less than 10! I have no idea how much fun they had on the maiden voyage.

happy days in Sweden I can tell you!!!

regards

m
Malky


----------



## Gulpers

Malky Glaister said:


> Alistair, Thanks for the invite. I will certainly keep it in mind. I do try to keep myself in order with my writings and agree with your words. Some others should really do the same. However no one is being careless with words as far as I can see.
> I understand the economics of building ships to a certain degree. This applies to everything eg aircraft, road vehicles, rai vehicles etc. It may apply to infrastructure projects but with a much longer life expectancy.
> The selling for further use of decrepit floating plant to inscruitable owners and crewed by hapless third world folk and perhaps under command of an also hapless UK national is to be condemned.
> We live in a rotten world, rotten from top to bottom but with a multitude of decent folk struggling to put things to right. An impossible job I am afraid as money talks.
> 
> Scandia Team.. Thanks Gulpers again for the info.
> 
> I stood by the building of this ship, the final one of the first batch.
> She was different! All others were built in Gothenburg in the famous covered dock where ships gradually emerged from the building sheds stern first and then floated out. Scandia Team, yard number242 was launched in the conventional style and was therefore differently constructed both fore and aft to take the launch stresses. The main engine was built onboard rather than lifted in as a complete unit. Above were two very large I beams to facilitate the installation. These were left in situ as they were not to be used again. Otherwise only etail mods applied.
> Another thing not genreally known was Arundels hull no 856 (?) not 857 as that was Anglia Team, was sold to SCINDIA to India and was called WHALCHAND (spelling?). Whereas we had several hundred defects notede she had less than 10! I have no idea how much fun they had on the maiden voyage.
> 
> happy days in Sweden I can tell you!!!
> 
> regards
> 
> m
> Malky


Malky,

Thank you very much for that interesting background. 
Those of us who knew of the vessels, but never sailed on them, (myself included) were probably under the impression that all the Team ships were churned out of the same sausage machine. (Thumb)


----------



## John Cassels

alastairrussell said:


> John or JC
> 
> With reference to your post 458
> 
> No john, it was before my time with BHP but I am pally with Dave Campbell who was C/E on one the first two motorships that BHP chartered ( the Clipper and the Cavilier). He used to be a follower of this thread. He was C/E of the Jolly Green giant called the 'Iron Somersby' for donkeys years and is now retired in Wollongong in NSW
> 
> regards Alastair


She was my 3rd. ship. Spent 16 months on her as apprentice - 1964.
Think BHP must have been reasonably pleased with her as don't
remember her breaking down much.


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Did any of you guys sail with Jim Binnie from Fort William? Nice guy.
> He was C/O on Nordic Crusader when I knew him and I believe he went from her to his first command on one of the SeaTeam ships ...... and did he take his bagpipes with him?


YES indeed I did sail with him, and I have just spent about an hour typing out some very interesting facts about another very fine gent, and his bagpipes - then when I went to go from preview to post - I lost it. Have you got it there by any chance ?
(Cloud)


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> Alistair, Thanks for the invite. I will certainly keep it in mind. I do try to keep myself in order with my writings and agree with your words. Some others should really do the same. However no one is being careless with words as far as I can see.
> I understand the economics of building ships to a certain degree. This applies to everything eg aircraft, road vehicles, rai vehicles etc. It may apply to infrastructure projects but with a much longer life expectancy.
> The selling for further use of decrepit floating plant to inscruitable owners and crewed by hapless third world folk and perhaps under command of an also hapless UK national is to be condemned.
> 
> 
> 
> We live in a rotten world, rotten from top to bottom but with a multitude of decent folk struggling to put things to right. An impossible job I am afraid as money talks.
> 
> 
> 
> Scandia Team.. Thanks Gulpers again for the info.
> 
> I stood by the building of this ship, the final one of the first batch.
> She was different! All others were built in Gothenburg in the famous covered dock where ships gradually emerged from the building sheds stern first and then floated out. Scandia Team, yard number242 was launched in the conventional style and was therefore differently constructed both fore and aft to take the launch stresses. The main engine was built onboard rather than lifted in as a complete unit. Above were two very large I beams to facilitate the installation. These were left in situ as they were not to be used again. Otherwise only etail mods applied.
> Another thing not genreally known was Arundels hull no 856 (?) not 857 as that was Anglia Team, was sold to SCINDIA to India and was called WHALCHAND (spelling?). Whereas we had several hundred defects notede she had less than 10! I have no idea how much fun they had on the maiden voyage.
> 
> happy days in Sweden I can tell you!!!
> 
> regards
> 
> m
> Malky
Click to expand...


Re the quote above:-
I am so proud of you Malky - you are so right.

Happy days indeed - but why don't you have a go at the quiz. ? I designed it for you !!!!!!!!!
I need to know the venue of our "concert house" - the one John Bull played at ? I can't remember the name. I was sure you would remember it.


----------



## Gulpers

oldman 80 said:


> YES indeed I did sail with him, and I have just spent about an hour typing out some very interesting facts about another very fine gent, and his bagpipes - then when I went to go from preview to post - I lost it. Have you got it there by any chance ?
> (Cloud)


Wow, that's spooky! (EEK)
No, I haven't received your message by some devious back door transmission. (Jester)

The same thing has happened to me in the past and as a precaution, if I am going to be writing a lengthy message, I compose it in Word then simply copy and paste it into the appropriate SN reply box.

I think it only happens if there is a glitch in the broadband connection, but it is infuriating. (Thumb)


----------



## Malky Glaister

John Bull played piano at the WHITE CORNER ! Songs of the sea and that! Our other venue was the BLUE PEACOCK or Mucky Duck.

The last ever Gotaverken engine went into Oresundvarvert # 243, mv A K Fenstrom. It was coupled to a KAMEWA CP prop. I spent much time watching this installation being done.

O BO 's were not what they were cracked up to be!

regards

Malky


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> John Bull played piano at the WHITE CORNER ! Songs of the sea and that! Our other venue was the BLUE PEACOCK or Mucky Duck.
> 
> The last ever Gotaverken engine went into Oresundvarvert # 243, mv A K Fenstrom. It was coupled to a KAMEWA CP prop. I spent much time watching this installation being done.
> 
> O BO 's were not what they were cracked up to be!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


*WHITE CORNER* - ok thanks for that - I had forgotten that name completely. As for the BP alias MD - well no one could ever forget that place !!!!
In the quiz I also asked what distinctive item of clothing did John Bull wear. The only other one I've ever seen was on the Telly - on a teenage Prince William - I reckon it suited him fine, but the fat guy was O.K. with it too.
I'll work out a way to give you some marks in the Quiz.(*))

Edit :- "*Last Gotaverken*" - that would be at Landskroner, would it not ? I never went there, just Arendal (and Kristiansand - after trials). Stood by Norvegia and Anglia, sailed on Anglia out of the yard with you, and later sailed on Anglia again, and Sevonia Twice also, then Scandia, she was undoubtably the best of the bunch, by far, small changes huge differences operationally. e.g. mc valves:- from seal on spiggot to seal on butterfly - that alone made an enormous difference.
For some reason her diesels didn't seem to perform so well as the Arendal ships, - the exhaust temps always apparently ran higher, therefore pumping slower on those two units. ????????????? No obvious reason. Have you any ideas on that one ?
Sad ending to good shipbuilders.


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Wow, that's spooky! (EEK)
> No, I haven't received your message by some devious back door transmission. (Jester)
> 
> The same thing has happened to me in the past and as a precaution, if I am going to be writing a lengthy message, I compose it in Word then simply copy and paste it into the appropriate SN reply box.
> 
> I think it only happens if there is a glitch in the broadband connection, but it is infuriating. (Thumb)


*Thanks for that* - I suppose I'll have to do it again - it was a cracker - full of international mystery and intrigue, kilts, bagpipes, and huge black waxy balls. (LSWR)
From Fort William you said - I believe he crossed the bar down in AYR. (this website - I think ) Another one too young - I reckon.


----------



## Gulpers

oldman 80 said:


> *Thanks for that* - I suppose I'll have to do it again - it was a cracker - full of international mystery and intrigue, kilts, bagpipes, and huge black waxy balls. (LSWR)
> From Fort William you said - I believe he crossed the bar down in AYR. (this website - I think ) Another one too young - I reckon.


Heavens no! That would be dreadful. 
Jim and his lovely family were originally from Glasgow and moved to Fort William. I spent a couple of very pleasant weekends with them in Fort William.
He had only started playing the pipes when he moved up the west coast and got immersed in the local 'culture.'

OM - sadly, you are right about Jim - I found the thread *here*. (Sad)


----------



## randcmackenzie

The last ever Gotaverken engine went into Oresundvarvert # 243, mv A K Fenstrom. It was coupled to a KAMEWA CP prop. I spent much time watching this installation being done.

regards

Malky[/QUOTE]

Hello Malky.

This ship went on to become Brostrom's Silverland and then became Friendly Carrier. I was on her in 1987.

She had a midships pumproom with 3 diesel driven pumps, floating skirt hatches, palatial quarters, and was as good as any OBO could be.

I did one trip on her after which she was sold to Lemos and became (I think) Thalassini Niki.

She ran like a watch, and was definitely a good OBO. The CP prop was designed, among other things, to enable her to run a shaft generator.

We only used it once in anger, as the main engine had to be on full rpm to operate it.

In common with most of the older Swedish OBOs she had sufficient Permanent Ballast to sail in almost all weathers without ballasting a hold - deeper double bottoms.


----------



## Malky Glaister

Hi Roddy,
I didn't think anyone would have heard of her. I saw her being launched.
I did wonder how the engine would behave. Not sure if she wasn't a ten cylinder.
Thanks for that !!!
seasons greetings

Malky


----------



## randcmackenzie

Malky Glaister said:


> From what I recall, the shipbuilder and the owners made it clear that the new build O B O s had a useful working life of 8 years. I will not go into further details for obvious reasons. They would then be sold on. Oldman 80 and myself were standing by the construction of, in my case three of 6 and we were together on ship 2. Therefore it is not OLDMAN80's sole opinion.
> 
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


Hello again Malky.

I did 3 x 4 month trips in Scandia Team in 1984/5. I went to London Team after that, as Scandia was sold during my leave to become Abant, reported scrapped in 2002 at 28 years old.

Scandia and London were 10/12 years old, and were getting a bit frayed here and there, but I don't remember any particular dramas, and only very minor fractures - One to an upper coffer dam, and the other to a shedding plate on top of the lower stool.

The main operational problem was shark mouthing of the cargo lines in the duct keel - solved by opening the VJ couplings at each end of the pipe, rolling it out, and replacing the short VJ with a long one which covered the hole. Quite a slick operation which could be done easily in a day.

London had some trouble with the jumper pipes to the heating coils fracturing underneath the main deck - it happened to most of them I believe.

London was sold to become Ifchor Tankers' Friendly Trader and retained Denholm crews but was managed by the owners. A very much superior arrangement! 

In their latter days in Denholm they were owned by Zenit, who cut operating costs to the bone, then realised they would have to improve them radically to have any hope of selling them.

We were told, in effect, to get this heap cleaned up, so we can sell it and put you out of a job!

Best regards.

RMcK


----------



## randcmackenzie

Malky Glaister said:


> Hi Roddy,
> I didn't think anyone would have heard of her. I saw her being launched.
> I did wonder how the engine would behave. Not sure if she wasn't a ten cylinder.
> Thanks for that !!!
> seasons greetings
> 
> Malky


Hello Again Malky, I didn't notice your post.

I'm pretty sure she was a 9 cylinder like all the others.

Best Regards,

Roddie.


----------



## Malky Glaister

Cheers Roddie,

I was out of Denholms in 1983, redundant following Cast collapse. Did 6 months on London Team and apart from # 3 having blown up before I got there the only problem was the steam heating jumpers in the stools and the deck steam lines all Yocalbro and impossible to weld, braze or what have you. Thistlebond!!
They were wel built ships

regards

Malky


----------



## David Campbell

John Cassels said:


> She was my 3rd. ship. Spent 16 months on her as apprentice - 1964.
> Think BHP must have been reasonably pleased with her as don't
> remember her breaking down much.


JC and Alastair. I joined Denholms as jun Ch.Eng. Naess Pioneer at Hamburg 7/2/62 then Ch. Eng Dunadd 25/5/62 then Ch. Eng Naess Clansman 2/10/62 then Ch. Eng Clarkforth 29/4/64 then Ch. Eng. Naess Clipper 7/9/64. Clipper taken over by BHP at Kobe Japan 26/11/64. Was on Naess Clipper until 1970, then Iron Endeavour 1971 and Iron Somersby at Belfast 7/12/71 until Iron Capricorn 1983 then Iron Shortland 1988, Retired 12/7/1993.

I had no real bother on any ship I was on, enjoyed them all, I could have been lucky. This thread has been an eye opener to me, but thanks to Alastair for starting it.


----------



## oldman 80

Gulpers said:


> Wow, that's spooky! (EEK)
> No, I haven't received your message by some devious back door transmission. (Jester)
> 
> The same thing has happened to me in the past and as a precaution, if I am going to be writing a lengthy message, I compose it in Word then simply copy and paste it into the appropriate SN reply box.
> 
> I think it only happens if there is a glitch in the broadband connection, but it is infuriating. (Thumb)


Thanks again - but I don't think there was a glitch in my bb connection at the time. Maybe though.
Could it by chance have been intercepted do you think.
I occassionally get a mysterious message stating that Windows has detected another web address using my computer - or words to that effect.
I have a photo of the message somewhere, so I will try and find it and post it on the internet forum - maybe someone will have an answer - it seems that on this site they often do.

As regards Jim Binnie, I now feel more determined to do it again, as I have a special kind of affinity with that man (perhaps not so much with the pipes though) and the "mystery and intrigue" includes, & extends to The White House, To meeting the first lady Rosylin pruning the roses, to coming within feet of the President himself on a particular Saturday afternoon in early 1980, a day which became as much a part of US History as did any other day - I suspect.
There was much going on in the White House that day - but up in the residence, not the oval office. The President looked ashen (when he came to the Rose garden to call the first lady in) - at least 10years older than when you saw him on the telly, but that was all sorted out by the "make up" people when he later addressed the nation on the telly that night.
And then on to The Capitol Hill, to the Washington Memorial, and to Arlingtons eternal flame with Bobby not far away.
A day I shall never forget, and one experienced only through the goodness and generosity of another very fine DSM Captain, now no longer with us, - and it is sad.
Now if that ain't Nostalgia - then I do not know what is .


----------



## alastairrussell

WilliamH

Thanks for all the info in your 463 post

The specs for Sigsilver which was the largest dry cargo ship in the world when she was commissioned were laid down by a very progressive Norwegian ship owning family called the Bergesens. Apparently Sig Bergesen's son's company who was having the rather 'overspecified' ship and engine built by the top ship builder IHI in Japan when he got into financial difficulties. Dad had to move in and he sold off the Sig Silver on the building blocks to Silver line of London. Silver line immediately tried to reduce the cost of the building of this rather unigue and very progressive ship by canceling the ER lift and other items !!!! 

From your post I now see why all our DNV required spare parts were all 2nd hand and worn out!

She was definitely built to the new 1966 Load Line convention and she did not appear to have any of the problems of the other ships built to the new 1966 specs. Yes, yes, she had a fo’c’s’le deck with heaps of 'beaut' electric hydraulic machinery to operate all the deck machinery. I remember the ford mast having a 1.3 tonne of hydraulic oil in the header tank fitted inside the mast.

William, I too loved that TA and we even put up with the water hammer when putting it on line when leaving port (our fault). We used to shut it down in port . We smashed one of the caterpillar crankshafts and then found out from the 'cat reps' that our torsional vibration dampers on both machines were well over their use by dates by as much as 20,000 hrs. After the both dampers were replaced, our cats rang like the proverbial singer sewing machines from then on both the electrical and diesel side. I really got to like caterpillar diesels after that as the spare parts are easily obtained and at a very reasonable price compared to UK diesels. They are definitely not like your shocking Paxman diesels.

I am of the view that there is two types of cracking in most ship structures, there are the localised ones from the stresses built into the ships during construction and then the main and bad ones which are generated from poor loading procedures and over stressing in heavy weather . Bulk carriers have a problem because of the stiffness created by the hatch coamings and this means that all the hull flexing has to be concentrated between the hatches.

No major hull welding should be carried out at sea especially on diesel ships (Too Too much vibration). When the weld is cooling down rapidly you do want any movement in the crack!!! The best thing you can do if this is not possible is to place the crack in total compression (metal to metal). Please note that most of the BHP trained marine engineers had welding certificates. 

I think the only hull failures on the Iron Sirius were all man made. There was a major failure in the flooded hold when she put sea from Port Kembla in ballast without the flooded hold being totally flooded. The wave action generated peeled the frames away from the outer shell. 

On another occasion I remember the DNV surveyor during a load line survey on the IS saying to the C/M “ I see you do not use all the extra cleats on the flooded hold hatch cover” The C/M face went red and the surveyor said “ Don't worry, Do not worry, no ship uses them all, but remember one thing if the ship sinks and we send a diver down and he reports that all the cleats have not been utilised you will be in trouble”. If I remember right that DNV surveyor was descended from Amundsen who was the first chappie to get to the south pole.

William I am thinking that BHP must have moved your office down aft to near the ER lift that they fitted. I only had a really small office with a wee poky window looking aft?

Great to hear from you

Alastair


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> Cheers Roddie,
> 
> I was out of Denholms in 1983, redundant following Cast collapse. Did 6 months on London Team and apart from # 3 having blown up before I got there the only problem was the steam heating jumpers in the stools and the deck steam lines all Yocalbro and impossible to weld, braze or what have you. Thistlebond!!
> They were wel built ships
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


It's me again Malky.
Your comment re London team - it seems to me she had not yet been "rotated" onto that USWC - Long beach - Vancouver- Pohang - Indonesia cycle.
A few trips on that run and she would have benefited immensely from the services of POMECO whilst in Pohang. The ship would have been flooded with welders, and all sorts - yocalbro all stripped out, any cracks repaired, glass flaking if required etc etc - but it was very hard work for ships staff also - there was cargo ops going on at same time.
Good quality workmanship at a very affordable price.
The run was terrible in the winter, but the repair/maintenance aspect of that cycle was very beneficial.
I was under the impression that all the cteam obo's were to be rotated to that run over time. Some may not have got scheduled on to it.
We converted Scandia to COW, 100% in Pohang, all by POMECO.


----------



## NoR

Excuse me for butting in, but what is 'yocalbro' ?


----------



## Malky Glaister

Yocalbro is an aluminium bronze alloy, sea water and corossion resistant but other wise NFG.

You have not butted in NoR at all!

regards

Malky


----------



## NoR

Malky Glaister said:


> Yocalbro is an aluminium bronze alloy, sea water and corossion resistant but other wise NFG.
> 
> You have not butted in NoR at all!
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky


Thanks, Using a material that cannot be repaired (even if it is corrosion resistant) doesn't seem like good idea. I wonder what made them do it?


----------



## oldman 80

Just look at it the wrong way, and it cracks.

Out it went - replaced by ms sched 80 pipe with sched 40 flanges.


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> Just look at it the wrong way, and it cracks.
> 
> Out it went - replaced by ms sched 80 pipe with sched 40 flanges.


I take it that is mild steel pipe with 80mm (inside ?) diameter with a 40mm flange ?

But what was the rational behind using Yocalbro, was it cheaper ?


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> I take it that is mild steel pipe with 80mm (inside ?) diameter with a 40mm flange ?
> 
> 
> 
> But what was the rational behind using Yocalbro, was it cheaper ?
Click to expand...

*No*. Sched 80 was a coding for wall thickness of pipe.
Sched 40 - flange thickness.

The rational behind it ? I have no idea - I suppose they thought it a good idea - just got it wrong thats all. It was thin, and lightweight.


----------



## NoR

> No. Sched 80 was a coding for wall thickness of pipe.


Ok found a link for it here.


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> *No*. Sched 80 was a coding for wall thickness of pipe.
> Sched 40 - flange thickness.
> 
> The rational behind it ? I have no idea - I suppose they thought it a good idea - just got it wrong thats all. It was thin, and lightweight.


Not cheap - I wouldn't think.


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> Ok found a link for it here.


Thank you for that.


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> Thank you so much for that photo, although she is not looking her best perhaps.
> Taken in my time - I think -
> 
> 
> 
> between the Horsburgh and Raffles heading for docking - I suspect ?
> 
> 
> 
> That wire over the stem is the give away and that oily mess over the side near the gas barrier. - I think.
> That ship worked a "miracle" - so she did.
> 
> And 1997 breakup sounds a bit nearer to what I heard once before - but I can't remember where from.
> All the best.
Click to expand...


But possibly it was taken South of Suez having just completed a transit, but I still think it is in Singapore Straits.
One thing for absolute certain is that it is post 1980.
If South of Suez it is likely to be 1984, in which case there is no excuse for that oily mess over the side down by the gas barrier.!!!!

Edit:- see #462.


----------



## Harry Grainger

Malky Glaister said:


> Yocalbro is an aluminium bronze alloy, sea water and corossion resistant but other wise NFG.
> 
> regards
> 
> Malky




Yorcalbro - an alloy produced by Yorkshire Alloys Ltd. originally patented in 1930 and patent lapsed in 2002 (Ask Jeeves)
Hence name YOR - York, C - copper, AL - aluminium, BRO - bronze.

