# 1920 Steam Coaster - Question about Power of Engine and Likely Speed



## Nswstar2 (Feb 9, 2018)

I'm still pursuing my investigations into the *wreck of the SS Camlough in January of 1932 on the Scottish coast near Monreith during a terrible winter gale which developed quite suddenly.*

I've been trying to plot her travels on that disastrous last voyage. 

Camlough left Belfast around 7 am travelling light 'in ballast' headed for Birkenhead to pick up a load of coal destined for Cork. The weather conditions were very calm for the first part of her journey, though the wind was gradually freshening from the middle of the day.

At 7.45 pm, Camlough experienced engine trouble. The engine was stopped for around a half hour while the crew made temporary repairs - which left her with an engine running under reduced power, and engine room full of steam and other operational problems.

(The suggestion on another thread on this website where I quoted the Chief Engineer from an article in the Belfast News Letter is that one of the cylinders of her triple expansion engine probably failed and the repairs by the crew left her engine running under reduced power from only two cylinders.)

After the repairs to the engine, Camlough attempted to limp back to Belfast under reduced engine power - but the force of the growing storm put the ship under great stress, and although the temporary arrangements were working for some hours, Camlough had lost engine power completely very soon after 7 am the following morning. 

*Camlough was built in 1920 and her details are:

Tonnage Length Breadth Depth Draft
540 grt / 205 nrt / 620 dwt 166.9 ft 26.6 ft 9.9 ft 

Engine builder William Simons & Co. Ltd., Renfrew

Engine detail
1- Screw T.3-cyl. (14", 24" & 40" x 30 ") 89 hp* 

After the repairs, the engine was operating under reduced power and according to The Chief Engineer, the ship made 'good headway' for about four hours, although the gale had been increasing throughout (the were heading West, and the ship was increasingly being being battered by waves on the port side.

Under those conditions, he reported that the ship was 'Travelling at a slow speed, probably about four knots - I believe we did about 15 miles in four hours in spite of the increasing gale.'

This is evidence of how fast Camlough 'travelling light' with her inefficient engine was able to travel in increasingly challenging conditions.

However to put this in perspective, my important background question is:

​*With her engine operating properly, under calm sea conditions, how much distance would a ship of Camlough's specifications be likely to cover in an hour?*

​*This information will be important in trying to estimate how far in her journey the ship had travelled when the engine problem first occurred.
*
Camlough's route of travel from Belfast to Birkenhead took her around the South of the Isle of Man, i.e. around the Calf of Man and the Chicken Rocks.

*I would be very grateful for guidance in estimating what speed Camlough would have been likely to be making on a calm day when an engine of this specification was working properly.* There is no evidence that she was gradually slowing down, instead, it appears that it was an abrupt engine failure.

Many thanks in advance for help in estimating probably travelling speeds.


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## D1566 (Sep 7, 2009)

So many variables; I take it that there is no info about which cylinder of the engine was disabled? If it was the LP cylinder was there provision for direct steam admission to the IP and HP cylinders? (I appreciate that there may be no answer to this!)


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## david freeman (Jan 26, 2006)

Nswstar2 said:


> I'm still pursuing my investigations into the *wreck of the SS Camlough in January of 1932 on the Scottish coast near Monreith during a terrible winter gale which developed quite suddenly.*
> 
> I've been trying to plot her travels on that disastrous last voyage.
> 
> ...


well you ''rock dodgers'', what are you actually asking??? Maybe if you read Lloyds list and attempt to trace the builders/owners trials, when handed over form the yard in Belfast. The ship I would have thought would have had to complete a trail speed for efficiency/power over a nautical mile at maximum output..

On a similar vein I remember sailing on a 12,000dwt tanker lightship and loaded, and on the voyage from Angle bay to Banias and returned to the Isle of Grain: Both times negotiating cape finistare and passage through the staights of gibraltra, the deck department under the master had to seek the most favourable navigable route taking tides and currents into consideration as the vessel could with its 4 stroke H&W BW 6 cylinder in line engine on a calm day could only achieve 10knots and an onion? and was almost at a standstill in certain sea conditions, and rock dodging was the name of the game.


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## wightspirit (Feb 15, 2008)

According to the report of her launch (only one entry found, and nothing regarding trials) she was expected to attain a speed of 11 knots. Source: Belfast Newsletter Saturday 11 December 1920.

