# Findings EL FARO Sailed Within Close Proximity to Hurricane Joaquin*



## Geoff Gower (Sep 8, 2011)

TOTE did not ensure the safety of marine operations and failed to provide shore side nautical operations supports to its vessels.*
TOTE did not identify heavy weather as a risk in the Safety Management System (SMS) and the Coast Guard had not exercised its flag state authority to require identification of specific risks.*
TOTE and the Master did not adequately identify the risk of heavy weather when preparing, evaluating, and approving the voyage plan prior to departure on the accident voyage.*
TOTE and the Master and ship’s officers were not aware of vessel vulnerabilities and operating limitations in heavy weather conditions.*
TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations. The Master and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions.*
TOTE did not provide adequate support and oversight to the crew of EL FARO during the accident voyage.*
The National Hurricane Center (NHC) created and distributed tropical weather forecasts for Tropical Storm and Hurricane Joaquin, which in later analysis proved to be inaccurate. Applied Weather Technologies used these inaccurate forecasts to create the Bon Voyage System (BVS) weather packages.*
The Master and deck officers were not aware of the inherent latency in the BVS data when compared to the NHC forecasts. Additionally, the Master and deck officers were not aware that they received one BVS data package with a redundant hurricane trackline.*
The Master and deck officers relied primarily on graphical BVS weather forecasts rather than the most current NHC data received via SAT-C. EL FARO crew did not take advantage of BVS’s tropical update feature and the ability to send BVS weather information directly to the bridge.*
The Master did not effectively integrate the use of Bridge Resource Management techniques during the accident voyage. Furthermore, the Master of EL FARO did not order a reduction in the speed or consider the limitations of the engineering plant as EL FARO converged on a rapidly intensifying hurricane. This resulted in loss of propulsion, cargo shifting and flooding.*
The Master of EL FARO failed to carry out his responsibilities and duties as Captain of the vessel between 8:00 PM on September 30 and 4:00 AM on October 1, 2015. Notably, the Master failed to download the 11:00 PM BVS data package, and failed to act on reports from the 3/M and 2/M regarding the increased severity and narrowing of the closest point of approach to Hurricane Joaquin, and the suggested course changes to the south to increase their distance from the hurricane.*
The ***ulative effects of anxiety, fatigue, and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the accident voyage.*


----------



## 5036 (Jan 23, 2006)

I am surprised that nothing is made of the fact that the ship was forty years old, a hangover from the Jones Act.


----------



## Alistair Macnab (May 13, 2008)

*El Faro...*

I have written before about the unfortunate effects of ship operational subsidies brought about by the U.S. "Jones Act". The entire world is aware that government subsidized lines never work no matter what country is involved, and the USA as a world-leader in many things, should be ashamed of their destruction of their formerly brilliant Merchant Marine.

With respect to the "El Faro" however, the problem is two-fold. The operational subsidy given automatically to a problematic company that was able to pick up the pieces and equipment of a failed predecessor plus the fact that the ship in question had been cut up and added to over many years until everyone had lost sight of her growing limitations (and I include ABS is this) just to keep the Puerto Rico connection in place, is a terrible comment on government interference and ignorance in maritime matters. It's not just the operators of the ship but it is the responsibility of the Congressmen, Senators, and Maritime Commission to ensure that an UNSEAWORTHY ship was not employed in the first place. Yes, UNSEAWORTHY!

How sad! How tragic for the seafarers that went down with the ship and their families who grieve for them. No doubt TOTE will hide behind government and quasi-government excuses! Scandalous!


----------



## John Dryden (Sep 26, 2009)

I think operational subsidy is,as we know, down to the ports involved surely.


----------



## Alistair Macnab (May 13, 2008)

*El Faro - Operational Subsidy...*

John...
Operational subsidies are provided by the federal government to ensure that American, as opposed to foreign, ships and operators through the 1936 Shipping Act. This means that coastal sea traffic is carried by ships built, owned, operated and manned by American entities. This mandate covers America's services to off-shore dependencies, like Puerto Rico. the American Virgin Isles, American Samoa, Hawa'ai, and the American Marshall Islands, and any port-to-port mainland carriage, all part of the definition of "Cabotage".

The problem is that these trades are hardly profitable and would run at a loss using American cabotage ships so the subsidy is necessary if services are to be provided at all. Puerto Rico is a particularly difficult trade and has attracted all sorts of ship types ro-ros,deck ships,hull cut-outs to open tween decks to lower tonnage measures, double deckers,towed barges, and so on. El Faro, as a case in point, was altered many times to reflect the system du jour as it has passed through several 'owners' and has even been on the Alaska run at one time over her 40 years.

One of the truly responsible carriers has been Matson which has actually built new innovative ships for the Hawa'ai service, and in a way, Pasha, on the same trade although mostly for ro-ro vehicle traffic.

Any port operational subsidies are limited to special berthing rebates or perhaps special stevedoring rates to encourage a carrier to use a particular port. This might also include reserved berths, entering, or leaving a port with some form of priority. Compulsory pilotage may possibly be waived with experienced Masters. There are several ways that a port can favour a regular customer.

Sorry to put my lecturing hat on!


----------



## John Dryden (Sep 26, 2009)

Thanks for the education Alistair,sounds like diplomacy was a skill you must have had being a superintendent for Bank line in the USA.


----------



## MikeGDH (May 10, 2014)

A little more info on this tragedy....


https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/04/inside-el-faro-the-worst-us-maritime-disaster-in-decades

Mike


----------