Would have agreed that is was impossible to repair until drydock in North Shields on "Tor Caledonia" after her charter in the Falklands, and talking to a welder from small specialist welding firm from ??? (just south of South Shields). Easy- if you pre heat area with oxy acet heating torch and have second oxy acet torch and correct flux covered yorcalbro brazing rods, - he showed me back in their workshop. So basically I agree impossible to repair. Seemingly an excellent material when used in smaller heat exchanger tubes but when used in larger pipework ended up as nightmare and a great product for shareholders in Thistlebond !


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> It's me again Malky.
> Your comment re London team - it seems to me she had not yet been "rotated" onto that USWC - Long beach - Vancouver- Pohang - Indonesia cycle.
> A few trips on that run and she would have benefited immensely from the services of POMECO whilst in Pohang. The ship would have been flooded with welders, and all sorts - yocalbro all stripped out, any cracks repaired, glass flaking if required etc etc - but it was very hard work for ships staff also - there was cargo ops going on at same time.
> Good quality workmanship at a very affordable price.
> The run was terrible in the winter, but the repair/maintenance aspect of that cycle was very beneficial.
> I was under the impression that all the cteam obo's were to be rotated to that run over time. Some may not have got scheduled on to it.
> We converted Scandia to COW, 100% in Pohang, all by POMECO.



*I should have added - and all without a Superintendent in sight.
Sometimes it was so much better that way - not always, but quite often. *


----------



## oldman 80

Harry Grainger said:


> Yorcalbro - an alloy produced by Yorkshire Alloys Ltd. originally patented in 1930 and patent lapsed in 2002 (Ask Jeeves)
> Hence name YOR - York, C - copper, AL - aluminium, BRO - bronze.
> 
> Would have agreed that is was impossible to repair until drydock in North Shields on "Tor Caledonia" after her charter in the Falklands, and talking to a welder from small specialist welding firm from ??? (just south of South Shields). Easy- if you pre heat area with oxy acet heating torch and have second oxy acet torch and correct flux covered yorcalbro brazing rods, - he showed me back in their workshop. So basically I agree impossible to repair. Seemingly an excellent material when used in smaller heat exchanger tubes but when used in larger pipework ended up as nightmare and a great product for shareholders in Thistlebond !


I really don't give a stuff what it is - I don't want it on my ship.
And whilst I'm at it, you can take those damned gate "run down" valves, slops/#9, and change 'em for butterflies.
(Cloud)


----------



## alastairrussell

Has anyone got any ideas on how to access this new 'youbute' DNV source of info as it looks really good. I have tried and failed so I was thinking of contacting DNV and get down on my knees and pleading! Google 'Ships Superintendant's Manual --- DNV'.

*For Superintendents - By Superintendents *

_*The new, online version of Superintendent's Manual™ has just been launched. Superintendent’s Manual™ is a unique product offering best practices and up-to-date operational, technical and regulatory information to maritime players ranging from shipbuilders and training centres to professional ship managers.
*_
With reference to your problems with 'Youcalbro' did anyone do a proper analysis on the failures. Aluminium is used as a sacrificial anode on ships so I was wondering if electrolysis might have been the problem, especially on the outside if there was any inferior shipyard welding on the exterior of the pipework (seawater).

On the Iron Endeavour the ships engineers had to replace all the carbon steel hatch hydraulics lines at sea after 2 to 3 years. We replaced all the pipes, clamps and bolts with marine grade stainless steel (316). We used stainless steel ermeto couplings (no welding). 

We were very impressed with these couplings as they were fitted to our new J type Doxford main engine on the HP fuel injection lines. I often wonder how these SS hydraulic lines are now getting on lying at the bottom of the sea off Capetown. She was the first big bulkcarrier in AU and the AU DOT decided that our 4/E had to have a 2/E motor ticket back then.

Alastair


----------



## alastairrussell

I just had to get the number 500 post. Thank you Thank you *everyone *from the DSM.

Dave

Thanks for your support it is much appreciated. I see you are to get 43'C today so just sit back in the chair and watch the TV and don't go into the bush and put any fires out.

I have turned my fibreglass dinghy the right way up and filled it with waater. Meg and I have our engine room boots,white boilersuits and hard hats ready for action. When I run out of water in the dinghy putting the spot fires out we will pull the dinghy down the steep hill and row it into the Newlands backwater!! We have been inundated with Kookaburras high up in the trees and the noise is deafning in the morning and in the early night. I am sure these birds know something that we don't.

Regards

Alastair


----------



## Malky Glaister

All the best of luck Alistair!

You got 501 also! Reynolds tubing!!

regards

Malky


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> I really don't give a stuff what it is - I don't want it on my ship.
> And whilst I'm at it, you can take those damned gate "run down" valves, slops/#9, and change 'em for butterflies.
> (Cloud)


 And before some goof asks why - because we are loosing too many good engineers and Superintendents because of it.
And does anyone out there seriously think for one minute that Malky doesnt know what it is - God give me a break.

Because I could no longer live in my own home because of them - and whilst away my " housekeeper " became terrified as a result of them, and I lost her because of them ----- 

THESE SHIPS are special ships, they require specialist people - they are not just bulkers.
(Whaaa)


----------



## David Campbell

Alistair. Good luck to you and Meg. Hope you don't need the Dinghy. Dave.


----------



## Malky Glaister

Yocalbro deck steam pipes.

I got a frantic call from the wheelhouse whilst we were approaching some Gulf oil terminal. I was second, the ship London Team. A winch stop valve had disappeared into the heavens and a large amount of the deck steam line was nothing more than a length of scrap. I shut off the deck steam line and told the bridge to abort the berthing. What a mess!! Eventually got it all patched up and we berthed, loaded and left. A flexible piece of steam pipe was delivered passing some place. i believe this incident was the end of the road for this alloy piping. We were very lucky that no one was hurt or killed.
It was used on sea water pipes in the engineroom too and the welds leaked there.
Bad stuff altogether. With steel you knew what was happening and you could easily repair/renew as required.

Regards

Malky


----------



## alastairrussell

Thanks Dave 

I have been teaching the dog how swim today and she has a doggy life jacket. Meg asked "Were is my life jacket" I said "I don't know, you can swim and the dinghy has buoyancy tanks" Keep it quiet Dave, but I bought the dinghy real cheap with a crack in the hull big enough to really shame a tired old bulky. I of course fibre-glassed it up without DNV approval!!!

Thanks for your info Malky. If I remember right the upmarket Iron Sirius had Cupra Nickel or something similar sea water pipes in the ER and it may have been fitted through out the whole ship. We did not have any problems that I know about.

Malky, see below as it is from the DNV 'Superintendants Manual' website:

_*Purpose
*
Superintendent’s Manual™ is a knowledge hub for best practices in shipbuilding and ship operations, and provides up-to-date operational, technical and regulatory information for ship superintendents and other marine personnel.

*Benefits
*
A user-friendly tool which helps improve the quality and efficiency of daily work 

Facilitates the planning, contracting and building of safer and more cost-effective ships 

Describes inspection work and procedures with focus on technical details where errors and poor workmanship are frequent and where the consequences of uncorrected faults may be serious 

Contributes to increased safety and reduced costs 

Assists in more efficient cooperation within the individual shipping company and between the company and its business partners 

Increases expertise and contributes to proficiency in shipping and other marine companies

Renders practical and theoretical support to maritime educations, post-graduate courses, training academies, etc.

Reduces training costs.

*Features*

Detailed and comprehensive information related to operational procedures and technical matters, including descriptions of systems and components, checklists, forms and examples of practical solutions and precautions 

Built on DNV’s know-how and expertise, contributions from recognised shipping organisations, experienced superintendents and other marine personnel 

A company’s private “work space”, where individuals can store and colleagues can share information 

Excellent search functionality for quick access to content 

Supports direct access from mobile devices: http://mobile.superintendentsmanual.com 

A fully web-based service.

_


----------



## WilliamH

oldman 80 said:


> Just look at it the wrong way, and it cracks.
> 
> Out it went - replaced by ms sched 80 pipe with sched 40 flanges.


First time I have heard of sch 80 pipe being used for steam heating. Sch 40 pipe is cheaper to purchase, cheaper to install and more efficient at transferring the heat from the steam to the liquid in the tank.


----------



## WilliamH

Never heard of aluminium anodes being fitted to steel hulls of ships, only ever used zinc anodes on steel hulls. Aluminium anodes are used on aluminium alloy hull vessels but I don't think the ships we are talking about here had aluminium alloy hulls. I was referring to an earlier alastarrussell post, but I see now that the referrence to aluminium anodes has been edited out of that post.


----------



## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> First time I have heard of sch 80 pipe being used for steam heating. Sch 40 pipe is cheaper to purchase, cheaper to install and more efficient
> 
> 
> 
> at transferring the heat from the steam to the liquid in the tank
> 
> 
> 
> .
Click to expand...

That was not it's function on those ships (Sea Team)
They were "Jump Pipes" between steam channels in the stools.

Edit:- Insert word bulkhead before stools.


----------



## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Never heard of aluminium anodes being fitted to steel hulls of ships,
> 
> 
> 
> only ever used zinc anodes on steel hulls. Aluminium anodes are used on aluminium alloy hull vessels but I don't think the ships we are talking about here had aluminium alloy hulls.
Click to expand...

WHO said they were ?


----------



## WilliamH

oldman 80 said:


> WHO said they were ?


Alastairrussell, post 500


----------



## Tony Morris

WilliamH said:


> Alastairrussell, post 500


Just google aluminium anodes and you will find a lot about them being fitted to hulls. I have fitted many in ballast tanks.


----------



## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Alastairrussell, post 500


OK thanks for that.
I've got him on my "ignore list".


----------



## NoR

I'm enjoying this thread thanks to OM80 drawing me in with the Mt Erebus thing. BTW there is a really good 5 part do***entary by tvnz on _*YouTube here.*_
I met an ex P&O master in 1994 (I think) whose last ship had been an 'pre used' OBO which the co had bought. He told me that it was in such bad shape that he planned all the voyages to be as near land as possible. Apparently matters came to a head when the co wanted them to prepare the ship for an oil cargo, as I understand it he refused and retired slightly early. I'm sure he was not exaggerating and the whole thing sounded like a complete nightmare. Maybe someone knows what vessel this was?


----------



## Malky Glaister

NoR, P&O were involved with many such vessels, Anglo Nordic ones for example. The list will be lengthy. They also had many of their own. All would be wrecks after ten years or less in service.

Not much good info wise but P&O do have a web site containing details of all their ships. Might be worth looking at.

regards

Malky


----------



## alastairrussell

BHP found that many drydocking companies were supplying sub standard Zinc anodes that were not doing their job. They then decided to purchase and test their own anodes and to make sure that they were indeed fitted to their ships. Our job in the dry docking process was to ensure that they were in fact fitted to our ship and this included that the anti foulingh paint we supplied was also used on our ships . 

We had two sister ships one was fitted with normal anti fouling paint and the other the super douper self polishing paint to see if there was a financial advantages in fuel cost saving to use the self polishing paint. The cost of the standard paint job was about $50,000 as against $250,000 for the many coats of self polishing paint.

Alastair


----------



## alastairrussell

Why would anyone be so terrible stupid as to want to fit an aluminium anode onto an alumium hull that is floating in sea water? Of course the silly and stupid oldman 8000 who else?

Regards to all
Alastair


----------



## oldman 80

It would appear none of you took part in my quiz in the quiz forum of this site, entitled "A ship with a problem"?

I am copying and pasting one of my replies to one chap who condemned them outright (OBO'S) saying "A POX ON THEM", after I had mentioned a favourite OBO of mine:-

My reply was as follows:-

Copy and Paste. 

************************************************** *****


_
The basic OBO concept was quite good, but the trouble appeared to have been, they were never given the opportunity to evolve, to develope, to improve, as I personally believe they deserved.
The first generation were shocking, but the second generation, was very much improved, but a headache nevertheless.
However, considering a batch of 6 x *2nd Generation* sister ships built over a period of 12 months ( approx), the difference / improvement between No. 1 and No. 6 was enormous.
They were sister ships, but with very small changes, came very big improvements - in fact. 
All things are relative, one to another, so (my term) " *favourite* ", should not suprise you.
Sadly, even favourites begin to grow old, as indeed we do, age does weary them, and it is clear the years do condemn.
* Is it therefore, a pox on us too*, simpy because we grow old ?
No, I feel sure that was not (what you) meant at all.
Had the OBO evolved for a few more generations - then they should have become quite acceptable.
They would never have been "easy" ships though, as more work and thought, was required, compared with some other types of vessel.
I concluded the best way to neglect and abuse an OBO, was to use her as a tanker, for several voyages, and then change to Bulk. ( and vice versa of course.) They would suffer immensely from that, to the point that they may not recover.
On the other hand, alternate wet to dry every voyage, and they would not present so many problems. (ie use them in the way they were designed for.)
They required much in the way of routine maintenance, which translates to additional Manpower, - and they never really got that either.
Hauling sea water ballast from Europe to the Persian Gulf - never made much economic sense to me - but many ships did it, and I suppose, there are many that still do, despite the horrific fuel costs of today - let alone tomorrow._

End of Copy and Paste.

I believe to this day that with modern construction and *further developement of the Team Ship OBO's design *-- then they could become very usefull vessels indeed, perhaps even essential - looking ahead.
Twin hatches ie 1 hold Port/1 hold Stbd with a centre line Fore and Aft subdivision, and a double skin hull, would be the start of an OBO - "*fit for heaven*" in my view." 
They should not be condemned outright as they have appeared to have been, but rather they should be further developed and allowed to evolve.
BUT there is no place on an OBO for a lazy bast*rd, nor any so called professors, nor the likes. Good workers are required, which includes the Master and Chief Engineer - they have to pull their weight also, and so often in the past, they have not. 
Emoluments to officers and crew - well they are *three ships in one*, so wages should be at least double that of dry bulker only, or tanker only, sea staff. 
They are hard working ships and always will be - but why spend vast sums of money carting sea water ballast for half a vessels life. 
It doesn't make sense to me. Even less so looking forward.
They can be made to be good ships - but it will take excellent ships staff to operate them - Far above average - for sure.
Not rocket scientists - just sound rational, reasonable, ordinary guys - endowed with above average common sense, and of course willing and enthusiastic - which attribute will necessitate real recognition of an employers duty of care toward them.
Abuse and neglect them, and your OBO will soon fall apart, as indeed it should do, under such cir***stances.


Edit: To be classified by DNV only - I reckon.


----------



## oldseamerchant

oldman 80 said:


> Twin hatches ie 1 hold Port/1 hold Stbd with a centre line Fore and Aft subdivision, and a double skin hull, would be the start of an OBO - "*fit for heaven*" in my view."
> T.


Please expand for the less enlightened.(Smoke)


----------



## John Cassels

Nobody took part in your in your quiz ? , awh - maybe 'cos no one
was interested ?.


----------



## chadburn

Is there anybody on the Site who sailed on the Naess Parkgate in April 1968 when I believe she was the vessel I visited at the Botlek to have a look at a crack repair which was done with a Rivetted Doubler right across the Deck along with the strengthening of the Hatch coaming aft corner.
R651400, he's back!


----------



## Duncan112

I would agree entirely with OM's conjecture in #518 that the OBO (and indeed PROBO) design should have been allowed to develop, as with modern technologies and experiences most of the problems should be solvable - although the design of the ship now would probably bear the same resemblance to the original concept as the Wright Flyer bears to the A380.

Joking aside though, the main problem appears to have been the design and maintenance of the hatch sealing arrangements, with the short life of any elastomer subjected to this type of usage and cargo. Starting with a clean sheet I would be tempted by a purging labrynth type arrangement.

One thing is sure though, any class or Port State system would have to be quite ruthless in inspection and in the case of class withdrawal of the notation that enabled the carriage of liquid cargoes if the seal integrity was in doubt. As was alluded to earlier however, the problems really manifest themselves once the ship begins to age and is perhaps under its third or fourth owner who, shall we say, may not be as fastidious or technically competent as the original owner.


----------



## Doug Shaw

> Is there anybody on the Site who sailed on the Naess Parkgate in April 1968 when I believe she was the vessel I visited at the Botlek to have a look at a crack repair which was done with a Rivetted Doubler right across the Deck along with the strengthening of the Hatch coaming aft corner.


Didn't the Jersey Bridge also crack across the deck? I seem to recall that they brought her back to port with some kind of lashing around the neighbouring hatch combings. It would have been around 1968 or 1969.

Regards
Doug


----------



## oldman 80

oldseamerchant said:


> Please expand for the less enlightened.(Smoke)


Well I am a bit busy today but very briefly :-
Double Skin Hull should need no explanation/clarification at all.
C/L subdivision relates to *Free Surface* or rather the reduction or minimisation thereof.
As for the "heaven" bit - well just think - "free surface above",the potential consequences, the heavens then opening up, and a down pour of crude oil upon the surface of the earth.
I doubt even *Noah and his ark* could solve that one. !!!! 
Hope the foregoing gives you some idea what I meant.
(Gleam)

Edit:- Sorry about the brief response above. Bush Fires raging across Oz. Hell of a heatwave - maybe hotest ever in parts. Who says the climate aint changing. One wonders if it is not already too late - and we've actually already gone "over the edge." Floods over there - fires over here - It's "stuffed" I reckon.


----------



## oldseamerchant

oldman 80 said:


> Well I am a bit busy today but very briefly :-
> Double Skin Hull should need no explanation/clarification at all.
> C/L subdivision relates to *Free Surface* or rather the reduction or minimisation thereof.
> As for the "heaven" bit - well just think - "free surface above",the potential consequences, the heavens then opening up, and a down pour of crude oil upon the surface of the earth.
> I doubt even *Noah and his ark* could solve that one. !!!!
> Hope the foregoing gives you some idea what I meant.
> (Gleam)



Thanks for your response OM80. Well understood.


----------



## randcmackenzie

Doug Shaw said:


> Didn't the Jersey Bridge also crack across the deck? I seem to recall that they brought her back to port with some kind of lashing around the neighbouring hatch combings. It would have been around 1968 or 1969.
> 
> Regards
> Doug


I was on Jersey Bridge Aug 68 to May 69 and she hadn't cracked anywhere at that time.

It must have been late 69 onwards, and I think the crack made it from sheerstrake to sheerstrake.

I don't think the longitudinals went though, just the plating.

I do recall seeing/hearing that they used the mooring winch wires to try and hold her together, and that they did try drilling the deck.

I think she was in ballast, and had to return to port, where she was repaired.

She was renamed Oinoussian Mother and went on for several years afterwards.

Denholm News always carried a version of any incidents/accidents, and there was nothing particularly secretive about them.

This leads me to believe that this mythical 'secret grounding' allegedly suffered by the Parkgate is just that.

It would have been reported either by the Denholm News itself, or by some of the crew on board at the time, and I never heard about it, nor heard from anyone who had heard about it, though I sailed with several who were on her, and in fact visited her in drydock in Lisbon. Routine docking I may add.

From what I remember she had an uneventful life with Denholm from 1968 to 1978, broken by her year with BHP, who didn't get to grips with her and are still wondering why not. 

B/R


----------



## Malky Glaister

Roddy, I certainly never heard of any grounding of the Parkgate. Not everything was passed on of course but generally word would get round. A flooding would certainly have been well known. I think engine alignment could be easily fixed unless something was properly bent!

regards

Malky


----------



## alastairrussell

Malky and Roddy

Re your posts 526 and 527

All my knowledge on the Parkgate is rather second hand and you must realise that I am holding back on some of the stories that I have heard for obvious reasons. 

The scuttlebutt was that after the inspection of the Parkgate by BHP seagoing staff their combined opinion was charter the other ships but not her! I am thinking they must have been overruled by the BHP shore side wallahs.!!! Did someone mention Buyer Beware? 

Among all the other problems there was severe corrosion in the ballast tanks and in the ME piston cooling system (no water treatment). All the rotary exhaust valves were rooted. The misalignment of the ME to the tail shaft must have happened prior to the ER being flooded. Are you sure is was not the same event?. One of our C/E during the inspection spotted a hardwood peg in the ER side tailshaft telltail hole and it had been spray painted over after the ER flooding! He removed it and a lovely flow of sea water under pressure jetted out. This C/E then had heated words with your Super I am told.

After the big repair job in Singapore her first loading port was in South America and she had problems pumping out the ballast there and I believe a bulkhead in the ballasts tanks had given away.

regards 

Alastair


----------



## Malky Glaister

Myself and mostly likely Roddy are just saying that we and no one we knew in Denholm new about the Parkgate and her alleged troubles. She did not have a good name as far as engineers were concerned.
I did not care for RD Sulzers having had a couple of big flash fires to do with exhaust valve oil leaks.
Major troubles on ships very quickly got around the fleet when it was all looked after from Glasgow, not the case with Foreign flagged vessels however, managed from elswhere.
I never saw it, I wasn't there, you have no witnesses and you can't prove it!!!
Joking

regards

Malky


----------



## oldman 80

Malky Glaister said:


> Yocalbro deck steam pipes.
> 
> I got a frantic call from the wheelhouse whilst we were approaching some Gulf oil terminal. I was second, the ship London Team. A winch stop valve had disappeared into the heavens and a large amount of the deck steam line was nothing more than a length of scrap. I shut off the deck steam line and told the bridge to abort the berthing. What a mess!! Eventually got it all patched up and we berthed, loaded and left. A flexible piece of steam pipe was delivered passing some place. i believe this incident was the end of the road for this alloy piping. We were very lucky that no one was hurt or killed.
> It was used on sea water pipes in the engineroom too and the welds leaked there.
> Bad stuff altogether. With steel you knew what was happening and you could easily repair/renew as required.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Malky


(@)
* AND*, You could sure loose a lot of water very quickly when that happened.
Not a good thing up the Gulf - generally speaking.
Did it come down again ? (That which went into the heavens)
And where was the Chief ? (engineer)
Not even you can be in two places at once, although sometimes some thought that you could.