Dave W


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## Nswstar2 (Feb 9, 2018)

Yes, there would have been no information about the exact nature of the engine fault which the crew had to do their temporary repairs on. The exact quote from the chief engineer in the Belfast News Letter was:

' We realised that the position was serious and so we worked like neggers to get the engines right, and for this purpose we had to stop for about half an hour to make the disconnections.

'The engine-room was filled with steam, which made matters worse, but the second engineer, the two firemen and myself struggled on. Of course the ship wadrifting then...'

I find myself accepting the chief engineer's later statement in the article that they made 'good headway'...'travelling about 15 miles in four hours at a rate of four knots' - but of course this kind of progress would have become increasingly impossible as the storm became more ferocious (even though the ship wasn't carrying a cargo, only traveling light in ballast).

So understanding the kind of progress the ship made on the earlier part of their journey depends upon my getting an idea of what she might have done with a properly-functioning engine, in calm seas, when travelling 'light'.

Some things I realise will never be fully explained from existing written sources, but the Ships Nostalgia website is invaluable in helping me unpick the details.


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## Nswstar2 (Feb 9, 2018)

Thanks for this insight!


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## Nswstar2 (Feb 9, 2018)

Great! I don't have access to this newspaper account, but I have a friend who has a subsciption to British Historic Newspapers and would be able to find this account. 

This detail is very useful in establishing a kind of 'optimistic' maximum speed.

I know that in her early days (i.e. in 1923) SS Camlough and her sister ship SS Corteen were two of the four ships who undertook the Strawberry Run between Brittany and Plymouth, carrying the earliest French fruit to the British market (I am given to understand that special trains were waiting to distribute the fruit from the port). So at least when new, she was capable of not just 'coaster' travel but also crossing the channel for this particular seasonal cargo.

It's my understanding that as the depression deepened and extended, it was the regular coal contracts which helped Kelly's to survive when some shipping firms without such steady contracts went out of business.


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## oldgoat1947 (Apr 5, 2018)

From all the info provided so far on this thread it would seem that the Vessel designed to do 11 knots. Probably achieved this new on sea trials. Would probably be running commercially at 9 knots loaded after a few years wear say 8 knots. In ballast maybe another 1/2 knot best. Going back to your original question I would estimate she made 8 to 8,1/2 knots initially in good weather before stopping, drifting, and then limping back at reduced power. Hope this helps .


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## Nswstar2 (Feb 9, 2018)

*Camlough's speed - the Developing Story*



oldgoat1947 said:


> From all the info provided so far on this thread it would seem that the Vessel designed to do 11 knots. Probably achieved this new on sea trials. Would probably be running commercially at 9 knots loaded after a few years wear say 8 knots. In ballast maybe another 1/2 knot best. Going back to your original question I would estimate she made 8 to 8,1/2 knots initially in good weather before stopping, drifting, and then limping back at reduced power. Hope this helps .


This is very helpful information, confirming what I was coming to understand about Camlough's last disastrous voyage. 

Although there was no mention of sea trials in the press, the assumptions about Camlough's top speed when new would also have been made on the basis of the observed performance of her three sister ships (Camlough being the last of four ships to be completed by Simons' yard).

That estimate of 8 knots (plus a notional half knot for running light in ballast) is very helpful, indeed. 

From the chief engineer's quoted comments, she was able to achieve about four knots for four hours of 'making good headway' on her attempt to run for home port until the force of the winds greatly increased.

At a speed of 8.5 knots, the 'Sea-Distances.org' website estimates the running time for a Belfast to Birkenhead trip of 16 hours (add an hour to this, if it was at 8 knots).

So to modern eyes, and most importantly with 20/20 hindsight, Captain Harvey's decision to try to limp for home with reduced engine power seems a very bad miscalculation. 

Camlough had been travelling over 13 hours at the time of the initial engine problem - so was perhaps only three or four hours' normal travel time from Birkenhead at the point where the engine trouble happened. By heading towards Belfast, Camlough also seems to have been actually running <into> the storm, and her rate of travel may have been affected sooner than would have happened if she'd continued on in the opposite direction towards her original destination of Birkenhead. So the irony is that even running on much-reduced engine power, it seems that Camlough might well have managed to limp into Birkenhead under her own steam. Or alternatively, if the increasing ferocity of the storm had become apparent just that bit sooner, the captain could have chosen to limp to safety in Douglas harbour on the Isle of Man.