Sorry for the delay - can only manage a minute, at this time.
Fire precautions are taking preference today.


----------



## alastairrussell

Malky

Back then I didnt, but now I realise sitting here retired that I was really lucky to have gained experience sailing with all these weird and run down diesel engines in the 60's. I remember the sulzer rep always blamed Clark Sulzer for all our RD problems (what about the flame rings dropping in). When I got my second's motor ticket in 68, I was in great demand as all the liner companies seemed to be using heaps of dispensation 2/E then. With me having a ticket then I was then having trouble getting bloody leave! 

I was single then and addicted to sailboat racing, all I wanted to do was to work hard for say 9 months then go racing my own boat and also crewing on the big ones in the 3 summer months. I also used to do yacht deliveries around Scotland (all for free and via the Caledonia canal and Crinan canal). Sir James Millar was going to restore the coal burning steam up and downer clyde puffer the Vital Spark in Edinburgh and needed a volunteer engineer to bring her from Ayr round to Granton. Yes, we were to get free coal from the NCB anywhere in Scotland. It was September and I was skint and I had to get back to sea, I have always always regretted missing out on my wee trip on that 'clyde puffer'. Her name was changed to the 'Auld Reakie' ( the nick name for Edinburgh). I also declined a paying job as bosun engineer on the Aberdeen based sail training ship the Sir Robert Gordon. This was when the oil industry boom was just starting up there and I feel we both might have done alright if we had moved up there then. 

My system of resigning my job in late spring and finding another company in September was great but of course I used to get all the weird ships with the one off type tired ME burning HFO. The dispensation 2/E had to have previous sea time on the engine he was to sail with. I was young and nothing phased me and I gained one heap of experience doing the rounds of the various liner companies.

My favorite London ship owner will always be Furnace Ship Management when they owned a heap of other shipping companies. They were the only UK company that appreciated the hard work and effort that I put in and yes they even thanked me. In them days it was all 12 hours a day with us only doing 8 hours a day at the weekend. 

I was having a wee sit down in my cabin after breakfast and the old man knocked on my door and came in. He said “em'em' Second, what are you going to do about the C/E drinking habits” I said “ Captain I will do a deal with you, Could you possibly look after the chief and I will look after your engines as I just cannot do both” He turned round and left my cabin and never said a word. The C/E was actually alright but he had a real hard time during WW2 in the RN and was graded a war hero. The raid on the secret Norwegian heavy water plant (remember the movie). Every time I reported to him that I have a problem he used to lock himself in his cabin with two cases of beer. I was that stupid , I thought that alcholics only drank whisky and not beer! 

When I married Meg and we decided to settle in Aus I applied for a BHP job that was advertised in UK papers for motor men with tickets and experience. I went all the way down to London for an interview only to be blasted by the BHP London manager for telling porkies in the application form. You did not tell us your were blind in one eye, you cannot work in the steel works with only one eye. I said that I will be at sea, not in the steel works and I filled the form correctly as I have normal sight, I am not colour blind and I do not need glasses of any kind. He said I will put it through to the shipping office in Newcastle but you will not get a job I can tell you. I would not have minded but he was sitting there with one arm missing. I was thinking of asking him what kind of Kangaroo ripped his arm off but luckily I didn’t as they hired me.

I think it was BHP shipping reading my resume with all the Doxford, Sulzer and B&W experience. I went from 2/E to 4/E on the new Iron Endeavour with a J type doxford engine I got double the pay and double the leave and had no responsibility. It was like being on holiday I can tell you.

Regards 

Alastair


----------



## slick

All,
I have come across the phrase RBI (' Reduced Briquette Iron') and shipping problems?
Can anyone enlighten me please/

Yours aye,

slick


----------



## Malky Glaister

Alistair,
One thing for the Diamond D. You sure gained a lot of experience and not much mechanical phased me. The folk in charge AFTER Denholm did phase me. ******s abounded!
I just sorted a large problem with my coal fired boiler this morning that had scared other folk!
I enjoyed my sea career up until the last couple of years when I found it really was time to go!
Regarding your beer drinking Chief. When I was a junior on the smaller ore carriers many of the older Captains and Chiefs were alkies. No one bothered at all. The Mate ran the ship and the second the engines. Reason most of the seniors had been in WW2 and many torpedoed some more than once. They were shot away! A grateful shipping Company kept them going.
Such loyalty exists no more.

regards
Malky


----------



## alastairrussell

Slick

I am wee bit confused by your term RBI as I reckon it should be HBI. BHP B lost billions of dollars building such a plant in Port Hedland and I believe it has been shut down now. It was their worst investment ever and heads did roll!

They had a pelletised iron plant down in Whyalla for a heap of years. I am thinking it was alright as a cargo but you had to be careful walking along the deck during loading and discharge as it was like walking on ball bearings. We used to ship it up to Japan and bring iron ore fines back from Port Hedland to Port Kembla on the Iron Endeavour.

Try checking up in the IMO website See below

What is HBI? 

Hot Briquetted Iron (HBI) is a premium form of Direct Reduced Iron (DRI)* that has been compacted at a temperature greater than 650° C at time of compaction and has a density greater than 5000 kilograms per cubic meter (5000 kg/m3). 

*DRI is a metallic material produced from iron oxide fines or iron oxide pellets and/or lump ores that have been reduced (oxygen removed) without reaching the melting point of iron. 

Listed by IMO as: Direct Reduced Iron (A) Briquettes, hot-moulded 

International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code, which on 1 January 2011 supersedes the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code), 1994 Edition 

Description of HBI:
HBI is a premium quality, high density steel industry raw material containing 90-94% total iron (Fe) in a nearly pure form, which is used in electric arc furnace (EAF) and basic oxygen furnace (BOF) steelmaking, blast furnace (BF) ironmaking, and foundry applications.

HBI Advantages: 
•High bulk density of 2500-3300 kg/m3 (156-206 lbs/ft3).
•Known, consistent chemistry certified by the producer.
•Minimal (trace) amounts of undesirable chemical elements (Cu, Ni, Cr, Mo, Sn, Pb, and V).
•High thermal and electrical conductivity
•Low reactivity with fresh and sal****er (reoxidation).
•Resistant to degradation due to handling and weathering.
•Compatible with all bulk materials handling equipment.
•Safe, easy to store in all types of weather. 

† Gangue is oxides not in metallic form (i.e., SiO2, Al2O3, CaO, MgO, and MnO) that remain in the HBI and are removed in the iron or steelmaking process. 

‡ Residuals are undesirable chemical elements for steelmaking (i.e., Cu, Ni, Cr, Mo, Sn, Pb, and V)

Use of HBI Fact Sheets
Click on the following links for facts about the use of HBI in the electric arc furnace (EAF), in the blast furnace for ironmaking, and in the basic oxygen furnace (BOF).

How HBI Is Made

HBI is produced by any of several commercially proven direct reduction processes. The direct reduced iron (DRI) is compacted while hot but in a solid state in specially designed roller presses to create a dense, pillow-shaped metallic iron briquette. Click on the link below for a description of the various HBI production routes based on the Direct Reduction Fundamentals and Applications – Short Course presented by Roy Whipp, President of Whipp Technology, Inc.


----------



## John Cassels

Was on the Jersey Bridge as 2nd.mate in 1970. The fracturing across the
main deck - in way of one of the after hatch coamings - was common
knowlege on board. Master at the time was Neil ....... ( name escapes
me just now , will have to check through the Denholm mags ).
She had sailed from Rotterdam to USNH and put back to Rotterdam for
repair.
As mentioned before , was 3rd,mate on the Naess Talisman - sister to
Naess Parkgate in 1968 . She was a good ship , don't remember any
dramas.


----------



## John Cassels

Master was Neil MacIver.


----------



## oldman 80

oldseamerchant said:


> Thanks for your response OM80. Well understood.


Just qualified it (#524) - with an edit .(?HUH)


----------



## slick

Alistair,
Many thanks for the information on HBI (RBI?), one can never stop being enlightened.

Yours aye,

slick


----------



## chadburn

Doug Shaw said:


> Didn't the Jersey Bridge also crack across the deck? I seem to recall that they brought her back to port with some kind of lashing around the neighbouring hatch combings. It would have been around 1968 or 1969.
> 
> Regards
> Doug


You have got me thinking Doug, as the Furness Guarantee Chief took us on board (he was sailing with us) I made the assumption that she was a Furness built vessel which I do not believe the Jersey Bridge was, however, it may be that he knew a member of her Crew whilst he was at sea and the invitation came that way. The reason why I remember it was because we had been ashore to an Ike and Tina Turner Concert, dropped into the Katendrecht for a drink via a Dutch Taxi Driver and his rumbling American Ford V8 Galaxy. Looking at the photograph's of the superb model of the Jersey Bridge on this site it could have been her, but as you are aware in those day's these type's of vessel looked very similiar. Regard's


----------



## John Cassels

chadburn said:


> You have got me thinking Doug, as the Furness Guarantee Chief took us on board (he was sailing with us) I made the assumption that she was a Furness built vessel which I do not believe the Jersey Bridge was, however, it may be that he knew a member of her Crew whilst he was at sea and the invitation came that way. The reason why I remember it was because we had been ashore to an Ike and Tina Turner Concert, dropped into the Katendrecht for a drink via a Dutch Taxi Driver and his rumbling American Ford V8 Galaxy. Looking at the photograph's of the superb model of the Jersey Bridge on this site it could have been her, but as you are aware in those day's these type's of vessel looked very similiar. Regard's


Read my # 535.
Jersey Bridge was built at Scotstoun. Also think she wasn't too
similar to others. It's over 40 years ago since I was 2nd.mate on
her but there wern't many of her size around. She was a good 
looking ship and had a great 8 months on her.


----------



## randcmackenzie

John Cassels said:


> Read my # 535.
> Jersey Bridge was built at Scotstoun. Also think she wasn't too
> similar to others. It's over 40 years ago since I was 2nd.mate on
> her but there wern't many of her size around. She was a good
> looking ship and had a great 8 months on her.



Lithgows, John.

I did 8 months there too, round the world twice and a good trip.

Nice ship, good quarters, good squad.


----------



## oldman 80

WilliamH said:


> Alastairrussell, post 500



Ok thanks again - sorry about the delay in responding as I would have liked to but I have been dealing with other matters of higher preference at this time - bush fires and security matters. ( I might have picked up on it sooner had certain guys not been on my ignore list)

The use of aluminium anodes on the ships I served in was not adopted so far as I know. It was *always zinc* so far as I can remember.
Indeed I can never recall any reference to aluminium being used on any dry dock spec which came across my desk - and they all did.

For sure aluminium was used, but just when they started using it I do not know. 

I recall from when I was C/O on Eden Bridge back in 1974, when she was fairly new (Maybe 3 or 4 years old - I can't remember, but certainly before her first quadrennial - I'm almost certain). Her ballast tanks, DB's; Peaks; and TST's relied on anodes alone for protection, and there was something seriously wrong with the set up, which was causing much concern as she came toward her quadrennial. There was massive amounts of rusty scale in the tanks maybe as much as 2/3 ft in depth, yet there was virtually no deterioration whatsoever in the condition of the anodes - and there were many many of them. I don't know what they did about it when she dry docked, but I remember hearing some stories of them cutting holes in her bottom plating so they could remove the scale. It was that bad.
I cannot remember if that ship had been build with de-gauzing equipment - probably not - but it is a possibility, I suppose. However maybe the anodes were just a very bad batch - I don't know.


----------



## John Cassels

randcmackenzie said:


> Lithgows, John.
> 
> I did 8 months there too, round the world twice and a good trip.
> 
> Nice ship, good quarters, good squad.


You've a better memory than me Roddy. Yes , she was a fine 
ship. Another member of the Gourock navy was master -
Jock McVicar. Only small problem was that the 2nd,mates
room was right on the cross alleyway , a nuisance when trying
to get some shut eye in the evenings.
Another thing I do remember is that J.J.Norrie relieved me.
Remember him ?.


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> I cannot remember if that ship had been build with de-gauzing equipment - probably not - but it is a possibility, I suppose. However maybe the anodes were just a very bad batch - I don't know.


De-gauzing ? That's a new one.
You don't mean 'Degaussing' by any chance ?


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> De-gauzing ? That's a new one.
> You don't mean 'Degaussing' by any chance ?


Thats it - spelling again !!!!!!!!!
In too much of a hurry this morning - perhaps


----------



## NoR

R651400 said:


> Don't think etymological correctness is the question here.
> Degaussing used against magnetic mines during WW2 most of us know but where does it feature in anti-corrosion issues on bulk carriers?


Bulk carriers of the generation under discussion would almost certainly not be fitted with degaussing equipment.

Whilst on the subject. I've heard of RFAs and RN ships with valves which were either made of bronze or had bronze components deteriorating as they electrolytically deposited themselves on the hull.


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> Don't think etymological correctness is the question here.
> Degaussing used against magnetic mines during WW2 most of us know but where does it feature in anti-corrosion issues on bulk carriers?



(Applause)
Now that is a very good question to ask.
I rather hoped someone might !!!!
Now think about it - and think about anodes and how they are supposed to work.
I don't know the answers for sure - but I'm fairly sure someone will.
In fact I've seen it mentioned somewhere before.

Edit. "_*Mentioned somewhere before*_" - not on the net, but back in the 1970's, and on paper. Some journal or another.


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> Bulk carriers of the generation under discussion
> 
> 
> 
> would almost certainly not be fitted with degaussing equipment.
> 
> 
> 
> Whilst on the subject. I've heard of RFAs and RN ships with valves which were either made of bronze or had bronze components deteriorating as they electrolytically deposited themselves on the hull.
Click to expand...

I'm inclined to agree - but that was made pretty obvious in my initial statement. (#542)
I cannot remember.
It was only a few years before she was built, that Ben Line was still having it included in their new buildings. It was always *ON* crossing the North Sea - but they remembered to turn it *OFF*, when it definately was no longer required. ?????????????
I was lead to believe it's inclusion in new buildings was a result of government encouragement and financial subsidy.
I suppose, we still had not forgotten - you see.
(Gleam)

Edit:- Just an afterthought, - but any answers/ideas/views etc., etc., should be submitted in the context of the situation explained in #542.


----------



## chadburn

The fitting of the degaussing was stopped and replaced by an ex- Inshore Minesweeper that use to come alongside and electrically "wipe" the Hull.


----------



## NoR

oldman 80 said:


> (Applause)
> Now that is a very good question to ask.
> I rather hoped someone might !!!!
> Now think about it - and think about anodes and how they are supposed to work.
> I don't know the answers for sure - but I'm fairly sure someone will.
> In fact I've seen it mentioned somewhere before.
> 
> Edit. "_*Mentioned somewhere before*_" - not on the net, but back in the 1970's, and on paper. Some journal or another.


Actually it's more of a spelling issue.


----------



## oldman 80

chadburn said:


> The fitting of the degaussing was stopped and replaced by an ex- Inshore Minesweeper that use to come alongside and electrically "wipe" the Hull.


Thanks for that Geordie Chief.
Don't quite understand that process though - how long would it last etc etc. ?

Would that process have been effective in the case of #542 ? (_If a degaussing effect had any part in the vessel being eaten away,down below.)
_
Can you recall when fitting degaussing was stopped, and who stopped it ?


(_I think the yanks call it degauzing, but I could be wrong_)
(Pint)


----------



## oldman 80

oldman 80 said:


> (Applause)
> Now that is a very good question to ask.
> I rather hoped someone might !!!!
> Now think about it - and think about anodes and how they are supposed to work.
> I don't know the answers for sure - but I'm fairly sure someone will.
> In fact I've seen it mentioned somewhere before.
> 
> Edit. "_*Mentioned somewhere before*_" - not on the net, but back in the 1970's, and on paper. Some journal or another.


someone has suggested it is a spelling issue - but I am not so sure that it is.
Don't forget, - "within the context of #542"

Edit: For clarity purposes I have just added some colour to #542


----------



## Cisco

oldman 80 said:


> Can you recall when fitting degaussing was stopped, and who stopped it ?
> 
> 
> (_I think the yanks call it degauzing, but I could be wrong_)
> (Pint)


Nope they call it http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/degaussing.htm

Only ships I sailed on that had the kit -which ran through the 'tween decks - were a series of cargo liners built around the mid 50's. They also had deck strengthening here and there for armament... not paid for by the ship owner I'm sure.
Newer ships in the company had no such gear. Didn't sail on any of their older tonnage.
It was never used... off the dutch/german coast you kept to the swept channels... nada mas.

I think there was a zillion dollars worth of copper in the coils.


----------



## chadburn

What happened was that they wrapped electric cables around the Hull and then "zapped" it with an electric charge from the ex-Minesweeper which when built as a Minesweeper had a large impulse genny already fitted, not sure how long it lasted before a re-boot. 
Not heard of the effect's you mention but it is possible.
The fitting of the old system stopped after the War, I cannot remember any being fitted to ship's built at Smith's in the 1950's.
I can understand switching the old system on going across the North Sea Post War as vessel's hit old Mine's on a regular basis.
The vessel's that were treated were usually those that were subject to a Grant and also subject to STUFT.


----------



## chadburn

Don't think so R, zinc anodes were used in the first Boiler's when they used salt water to make and condense steam, then into Fresh Water Boiler's but died out when the chemical concoction's came into use. The D.G. was to prevent the "magnetic attraction" of Mines but did not seem to protect the vessel from hitting other ship's or the putty.

Just want to make a comment in regard's to a previous comment about the Derbyshire Forum and what happened; it became obvious to some of us that there was something amiss with some of the odd comment's being made by certain contributor's and their praise for A.N Other's alleged "Safety Invention" of a Hatch with a Latch which in his view would have possibly saved the unfortunate Derbyshire. Just looking at his design it was obvious that it was a nonsense but the undying support of the same contributor's made strange reading as well as being frustrating. Comment's were made which eventually led to the "smoking out" of A.N.Other and his use of numerous "sock puppet's".


----------



## Malky Glaister

I recall deguassing gear on I think Denholms Dunadd and Wellpark. The switch gearwas there but all the rest had been liberated.
There were still plenty of mines a round in the late sixties off Ska and into the Baltic.
I too seem to recall the term, de-guassing, being used in corrosion protection somwhere, but I think it was something that suffered in translation, possibly SWEDISH to ENGLISH. I may well be wrong with the mists of time not helping!!
regards
Malky


----------



## NoR

Ships were steamed through a degaussing range to measure their magnetic signature which was then compensated using the degaussing coils installed on the vessel. 
There was a degaussing range at Portland we went through when I was on the Regent 1968.


----------



## tzinieres

Trinity House vessels had Degaussing gear,there was a range at Plymouth.


----------



## Malky Glaister

After some further reflection.
I seem to recall that the instructions for operating the hulls CATHODIC PROTECTION on some Swedish built OBO carriers mentioned the term de-gaussing. Cathodic protection here was an impressed electrical current which reduced electrolytic corrossion. It had to be switched off at oil ports!!
Now whether this impressed current system was termed de-gaussing in technical Swedish I cannot recall. 
It may well have, however, interfered with an operating de-gaussing system.

It was definately mentioned in the operating instructions!! Out of date possibly, well we all are!!

regards

Malky


----------



## Tom S

As a Cadet in Ben Line in the late fifties the coastal passage between Rotterdam was still heavily mined and you were restricted to sailing along a cleared mine free passage some of the older vessels like the Benmhor were still fitted with degaussing gear and this was used during coastal passages. I remember the degaussing vessel I think she was called the Flinders cleaning the ship in the Royal Docks they wrapped cables round the ship and changed the magnetic signature In later years I sailed on a couple of vessels that used the degaussing principle for catholic protection one was the Vancouver Island it was never used much as some people were sensitive to the noise the signal produced and it could be quite uncomfortable for them also you had to switch it off in Port
Tom


----------



## Duncan112

As regards when degaussing gear was last fitted Meadowbank built 1973 and British Dart built 1972 were equipped - certainly Admiralty money was involved with the Dart. 

I must admit however that I am somewhat puzzled as to the anti corrosive effect of degaussing equipment?


----------



## NoR

Tom S said:


> As a Cadet in Ben Line in the late fifties the coastal passage between Rotterdam was still heavily mined and you were restricted to sailing along a cleared mine free passage some of the older vessels like the Benmhor were still fitted with degaussing gear and this was used during coastal passages. I remember the degaussing vessel I think she was called the Flinders cleaning the ship in the Royal Docks they wrapped cables round the ship and changed the magnetic signature In later years I sailed on a couple of vessels that used the degaussing principle for catholic protection one was the Vancouver Island it was never used much as some people were sensitive to the noise the signal produced and it could be quite uncomfortable for them also you had to switch it off in Port
> Tom


What effect did it have on the compass, did you have to be re swung.