Of course it's clear that the Captain (and also the chief engineer who would have agreed to the decision to run for home) had NO idea that they were running into such a serious storm.

Aside from taking barometer readings, and looking at the sky, they would have had no reason to assume that the 'freshening' wind was going to rise to gale/hurricane force when they reversed their course and headed back towards Belfast (and indeed, the chief engineer seemed happy with their progress for the first few hours, 'in spite of the increasing gale').

I'm guessing that the Captain would have had to do some serious talking to the ship's owners as they stood by the stranded/wrecked vessel. He would have to convince them that the weather conditions were okay at the time he made the decision which turned out so badly, and that they didn't worsen seriously until it was too late to head for safety in Douglas harbour (where, unlike Birkenhead, it might not have been possible to repair the engine properly). He would have been trying to save the company money by heading back to Belfast, but in the event, his decision led to the loss of the ship.

What a scary situation, in those days with no radio and none of the modern weather data that we have come to rely on!


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## Monreith Boy (Mar 17, 2018)

oldgoat1947 said:


> From all the info provided so far on this thread it would seem that the Vessel designed to do 11 knots. Probably achieved this new on sea trials. Would probably be running commercially at 9 knots loaded after a few years wear say 8 knots. In ballast maybe another 1/2 knot best. Going back to your original question I would estimate she made 8 to 8,1/2 knots initially in good weather before stopping, drifting, and then limping back at reduced power. Hope this helps .


It would be a good enough guess in normal cir***stances, but not at all in this case. You have been denied much useful information which would have helped you reach a more realistic conclusion as far as the Camlough is concerned.

The first crucial point you need to consider is that when the first breakdown occurred Camlough was confidently stated to be 15 miles from the I.O.M. The speeds you suggest place her twice that distance from the I.O.M., far too wide a margin to come anywhere close to being within the range of probability.

Secondly, we also know that the Captain made a decision to return to Belfast, following attempted repairs. We also know to within reasonable limits the final position she reached on her reciprocal course , before she finally lost all power. We also have a position for the point where the Moyalla first made contact late the following morning. These two points are acceptably close together, when we take into account that Camlough had been adrift and without power in a gale for approx 4 hours before Moyalla appeared.

Crucially, we also know how long the Camlough was under way, (10hours) before the final loss of all power, and we have a good estimate of the speed Camlough was making following the first repair attempt. (4 knots). She thus covered approx 40 miles on her reciprocal course. Had she achieved 8 knots on her outward bound journey, her final loss of all power would have placed her close to the Chickens on her ill-fated attempt to return to Belfast. She was nowhere near the Chickens when she was finally disabled.

And incidentally, there is no evidence whatsoever that a second engine failure occurred. There IS clear evidence that the crowns of both port and starboard furnaces failed, leading to a loss of all steam., without which the engine could not function.

Nor is there any evidence that the ship was unable to maintain 4 knots throughout the night. On the early part of her return journey she was heading west into the teeth of the gale, and the Chief Engineer claims she made 15 miles in 4 hours. On this part of the journey she was shipping heavy seas at both bow and stern, ( not on the port side as claimed elsewhere.) After turning north at the Chickens, she WAS taking heavy seas on her port side, and at one point in the early hours of Wednesday, was claimed to be within 1 mile of rocks to STBD, probably Bradda Head. Calculating her progress northwards, it seems very probable that she did in fact maintain her suggested speed of 4 knots, or even slightly exceed it, after she turned away from the teeth of the gale at the Chickens.

And finally, a most crucial omission. The situation which faced the engineers when they attempted to first address the engine problem has been described, (engine room full of steam, could not see to read the water gauges.) but fails to mention one very crucial factor. The Chief Engineer claims they were, 'up to their knees in water' Where did it come from? Even allowing for some exaggeration, there was clearly a large quantity of water in the engine room. The storm had not yet struck, so they were not shipping water. This aspect has been completely ignored to date, and it seems to me, a non mariner, and although an experienced engineer, NOT an expert on steam engines, that it is a factor which is crying out for advice from someone who has relevant knowledge, especially when we consider that it appears that, although the engine was quickly fixed to the extent that it could be restarted, the engineers were NOT successful in eliminating the continued loss of steam (and water?) During the night that would follow, the engine room was stated to be 'still full of steam' and the engine had to be stopped to try to get more water into the boiler. That this was ultimately unsuccessful, is surely evident by the subsequent failure of the port and stbd furnace crowns