----------



## John Cassels

Your right Malky , all the Denholm ore carriers I was on ( 7 in total)
had degaussing gear just under the bulwark angle.


----------



## Tom S

NoR said:


> What effect did it have on the compass, did you have to be re swung.


When the ship was swept clean in London we had to swing and renew the compass card. As for the Cathodic Protection system it was a Wilson Walton system similar to the ones they use on rigs .Its such a long time ago I can't honestly remember I am sure it was such a low voltage it didn't change the ships magnetic signature. 
Tom


----------



## Gulpers

Nordic Crusader was fitted with Impressed Current Cathodic Protection which I recall always had to be switched off in port as Tom S has described. (Thumb)


----------



## chadburn

Now there's a name I remember well, Wilson Walton and the Boss Captain Downes who lived in a former WW2 Bunker which had walls 4ft thick and the largest underground wine cellar certainly in the North of England. Bit of a Pirate the Captain, he had the maintenance contract's for the majority of the Oil Rig's in the North Sea. In the end he needed to "retire" to his Bunker when he received a lot of flak much of it of his own making.


----------



## oldman 80

Duncan112 said:


> As regards when degaussing gear was last fitted Meadowbank built 1973 and British Dart built 1972 were equipped - certainly Admiralty money was involved with the Dart.
> 
> I must admit however that I am somewhat puzzled as to the anti corrosive effect of degaussing equipment?


Now that is a post I was looking for/ hoping to extract from someone.
The references to British Ships and 1972 / 1973 along with government money.
1972/1973 indicates that the government was still subsidising the installation of degaussing on selected British Merchant Vessels. It is therefore possible they subsidised it's installation on Eden Bridge which must have been built/delivered to British owners around 1970.
It would appear logical that a possible return to wartime conditions, would require consideration of every possible measure to ensure the U.K. stood a good chance of being able to maintain it's supplies not only of oil, but iron ore (for steel making), even coal (although UK had its own supplies) and perhaps more importantly grain. THAT IS VERY MUCH O.B.O. WORK, so I imagine there is a good possibility that maybe Eden Bridge was so fitted. It is only a possibility though - my memory does not allow me to confirm it.
The significant point which I was trying to extract from the real knowledgable blokes who contribute to this forum and which I am sure the "discussion paper" (previously mentioned) I read in some journal back in the 1970's (late I believe) was pointing at, is that if a vessel relies solely on anodes for cathodic protection in her ballast tanks, what would be the effect of activating a degaussing system in such cases ?
What I mean is, could the activation of a degaussing system cause the cathodic protection system to completely break down, or even be reversed, causing the steel to waste away and not the anodes.
*It's just a thought*, but for some reason or another that was obviously what had been going on on Eden Bridge - for some reason or another.
It would be good if some of the expert contributors to this site, could give us their views on that potential/possibility.
Who knows, maybe even the Derbyshire had it fitted.
If people just will not go into DB's to inspect them on a much more regular basis (ie the lazy & boozey fraternity) then such deteriorations won't be discovered perhaps until it is too late.
How they eventually resolved Eden Bridges problem - I don't know, but as I stated before there was no way I'd ever have returned to either her or Spey Bridge, and Head Office new it, so they never tried to dump me on those Clerkson's OBO' s again. Sea Team OBO's were a different kettle of fish entirely, besides I had stood by two of them whilst building, (The first two only). 
Malky sailed with the second one along with me, after which he returned to the Builders yard carrying the knowledge of the experiences of the maiden voyage of ship #2 and no doubt contributed to an emmense improvement by the time they got around to building Scandia Team.
I didn't go back to the yard, I was sent to two Clerkson's OBO's to try to sort their problems out, or at least more clearly identify them.
What I saw, I did not like at all, and therefore would not have returned to them under any cir***stances - but at least I had a damned good look at them and did what it was possible to do - i.e. a lot of detailed internal inspection.
(Nobody liked doing that - who could blame them ? - neither did I really, - but it had to be done by someone).
That's what DSM required of me - That's what I did.
_I suppose it was one of the reasons I was not "passed over" for command. In those days they were not fools in Head Office, far from it in fact. _
Indeed, I was not deemed to be a lazy drunken bast**d, - like some were, - by the "real brains", back in Head Office.


----------



## Tom S

During the eighties I held a fairly senior position in the UK Governments Port Emergency Organisation . The purpose of this organisation was to develop plans for emergency cargo handling centres around the UK. It was assumed that the major ports in my area would be wiped out in the event of an enemy attack. To this end and emergency temporary Port would be created . It was quite a fascinating concept and involved the use of a number of BP Tankers ,these tankers had been built with certain extras financed by the Government extras such as additional deck strengthening and as previously mentioned degaussing equipment.At this time the UK government still had a financial stake in BP. Anyway to cut a long story short th designated Tanker would be brought into the designated area moored and set up as a Mother Ship.A gantry type crane would be erected on deck and used for cargo handling. It sounds far fetched but I can assure you it is fact and if I were in a position to explain the whole operation you would see why it would have worked. Grain would have arrived by medium sized geared bulk carriers and barges would be an essential part of the operation. OBO ships would not have been used too big to deep and no cargo handling gear.


----------



## Tom S

Also during the eighties after a number of serious incidents and in agreement with BP we banned OBO,s from loading at the Hound Point Terminal. The final incident was an OBO that was inertng prior to loading when a major explosion occurred and a couple of very large hatch covers landed in the murky depths of the river.
Tom


----------



## Duncan112

Tom - thanks - I'm now beginning to see why certain structural features were on BP's "River Class" - some apparently used in the Falklands campaign - others no one knew the purpose of and put down to Naval Architects foibles. 

Knowing what I know now there are a large number of ships (that I probably use for shaving every morning) that I would like to go back to and look around again with hindsight!!

OM - just a thought re anodes but when we changed them at sea it was a case of unbolting the old ones (or burning off) and attach the new ones - I remember pointy bolts that allegedly penetrated coatings and rust to make a good electrical connection but this was never (in my experience) checked for continuity. Currently I am involved in owners inspections on sub sea christmas trees and one of the tests that we witness is electrical continuity between the zinc anode and the bar the anode is cast to and the anode to the tree frame - is it possible that the electrical continuity was unsatisfactory in some of the ships that suffered excessive corrosion?


----------



## chadburn

Tom, are you writing about a Military Position (NCSO/NOIC) or a civilian one. In regard's to Grant's and Future possible use on STUFT work for the Military by Merchant Vessel's those Grant's went on into the 1970's. The early MFC vessel's were built with a Grant from the Israeli Government and had various modification's, when it came to the building of the Drammen "Clipper" Class they were also built with a Grant from the British Government much to J. Prescott's annoyance as it was not spelt out as to which Goverment would benefit from the strategic importance of the vessel's. Having not served on the "Clipper's" (Sulzer's) I am unaware as to whether they had any modification's barring for their speed which was important to be able to run as independent's.


----------



## Tom S

chadburn said:


> Tom, are you writing about a Military Position (NCSO/NOIC) or a civilian one. In regard's to Grant's and Future possible use on STUFT work for the Military by Merchant Vessel's those Grant's went on into the 1970's. The early MFC vessel's were built with a Grant from the Israeli Government and had various modification's, when it came to the building of the Drammen "Clipper" Class they were also built with a Grant from the British Government much to J. Prescott's annoyance as it was not spelt out as to which Goverment would benefit from the strategic importance of the vessel's. Having not served on the "Clipper's" (Sulzer's) I am unaware as to whether they had any modification's barring for their speed which was important to be able to run as independent's.


Chad burn
Sorry not familiar with your terminology. The modifications were financed by the Government during building. In the event of the plan being put into action it would have been under the control of the Military. Sorry cant be more helpful
Tom


----------



## chadburn

As you are obviously aware Tom all Port's would come under Naval Control (NOIC) Naval Officer In Charge, he and his combined Staff from other Organization's both Military and Civilian would run the Port. Port's were graded as to their importance and measure's both onshore and offshore were put in place for the most important, clearly the work you describe would make the Port a Class A (the highest grading)


----------



## Tom S

chadburn said:


> As you are obviously aware Tom all Port's would come under Naval Control (NOIC) Naval Officer In Charge, he and his combined Staff from other Organization's both Military and Civilian would run the Port. Port's were graded as to their importance and measure's both onshore and offshore were put in place for the most important, clearly the work you describe would make the Port a Class A (the highest grading)


Chadburn
You are correct in saying Military i put all three services under the one umbrella but obviously the port would come under Naval Control in my case FOSNI from his bunker at Pitreavie Castle and as you say it would have been a Class A Port. 
Tom


----------



## oldman 80

R651400 said:


> On Blue Funnel's Adrastus called at Portland circa 1959 to load torpedoes for the Indonesian navy.
> The "dockers" were cons doing time at the local Portland nick and I do recall we were also degaussed at the facility previously mentioned.
> I cannot see where this was intended as an anti corrosion measure and I've still to read on this thread that degaussing is actually connected in any way to corrosion.
> What I have read is OBO's/bulkers or whatever you care to call them after five years use come close to pre Plimsoll coffin ships!


In 1959, the time you are talking about, parts of Indonesian Waters were still heavily mined, so no doubt your DG was in use.
By 1980 most of the mined areas had been cleared, but not all.


----------



## oldman 80

NoR said:


> What effect did it have on the compass, did you have to be re swung.


 
It did effect the magnetic compass but it was no problem. When ships were swung for determining deviation, it was done twice, at the same time. One swing DG ON and the other swing DG off. Two deviation cards were drawn up, One for *DG ON* the other for *DG OFF.*
On some ships, a special coil was fitted to the binnacle, which was connected to the DG system, and was activated with it. That coil was
supposed to neutralise the effects of activating the DG system, or at least minimise the effects of it.


----------



## oldman 80

Tom S said:


> As a Cadet in Ben Line in the late fifties the coastal passage between Rotterdam was still heavily mined and you were restricted to sailing along a cleared mine free passage some of the older vessels like the Benmhor were still fitted with degaussing gear and this was used during coastal passages. I remember the degaussing vessel I think she was called the Flinders cleaning the ship in the Royal Docks they wrapped cables round the ship and changed the magnetic signature In later years I sailed on a couple of vessels that used the degaussing principle for catholic protection one was the Vancouver Island it was never used much as some people were sensitive to the noise the signal produced and it could be quite uncomfortable for them also you had to switch it off in Port
> Tom


New ones too Tom. eg Benarty was built with it 1963. Government subsidy.

Edit: My memory is a bit shaky with this one, but I'm fairly sure Benarmin had it as well, she was built some 3 maybe 4 years after Benarty.


----------



## oldman 80

Tom S said:


> Also during the eighties after a number of serious incidents and in agreement with BP we banned OBO,s from loading at the Hound Point Terminal. The final incident was an OBO that was inserting prior to loading when a major explosion occurred and a couple of very large hatch covers landed in the murky depths of the river.
> Tom


(Whaaa) I think you mean "inerting".
My OBO had a fairly large oil spill at Hound Point in the early 1980's.
It occured because the shore personnel did not stick to the *agreed and signed for loading plan.*
*They blatently disregarded it in fact.*
Fortunately I was actually on the jetty when the gusher occurred.
Although I got covered in crude, I was able to view the log compiled by the guy on the jetty. It was all there in black and white - no question about it.

Of course they initially tried to blame the ship - *but that is one time it didn't work.
*Bloody mess so it was, she was a *beautifull orange and grey, with some cream,* - then suddenly she was *black all over.
*I should have sent them the bill for my new uniform. !!!!!


_In addition, you were lucky it was only hatch covers that were blown off the ship - had it been a VLCC it might well have been much worse, the whole tank deck even - perhaps.l_


----------



## Tom S

oldman 80 said:


> (Whaaa) I think you mean "inerting".
> My OBO had a fairly large oil spill at Hound Point in the early 1980's.
> It occured because the shore personnel did not stick to the *agreed and signed for loading plan.*
> *They blatently disregarded it in fact.*
> Fortunately I was actually on the jetty when the gusher occurred.
> Although I got covered in crude, I was able to view the log compiled by the guy on the jetty. It was all there in black and white - no question about it.
> 
> Of course they initially tried to blame the ship - *but that is one time it didn't work.
> *Bloody mess so it was, she was a *beautifull orange and grey, with some cream,* - then suddenly she was *black all over.
> *I should have sent them the bill for my new uniform. !!!!!
> 
> 
> _In addition, you were lucky it was only hatch covers that were blown off the ship - had it been a VLCC it might well have been much worse, the whole tank deck even - perhaps.l_


Spelling mistake corrected my spellchecker has a habit of putting in what it thinks the word should be.
Going back to the ban on OBO,at Hound Point the ban was put in place not because of Oil spills ,infact the Hound Point Jetty has a good record for Oil Spills. The main problem was defects, At that time there was only one loading jetty and North Sea oil production was at its maximum so you had to make sure vessels had a quick turnaround. 
The majority of delays were caused by OBO,s quite a number of them had previously carried a bulk cargo and had obviously not been given a lot of time to changeover to oil. They would arrive in the Forth with quite a few defects and unable to serve their notice of readiness. On a couple of the Port Inspections I carried out my heart would go out to the Chief Offiers I met, they had obviously given the job their all and were so tired .But you could also come across some ships where they tried to cut corners and that did cause problems. 
Thankfully I didn't stay in that job too long and moved into the port management side of the business.
Whilst in Denholms I did my tanker time prior to command on the Dalma so glad I didn't get an OBO
Tom


----------



## Gulpers

> Whilst in Denholms I did my tanker time prior to command on the *Dalma* so glad I didn't get an OBO


......... and *here* she is Tom. (Thumb)


----------



## Tom S

Gulpers said:


> ......... and *here* she is Tom. (Thumb)


Ray
She was a bit of a nightmare on her maiden voyage loaded her first cargo in Mena and discovered a massive fracture in the hull oil everywhere good lesson in UEL and Lel had a team of Texan welders fixing the fracture in the Hull how they welded with all that oil around I will never know .But boy were they good
Tom


----------



## Gulpers

> She was a bit of a nightmare on her maiden voyage loaded her first cargo in Mena and discovered a massive fracture in the hull oil everywhere good lesson in UEL and Lel had a team of Texan welders fixing the fracture in the Hull how they welded with all that oil around I will never know .But boy were they good


Indeed .... a tad buttock clenching for those on board, I'd imagine. (Jester)
Seems to have been a bit of a work up for the Engineers according to some of the photograph's comments! (EEK)


----------



## oldman 80

Tom S said:


> Spelling mistake corrected my spellchecker has a habit of putting in what it thinks the word should be.
> Going back to the ban on OBO,at Hound Point the ban was put in place not because of Oil spills ,infact the Hound Point Jetty has a good record for Oil Spills. The main problem was defects, At that time there was only one loading jetty and North Sea oil production was at its maximum so you had to make sure vessels had a quick turnaround.
> The majority of delays were caused by OBO,s quite a number of them had previously carried a bulk cargo and had obviously not been given a lot of time to changeover to oil. They would arrive in the Forth with quite a few defects and unable to serve their notice of readiness. On a couple of the Port Inspections I carried out my heart would go out to the Chief Offiers I met, they had obviously given the job their all and were so tired .But you could also come across some ships where they tried to cut corners and that did cause problems.
> Thankfully I didn't stay in that job too long and moved into the port management side of the business.
> Whilst in Denholms I did my tanker time prior to command on the Dalma so glad I didn't get an OBO
> Tom



Well I have to say the Forth Port Authorities decision to ban OBO’s was ridiculous and extremely short sighted.
A far more rational response would have been to make it known that OBO’S arriving from near continental ports (i.e Ijmuiden/Dunkirk etc) to load oil having previously carried dry cargo, would not be accepted for loading any sooner than say 7days after their departure from the last port.
That would have solved many problems, for ships staff and the port authorities, It would have been a rational and well targeted decision, setting an example for the rest of the world .( ie. Would have been an opportunity for them to lead the world, by setting a good example which might have been followed elsewhere ) However they obviously did not seize that opportunity and chose to behave more like some delinquent adolescents, displaying emotional outburst.
Banning OBO’s has done no one any favours at all – in fact I’d say that decision was detrimental to mankind. We just simply cannot go on burning vast amounts of fuel for no other purpose than to cart sea water from one location to another on the other side of the world. 
But you are quite right when you mention tired and worn out personnel. The foregoing would have resolved that problem also.
The OBO has to make a come back somehow, and I very much believe that it can, and furthermore, that it should.


----------



## chadburn

Tom S said:


> Chadburn
> You are correct in saying Military i put all three services under the one umbrella but obviously the port would come under Naval Control in my case FOSNI from his bunker at Pitreavie Castle and as you say it would have been a Class A Port.
> Tom


Tom, I have been in the past a member of the FOSNI Staff down The Bunker along with being a Boarding Officer on occasion's.


----------



## Tom S

oldman 80 said:


> Well I have to say the Forth Port Authorities decision to ban OBO’s was ridiculous and extremely short sighted.
> A far more rational response would have been to make it known that OBO’S arriving from near continental ports (i.e Ijmuiden/Dunkirk etc) to load oil having previously carried dry cargo, would not be accepted for loading any sooner than say 7days after their departure from the last port.
> That would have solved many problems, for ships staff and the port authorities, It would have been a rational and well targeted decision, setting an example for the rest of the world .( ie. Would have been an opportunity for them to lead the world, by setting a good example which might have been followed elsewhere ) However they obviously did not seize that opportunity and chose to behave more like some delinquent adolescents, displaying emotional outburst.
> Banning OBO’s has done no one any favours at all – in fact I’d say that decision was detrimental to mankind. We just simply cannot go on burning vast amounts of fuel for no other purpose than to cart sea water from one location to another on the other side of the world.
> But you are quite right when you mention tired and worn out personnel. The foregoing would have resolved that problem also.
> The OBO has to make a come back somehow, and I very much believe that it can, and furthermore, that it should.


Oldman you are entitled to your opinion. Port Authorities do not ban ships lightly it is not in their interest to do so,they are commercial and their success depends upon them making a profit but they also have a Statutory Duty that often conflicts with the Commercial side of the business.Before a ban is imposed or even considered full consultation must be carried out by all parties concerned ,otherwise claims could be made against the Authority.
The authority cannot dictate to the Shipowner how long he will give him to get his ship into a state of readiness,infact if the owners had wanted to come in to the river they could take as long as they like to get their vessel ready,they still make revenue whilst the ship is at anchor.
The problem with OBO,s in the eighties was caused by their Charterers and the Owners presenting their ships ready to load when obviously they weren't. There was only one jetty at the time operated by BP scheduling was extremely tight,any delays were costly.A lot of these ships were FOC sub standard and badly maintained.


----------



## oldman 80

Tom S said:


> Oldman you are entitled to your opinion. Port Authorities do not ban ships lightly it is not in their interest to do so,they are commercial and their success depends upon them making a profit but they also have a Statutory Duty that often conflicts with the Commercial side of the business.Before a ban is imposed or even considered full consultation must be carried out by all parties concerned ,otherwise claims could be made against the Authority.
> The authority cannot dictate to the Shipowner how long he will give him to get his ship into a state of readiness,infact if the owners had wanted to come in to the river they could take as long as they like to get their vessel ready,they still make revenue whilst the ship is at anchor.
> The problem with OBO,s in the eighties was caused by their Charterers and the Owners presenting their ships ready to load when obviously they weren't. There was only one jetty at the time operated by BP scheduling was extremely tight,any delays were costly.A lot of these ships were FOC sub standard and badly maintained.




Ok thanks for that. Looks like we will have to agree to disagree on many of your points, but not all.

Statutory Duties :- A common problem which applied equally to owners, charterers and shipmasters. 

Before a Ban is Imposed:- Well that's what they would like us to believe - I suspect. OBO's would never be in the good books so far as an oil major was concerned. Oil Majors had an interest in doing them down, in favour of the straight tanker guzzling up fuel shoving sea water ballast around the world. Seems to me the Forth Port Authority simply may not have had the vision to see that.

The authority cannot dictate to the shipowner:- It seems very clear to me that they did just that when they effectively said "Do not bring your OBO in here". They could just as easily said we will not permit the acceptance of any NOR prior to the stipulated time. The reason for that would fit comfortably within the Statutory Duty of Care - I reckon.

They still make revenue:- (The ship) Almost certainly not, particularly in the case of the OBO which has just come from a dry cargo discharge facility. She'd be Voyage Chartered (not time chartered) and would not make revenue until NOR was accepted.
That should not have happened until she actually berthed, providing the brokers got the wording of the C/P correct.

The problem with OBO's in the 1980's:- well that may have been the case with some, but not all. In the case I refered to we were ready in all respects. The problem on that occassion was that the terminal deviated from an agreed (in writing and signed for) 
Loading procedure - and worse still, having done so, they did not inform any member of ships staff - none at all. 

FOC Sub Standard and badly maintained:- Well I can agree with you on that one for sure. Indeed Just the type of vessel the oil majors would charter - BP very much included.
Not much Duty of Care there I'm afraid.

Thank you for participating in our debate.

Regards. Jerry


----------



## Tom S

Jerry
Sorry I can't get my points across to you as you tend to put your own interpretation on any of the points I try to make. Harbour Authourities in the UK are empowered by the http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/40/enacted the Harbours Act of 1964 they are enforcement bodies and do not make commercial decisions on banning ships. 
Tom


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## oldman 80

Tom S said:


> Jerry
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry I can't get my points across to you as you tend to put your own interpretation on any of the points I try to make.
> 
> 
> 
> Harbour Authourities in the UK are empowered by the http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/40/enacted the Harbours Act of 1964 they are enforcement bodies and do not make commercial decisions on banning ships.
> Tom
Click to expand...

Thats Ok Tom - don't worry about it - it's history now in any case. As I said before we have to agree to disagree, and as I disagree, then of course that disagreement stems from my interpretation and perspective on the matter, which is clearly different to yours.
I don't have a problem with that.

However, in your posting #573, posted at 2145hrs on Jan 11th you did say , and I copy and paste it herewith:-

_"Also during the eighties after a number of serious incidents and in agreement with BP we banned OBO,s from loading at the Hound Point Terminal. The final incident was an OBO that was inertng prior to loading when a major explosion occurred and a couple of very large hatch covers landed in the murky depths of the river.
Tom "
_
End of copy and paste.

It's your posting, not mine Tom.
You state "we banned" etc etc. - if that was not a commercial decision then I do not know what is - especially when you happen to be on the OBO side of the fence.

It would seem BP was calling the shots, and they were as bad at it then as they have been in more recent times. Besides their (B.P.'s)knowledge of OBO's would be virtually nil at that time - all wind, hearsay, bull, crap - call it what you may. There were some very good OBO's around, owned by good owners, and managed by people who by that stage knew how to do it , and how to do it properly.
Perhaps they didn't get the full co-operation of seastaff in some cases, but with all the redundancies in the pipe line, and the move toward offshore FOC Ops - that's not altogether suprising.
Thatcher did nothing to help either.
A few more corporate prosecutions and the jailing of "executives" might have made a big difference - but of course that would not happen with the likes of B.P. - especially with Thatcher in Charge.
Well time have changed as a result of their carryings on in the US over decades, the world knows it - so perhaps they won't get away with it so easily now.

They spilled oil all over my ship, some went into the river - and damn all was done about it. Had it been the ships fault, all hell would have broken loose. One set of Rules for B.P.- another set for everyone else !!!!!!!!!!

Your contribution to the debate continues to be appreciated - and I thank you for that, but your reference to:- http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/40/enacted
really does not impress me at all, although I do recognise it as being a convenient way out for you, and everyone else for that matter.

*No*, you are quite definately right - you have not been successfull in getting your point across, (to me at any rate,) - and I doubt you ever will.
I am very much an advocate for the OBO ( a more evolved and improved version for sure, which is where they were ultimately heading).
I gave many years of my working life to them and the good owners and managers who operated the second (Seateam) generation, in particular.
In the end the cost to me was "heavy", but I still believe in them - very much so, particularly looking ahead.
They will always demand well above average seastaff, of that you can be sure, and their working lives as OBO's should not be overextended.
In their final years - perhaps just a restriction to *grain and non high density dry bulk only.* But they will no longer be OBO's then, just have beens the same as we all are.
They do after all age, - the same as we do.
Which ones did you serve in - the first or second generation ?


----------



## Tom S

As a final posting on this subject

"Also during the eighties after a number of serious incidents and in agreement with BP we banned OBO,s from loading at the Hound Point Terminal. The final incident was an OBO that was inertng prior to loading when a major explosion occurred and a couple of very large hatch covers landed in the murky depths of the river.
Tom "
The ban at the time was made on the grounds of safety and no other.At that particular time Hound Point was in the area controlled by the Navy who had a vested interest in protecting their Naval Base and Nuclear facility in addition the terminal is located in a densely populated area of central Scotland with two major bridges. It is only correct that strict safety regulations are enforced.


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## oldman 80

Thanks for that also Tom. I'm still not convinced though, - *even less* now, I suppose.
Looking back at your previous postings I see you mention the fact that the decision to ban OBO's was made, not because of oil spills, but because of OBO defects.
What defects do you refer to. Most would not have existed had the 7 day exclusion period been imposed on them. However there would be cases with the FOC, offshore manager operators, where no matter what was done it would have made no difference and that would apply to straight tankers as well.
The Braer incident, and indeed the Prestige and the Kirki, are testament to that, I believe.
As has been said before, both by myself and others in this forum, the 2nd Generation of OBO at 12 years of age was clearly approaching it's effective OBO use by date. The First generation - long before that - 7 years, I would say, based on my experience of both generations.
At that vintage (about) they were conveniently sold off to other owners, many of whom did not operate them in a responsible manner. I think that is born out in your reference to "*defects*" being the main cause for banning them.
*Defects* is a bit of a vague description in my view, it's a pity you could not be a bit more specific.
My own view is that the 2nd generation should have lost their certification for "Ore" at around 8 years of age, - it was ore cargoes which caused all the cracking, not oil, not coal, and not grain.
The first generation should have been downgraded to bulk (grain) only at 4 years of age - better still probably, scrapped at 7 years.
Of course those figures are just estimates or approximates. Obviously each would be assessed in detail at the time, but setting such approximate life spans might have caused more thorough inspections by class, than was the case at the time.
However your contributions to the debate have been enormously beneficial to it, and I feel all members should at least appreciate that.
For my part, I can only thank you again.
(Applause)


----------



## Duncan112

Thanks OM, for your comments regarding "Use By Dates" this is something where I feel the marine industry has lagged far behind the aviation industry in terms of allowable life cycles, as my dissertation for my EC exams I chose to investigate if fatigue cycles could be applied to hull structures and found that in normal conditions a hull life of about 25 years before an incipient crack approached its critical length for complete failure. Unfortunately the dissertation was limited in its length so I could not develop on some of the ideas as I would have wished.

The assumption has long been that, provided the stress in a steel structure is kept below the line in a s-n curve then fatigue failure is not going to be a problem. This is only true for a defect free structure, any notching or weld inclusions will provide for a stress point that could propagate into a crack. 

I believe that stress monitoring equipment should be mandatory on all ships subject to load/unload cycles and once the potential fatigue life from an incipient defect is approached then the structure should be subjected to UT in the highly stressed areas (I believe that the aircraft industry allow 30% of fatigue life before remedial action/scrapping takes place although the behaviour of alloys in fatigue is rather different from ferrous metals)


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## Mariner44

Interesting 15 minute programme about the Derbyshire Families Assoc on BBC Radio 4 "one to one" programme. Catch it on BBC I-player 9.30 15th January 2013


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## oldman 80

Duncan112 said:


> Thanks OM, for your comments regarding "Use By Dates" this is something where I feel the marine industry has lagged far behind the aviation industry in terms of allowable life cycles, as my dissertation for my EC exams I chose to investigate if fatigue cycles could be applied to hull structures and found that in normal conditions a hull life of about 25 years before an incipient crack approached its critical length for complete failure. Unfortunately the dissertation was limited in its length so I could not develop on some of the ideas as I would have wished.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The assumption has long been that, provided the stress in a steel structure is kept below the line in a s-n curve then fatigue failure is not going to be a problem. This is only true for a defect free structure, any notching or weld inclusions will provide for a stress point that could propagate into a crack.
> 
> 
> 
> I believe that stress monitoring equipment should be mandatory on all ships subject to load/unload cycles and once the potential fatigue life from an incipient defect is approached then the structure should be subjected to UT in the highly stressed areas (I believe that the aircraft industry allow 30% of fatigue life before remedial action/scrapping takes place although the behaviour of alloys in fatigue is rather different from ferrous metals)
Click to expand...

WELL Absolutely, and thank you for yet another constructive contribution to this string.
Welded construction of the era to which I have been referring (1970's /1980's approx) and to the particular vessels to which I have been referring cannot possibly match the welded construction of today with all the enormous technological advances. Weld **** inclusion was common place despite all the efforts to prevent its occurrence. Sample selective X-ray imaging of welds was done on a random ad hoc basis during construction, and where hand welding had been used, (as opposed to machine / robotic welding) many of those images were not a pretty sight, despite the supposed high quality of the graded welder regime.
Not only that, but even simple visual inspections were enough to demand sections of weld be cut out and re-welded. I would not care to mention how many boxes of chalk I used up along with DNV surveyors marking apparently defective welds whilst standing by new buildings in the early 1970's.
The foregoing system of quality control of the welding, though antiquated was nevertheless quite successfull although by no means perfect. Today's technology both from the welding and quality control thereof, must surely be far far advanced on anything we had available in those days, therefore there should be little doubt that *a near perfectly constructed OBO is well within the capabilities of any shipyard today.*
Structural Cracking and fracturing was a problem with the OBO's of that era, but it was far less of a problem on the 2nd generation built for Sea Team in Sweden, than it was on the 1st generation of vessel, built mainly in Japan and U.K. The antiquated (by comparison with what must be available today) quality control system we used in Sweden, under the DNV jurisdiction, made a huge difference, the improvement was remarkable. 
Notches of course are & were a separate issue, and yes, they caused problems as well. In the 1st Generation OBO's the problems were everywhere, whilst in the 2nd Generation OBO's that problem was reduced and manifested itself mainly at the turn of the tank tops and the hopper sides. In those cases the problem was detected early by the adoption of a simple more frequent visual inspection of the water ballast double bottom tanks particularly in the area referred to.
( Notches effected by the additional burden of some corrosion)
Those transverse floors and webs were committed to an on-going reinforcement programme, (_immediately the problem was detected in its early stages and before significant consequences resulted_) consisting of the welding of reinforcement plates to the floors / web connections at that location. I recall those reinforcement plates were basically about 25mm thick triangules, (corners rounded) with 10 inch sides adjacent to the right angle, and with the hypotenuse fashioned to fit the obtuse angle between tank top and hopper side "framing" ie the transverse floors and webs. It was an extensive "on going" programme conducted over a period of about 4 years, whenever the opportunity of progression occured - *and it was highly successfull*. It did mean additional "work" though, which stretched ships staff to the limit on some occassions - not infrequently, if the truth were known.


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## oldman 80

(@)


NoR said:


> You have completely missed the point. If I were you I would confine myself to commenting on subjects you know something about.



Revelation 18.
[1] And after these things I saw another angel come down from heaven, having great power; and the earth was lightened with his glory.
[2] And he cried mightily with a strong voice, saying, Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen, and is become the habitation of devils, and the hold of every foul spirit, and a cage of every unclean and hateful bird.
[3] For all nations have drunk of the wine of the wrath of her fornication, and the kings of the earth have committed fornication with her, and the merchants of the earth are waxed rich through the abundance of her delicacies.
[4] And I heard another voice from heaven, saying, Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues.
[5] For her sins have reached unto heaven, and God hath remembered her iniquities.
[6] Reward her even as she rewarded you, and double unto her double according to her works: in the cup which she hath filled fill to her double.
[7] How much she hath glorified herself, and lived deliciously, so much torment and sorrow give her: for she saith in her heart, I sit a queen, and am no widow, and shall see no sorrow.
[8] Therefore shall her plagues come in one day, death, and mourning, and famine; and she shall be utterly burned with fire: for strong is the Lord God who judgeth her.
[9] And the kings of the earth, who have committed fornication and lived deliciously with her, shall bewail her, and lament for her, when they shall see the smoke of her burning,
[10] Standing afar off for the fear of her torment, saying, Alas, alas, that great city Babylon, that mighty city! for in one hour is thy judgment come.
[11] And the merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn over her; for no man buyeth their merchandise any more:
[12] The merchandise of gold, and silver, and precious stones, and of pearls, and fine linen, and purple, and silk, and scarlet, and all thyine wood, and all manner vessels of ivory, and all manner vessels of most precious wood, and of brass, and iron, and marble,
[13] And cinnamon, and odours, and ointments, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and wheat, and beasts, and sheep, and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men.
[14] And the fruits that thy soul lusted after are departed from thee, and all things which were dainty and goodly are departed from thee, and thou shalt find them no more at all.
[15] The merchants of these things, which were made rich by her, shall stand afar off for the fear of her torment, weeping and wailing,
[16] And saying, Alas, alas, that great city, that was clothed in fine linen, and purple, and scarlet, and decked with gold, and precious stones, and pearls!
[17] For in one hour so great riches is come to nought. And every shipmaster, and all the company in ships, and sailors, and as many as trade by sea, stood afar off,
[18] And cried when they saw the smoke of her burning, saying, What city is like unto this great city!
[19] And they cast dust on their heads, and cried, weeping and wailing, saying, Alas, alas, that great city, wherein were made rich all that had ships in the sea by reason of her costliness! for in one hour is she made desolate.
[20] Rejoice over her, thou heaven, and ye holy apostles and prophets; for God hath avenged you on her.
[21] And a mighty angel took up a stone like a great millstone, and cast it into the sea, saying, Thus with violence shall that great city Babylon be thrown down, and shall be found no more at all.
[22] And the voice of harpers, and musicians, and of pipers, and trumpeters, shall be heard no more at all in thee; and no craftsman, of whatsoever craft he be, shall be found any more in thee; and the sound of a millstone shall be heard no more at all in thee;
[23] And the light of a candle shall shine no more at all in thee; and the voice of the bridegroom and of the bride shall be heard no more at all in thee: for thy merchants were the great men of the earth; for by thy sorceries were all nations deceived.
[24] And in her was found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth.
________________________________________

********************************

*But you are not me.*
Best Rgds,
*Marine*:-
Capt. Retired.
[Master Mariner Class 1 (Fgn) Endorsed:- Crude Oil, Petroleum Products & Liquid Chemicals in Bulk.]
Marine/Cargo Surveyor (Retired)
Ratified Nautical Surveyor (Retired)

*Aviation:-*
Pilot Fixed Wing Aircraft.(Retired)
Multi - Engine Rated: & Multi-engine Command Instrument Rated.
Endorsements :- Too many to mention here.


----------



## jmcg

What has all that got to do with OBOs

J


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## John Cassels

jmcg said:


> What has all that got to do with OBOs
> 
> J


Think that's probably the point.


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## jmcg

Unless the OBO in question was named King James, I cannot see the relevance at all.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## jmcg

Can anyone remember the Swedish built bulker (not sure if she was an OBO) named Gallant Dragon 123126 dwt.

I believe she broke her back after a crossing to Japan, patched up re-loaded and then scuttled with full cargo.

She went down in 7 seconds.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## jmcg

*Mineral Diamond* built 1982 foundered with all hands in the Indian Ocean. Classification DNV. Her loss generated a one page Report prepared by AIB 

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## alastairrussell

jmcg

You can read the full report on the investigation carried out on the loss of the Mineral Diamond by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in their website. 

This investigation was carried out to assist the HongKong Authorities and it is quite a good read. She was under daily radio contact with an Australian marine radio watch system at the time of her loss. Who are the AIB?

Regards 

Alastair

Ps I tried to cut and paste bits of the report but failed!


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## alastairrussell

I have just read a real good speil from Paul Lambart from the MV Derbyshire families Association. Google 'The MV Derbyshire Prologue' . This paper is even being discussed in the World Naval Ships Forum by high ranking retired naval types!! It goes under 'The loss of the Derbyshire' there.

Now hear this! Now hear this! 

I am shocked to read the all the following info on a brand new class of 400,000 tonne VALEMAX iron ore carriers. How can someone get it so wrong?

I quote:

Valemax No. 8 has not even loaded its first ore and it's already worth 36% less than it cost

Frik Els | April 4, 2012 

Executives at world number one iron ore miner Vale told Reuters it expects to receive the go-ahead "within months" to unload the company's massive Valemax vessels at Chinese ports.

The dry bulk carriers are 362-metre-long and 65 metre wide vessels that can carry 400,000 dead-weight tonnes of iron ore and cost just under $110 millions a shot. 

Brazil-based Vale has so far received 8 of the 35 it has ordered from Korean and Chinese shipbuilders, but they have been drifting aimlessly since May because China, by far Vale's biggest customer, has so far only granted one vessel port entry and has since banned anything over 300,000 tonnes.

In December, one of the ships – rather unfortunately called the Vale Beijing – ruptured its hull and temporarily blocked a port from where Vale ships more than 130 million tonnes per annum.

Chinese shipowners are saying the carriers will worsen overcapacity and depress freight rates, while steelmakers are also against the leviathan-size ships, which are described as “each almost as large as the Bank of America tower in New York,” because they will give Vale even more control over pricing and delivery.

Bloomberg reports according website VesselsValue.com, the latest Valemax to be received by the company is already worth 36% less than what it cost. 

The Vale Malaysia's worth is now pegged at only $68 million because a "slump in values of dry-bulk ships that were ordered before returns plunged is getting worse as shipyards lower contract prices for new vessels." 

80% of the world's iron ore is borne by so-called Capesize vessels which can only carry a third of the cargo of a Valemax. The value of these ships has declined even more – "new Capesize ships worth $69.9 million in April 2010 are assessed at $39.9 million today," according to a VesselsValue analyst. 

Vale, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto completely dominate the 1 billion tonne seaborne iron ore trade – Vale alone controls a quarter of world supply.


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## Cisco

I heard that part of the problem was that Vale did not get the ships built in China.... shades of ANL building ships in Sweden in the 70's and then trying to muscle into the Japanese trade with them....


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> What has all that got to do with OBOs
> 
> J


Early DC 10 Cargo doors and later OBO side rolling hatch cover locking design similarities/susceptibility/failure - vulnerabilities etc. etc.. (Camlocks)


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## jmcg

Cannot see any relevance or connection of OBOs to your quotation of the King James version of the Bible.

J


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> Cannot see any relevance or connectionof OBOs to your quotation of the King James veersion of the Bible.
> 
> J


Nah - but that doesn't suprise me at all.
Your problem, not mine.

(Pint)


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## jmcg

Alaistair #604


Thanks for the correction - it was the Australian Transport Safety Bureau Report. Could not quite remember their full title.


Vinalines Queen (ex Medi Dublin)- a Vietnamese registered bulker of some 56000 dwt is a recent ( December 25 2011) casualty. Whether strutural failure and her cargo of nickel ore are contributory factors is , I believe subject to further inquiry. Twenty two crew members perished - one survivor. 

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## Cisco

Nickel ore is nasty stuff.... I recall an MM tweendecker bound from New Caledonia to Europe in the late 60s early 70s rolling over and sinking with heavy loss of life. Also one similar ship in a company I was with also had an issue but wasn't lost. 

Mas aqui http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?171881


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## jmcg

Berg Istra and Berg Vanga are others that "disappeared" in mysterious ways. Only two survived the Istra, 40 perished on Vanga.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## oldman 80

jmcg said:


> Berg Istra and Berg Vanga are others that "disappeared" in mysterious ways. Only two survived the Istra, 40 perished on Vanga.
> 
> BW
> 
> J(Gleam)(Gleam)


In one of those cases (the Vanga, I think) an explosion on board is/was quite likely the cause. (Satellite imagery of the area revealed an unexplained/mysterious "flash" in the middle of the South Indian Ocean around the time she went missing - *it was confirmed as being not a missile launch *- or so I was lead to believe.

(Sad)


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## alastairrussell

*MV Berge Vanga

*
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Jump to: navigation, search


The MS Berge Vanga was an ore-bulk-oil carrier with 227,912 metric tons deadweight (DWT). The ship was owned by Norwegian shipping company Sig. Bergesen d.y. and registered in Liberia. The ship had build number 300 at the Uljanik shipyard in the port city Pula in Croatia where it was built in 1974.

The ship was on route from Brazil to Japan with iron ore when contact was lost with the vessel in the South Atlantic in November 1979. The ship vanished and the ensuing search operation yielded no results. 40 people lost their lives.

Some debris that could resemble parts from the tanker was found but no people. Still very little is known about the disaster, and the hearing after the accident was held behind closed doors. The principal theory holds that the cause could have been explosions caused by oil residue in the cargo compartments. MS Berge Vanga was, like its sister ship MS Berge Istra which disappeared under similar cir***stances four years earlier, a ship which could transport both oil and iron ore. After these two disappearances no more combination ships like this were built, and oil was never again transported alongside ore.[citation needed]

[edit] Source


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## alastairrussell

*MV Berge Istra*


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Jump to: navigation, search


The MS Berge Istra was a ship owned by Norwegian shipping company Sig. Bergesen d.y. and registered in Liberia, an ore-bulk-oil carrier with 227,550 metric tons deadweight (DWT). The ship had build number 296 at the Uljanik shipyard in the port city Pula in Croatia where it was built in 1972.

The ship was on route from Tubarão in Brazil to Japan with iron ore when contact was lost with the vessel in the Pacific (near the island Mindanao, Philippines) on December 30, 1975. After one week, on January 7, 1976, the ship was reported missing, but the ensuing search operation yielded no results and was called off on January 10 of that year. 30 people lost their lives. There were two survivors, Spanish citizens Imeldo Barreto León (41) and Epifanio López (39), who were picked up from a raft on January 20, 1976 by Japanese fishermen.