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## eddyw (Nov 6, 2007)

As well as engine power available, speed over the ground would depend heavily on strength and direction of the wind and tidal flows especially as initially she was only able to make est. 4 knots in the water . As she was 'in ballast' the efficiency of the propellor might be compromised if there was insufficient immersion with the added effect of pitching in heavy seas. Similarly the effect of the gale and heavy seas on her progress would be more pronounced given her light draught and additional exposed area of the hull especially if she was making leeway and had to carry helm to compensate.


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## Nswstar2 (Feb 9, 2018)

*Travelling Light in Heavy Seas*



eddyw said:


> As well as engine power available, speed over the ground would depend heavily on strength and direction of the wind and tidal flows especially as initially she was only able to make est. 4 knots in the water . As she was 'in ballast' the efficiency of the propeller might be compromised if there was insufficient immersion with the added effect of pitching in heavy seas. Similarly the effect of the gale and heavy seas on her progress would be more pronounced given her light draught and additional exposed area of the hull especially if she was making leeway and had to carry helm to compensate.


Thanks for this exploration of issues for 'travelling light' in heavy seas.


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## Monreith Boy (Mar 17, 2018)

(@)


eddyw said:


> As well as engine power available, speed over the ground would depend heavily on strength and direction of the wind and tidal flows especially as initially she was only able to make est. 4 knots in the water . As she was 'in ballast' the efficiency of the propellor might be compromised if there was insufficient immersion with the added effect of pitching in heavy seas. Similarly the effect of the gale and heavy seas on her progress would be more pronounced given her light draught and additional exposed area of the hull especially if she was making leeway and had to carry helm to compensate.


All very valid points, eddyw. The best clues we have as to her speed on the return journey are from the Chief Engineer, who claims that in the early part of that journey she covered 15 miles in 4 hours. At this time she was heading generally westerly, into the gathering gale. Once she turned northwards at the Chickens, the seas were generally from the port side, so it seems likely she was making some leeway on to the I.O.M. shore, where shortly after making her turn northwards, she came briefly much closer to shore that would have been expected from her general heading. Thereafter, she seems to have made pretty good progress, all things considered, as we have decent estimates of the most northerly position she reached under her own steam, as well as her position when the Moyalla appeared on the scene, some hours later, to try to take her in tow. From those known details it would suggest she achieved just under 4 knots en route to the Chickens, and perhaps just a little over 4 knots as she moved northwards.


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## david freeman (Jan 26, 2006)

*specifications*



Monreith Boy said:


> It would be a good enough guess in normal cir***stances, but not at all in this case. You have been denied much useful information which would have helped you reach a more realistic conclusion as far as the Camlough is concerned.
> 
> The first crucial point you need to consider is that when the first breakdown occurred Camlough was confidently stated to be 15 miles from the I.O.M. The speeds you suggest place her twice that distance from the I.O.M., far too wide a margin to come anywhere close to being within the range of probability.
> 
> ...


This saga is slightly disturbing, and I wish to salute the deep sea fishing industry of Hull, Grimsby and Fleetwood: Here steam trawlers 180 feet long in the early 1970's had a single scotch boiler, a triple expansion steam expansion engine working sometimes on superheat and bauw wauk exhaust turbines. The engineers were men licenced by the federation of trawler owners insurance, and then the key was the superintendents who if the trawler got into trouble on its 28 day fishing trip in the North Atlantic, Artic and white sea fishing grounds
had to advise the ships engineers on possible difficult technical problems of an emergency repair. [ if total loss of power the trawler would have been towed to the nearest safe port]. These boilers were salt water feed, so these trawler engineers were men of immense confidence and practical ability. A great credit to the deep sea fishing industry, and a credit to how the industry was run.

The above story of the ss Camlough suggested a multi boiler ship, and and story of Main Engine Mechancial failure, the story does not question or take into consideration how the ship was powered and designed. The then [1932] Home Trade engineers were most probably not certificated or Licenced, so one is left with a suspicion of the financial viabilty of the voyage, and maybe the engineers and ship crew were blameless.


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