To this day, 30 years later, the shipping company maintains secrecy with regards to the cause of the accident. The most prominent theory holds that the cause could have been explosions caused by oil residue in the cargo compartments that were filled with iron ore. MS Berge Istra was, like its sister ship MS Berge Vanga which disappeared under similar cir***stances four years later, a ship which could transport both oil and iron ore. After these two disappearances no more combination ships like this were built, and oil was never again transported alongside ore.[citation needed]

[edit] Source
Meland, Astrid (2006-01-03). "Skipet som forsvant (The ship that disappeared)". Dagbladet Magasinet (in Norwegian). Retrieved 2006-09-24.
Visser, Auke. "Auke Visser's International Super Tankers (images & details)". Retrieved 2007-05-22.






Categories: Merchant ships of Norway
Shipwrecks in the Pacific Ocean
1972 ships
Maritime incidents in 1975
Missing ships


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## alastairrussell

_Does any one know how to translate the following Norwegionnews article into to English using 'Google Chrome?

Alastair_


The mystery around "Berge Istra" and "Berge Vanga" 

The Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet published today an article about the mystery around these accidents. A former Captain in the company "Bergersen" reveals the secret he has kept for him self in over 30 years. 

Sadly the article is on Norwegian, but those who uses "Google Chrome" should be able to translate it directly in the web browser.

http://www.dagbladet.no/2011/01/21/m...esen/15151445/


Reply With Quote



Don't know how well the Google translation works, so in very short, the article says:

Bergesen had several ships sailing in a very, very profitable combination traffic: ore from Brazil to Japan and via the Persian Gulf to load oil back to Europe.
The ships had a 'neutral-gas' filling system of poor quality, often not working at all.
This led to the fact that they, after emtying their wing oiltanks, left Brazil again with ore in the center rooms and highly explosive oil gas in the wing tanks.
This gas did not explode until reaction with oxygen..., and that was bound to happen.
Capt. Eilers, who's now talking freely in the newspaper Dagbladet, knew what happened and he wanted Bergesen to pull their last combination megaships out of the business, or he would go to the press.
To his astonishment, Bergesen accepted this deal, and rebuilt their last ships to only carry ore.
Finally, when Bergesen now are sold and the c ompany director and owner himself at the time of the tragic accidents are dead, 30 years after capt. Eilers made the deal, he can't have all this knowledge kept inside any more.

Of course the article say more, but this was a short summary.
Hope this article/info will be published in english some place, because it is very interesting. Also what happened after the accidents and how the work for more safety on ships has progressed as a direct result of the loss of "Berge Vanga" and "Berge Istra" 


"IF GOD COULD MAKE ANGELS...., WHY IN HELL MAKE MAN?"


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## jmcg

Alaistair

Thanks for the above two postings - I am not a fan of Wiki although the information available is usually correct.

OM80

It is indeed comforting to know that you are somewhat chilled this morning. I was concerned about you . Do practice it. It is good for you. Getting excited about nothing is definitely not good for blood pressure.
BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## alastairrussell

_Captain Eilers should get the IMO whistleblower of the year award. HE IS MY HERO. There should be no need for any whistleblowers in the shipping game if all the Classification and the Shipping authorities were doing their job properly.

Alastair
_


A great article... I must read it twice, to make sure I got the details correctly. 


With best regards from Jan-Olav Storli

Administrator and Owner of CaptainsVoyage.
Main page: http://www.captainsvoyage.com
Old forum: http://captainsvoyage.7.forumer.com/
Join us: Save the "Kong Olav" on facebook

*Surround yourself with positive, ethical people who are committed to excellence.
*


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## jmcg

I say very well done to the Captain from Norway. Great read.

He appears to be a good solid type of OM too.

BW

J(Gleam)(Gleam)


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## oldman 80

alastairrussell said:


> MV Berge Vanga
> 
> 
> From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> 
> Jump to: navigation, search
> 
> 
> The MS Berge Vanga was an ore-bulk-oil carrier with 227,912 metric tons deadweight (DWT). The ship was owned by Norwegian shipping company Sig. Bergesen d.y. and registered in Liberia. The ship had build number 300 at the Uljanik shipyard in the port city Pula in Croatia where it was built in 1974.
> 
> The ship was on route from Brazil to Japan with iron ore when contact was lost with the vessel in the South Atlantic in November 1979. The ship vanished and the ensuing search operation yielded no results. 40 people lost their lives.
> 
> Some debris that could resemble parts from the tanker was found but no people. Still very little is known about the disaster, and the hearing after the accident was held behind closed doors. The principal theory holds that the cause could have been explosions caused by oil residue in the cargo compartments. MS Berge Vanga was, like its sister ship MS Berge Istra which disappeared under similar cir***stances four years earlier, a ship which could transport both oil and iron ore. After these two disappearances no more combination ships like this were built, and oil was never again transported alongside ore.[citation needed]
> 
> [edit] Source


Well good old Wiki - that's just typical.
That class of vessel did not have a fully "Protected Slop Tank" as later vessels did, and in all probability she had a *dry deck seal *- *Bang, Bang, Bang *- no mystery there , none whatsoever, - it's ensactly what you'd expect - if you knew what you were talking about.

(Scribe)


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## alastairrussell

*MV Vinalines Queen
*
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

MV Vinalines Queen was a bulk carrier of the Vietnam National Shipping Lines, or Vinalines. On its last voyage the ship was travelling from Indonesia to China with more than 54,000 tonnes of nickel ore. The ship disappeared on 25 December 2011 and its fate was initially unknown. On 30 December 2011 a single survivor of its 23 member crew, Dau Ngoc Hung, was found by the British ship London Courage, after floating with a rescue vest for 5 days. He reported that the ship sank quickly in the early hours of the morning after capsizing to the left. It sank after passing the island of Luzon in very bad weather conditions in waters up to 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) deep. .[1]

The cir***stances leading to the sinking of the vessel are still under investigation. It is thought that the probable cause of sinking was the liquefaction of her Nickel Ore cargo resulting in the shifting of cargo in the holds and destabalising the vessel causing her to sink.[2]

[edit] References

1.^ "Vietnam sailor saved as 22 crew mates die at sea". AFP.
2.^ The London Steam-Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Limited


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## alastairrussell

_From the Vietnam News ( english version)

Alastair

I quote:
_
*Sole survivor of sunken ship found alive after five days adrift at sea 
*
HA NOI — A crew member from the missing Vinalines Queen ship has been found alive after five days adrift in a life boat, the Viet Nam Maritime Search and Rescue Co-ordination Centre has said. 

According to the centre, the 31-year-old crew member, Dau Ngoc Hung, was found and rescued yesterday by the M/V ‘London Courage' ship from England while en route to Singapore. 

The centre's director, Nguyen Anh Vu, said Hung was the only surviving member of the Vinalines Queen, Viet Nam's second biggest and most modern vessel. 

Hung, who is currently in good health on board the ‘London Courage', said via satellite telephone with the centre that the Vinalines Queen sank after tilting to the side at 7am on December 25 where sea depth reached 5km.

Hung said he was the only one able to get to a life buoy. 

"It was too windy and the ship leaned very fast. As soon as I found a torch, I opened the door and got out," he said.

Vu added: "Hung had drifted some 350km before being rescued."

The English ship that found the drifting sailor was scheduled to dock at Singapore's port on January 4.

The rescue centre has reported the case to rescue teams from the Philippines, Japan and Taiwan and several other countries and asked them to help search for the missing ship.

Last Sunday, while transporting 54,000 tonnes of nikel from Indonesia to China within the territory of Philippines, the Vinalines Queen went missing off Luzon Island. The ship had a crew of 23 people.

After searching for a week, rescue teams from Viet Nam, Philippines, Japan and Taiwan have failed to locate the missing vessel, and the reason for its sinking remains unknown.

In late 2010, three ships carrying nikel were also reported missing in waters northeast of the Philippines. — VNS


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## oldman 80

John Cassels said:


> Have a funny feeling you're wasting your time William.
> 
> I too would like to know which ship and asked as much politely.
> But it's not the first time oldman80 has put something on open
> forum , then when one askes for a few more details all one gets
> is a sarcastic remark.
> 
> 
> 
> Bye the bye , would you happen to know who T.C. is ; cos I don't
> so can't ask him
> 
> 
> 
> .
Click to expand...

*Revelation.17*
[1] And there came one of the seven angels which had the seven vials, and talked with me, saying unto me, Come hither; I will shew unto thee the judgment of the great ***** that sitteth upon many waters:
[2] With whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication, and the inhabitants of the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication.
[3] So he carried me away in the spirit into the wilderness: and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns.
[4] And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication:
[5] And upon her forehead was a name written, *MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH.
*[6] And I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus: and when I saw her, I wondered with great admiration.
[7] And the angel said unto me, Wherefore didst thou marvel? I will tell thee the mystery of the woman, and of the beast that carrieth her, which hath the seven heads and ten horns.
[8] The beast that thou sawest was, and is not; and shall ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition: and they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, whose names were not written in the book of life from the foundation of the world, when they behold the beast that was, and is not, and yet is.
[9] And here is the mind which hath wisdom. The seven heads are seven mountains, on which the woman sitteth.
[10] And there are seven kings: five are fallen, and one is, and the other is not yet come; and when he cometh, he must continue a short space.
[11] And the beast that was, and is not, even he is the eighth, and is of the seven, and goeth into perdition.
[12] And the ten horns which thou sawest are ten kings, which have received no kingdom as yet; but receive power as kings one hour with the beast.
[13] These have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beast.
[14] These shall make war with the Lamb, and the Lamb shall overcome them: for he is Lord of lords, and King of kings: and they that are with him are called, and chosen, and faithful.
[15] And he saith unto me, The waters which thou sawest, where the ***** sitteth, are peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues.
[16] And the ten horns which thou sawest upon the beast, these shall hate the *****, and shall make her desolate and naked, and shall eat her flesh, and burn her with fire.
[17] For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.
[18] And the woman which thou sawest is that great city, which reigneth over the kings of the earth.
________________________________________
(Whaaa)


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## duncs

John cXI vXXXV


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## alastairrussell

O Captain! My Captain!
Walt Whitman

_[Whitman wrote this poem about Abraham Lincoln's assassination, choosing the image of a ship's captain's untimely death just as the vessel nears safe harbor (end of the Civil War and the preservation of the Union) after a terrible voyage (the Civil War itself) to express his dismay that Lincoln was dead before he could see our nation move past its most bloody conflict.]
_
O CAPTAIN! my Captain! our fearful trip is done,
The ship has weather'd every rack, the prize we sought is won,
The port is near, the bells I hear, the people all exulting,
While follow eyes the steady keel, the vessel grim and daring;
But O heart! heart! heart!
O the bleeding drops of red,
Where on the deck my Captain lies,
Fallen cold and dead.

O Captain! my Captain! rise up and hear the bells;
Rise up -- for you the flag is flung -- for you the bugle trills,
For you bouquets and ribbon'd wreaths -- for you the shores a-crowding,
For you they call, the swaying mass, their eager faces turning;
Here Captain! dear father!
This arm beneath your head!
It is some dream that on the deck
You 'ye fallen cold and dead.

My Captain does not answer, his lips are pale and still,
My father does not feel my arm, he has no pulse nor will,
The ship is anchor'd safe and sound, its voyage closed and done,
From fearful trip the victor ship comes in with object won;
Exult O shores, and ring O bells!
But I, with mournful tread,
Walk the deck my Captain lies,
Fallen cold and dead.


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## Robert Bush

There have been several cases when Classification Societies have not done their jobs properly with the result of loss of lives at sea.


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## oldseamerchant

Robert Bush said:


> There have been *several cases* when Classification Societies have not done their jobs properly with the result of loss of lives at sea.


An understatement Robert.


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## alastairrussell

THE MV DERBYSHIRE PROLOGUE

We know much of this paper will find agreement with the Derbyshire Family Association: we hope
all of it will. But it is the sole work and responsibility of Paul Lambert (Chairman of the Derbyshire
Family Association) and Dave Ramwell (Captain), and it must not be taken as necessarily reflecting
the views of any other party.

SAFETY FIRST - COMMERCE SECOND


INTRODUCTION

The "Derbyshire", an oil/bulk/ore (OBO) ship, loaded with 150,000 tons of iron ore and carrying 44
persons, disap peared in a typhoon she should have shrugged off with ease - and so quickly that not
even a distress signal escaped.

BACKGROUND

"Derbyshire" was supposedly well found, classed to highest standard and barely four years old. (In
terms of working life, three, as she had been laid up at Stavanger for a year). Her crew consisted of
competent, qualified men, she was fined with the latest navigational equipment and all her papers
were in order.

News other loss in September 1980 prompted an instinctive reaction from seafarers : "She's too big
to disappear ......."

Indeed, when nine year old "Mineral Diamond" disappeared in uncannily similar cir***stances 11
years on, the subsequent inquiry, instituted by the Hong Kong Director of Marine, concluded: "...... it
seems most likely that a major structural failure of her hull, which resulted in her breaking in two, is
the cause of her sinking ....."

Events following the severe cracking of sistership, "Tyne Bridge", in 1982 were to prove "Derbyshire"
and all her sisters were weak just forward of the accommodation superstructure, and in all but the
first of the six ship series extemporaneous construction methods in the region of frame 65 introduced
a potentially fatal flaw.

The UK Department of Transport recognised this in its first report after preliminary investigation of
the loss of the "Derbyshire" conducted in 1985. The report was changed in 1986 to blame the
weather. Parties who perceived possible compromise of their position in the 1985 version, were
happier with the second - not surprising when it is known their input led to the change.
The only ill built and un-restored "Derbyshire" sister, in a collapsing and abandoned state, collided
with Southern Ireland and, in doing so, precipitated the Formal Investigation of the loss of
"Derbyshire" over six years earlier.


FORMAL INVESTIGATION

Hopes, by those who lost loved ones in "Derbyshire", that the Formal Investigation would deliver the
truth at last, were dashed when, by ignoring or trivialising the history of the damage throughout the
fleet, and by failing to call crucial witnesses, the Court nursed ''Lost in Bad Weather" over the
finishing line well ahead of all other runners.

But the whitewash was at least blatant enough to excite the anger of others who, like most of the
families^ knew they had just witnessed a cover-up. A formidable team, formed almost
spontaneously by a shared burning desire for justice, joined forces with the Derbyshire Family
Association. Together they forced a review of the Formal Investigation, captured the interest of the
media (investigative programmes were broadcast on national stations, both TV and radio), wrote a
book on the case, published articles, initiated questions and debates in both Houses of Parliament,
and, most crucially, stemming from the initiative of Shaun Kent, working with John Jubb, located the
wreck of the "Derbyshire" 2.8 miles deep.

The DFA and its helpers provided the wherewithal to find "Derbyshire" when others said it could not
be done.

In searching the wider bulk carrier scene for any corroborative general evidence it was inevitable that
this team would stumble on "the bulker problem"; it was too big to miss. Put simply the problem is:
most bulk carriers are not strong enough to do the job for which they were built over the lifetime that
was originally projected for them. Hundreds of seafarers have lost their lives as a result.
It is being argued by some that, regrettable as the losses are, the problem cannot be cured quickly.
We, the two authors of this paper present the wherewithal to show that it can.
The "Derbyshire" is a separate case covered by separate argument; she was a new ship and only
carried the ageing bulker problem in embryo. But our knowledge of the unacceptable toll of life, and
our awareness that, through a profile raised by the "Derbyshire", we can make an impression,
emboldens us - indeed, we feel, leaves us no alternative other than - to open this wider front in the
battle for justice, in the interests of all who still sail in these coffin ships. If we complicate matters for
ourselves, so be it..... we cannot just walk away.

LOSSES IN BULK

How could the late Doug Foy, retired seafarer turned marine journalist, pre-empt the classification
societies, with their vast data banks, in warning of the inadequacy of bulk carrier design? It was
November 1990 before Lloyd's Register conceded that the then current spate of losses signaled a
need for investigation into the type. At the beginning of that same year one spokesman claimed
those losses were "atypical", another told a BBC Interviewer, Lloyd's Register "don't believe the
vessels have a fundamental design fault; they believe the ships' sides simply wear out because of
corrosion and punishment they receive as cargo is loaded and unloaded".

Which prompts the question, if it was not the job of the classification society to foresee and cater or
such corrosion wastage and natural punishment, then whose job was it? Perhaps the authors of "A


Ship Too Far; The Mystery of the Derbyshire" (one of them Dave Ramwell) touched on the truth:
“The classification society system no longer works in today's fiercely competitive environment. It
should be ended."

We think ail the classification societies have fallen short of those standards which could reasonably
be expected of them; that measures could have been taken much earlier and that, even now, their
diagnosis does not properly disclose the severity of the malady.

During the. five years before the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) reviewed
the safety and structural integrity of bulk carriers, losses averaged 10-per year and 700 seafarers
died in the type. In 1990 the total bulk carrier fleet represented 7% of the world's fleet -and
accounted for 57% of its casualties.

In the period 1980 to 1996 43 'standard' bulk carriers of over 20.000 dwt were lost in
cir***stances where structural failure could well have played a part. (Taking a 'standard' bulk
carrier to be a vessel with a configuration where there is a single skin, transversely framed side,
double bottom, with topside and hopper tanks running through the cargo holds). Other bulk
carriers failed structurally but were fortunate enough not to be lost as a result.
The age of the ships varied - from only eight years to thirty nine years old. The average age was18,
with 78% of them fifteen years or over.

At the time of writing statistics (source: MARINE ENGINEERS' REVIEW, April '97) give 4,200
bulk carriers (of all configurations) of 150 m or more, 1,900 of these are fifteen years old or
more.

As the MER points out, "...... the ships were built to class and international regulations that applied at
the time of their construction."

But the plain fact is many of these ships were built when the classification societies knew, or ought to
have known, those regulations were inadequate.

Track records spell out the only sure way of eradicating the danger posed by the fifteen year old bulk
carrier – scrap it.

Recently IACS has claimed its Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP), started in 1993, has reduced
bulker losses. We believe such reduction could have more to do with the raised level of awareness
of the mortal dangers attaching to old bulkers. It is not a case any more of clapped out rustbuckets
slipping quietly below the waves, with a "can't lose" owner recovering his "total loss" from the
underwriters. Now the public increasingly demands an answer, and it harbours a sympathy for the
seafarer that would countenance the spending of £ millions to investigate one "classic case" lying 2.8
miles down. This awareness, together with recent moves to update the marine insurance industry
towards better actuarial practice, is the real medicine to start the cure.

To what extent, we wonder, was the "raised awareness factor" instrumental in dictating the fate of
the "Nafsika M", last of the "'Derbyshire" sisters? Despite her owners having spent thousands of
dollars to (one would suppose) extend her life just two and a half years ago, she is now destined for
breaking up in Bangladesh. Paul Lambert warned the major classification societies of the difficulties

in making such an old bulk carrier safe. He was rewarded with threats from the Greek lawyers of her
owners with action against him in the civil and criminal court. That legal action may still be pending,
but, in the meantime, given "Nafsika M's" implications for the "Derbyshire" case swivelling the
spotlight on her, would any classification society now dare to put her in class unless she was
absolutely seaworthy? Conversely, without such spotlight, would she have been granted a few more
years to justify all that expenditure in the Gdansk shipyard?

Whatever the case with "Nafsika M", we believe the IACS' ESP is ineffective.
Early February 1997 the bulk carrier, "Leros Strength" sank off Norway, killing her 20 man Polish
crew and sending 15 tons of oil ashore to foul the coast.

•"Leros Strength" had been through the ESP.

• "Leros Strength" had been classed by RINA, the Italian classification society and an
accredited member of IACS

• Transfer of "Leros Strength" from the American Bureau of Shipping had conformed to all
reporting requirements laid down by IACS.

Just a few weeks later the bulker "Albion Two" was discovered broken in two on the seabed some 70
miles west of the tip of Brittany. She is now the grave of 25 men. She had been through the ESP.
When the sinking of a deliberately scuttled, loaded bulk carrier ("Gallant Dragon") takes six seconds,
when a 22 year old bulker ("Trade Daring") simply snaps in two alongside whilst loading, when plates
peel away from ships' sides, and when, over a period of only eighteen I months, the deaths number
nearly 300, with thousands over two decades .... then we think we are justified in demanding of
IACS, and all who help keep these old bulker carriers in circulation; take more positive action,
because the measures you have taken so far are clearly not enough.

NEW CRITERIA

In December 1996 IACS ratified its decision requiring the corrugated bulkhead between holds No. 1
and No. 2 and the double bottom structure in way of No. 1 hold, to meet new criteria for single skin
bulk carriers of 150 m in length or over, being, at the same time, fifteen years or more in age, and
likely to carry cargo that includes material of bulk density lt/m3 or more. 

This requirement was shaped by statistical indication that tonnage over fifteen years old was most at
risk, and hold No. 1 was most likely to flood - making the corrugated transverse bulkhead between
holds 1 and 2 the most structurally vulnerable. (Some 40% of the bulker losses involved water
ingress to No. 1 hold). But, again, given the vast data banks of the classification societies, why did
it appear to us that John Jubb, Welding Consultant, beat the whole maritime regulatory system to the
draw on this one, when he was promoting awareness of the relative fragility of these connections
during talks he gave (and still gives) on "Derbyshire"' and bulk carriers, generally?

We believe most fifteen year old bulkers cannot be made safe without spending more than the ship
is worth. Tinkering about with bulkheads could even prolong the sickness by creating the impression
that something positive is being done. You cannot make a silk purse out of an old sow's ear.

We believe all bulk carriers should be scrapped on their fifteenth 'birthday', unless the owner makes
specific appeal on the grounds that his ship is well above average condition for her age. If the owner
does so appeal there should be an initial and relatively cursory inspection by an independent suitably
qualified professional to check whether the ship in fac t tallies with her owner's optimistic assessment.
If it does there should be a further inspection, this time of a thorough and rigorous nature, using the
most sophisticated crack detecting and weardown measuring instruments available. The ship would
be taken out of service for as long as the inspectors 'considered necessary. It would be for the owner
to ensure his ship was brought to such condition as would best facilitate such survey.

This second survey would be carried out by an International Maritime Organisation (IMO), or IMO
appointed, team. (It is envisaged the IMO would be "empowered" as in point 10 of the 30 point
presentation attached). And we would suggest an owner be assisted with his survey costs should
such IMO team agree to extending the life of his 15+ bulker, monies being taken from an IMO
centrally administered fund created with levied contributions from the shipping industry and the
marine insurance industry - both of which stand to gain from this policy in the long term.

The policy puts the onus on the shipowner and, if he believes his ship warrants it, encourages him
to avail himself of such option. Conversely the rust bucket, cowboy will have little choice but to cut
his losses (and, as a happy incidental, the seafarers' death rate in bulk carriers) by sending his ship
to the scrapyard where he can at least get the price other metal.

IACS may be making moves in the right direction, but the loss of "Leros Strength" and "Albion Two"
do not inspire confidence in the effectiveness of those moves. More, much more, needs to be done.
Old bulk carriers - rundown ships generally - are a global problem requiring a global strategy. Self
regulation has failed; a radical, new approach is needed.

We believe safety at sea can be enhanced, and enhanced quickly, but it would require the
implementation of '"people orientated" policies, and these days such a bias is out of fashion. It
would require safety first, commerce second.

We are certain that once such policies have been established, such commerce as grows out of the
new regime will be on sounder and more profitable footing. And not in spite of, but because safety is
the first consideration.

Some may think us arrogant for taking upon ourselves to advise the maritime establishment.
Indeed we know we have entered territory that should rightly be occupied by others - but now
we’re here, we've looked around, and we seem to be on our own.

PROPOSALS - 30 POINT PLAN

So - here is our 30 point plan to make things better ...

1. Damage arising from possible design flaws in a ship should be promulgated by M.

Notice, or other means, to alert others in similar ship type to their potential danger.

2. Should any party not so broadcast such possible danger, it shall count as having
recklessly endangered life and attract meet penalty

3. An International Ship Data Base (ISDB) should be established to record the salient
details of every ship. It should be managed by the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO).

4. There should be a basic "core record" for each ship, and this core would reflect those
conditions against which a good maritime insurance company would set its judgment as
to what constitutes a "good risk". For example, criteria would include: ship's age;
condition at last survey; history of insurance claims/accidents; number and nationality of
crew; qualifications.

5. Anyone should have access to ISDB information provided they can prove good intent to
the IMO. For example, parties engaged in safety exercises should have unimpeded
access, but where suspicion of seeking knowledge to secure, say, commercial
advantage over rivals exists, the IMO would have to be cir***spect to greater degree.
(Charges for information should be only that necessary to cover costs. There is
philosophy behind the ISDB such that seeking to profit by it would compromise it as a
"lifesaver").

6. Anyone having knowledge of what he/she considers to be a dangerous defect in a ship
should have the right to cause such defect to be appropriately recorded with the ISDB.
Should the IMO refuse to so record such alleged defect then the IMO should give to the
complainant its written reasons. Such response would then, potentially, have the force
of a legal do***ent and a copy would be retained by the IMO.

7. Similarly, if an applicant is refused details he/she has requested from the ISDB, and
same applicant is not satisfied with the IMO verbal explanation for refusal, then same
applicant should be given a written letter detailing the reason(s) for such refusal.

8. The criteria as to what constitutes a seaworthy ship must be agreed between: the IMO.
the marine insurance industry, maritime regulators, seafarers, seafarers' unions and
professional bodies (e.g. Nautical Institute), ship-builders, shipowners and naval
architects. In the event of disagreement the final arbiters would be the IMO in
collaboration with the marine insurance industry.

9. There should be global standardisation of rules and regulations governing the building
and operation of ships in order to stop the downward spiral of safety standards caused
by solely profit relat ed flag of convenience 'standards'.

10. The IMO, presently responsible for formulating and bringing to ratification, rules and
regulations, should also be responsible for the implementation, and then policing, of
such rules and regulations.

11. Where safety is concerned (e.g. reserves of stability in a damaged roro, or the current
unacceptable rate of bulk carrier losses and associated deaths) there should be an
agreed "fast track" towards implementation of necessary measures.

12. The classification society system is failing to protect life at sea to satisfactory level; it
should be ended - along with the shipping industry's over reliance generally on self
regulation. No replacement system should be profit orientated, inter-classification
society competition having helped to drive standards down to present state.

13. Respective governments should 'take charge of issuing all licences and certificates
through different shipping levels - from certifying the seafarer's qualifications to granting
licence for a shipping company's formation.

14. Governments should ensure that the responsibility for both promoting and regulating
the shipping industry does not reside with the same Government (or Government
appointed) Department. (This has been done in the off shore UK oil industry. After the
Piper Alpha explosion safety matters were removed from the Department of Energy
and given to the Health and Safety Executive).

15. The current UK ship accident investigation body is the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch of the Department of Transport. It cannot be seen as truly independent; there
should be a Civil Maritime Authority (analogous to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA))
recognised by all parties as being professionally impartial, and the CMA alone would
make official investigation post accident.

16. Such CMA would count as "any party" within the context of point 2 of this presentation.

17. An individual, or a board of directors, should be named as being solely responsible for
the efficient running of the ship(s) within their company, and an address should be
given. Such address being the place where the responsible party can be accessed at
all times by anybody having legitimate cause for enquiry. This should be a condition of
their licence to operate as a shipping company.

18. Every ship must be appropriately insured and carry proof of insurance.

19. Underwriters should accelerate moves to update actuarial practice (still rooted in the
days of Samual Plimsoll) and simplify procedures after an accident. In associated legal
proceedings, lawyers unnecessarily complicating or drawing out cases would be named
and fined.

20. If, during insurance related, legal, or any other proceedings, there emerges information
with the capacity to enhance safety elsewhere, that information shall be promulgated as
per points 1 and 2 of this presentation.
Confidentiality or other judicious precaution shall, as far as possible protect the
interests of parties specific to the case, but, whatever, the promulgation of such
information must take precedence.

21. When standards have been internationally agreed they must be treated as minimum;
enhancement above the benchmark should be encouraged.
For example, the UK DOT cites roros as meeting the highest standards - and they do. But
presently agreed standards, where they address matters of reserve buoyancy and
stability in the event of accident, are themselves too low.
Again, the US has decreed above minimum standards for the construction of tankers
sailing in US waters, in deference to environmental safety. This has pushed up general
standards as owners anticipating trade with the US have to meet those US standards.
Also, a ship not complying with these enhanced standards would lose resale value vis a
vis one that did.

22. Anyone having legitimate cause for concern over matters relating to safety should
never be discouraged from expressing such concern for fear of adverse consequences.
Any party threatening such adverse consequence in order to protect their own position,
or for any other reason, should be severely penalised.

23. A system for the confidential reporting of "near misses" (akin to that run by the CAA)
should be established internationally. (The Nautical Institute runs such a scheme
voluntarily; it could serve as a model).

24. The location of ''Derbyshire" 2.8 miles down demonstrates that a sh»p need never bi?
"lost" again - only "missing pending location".
Where a foundering has similar controversial connotations to "Derbyshire's" case, or
where forensic examination of the wreckage could usefully add to the store of scientific
maritime knowledge, then such wreckage investigation should proceed under the
authority of the CMA proposed in point 15 of this presentation. Findings should be made
public in every case, or, if there is compelling reason for secrecy, such reason should be
given as fully as possible. The usual''.... It will not serve the public interest..." will no
longer be acceptable.

25. Following such wreck examination by the CMA there should first be published the CMA
findings; but these should be regarded in the first instance as 'draft' only; responses
from various and acknowledged expert individuals and organisations shall be fully
considered and the draft, if appropriate, amended and published in 'final' version.
Where there is disagreement between parties this should be noted with, as appropriate,
explanations to support opposing views to those published in the body of the final version,
and such views shall be published as an annex to and integral part of same final CMA
publication. (In event of similar accident this will alert parties involved to all likelihood.
Such a mechanism, had it been in place, would have long ago accelerated moves to
improve bulk carrier safety and saved many hundreds of lives).

26. The proposed CMA should undertake the monitoring of quality control at shipyards,
mainly by un-announced spot checks. Regular reports on the different yards should be
sent to the IMO by the CMA (and its equivalent in other countries, using the same
criteria by which to make judgment).
The IMO should publish the names of any shipbuilders who fall so short of good practice
as to compromise safety.

27. If inspection of a ship reveals evidence of bad practices at her builders (for example,
welding rods, found during repairs, which were used in the building as ‘fillers’ in a weld),
then it should be investigated by the CMA and the builders brought to account.
In each such event the CMA would report to the IMO, and as soon as possible where the
CMA judges other contemporaneously built ships from the same yard could have been
similarly the subject of bad practice.

28. Records of all shipyard related reports should be retained by the IMO, and yards should
be aware that bad practices could adversely affect future cases involving ships built at
their yards, especially in legal context.

29. If statistics alone indicate patterns giving cause for concern (e.g. excessive losses in
the older sections of the bulk carrier fleet, and in the fishing fleet) then this should be
sufficient reason for the IMO to mount appropriate investigations. Any protests resulting
from such initiative should be made in writing, and protesters should be aware that
attempts to compromise safety, by seeking excessive accommodation of factors
conducive to profit for example, would meet with severe penalties.
(Again, had such facility been in place 10 years ago hundreds of lives would have been
saved).

30. The IMO alone, using its ISDB and established ground rules, shall' -decide what
constitutes "fair treatment", and then it will ensure global implementation of same.


Paul Lambert Captain Dave Ramwell
Chairperson Cheshire, UK

MV Derbyshire Families Association
Liverpool, United Kingdom.


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## jmcg

Let us all remember the Master & his crew of Derbyshire on the 33rd anniversary of their deaths next Monday 9th September.

RIP all - never forgotten.

J


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## alastairrussell

SS Schenectady

From The Wikipedia Website

Although she was an oil tanker she is a good read and remember that the early liberty ships suffered from the same problem. Alastair

Name: Schenectady 
Owner: War Shipping Administration 
Ordered: 24 March 1942 
Builder: Kaiser Shipyards 
Cost: $2,700,000 
Yard number: 1 
Laid down: 1 July 1942 
Launched: 24 October 1942 
Sponsored by: Mrs Alex B. McEachern 
Completed: 31 December 1942 

General characteristics

Class & type: T2 tanker 
Type: T2-SE-A1 
Tonnage: 10,448 GRT / 16,613 DWT 
Length: 523 ft (159 m) 
Beam: 68 ft (21 m) 
Installed power: 6,000 hp (4,500 kW) 
Speed: 15 knots (28 km/h) 
Range: 12,600 nautical miles (14,500 mi; 23,300 km) 

The SS Schenectady was a T2-SE-A1 tanker built during World War II for the United States Maritime Commission.

She was the first tanker constructed by the Kaiser Shipbuilding Company shipyard at Swan Island in Portland, Oregon.[1] The keel of the Schenectady was laid on 1 July 1942, the completed hull launched on 24 October, and she was declared completed on 31 December, six months after construction began and two and a half months ahead of schedule.[2]

Hull fracture[edit]

On 16 January 1943, she was moored at the fitting dock at Swan Island, in calm weather, shortly after returning from her sea trials. Without warning, and with a noise audible for at least a mile, the hull cracked almost in half, just aft of the superstructure. The cracks reached down the port and starboard sides almost to the keel, which itself fractured, jackknifing upwards out of the water as the bow and stern sagged to the bottom of the river. Only the bottom plates of the ship held. This was not the first of the war-built merchant fleet to fracture in this way – there had been ten other major incidents, and several more would follow – but it was perhaps the most prominent; it occurred in full view of the city of Portland, and was widely reported in the newspapers even under wartime conditions.[3]

The cause of the fracture was not fully understood at the time; the official Coast Guard report gave the cause of failure as faulty welding, whilst the Board of Investigation considered factors as diverse as "locked-in" stresses, sharp changes in climate, or systemic design flaws. Defective welding became the most common explanation for these incidents, especially when later investigations uncovered faulty working practices at some yards, but even then it could only be clearly identified as the case in under half of all major fracture cases. Later research indicated that the failure method was probably a brittle fracture, caused by low-grade steel. This would become highly brittle in cold weather, exacerbating any existing faults and becoming much more liable to fracture.[3]

Later service[edit]

She was repaired and successfully entered service in April 1943.[1]

Details of her exact service are unclear, but it is known that she sailed from California on June 10, 1944, possibly for service as a fleet oiler. During the next year, she sailed to Australia, the Persian Gulf, New Zealand, the Marshall Islands, then Curaçao, back through the Panama Canal to the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Admiralty Islands and finally Ulithi, before returning home to San Pedro, arriving on May 20, 1945. She participated in battle engagements in the Marshall Islands and at Ulithi.[4]

Following the war, she was transferred to the National Defense Reserve Fleet in July 1946.[5] In 1948, she was sold to the Diodato Tripcovich Shipping Corporation in Trieste, and renamed as Diodato Tripcovich. She was finally scrapped in Genoa in 1962.[6]

References[edit]

1.^ Jump up to: a b Fingering The S. S. Schenectady, Portland Communique. May 20, 2005.
2.Jump up ^ Database entry at us-maritime-commission.de
3.^ Jump up to: a b Thompson, Peter (2001). "How Much Did the Liberty Shipbuilders Learn? New Evidence for an Old Case Study". The Journal of Political Economy (The University of Chicago Press) 109 (1): 103–137. doi:10.1086/318605. JSTOR 3078527.
4.Jump up ^ Notes made in the statement of fact in the case of Carmichael v. Delaney, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 18 October 1948. Quoted on p.271 of International Law Reports, by H. Lauterpacht & Christopher J. Greenwood. Cambridge University Press, 1951. Online edition
5.Jump up ^ Database entry at PMARS.
6.Jump up ^ Database entry at Auke Visser's Famous T-Tankers Pages


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## alastairrussell

*Great News from IMO they are doing a great Job! (From Their Website)* 

Alastair


Goal-Based Standards (GBS) verification process is underway

Briefing: 2, January 3, 2014 

​Goal-based ship construction standards (GBS) audit teams will be established to verify construction rules for bulk carriers and oil tankers 

IMO audit teams will shortly be established to verify construction rules for bulk carriers and oil tankers of classification societies which act as recognized organizations (ROs), following the receipt of requests for verification by the 31 December 2013 deadline. 

A new SOLAS regulation II-1/3-10 on Goal-based ship construction standards (GBS) for bulk carriers and oil tankers was adopted by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eighty-seventh session in May 2010, by resolution MSC.290(87). This regulation, which entered into force on 1 January 2012, requires that all oil tankers and bulk carriers of 150 m in length and above, for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 July 2016, satisfy applicable structural requirements conforming to the functional requirements of the International Goal-based Ship Construction Standards for Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers (GBS Standards) (resolution MSC.287(87)). 

Under the GBS Standards, construction rules for bulk carriers and oil tankers of classification societies which act as recognized organizations (ROs) or national Administrations will be verified, based on the Guidelines for verification of conformity with goal-based ship construction standards for bulk carriers and oil tankers (resolution MSC.296(87)) (GBS Guidelines). According to the timetable approved by MSC 87, the deadline for the receipt by IMO of initial verification requests from classification societies was 31 December 2013. 

In support of the Committee’s request that the verification process should be conducted as efficiently as possible, the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has delivered its Common Package 1 comprising various IACS requirements to support the requests from its member societies.

Based on the requests for verification audits, the IMO Secretariat will establish GBS Audit Teams as soon as possible, to conduct audits for verification of the subject construction rules. The outcome of the audits will be submitted to the MSC in May 2016 at the latest and, if approved by the MSC, those construction rules will be applied to bulk carriers and oil tankers to be built on or after 1 July 2016. 

On 20 December 2013, IMO Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu met with the Chairman of IACS, Mr. Roberto Cazzulo, Chairman of RINA Services, who confirmed that the IACS Council had adopted new harmonised Common Structural Rules (CSR) for oil tankers and bulk carriers, which will be presented to IMO for GBS verification as its Common Package 2, by the end of June 2014. 

Commenting on the above developments, Mr. Sekimizu expressed his satisfaction with the timely and efficient manner in which the GBS verification process was being progressed, as instructed by the Maritime Safety Committee. 
___ 

IMO – the International Maritime Organization – is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. 

*Web site: www.imo.org
*
Photo collection: 
Flickr: http://www.flickr.com/photos/imo-un/collections 

Join us on our social media sites: 
Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/imohq 
Twitter: http://twitter.com/imohq you can also find us: @imohq 
YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/user/IMOHQ 

For further information please contact:
Lee Adamson, Head, Public Information Services on 020 7587 3153 ([email protected])
Natasha Brown, External Relations Officer on 020 7587 3274 ([email protected]).


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## alastairrussell

Read a highly technical and informative article in the May (2014) edition of the magazine 'Shipping – Today and Yesterday'. Its a feature article by Mark Rowbotham under the title ' The Evolution and Nature of the Bulk Carrier'.

I left the sea in 1985 and was not aware that the problems with Bulk Carriers went on into the early 90's. All I heard was that BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto had refused to load iron ore onto bulk carriers older than 15 years in Port Hedland!


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## alastairrussell

Let us all remember that today, 25 June 2014 is the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) *Day of the Seafarer *


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## ben27

good day alastairrussell.sm.25th march,2013.11:33.#626,re:a list of bulk carriers that have suffered structual failure.i was reading this old tread and came across your post.re captain my captain by walt whitman.a fine poem.thank you for posting.regards ben27


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## chadburn

The problem of Hull cracking seems to be at the forefront again this time with Container Ships as to Hull design/ build problem or a loading problem. Court proceedings seem to be in the offing regarding MHL.


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## alastairrussell

To Chadburn and Ben 27


If you go into Jack Devanney's book ' Tankships Tromedy ' (it can be read on his website) and go to Page 59 you can read the following in his chapter on the Kirki ( see below).

I am a great fan of Jacks especially with his push for twin screwing large highly valued and risky ships. I have served on a number of twin screw reefer ships way back in the 60's and we were always able to keep the ship underway on one engine while repairing the other ! 

Having been a boiler and a pressure vessel risk management specialist in the past I just cannot understand how any marine insurance organization could carry the risk on these new ultra large container ships carrying a very high value cargo in say 18000 containers on a ship propelled by one propeller, one tail shaft and one single 14 cylinder cathedral diesel engine in this day and age. Crazy! Crazy! Crazy! 

My two Guru's on whom I have relied on during my battle against substandard bulk carriers will always be Jack Devanney from USA and Captain Pierre Woinin from Belgium. It upsets to me to see my favourite book on the subject which is Jacks 'Tankships Tromedy' being attacked in 2006 by someone from the shipping establishment in an article in the Lloyds List newspaper. 

No mention was made in William O Grays letter to the LL newspaper about the free surface affect problems on Ro Ro ships, the static electricity problems when water washing cargo tanks on the new ultra large tankers or the corrosion and hull structural problems in the bulk carriers and tankers. These were bad years for all seafarers and can William O Gray not see that the western world were dumping their tired, corroded and structurally unsound ships into Asian areas to be crewed by inexperience and underpaid third world crews.


From Jack's book

_9.
44 The Australians were among the first to lose confidence in the IMO/FOC/Class
triumverate. The parliamentary report, “Ships of Shame” issued in December, 1992 is
a trenchant critique of the Tromedy.[74] This investigation was mainly motivated by the
loss of six bulk carriers in rapid succession off Australia. But the Kirki must have played
some part in Australian thinking.

45 The Japanese report also criticized the crew for not using a loading pattern that
would have placed less stress on the ship. But the report admits that the pattern the ship
used was perfectly legal, and, if it weren’t for the corrosion, the ship would have been
unscathed. The crew has the right to expect that, if it uses a legal loading pattern, the
ship will be safe. The Tromedy is unable to overlook any opportunity to blame-the-crew._


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## chadburn

Thanks Alastair(Thumb)


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## alastairrussell

Google 'MV Kirki' and read the input by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority on the structural failure of the ship and the difficulties they had off the West Australian coast to reduce the oil spillage.

Please note the photos of the ballast tank corrosion and the fact that Singapore did the right thing and took the wreck into their port to break her up. This would not have happened in Europe


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## chadburn

I will do that Alastair


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## chadburn

G.L. Seemed to have been very negligent (Patched Tank With canvas and painted to disguise) mind you that's an old trick! Badly maintained vessel had not been surveyed correctly by anybody it seems.


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## alastairrussell

Please Google 'Australia' s Ships of Shame' and read and also Jack Devanney's 'Tankship Tromedy' and read.

Alastair



Austalia warns against “ships of shame” – Kirki


Also on the other side of the globe, the experience with the standard of foreign ships gave rise to serious concern.

The anger in Australia culminated on July 21, 1991, when the bow section simply fell off a rusty Greek registered tanker, Kirki, while en route from the Arabian Gulf. She was loaded with 82,000 tons of light crude when she collapsed. The coast of Western Australia and its marine environment faced a major pollution risk that was only narrowly averted. In the event the lives of the crewmembers were put at risk, but with good luck and a major salvage operation, the crew was rescued and the ship saved.

Together with the loss in close succession of six bulk carriers in the same waters between January 1990 and August 1991, Kirki resulted in an inquiry from the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport. The report, which was presented in December 1992, carried the name “Ships of Shame.” Kirki, owned by the Thenamaris group, was nicely painted whilst her tanks were horribly corroded. Rust was camouflaged with canvas. The committee pointed out that Kirki was in class with a reputable classification society and had been regularly inspected. Yet the tanker suffered a major structural failure because of corrosion which had gone undetected by all responsible parties including the classification society, Germanischer Lloyd, the ship’s managers and the charterers.

The committee turned its focus on the classification societies and made the point that the industry is unusual in the sense that these societies, which are used to regulate the world fleet, are subject to the same market forces as shipowners. Whilst being responsible for safety at sea, the societies have to maintain market share to be commercially viable. The basic dilemma that it is the shipowner who selects and pays his regulator – the classification society – for its services was not expressly mentioned. More diplomatically, the committee focused on the wide variance in the quality of classification societies that allowed irresponsible tanker owners to cut corners with respect to investments in safety.

A small consolation to the tanker industry is shown in the findings that the dry bulk industry standards were found to be worse. The Australian committee stated:

“It is generally recognised that the conditions of oil tankers is better than dry bulk carriers. … It is evident that, with the new leadership, the IMO is becoming more active. The recent initiative of the Secretary General in having bulk carrier safety addressed is an indication of a refreshing change of attitude within IMO. … This attitude must be encouraged.”

In this connection it was pointed out that between 1988 and 1991, 47 dry bulk carriers sank, with a loss of 381 lives. In 1991 alone, 19 of these carriers sank, with a loss of 149 lives.

The Committee recognized that while IMO had proven an effective forum for setting standards, it had generally been ineffective in ensuring the observation of the same standards. Thereby it repeated the message that Sir Yue Kong Pao had sent to IMO from Helsinki 11 years earlier. The considerations in the report also included a reference to the continued crisis in the shipping industry with substantial overcapacity, which enabled the charterers – including the oil companies – to press freight rates to levels below what was required to maintain decent quality for marine transportation:

“In response to commercial pressure, substandard ship-owners/managers are accepting lower freight rates, leaving responsible ship/owners/managers that are unable to operate at the lower freight rates with a declining market share. … Where maintenance is not carried out it may be a case of the captain and crew not being provided with the necessary resources rather than poor onboard procedures.”

It was found that the continued depression in the market place also had resulted in considerable pressure by the shipowner on the master. Such pressure could include maintaining speed in heavy weather conditions to meet deadlines set by the oil charterers, in which case the Captain was reduced to “merely the driver of a ship, rather than its master.”

The inquiry into ship safety undertaken by the Australian Parliamentary Committee revealed a better understanding of the market forces than seen within other governmental quarters prior to Erika, which grounded seven years after the inquiry was published.

When Kirki experienced structural failure, Australia had not taken steps to ratify many IMO conventions, yet the report concluded that international co-operation was the most effective lasting solution to ship safety problems. Disaster was never far away, and prevention of pollution of the sea is a far better option than cure. IMO, flag states, port states, classification societies, shipowners and managers, crews, insurance underwriters, charterers and cargo owners all need to participate if shortand long-term solutions were to bear positive results. The possibility of unilateral Australian action was considered, but rejected: “What concerns the Committee is that ships which are now inappropriate for the US trade will operate in those areas which are less capable of regulating them. This situation would not improve the ship safety problem as much as pass it on to those nations least able to do something about it.” Australia’s representation at IMO should be strengthened by the inclusion of industry and trade delegates with relevant experience.

In a widely published message to IMO and the oil industry, INTERTANKO once more appealed – this time through its new chairman, Mr. Suzuki, Mitsui OSK (Japan):

“accidents happen not due to lack of regulation but due to lack of compliance with the existing rules. … Quality must be paid for – in shipping as in other industries. The oil companies continue to declare their preference for first class tankers, but their chartering departments often pursue a different strategy. In the spot market, the cheapest rust bucket is often treated as the market leader – the rate setter! The oil industry’s chartering conditions should induce compliance with conventions. Today, however, this is not always the case. … If charterers pay a premium for quality, they also pay a premium for a better marine environment and, not least, the aging tanker fleet would be renewed on a sound financial basis. Governments can contribute to this renewal process by resisting pressure to over regulate the industry. … Overregulation would detract from existing standards and, once again, would push quality tonnage into an unfavourable market position. This, in turn, would delay much-needed fleet renewal.”

Notes:
Seigo Suzuki’s statement is found in Lloyd’s List, July 2, 1991.
On Kirki, see the above mentioned report “Ships of Shame” from the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport to the Parliament in December 1992, pp. xxi, xvii, 1, 2, 27-29, 32 and 75.
See also Jack Devanney: “The Tankship Tromedy,” Florida, 2006, pp. 56-57.


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## alastairrussell

*Please note that this was written in 1992.

Regards 

Alastair

Safety warnings over cargo ship defects 'ignored': Unsafe maritime practices and structural faults are blamed for the sinking of 27 bulk carriers. Arlen Harris and Jason Bennetto report 
Friday 24 July 1992 
* 


Note: We do not store your email address(es) but your IP address will be logged to prevent abuse of this feature. Please read our Legal Terms & Policies 

SHIPOWNERS are ignoring safety warnings about defects in cargo vessels, which have been blamed for the sinking of 27 bulk carriers and the deaths of more than 300 men in the past two and a half years. 

Surveyors still find vessels with serious corrosion and structural damage despite warnings to owners by international safety groups, led by Lloyd's Register of London. Some owners avoid inspection by using unscrupulous regulatory authorities in the Third World.

So far this year there have been six serious incidents in which three bulk carriers have sunk. Not all sinkings can be blamed on individual owners, but a worrying body of evidence is growing of unsafe practices in the maritime industry and structural faults in the ships.

Bulk carriers, which transport dry cargo, in particular iron ore and coal, are the workhorses of the ocean and designed to survive the worst conditions. In May this year the Great Eagle, a bulk carrier transporting iron ore, sank in the Indian Ocean after its hull mysteriously cracked.

The Karadeniz S was abandoned on 30 March west of Gibraltar after the engine room flooded. The vessel, which was carrying iron ore and was registered in Turkey, sank on 1 April. The 75,000-ton Arisan, built in 1974 and registered in Panama, ran aground off Norway while transporting 133,000 tons of iron ore to the Netherlands. It sank on 12 January after it broke in half.

Some bulk carriers, or 'bulkers', have disappeared without trace in calm water. Up to 1,000 feet long (300 metres) and weighing up to 170,000 tons, they have sunk in less than a minute. A record number of bulk carriers sank in 1991. Thirty-seven per cent of the tonnage lost in that year was bulkers, which make up about a quarter of the world's sea-going tonnage. There have also been more than 200 incidents of carriers being damaged since 1990. Among the ships that sank were vessels managed by British companies carrying cargo to British ports, including Port Talbot.

The Protektor, an 80,000-ton carrier built in 1967, sank off Newfoundland in heavy seas while transporting iron ore. All 33 crew died on 11 January 1990. The crew, mainly Indian and Pakistani, were supplied by Wallem Ship Management, a British company based in Hong Kong. Jacoub Ismael was an officer on the Protektor. His death left his wife Rafia, his mother, and four children in poverty in Karachi, Pakistan. The family says compensation has been agreed, but no money has yet been paid.

The maritime industry started to become aware of the problem with bulkers in 1989. Lloyd's Register, the British classification society that provides ships with an ocean-going 'MoT', issued warnings in 1990 and early 1991 to shipowners and port authorities. The dangers highlighted in the ageing fleet of bulk carriers included corrosion in cargo holds, lack of proper inspections, and damage caused by incorrect loading. Other authorities criticised the use of cheap, poorly trained crews.

A master mariner who worked on bulk carriers for more than five years said: 'Some bulkers should have been sent to the scrap-heap a long time ago. Although there's a much greater awareness of the dangers, it does not mean the number of dangerous vessels has been reduced - they are being nursed along.' He was aware of several classification societies willing to turn a blind eye to substandard bulkers. 'You only have to go to some societies with a bottle of whisky - it works wonders.'

He added that shipowners put pressure on bulk carriers' crew to spend as little time as possible loading and unloading.

The scraping action of cargo grabs, weighing up to 35 tons, and the use of bulldozers to shift ore, have been blamed for weakening vessels' structure. The speed at which the cargo is loaded can also cause strain on the hull. The corrosive effects of chemicals in ore and coal are also believed to play a part in weakening hulls.

A worrying development is the suggestion that the corrosion problems may also be affecting oil tankers. This follows the sinking of the Katin P off the coast of Mozambique in April this year. The 70,000-ton tanker, built in 1966, was damaged in a storm and went down spilling several thousand tons of oil. A naval architect estimated that only 40 per cent strength was left in the deck.

The demand for iron ore and coal has slumped because of the world recession, leaving many owners desperate for business and willing to cut costs. The average age of ships that have been lost is nearly 20 years. A spokesman for the Salvage Association said: 'Shipowners are not earning enough to build new ships, so they are extending the life of vessels which would normally be considered for scrapping.'

Professor Ken Rawson, chairman of the Royal Institute of Naval Architects' safety committee, said: 'The shipowners have a lot of influence because their representatives sit on classification committees and they have a powerful financial clout.'

The International Association of Classification Societies, whose 14 members make up less than a third of societies in the world - although they include all the biggest organisations - is holding an inquiry into the bulk carrier problem. James Bell, the IACS secretary, said its surveyors carried out a major inspection on the carriers once every five years. He said there was no control over organisations that are not members of IACS and this was a cause for concern. 'Some of these organisations are bound to be less scrupulous about their checking procedures and conditions.'

Another method of cutting costs is for owners to register their ships with a country whose rules are less stringent - the 'flag of convenience' ship.

The International Maritime Organisation, the United Nations body which oversees world shipping, is also carrying out an investigation into the problem and recommendations have been made to member countries. A spokesman said: 'In some cases the port operations are still believed to be a major problem, as is corrosion and the sheer age of the fleet.'

None of the recommendations made by Lloyd's Register and the IMO is mandatory.

Among the ships to sink in 1991 were two that were chartered on behalf of British Steel bringing iron ore to Port Talbot. Manila Transporter, a 16-year-old bulker, was abandoned by its Filipino crew after they discovered water in the hold. It sank off Mauritius in July 1991. In August, 26 people died when the Melete, a 16-year- old vessel built in Sunderland, sank 250 miles off Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.

British Steel, which charters 60 per cent of its ships, refused to comment on the two cases. A spokesman said: 'The ship's condition is the responsibility of the supplier. British Steel have asked for quality ships, the suppliers are aware of our concern and what needs to be done.'

Norway, Canada and Australia are so concerned that they have increased the number of inspections. Since January, the Norwegian government's maritime inspection department has detained up to 10 ships after discovering serious structural faults, including rusty hulls, defective lifeboats and corroded steel supports in the cargo holds.

Bruce Farthing, director of Intercargo, an international association which represents owners and managers of more than 1,000 dry bulk carriers, said safety improvements were being made. He pointed to the fall in the number of sunken ships this year as evidence of success. He said: 'One of the problems is there's a tendency for cargo owners to go for the cheapest deal, which can create a vicious circle.'

(Photograph omitted)


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## alastairrussell

*Improving the safety of bulk carriers

*
A study by the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) found that a typical midsize bulk carrier should survive all one-hold flooding so long as
the ship is not suffering from metal wastage and undetected cracks but flooding of any two holds would have disastrous consequences.

The dangers with two holds flooding

Bulk carrier losses in the early 1990s were dramatic: ships sank rapidly, often with the loss
of all lives. Many were old and had suffered structural damage.

A study by IACS(International Association of Classification Societies) found that after flooding in the foremost hold, the bulkhead between this hold and the adjacent hold can collapse from the pressure of cargo and water, leading to progressive flooding and sinking.

Water enters hold No.1 through faulty hatch cover, collision, corroded hullplating or other reason. Weight of water and cargo in hold No.1 forces the transverse watertight bulkhead to collapse

Hold No.2 fill with water Ship sinks as soon as holds 1 and 2 are flooded. Structural failure and flooding Holds 1 & 2 or 2 & 3: Ship sinks rapidly, no time for crew to abandon ship.

Holds 6 & 7: Submergence of the after deck and possible catastrophic down-flooding in the engine room. Remaining holds: Sagging, which could cause structural failure, especially if the ship is poorly maintained.

Loading instrument Equipment to be fitted to monitor the stresses during loading and unloading operations. 

Existing ships The bulkhead between holds 1 and 2 and the double bottom of hold 1 must be strengthened to withstand flooding in hold 1 unless loading restrictions are imposed.

Enhanced surveys Enhanced programme of inspections to detect potential structural weakness and areas of corrosion.

Conveyor belts (severalkilometres long) often overload ships. Huge grabs (up to 36 tons), bulldozers and hydraulic hammers used for unloading can cause structural damage.


In November 1997 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a new Chapter XII on bulkcarrier to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974. The new rules
cover survivability and structural requirements for bulk carriers of 150 metres and upwards to prevent them from sinking if water enters the ship for any reason. IMO also adopted revised guidelines on enhanced surveys of bulk carriers and a code of practice for safer loading and unloading.

Restrictions on carriage of cargoes 

Existing bulk carriers which meet the new structural requirements by means of loading restrictions must be marked with a solid equilateral triangle on the hull at midships below the deck line.


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## alastairrussell

*Australia spells out ship bans

*Zoe Reynolds 

03 March 2015



The notice highlights wages, crew welfare, fatigue management, and unsound navigation practices, especially while transiting the Great Barrier Reef as issues leading to detentions and bans. 


The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has released a Marine Order detailing its 'three strikes and you're out' policy for ships breaching international safety and labour standards.

'Directions and refusal of access to Australian ports' details AMSA's newfound powers under the Navigation Act 2012.

AMSA may refuse a ship access to Australian ports if it has a poor port state control (PSC) record or there are concerns about its vessel operator.

The notice warns shipowners of a three-month ban on a vessel if it returns to Australia without carrying out corrective action required after having three detentions in the past two years.

Vessels that have been barred for three months, then return only to be detained again within two years are banned for a further 12 months.

If still found to breach safety and labour laws upon return, AMSA may refuse a vessel entry to Australian ports for a further two years.

The notice highlights wages, crew welfare, fatigue management, and unsound navigation practices, especially while transiting the Great Barrier Reef as issues leading to detentions and bans.

Vessels breaching Australian legislation or with substandard vessel operator management system that poses "a significant risk to the welfare of seafarers, their safety, or Australia's marine environment" can also be expelled from Australian waters.

"A direction resulting from a new detention in Australia will generally have effect as soon as the vessel leaves the Australian port or anchorage following the clearance of the latest detainable deficiency," the notice details.

AMSA, however, says it may allow the vessel access to a specific port in the event of force majeure or overriding safety considerations.

"Specific requirements may be imposed on the owner, operator, or the master of the ship to ensure safe entry in those cir***stances," it says.

Ship management companies or operators are also under the microscope.

"When considering vessel performance, AMSA will also look at the performance of the company as a whole," the notice states.

When the standards of some vessels under an operator are so poor as to cast significant doubt on the standards of other vessels managed by the same company, AMSA may also consider barring other ships in its fleet.

To date, four vessels have been banned from Australian ports - three for three months each (Vega Auriga, Territory Trader, and Meratus Sangatta) and one repeat offender, Red Rover, for 12 months.


To contact the author of this article, email [email protected]


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## Novice 9

On March 8th 1981 the Israeli flagged bulker Mezada sunk in position in position N31º 58'; W062º 55', after No. 1 hutch cover was damaged in heavy seas. The three forward holds rapidly filled with water causing the ship to sink with the loss of 24 lives, 10 lives were saved.
The Mezada built in 1960 by Deutsche Werft - Hamburg IMO 5233755 
In 1965 the ship was lengthened in Japan .


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## Hamish Mackintosh

Nobody has yet explained why the Derbyshire was in so many pieces on the bottom, the book "Return of the coffin ships", points the finger at an internal explosion ?


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## chadburn

Empty Ballast tanks imploded due to the depth. As far as I understand it she rolled over at some point and the M/E fell out taking her Topsides with it as the M/E is not in the Engineroom.


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## alastairrussell

Google 'Derbyshire Sinking Animation' and have look see at the sinking animation made up for one of the Royal commisions into the accident. 

Alastair


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## alastairrussell

*An IMarEST Magazine Article on a Container Ship Hull Structural Failure 
*

Written by Kevin Tester 

The International Association of Classifications Societies (IACS) has received the final report issued by the Committee on Large Container Ship Safety (CLCSS), which was convened by Japanese authorities in the wake of MOL Comfort break up.

The Japanese report concludes that Comfort broke in two because sea loads exceeded the hull girder ultimate strength at the time of the casualty. IACS will now scrutinise the do***ent and its recommendations with a view to sharing its assessment at a later date.

As a matter of fact, IACS inaugurated its own expert group on structural safety of container ships in early 2014, which reviewed the Comfort incident as well as a number of past casualties. This work resulted in the development of two new IACS Unified Requirements (URs), which are due to be finalised in the coming months:

1) UR S11A which is a longitudinal strength standard for containerships;
2) UR S34 dealing with functional requirements for direct analysis by Finite Element Method of containerships, including a set of loading conditions.

It's worth noting the new URs take into account the effect of lateral loads on bi-axial buckling of stiffened panels (a phenomenon preceding loss of ultimate strength as correctly indicated in the report) and whipping on vertical bending strength.

It should be remembered that IACS' Unified Requirements are minimum common technical requirements to be incorporated into the rules of each individual member. They are not intended to address all the strength aspects of hull structures, which remains the function and responsibility of each class society.

MOL Comfort was a 2008-built Bahamian-flagged post-Panamax container ship chartered by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. On 17 June 2013, it broke into two about 200 nautical miles off the coast of Yemen. The aft section sank on ten days later on 27 June and the bow section, after having been destroyed by fire, on 11 July.


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## alastairrussell

*Shipping Casualties 'Lowest in 10 years'*

Safety & Security 

*Shipping casualties ‘lowest in 10 years’
*
Michael Hollmann 

24 March 2015 

The number of shipping losses dropped to a 10-year low last year, according to the third safety and shipping review from German marine insurer Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (AGCS).

Only 75 ships over 100 gt were lost to sinking, grounding, or fire/explosion last year - down 32% on the previous year, AGCS said, making 2014 the "safest year in shipping in 10 years".

The long-term trend looks even better, with last year's level of total losses 41% below the 10-year average of annual total losses (127).

Passenger shipping remains an area of serious concern, though, as highlighted by the ferry casualties of Sewol in South Korea and Norman Atlantic in the Mediterranean, AGCS warned.

"In many cases construction of the vessels is not the only weak point. Both ferry disasters highlighted alarming deficits in contingency planning among crews of ro-ro ferries and passenger ships," said Sven Gerhard, global product leader hull and marine liabilities at AGCS.

The German insurer also repeated its concerns about the familiar issue of increased risk concentration on ever-bigger container ships. With the latest generation of ultra-large ships of more than 19,000 teu, the industry should brace itself for single marine claims exceeding USD1 billion, Gerhard warned.

Following an 80% increase in maximum container ship sizes over the past 10 years, risk management in container shipping might have to be reviewed altogether, he said.

The Allianz subsidiary says it insures 10,500 vessels worldwide as lead or following insurer, logging gross premium income of EUR250million (USD271million) from hull & machinery insurance last year.

To contact the author of this article, email [email protected]


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## alastairrussell

From the Marine Professional Magazine


Test run for new DNV GL class rules 

 Written by Namrata Nadkarni 

DNV GL has announced the launch an external hearing process of its new rule set, which will replace the existing legacy rules in place from the two societies prior to their merger. Over DNV GL 800 customers and stakeholders will receive the classification society's new rules before their publication and entry into force. The structure of the rules are said to complement the typical design process, with 38 Ship Type Class Notations specifically designed to defined give shipyards and designers starting out on a new project an easy entry point.

Geir Dugstad, Head of Division Classification in DNV GL – Maritime said: "One of the areas where we truly believe the rules will set a new standard for the industry is in the hull structure rules. The new advanced load concept is a major step towards a more realistic representation of the environmental loads. Along with our state-of-the-art capacity models, this concept will increase the consistency in the safety level applied for the complete hull structure. In addition, this approach will also accommodate the challenges related to development of novel and unusual designs. They could be a real game changer for our customers."

Once DNV GL has received the feedback from its customers and stakeholders from the hearing, this input will be processed and incorporated into the rules. The launch and publication of the rules is expected to take place in October 2015 and the new DNV GL rules will enter into force on 1 January 2016.


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